ALVMNVS  BOOK  FVND 


—  —   ^-»  ^ 


-f  ^_^ 


A  CRITICAL  HISTORY  OF 

PHILOSOPHICAL 
THEORIES 

AARON  SCHUYLER 


RICHARD  G.  BADGER 

THE  GORHAM  PRESS 
BOSTON 


Copyright,  1913,  by  Richard  G.  Badger. 
All  rights  reserved 


£4 


\ 


The  Gorham  Press,  Boston,  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 

Philosophy  is  the  result  obtained  by  the  employment  of 
reason  in  the  discovery  of  those  fundamental  principles  that 
^  give  unity  and  harmony  to  knowledge.  It  seeks  to  reduce 
complexity  to  simplicity,  and  multiplicity  to  unity,  and  to  find 
the  ultimate  reality.  Facts  acquired  by  observation  are  ex- 
plained by  reason. 

The  history  of  philosophy  is  the  record  of  these  speculations 
and  their  results.  A  critical  history  of  philosophy  is  a  dis- 
criminating examination  of  the  theories  of  the  philosophers 
of  the  various  schools,  in  order  to  test  and  confirm  their  truth, 
to  expose  their  errors,  to  trace  the  relations  of  the  different 
systems,  the  conflict  of  their  principles,  the  occasions  of  their 
appearance,  and  the  order  of  their  development. 

To  understand  the  principles  maintained  by  the  philoso- 
phers of  the  various  schools,  the  conflict  of  their  principles, 
the  reasons  for  their  theories,  and  the  connection  of  the  various 
systems,  is  to  understand  philosophy  itself.  The  phenome- 
nal world  is  the  product  of  two  factors — the  external  world  and 
the  human  mind;  philosophy  deals  with  both. 

Uncritical  thought  accepts  appearance  as  the  sole  reality. 
Science  classifies  phenomena  and  determines  their  laws,  while 
philosophy  attempts  to  find  a  rational  explanation  of  phe- 
nomena as  facts  of  experience.  That  is,  Science  treats  of 
phenomena  and  their  laws,  while  philosophy  seeks  for  causes 
and  the  rational  explanation  of  phenomena.  Nothing  can  be 
more  interesting  or  more  stimulating  to  thought  than  the 
study  of  the  relations  of  philosophy  and  science. 

It  will  be  found  that  no  system  of  philosophy  is  without 
some  merit,  though  it  may  be  only  a  crude  beginning,  or  a 
one-sided  attempt  to  give  an  account  of  the  mystery  of  ex- 
istence. Broad  views  are  requisite,  if  we  wish  to  avoid  the 
errors  of  all  partial  or  incomplete  systems. 

As  the  mission  of  philosophy  is  to  give  a  rational  explanation 
of  the  phenomenal,  it  cannot,  therefore,  disregard  the  facts  of 
experience,  and  still  be  true  to  its  calling.  On  the  other  hand, 
to  deal  exclusively  with  phenomena,  discarding  the  necessary 
principles  which  afford  their  rational  explanation,  is  to  aban- 
don the  guide  of  reason,  or  to  resolve  it  into  transformed  sen- 
sation. 

Herein  is  revealed  the  chief  conflict  in  philosophy,  as  it 
exists  between  the  empirical  and  rational  schools.  To 

333957 


PREFACE 

neglect  facts  is  to  lose  sight  of  that  which  is  to  be  explained;  to 
discard  necessary  principles  is  to  miss  their  true  explanation. 
Either  course  is  one-sided  and  doomed  to  failure.  True  phil- 
osophy is  a  combination  of  the  two  methods — the  observation 
of  phenomena,  and  their  explanation  by  the  aid  of  rational 
principles. 

No  study  is  more  interesting  than  that  of  the  theories  and 
speculations  of  philosophers.  These  theories  will  pass  in  re- 
view in  the  course  of  this  treatise,  and  their  truth  or  falsity 
will  be  critically  and  candidly  examined.  If  the  reader  will 
study  these  investigations,  neither  in  a  partisan  spirit,  nor  in 
the  temper  of  controversy,  he  will  not  fail  of  his  reward.  The 
distinction  between  things  and  ideas  accords  with  the  un- 
biased good  sense  of  mankind. 

The  proper  attitude  of  a  philosopher  is  not  that  of  a  disciple 
of  a  great  master,  nor  that  of  an  advocate  of  a  certain  school 
of  philosophy,  but  that  of  an  independent  thinker,  and  as 
such  he  will  confer  a  benefit  on  other  thinkers,  not  because  of 
agreement,  but  rather  because  of  divergence,  and  on  that  ac- 
count his  investigations  will  receive  a  more  hearty  welcome. 
Philosophy  is  the  love  of  wisdom. 


CONTENTS 
CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     The  Milesian  School 9 

II.     The  Eleatic  School 13 

III.  Heraclitus  and  Pythagoras 18 

IV.  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras,  the  Atomists. ...  23 
V.     The  Sophists 32 

VI.     Socrates  and  Immediate  Successors 42 

VII.    ^Piato 53 

VIII.     Aristotle 63 

IX.     The  Epicurean  and  Stoic  Schools 71 

X.     Skepticism  in  Philosophy 82 

XI.  Eclecticism,  Neo-Platonism,  Gnosticism.  .  .  96 

XII.     Patristic  Philosophy 107 

XIII.  Scholastic  Philosophy— First  Period 117 

XIV.  Scholastic  Philosophy— Second  Period 127 

XV.     Transition  to  Modern  Philosophy 142 

XVI.     Modern  Philosophy— Cartesian 158 

XVII.     Modern  Philosophy — Metaphysical .' 172 

XVIII.     Modern  Philosophy— English 188 

XIX.     Berkeley  and  Hume 208 

XX.     Kant 227 

XXI.     Fichte,  Jacobi,  Schelling 250 

XXII.    Hegel 267 

XXIII.  Herbart,  ScliopenhauerrHartmann 280 

XXIV.  Reid,  Stewart,  Brown 293 

XXV.     Hamilton,  Ferrier,  McCosh.  .  , 304 

XXVI.  Associational  and  Empirical  Philosophy. . .  321 

XXVII.  Associational    and    Empirical    Philosophy, 

(continued) 339 

XXVIII.     French  Enlightenment  Philosophy 351 

XXIX.     Reaction,  Eclecticism,  Positivism 367 

XXX.     Later  German  Philosophy 383 

XXXI.     Philosophy  of  Evolution 402 


^ 


A  CRITICAL  HISTORY 

OF 
PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 


A  CRITICAL  HISTORY  OF 
PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Milesian  School 

The  Milesian  School  of  Philosophy  received  its  name  from 
Miletus,  the  city  of  its  chief  philosophers — Thales,  Anaxi- 
mander  and  Anaximines.  The  term  Ionic  Philosophy  is  often 
applied  to  the  Milesian  School;  but  this  term  is  too  generic 
as  it  would  include  the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus,  which  is  dis- 
tinct from  that  of  the  Milesian  School,  though  the  two  are 
species  of  the  same  genus.  The  term  Milesian  School  is, 
therefore,  specifically  what  is  needed. 

1.  Thales  (640-548  B.  C.)— Thales  of  Miletus  was  the  first 
of  the  Milesian  Philosophers,  and,  in  fact,  he  was  the  first 
Greek  philosopher.  Standing  by  common  consent,  at  the 
head  of  the  seven  wise  men  of  Greece,  the  leader  in  philosophic 
speculation,  noted  for  his  mathematical,  astronomical  and 
scientific  attainments,  and  for  his  practical  sagacity  and  po- 
litical influence,  he  is  to  be  regarded  as  no  ordinary  man. 

It  is  said  that  Thales  predicted  the  solar  eclipse  which  oc- 
curred, according  to  the  Julian  calendar,  May  28,  585  B.  C. 
The  probability,  however,  is  that  he  only  explained  the  cause 
of  the  eclipse  after  its  occurrence.  As  a  civil  engineer,  he 
superintended  the  changing  of  the  course  of  the  river  Halys, 
by  order  of  Croesus.  His  political  influence  is  seen  in  that  he 
dissuaded  the  Milesians  from  allying  themselves  with  Croesus 
against  Cyrus. 

In  opposition  to  the  poets  who  explained  the  phenomena 
of  the  world  by  the  intervention  of  mythical  divinities,  Thales 
sought  for  the  principle  of  things  in  nature  itself.  He  was, 
therefore,  a  natural  philosopher.  He  found  the  ultimately 
.real,  the  principle  of  the  universe,  in  water,  which  he  supposed 
/to  be  endowed  with  life  and  motion.  The  important  part 
which  water  evidently  plays  in  the  economy  of  nature,  no 
doubt,  confirmed  him  in  this  opinion.  The  first  principle 
4  "PX1?*  is  that  from  which  all  things  are  generated. 

It  is  not  probable,  as  Aristotle  conjectured,  that  Thales  was 

0 


1&  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

led  to  this  view  by  the  old  mythological  notion  of  the  poets, 
Homer  and  Hesiod,  who  had  ascribed  the  origin  of  all  things 
to  Oceanus  and  Tithys,  or  because  the  gods  swear  by  water, 
for  his  whole  proceeding  is  in  opposition  to  mythology.  His 
theory  was  based  on  the  observation  of  facts;  but  that  water 
is  the  principle  of  things,  that  it  is  the  living  and  life-giving 
principle,  affording  by  its  motions,  its  modifications,  its  thick- 
ening and  thinning,  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  count- 
less phenomena  of  nature,  cannot,  for  a  moment,  be  enter- 
tained, though  it  plays  no  unimportant  part. 

How  then  can  the  theory  of  Thales  be  regarded  as  philo- 
sophical? Not  because  it  gave  a  true  explanation  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  nature,  but  because  of  its  right  methods,  in  dis- 
carding the  mythical,  and  in  seeking  a  natural  explanation 
of  things,  and  because  of  its  aim  in  attempting  to  reduce  mul- 
tiplicity to  unity  and  complexity  to  simplicity.  The  spirit 
of  the  theory  of  Thales  is  truly  philosophical;  for  philosophy 
is  the  employment  of  reason  in  the  discovery  of  those  funda- 
mental principles  which  give  unity  and  harmony  to  thought. 
It  goes  back  of  phenomena  to  their  conditions  and  cause. 
Science  classifies  phenomena,  names  and  defines  the  classes, 
and  discovers  and  verifies  the  laws  according  to  which  the 
phenomena  occur. 

2.  Anaximander  (610-547.) — Anaximander  lived  at  Mi- 
letus, and  was  contemporary  with  Thales,  though  younger. 
He  was  a  profound  and  influential  thinker,  pre-eminent  for 
his  geographical,  mathematical,  and  astronomical  knowledge. 

Believing  that  water,  the  principle  of  Thales,  is  too  deter- 
minate, since  any  definite  form  requires  explanation,  Anaxi- 
mander conceiving  that  the  ground  of  all  things  must  itself 
be  without  form,  yet  boundless,  and  thus  permitting  the  sep- 
aration from  itself  of  any  form,  or  even  opposite  forms,  as- 
sumed i?  <wri»  the  origin,  first  principle,  or  essence  of  things 
to  be  TO  mrfipov,  the  infinite,  unlimited,  unbounded,  or 
indeterminate.  The  TO  aTreipov  cannot,  however,  be  pure 
unbounded  space,  which  cannot  be  the  origin  of  any  thing;  it 
must,  therefore,  be  unbounded  substance,  analogous  to  ether, 
from  which  opposite  elements,  as  hot  and  cold,  moist  and  dry, 
are  separated  in  the  work  of  creation. 

The  apx*?>  or  original  essence,  Anaximander  probably 
held  to  be  formless  matter,  as  distinct  from  particular 


THE  MILESIAN  SCHOOL  11 

kinds  of  matter.  It  must  be  indeterminate,  unbounded  sub- 
stance, TO  ttTreipoi/,  original,  uncreated  and  eternal,  not  ex- 
hausted in  the  production  of  the  universe.  To  assume  it 
produced  by  something  back  of  itself,  would  be  to  assume  the 
first  principle  not  the  first,  which  is  a  contradiction. 

It  is  evident  that  if  we  assume  this  first  principle  to  be 
spirit,  instead  of  matter,  and  endowed  with  intelligence  and 
will,  we  have  the  God  of  Theism. 

Anaximander  held  that  after  the  universe  has  run  its  course, 
it  will  collapse  and  return  to  its  former  nebular  condition, 
which  will  develop,  as  in  the  past,  and  so  on,  over  and  over 
again,  an  eternal  repetend. 

The  &pxn>  or  TO  owrapov,  of  Anaximander,  is  the  equiv- 
alent of  the  one  substance  of  Spinoza,  which  he  called  Deus 
vel  Natura.  The  evolution  of  the  dpxv  anticipated,  by  two 
thousand  years,  the  nebular  hypothesis  of  Kant  and  La  Place. 

As  a  thinker,  Anaximander  was  the  most  profound  of  the 
Milesian  Philosophers.  He  sought  for  the  foundation  of 
things,  which  was  itself  without  foundation,  and  therefore 
original  and  eternal.  It  is  evident  that  something,  other  than 
space  and  time,  must  be  original  and  eternal,  otherwise  there 
never  would  have  been  any  other  reality,  save  space  and  time 
themselves. 

3.  Anaximines  (588-524 .) — Anaximines  rejected  water,  the 
principle    of  Thales,    as   too   determinate,   also   TO   aTrapov, 
the  principle  of  Anaximander  as  too  indeterminate,  and  as- 
sumed air  as  the  first  principle.     His  system  may,  therefore, 
be  regarded  as  a  compromise  between    the    philosophy  of 
Thales  and  that  of  Anaximander. 

Anaximines  held  that  by  rarification  air  became  fire,  and 
by  condensation  wind,  clouds,  water,  rocks,  metals.  He  con- 
sidered air  to  be  the  substance  of  mind  or  spirit,  as  indicated 
by  such  words  as  ^x7?*  w^v/ia.  The  earth  he  believed  to 
be  a  great  circle,  having  thickness  or  depth,  floating  on  the 
air.  The  thesis  of  Thales  and  the  antitheses  of  Anaximander 
were  thus  combined  in  the  synthesis  of  Anaximines.  If  water 
is  too  definite,  air  is  so  too,  only  perhaps,  in  a  less  degree. 

4.  Diogenes  of  Apollonia  (478-428.) — Though  not  a  Mi- 
lesian, as  to  residence,  Diogenes  accepted  Air,  the  principle 
of  Anaximines,  as  the  first  principle,  and  held  it  to  be  intelli- 
gent; but  this  is  implicit  in  the  view  of  Anaximines,  that  air 


12  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

is  the  substance  of  mind  or  spirit.  The  assignment  of  intelli- 
gence to  air,  a  material  substance,  conflicts  with  the  later 
theory  of  Anaxagoras,  that  Novs,  or  spirit,  is  the  first  principle 
or  originator  of  all  other  things.  Here  we  see  the  beginning 
of  a  conflict  continued  to  the  present  day,  between  Spiritual- 
ism and  Materialism. 

5.  Remarks  on  the  Milesian  School.  1.  The  Milesian 
philosophy  discarded  the  mythical  explanation  of  phenomena 
in  favor  of  the  natural.  Its  point  of  departure  was  physical, 
and  its  philosophers  were  natural  philosophers.  2.  Neither 
water,  the  principle  of  Thales,  nor  air,  that  of  Anaximines, 
can  be  regarded  as  the  first  principle;  for  they  are  too  deter- 
minate, and  need  to  be  accounted  for.  The  principle,  TO 
airupov,  of  Anaximander,  rests  on  higher  ground, 
though  it  was  not  necessary  to  assume  it  material,  which 
Anaximander  did.  He  might  as  well  have  assumed  it  Notk, 
that  is  Mind  or  Spirit,  as  Anaxagoras  afterwards  did,  or  left 
the  alternative  between  matter  and  spirit  to  be  decided  later, 
according  to  which  one  would  best  explain  the  phenomena. 
3.  The  Milesian  philosophy  is  truly  philosophical  in  aim, 
though  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  found  the  real 
first  principle.  4.  It  has  great  interest  as  the  beginning  of 
philosophy. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Eleatic  School 

The  philosophers  of  this  school  were  Xenophanes,  Parmen- 
ides,  and  Zeno.  Melissus  of  Samos  was  an  adherent  and 
supporter  of  this  school,  though  not  an  original  philosopher. 

1.  Xenophanes  (circ.  572-480.) — Xenophanes,  the  founder 
of  the  Eleatic  philosophy,  was  a  native  of  Colophon,  a  city  of 
Ionia,  in  Asia  Minor.  In  consequence  of  the  Persian  con- 
quest of  Ionia,  Xenophanes  left  Colophon,  and  traveled  as  a 
poet  and  a  rhapsodist  through  the  cities  of  Greece,  and  finally 
settled  hi  Elea,  a  city  in  Southern  Italy.  From  Elea  this 
school  of  philosophy  derived  its  name. 

Xenophanes  held  that  "there  is  one  God  supreme  among 
gods  and  men,  resembling  mortals  neither  in  form  nor  in 
mind."  Accordingly  he  sharply  criticised  the  prevailing 
anthropomorphic  conception  of  the  gods,  who  in  popular 
mythology,  as  hi  the  poetry  of  Homer  and  Hesiod,  were  rep- 
resented in  the  likeness  of  men,  and  characterized  by  human 
faults,  and  were  guilty  of  base  immoralities.  He  said,  in 
ridicule  of  this  view:  "If  oxen  and  lions  could  paint,  they 
would  make  the  pictures  of  their  gods  hi  their  likeness — horses 
would  make  them  like  horses,  oxen  like  oxen. "  He  said,  in 
fact:  " ^Ethiopians  make  their  gods  black  and  snub-nosed; 
Thracians  give  them  blue  eyes  and  red  hair. " 

Xenophanes  was  not  an  Atheist,  for  he  speaks  of  the  one 
supreme  God;  he  was  not  a  Polytheist,  for  he  considered  the 
other  so-called  gods,  mythical.  He  was  a  Pantheist,  since  he 
denied  the  plurality  of  gods,  and  affirmed  that  the  universe, 
not  the  phenomenal  universe  but  the  unchangeable,  essential 
universe,  is  itself  the  Divine  Being.  He  condemned  the  cus- 
tom of  exalting  the  physical  qualities  of  men,  as  strength  and 
agility,  above  their  intellectual  and  moral  attainments,  as  is 
done,  when  in  public  assemblies,  the  victor  in  athletic  games, 
the  boxer,  the  wrestler,  the  runner,is  assigned  the  seat  of  honor 
above  the  philosopher  or  public  benefactor. 

IS 


14  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Xenophanes  held  that  philosophy  is  reasonable  opinion, 
only  probability,  rather  than  certain  knowledge.  In  common 
with  all  the  Eleatic  philosophers,  his  thoughts  were  concerned 
with  the  antitheses,  being  and  not-being,  the  one  and  the 
many,  the  permanent  and  the  changeable,  the  universal  and 
the  particular,  assigning  reality  to  being,  the  one,  the  perma- 
nent, the  universal,  and  denying  it  to  not-being,  the  many, 
the  changeable,  the  particular. 

Greater  importance  was  assigned  to  the  principles  of  reason 
than  to  the  deliverances  of  the  senses;  hence  the  Eleatic  phil- 
osophy is  dialectical,  logical,  metaphysical,  rather  than  sen- 
sational and  empirical. 

Xenophanes  held  to  the  truth  of  the  axiom:  Ex  nihil 
nihil  fit,  regarding  it  as  self-evident  that  nonentity  has  no 
power  of  generation,  which  is  an  incontrovertible  truth.  He 
maintained  that  being,  in  the  sense  of  unchangeable  substance, 
is  the  principle  of  the  universe,  the  ultimately  real,  and  that 
change  is  not-being,  the  unreal.  As  being  is  unchanging 
substance,  void  space  is  not  being,  is  in  fact,  inconceivable  and 
impossible. 

Xenophanes  also  held  that  whatever  be  the  apparent 
changes  in  the  phenomenal  world,  the  one,  the  permanent, 
the  unchangeable  unity,  is  the  only  real,  the  essential  universe, 
the  principle  of  all  things,  the  ultimate  and  the  absolute  being, 
the  same  from  everlasting  to  everlasting.  This  view,  changed 
from  the  pantheistic  to  the  theistic  conception,  expresses  the 
highest  Christian  thought  of  the  present  day.  Theism  holds 
that  God  is  the  ground  of  the  universe,  though  distinguishable 
from  it,  while  pantheism  maintains  that  the  universe  itself  is 
God  in  the  unity  of  its  essential  being. 

The  ultimate  reality  is,  without  doubt,  unchangeable  in  its 
essence,  though  it  is  not  inactive,  since  it  is  the  eternal  First 
Cause  whose  energy  produced  the  universe.  The  phenomenal 
though  changeable,  cannot  be  regarded  as  non-existent;  for 
if  non-existent  it  could  not  change.  The  Eleatic  philosophy 
failed  to  explain  change,  and,  therefore,  denied  its  reality,  but 
the  fact  of  change  is  not  disproved  by  its  denial. 

2.  Parmenides  (cir.  520-440.) — Parmenides,  the  most  re- 
nowned of  the  philosophers  of  the  Eleatic  school,  was  held  in 
high  esteem  by  Plato,  and  greatly  venerated  by  the  thinkers 
of  antiquity.  He  may  be  regarded  as  the  metaphysician  of 


THE  ELEATIC  SCHOOL  15 

the  Eleatic  School.  Unchangeable  being,  the  one  only  reality 
which  to  the  mind  of  Xenophanes,  was  a  poetic  conception, 
became  to  the  mind  of  Parmenides,  a  necessary  truth  appre- 
hended by  reason. 

Parmenides,  therefore,  dwelt  on  the  distinction  between 
being  and  not-being,  regarding  it  as  self-evident  that  being 
is  the  true,  the  permanent,  the  unchangeable,  the  immutable, 
the  principle,  not  simply  pictured  by  the  imagination,  but  ap- 
prehended, at  once,  by  the  reason  as  the  necessary  reality, 
while  not-being  is  apprehended  as  the  false,  the  transitory, 
the  changeable,  the  mutable,  the  unreal.  The  phenomenal, 
however,  is  not  refuted  by  its  denial.  It  is  the  business  of 
philosophy  to  account  for  the  phenomenal,  not  to  deny  its 
reality. 

The  philosophy  of  Parmenides  is  known  from  his  poem 
"Concerning  Nature,"  a  fragment  of  which  has  been  pre- 
served. The  poem  consists  of  two  parts,  the  first  "  Concern- 
ing Truth/'  the  second  "Relating  to  Opinion." 

Parmenides  represents  himself  as  going  in  pursuit  of  truth 
in  a  chariot  drawn  by  impetuous  horses,  symbols  of  the  pas- 
sions, escorted  by  the  nymphs  of  the  sun,  symbols  of  the  senses. 
At  length  he  reaches  two  gates  where  the  goddess  of  justice 
and  truth  stood  with  keys  and  opened  the  gates,  the  one  the 
entrance  to  the  path  of  light,  the  other  to  that  of  darkness. 
The  first  path  is  the  way  of  reason  leading  to  truth,  to  being, 
the  constant,  the  real;  the  second  path  is  the  way  of  the  senses 
leading  to  falsehood,  to  not-being,  the  variable,  the  unreal,  the 
non-existent. 

It  is  right  here  that  the  philosophy  of  Parmenides  fails. 
The  real  is  not  necessarily  the  unchangeable;  it  may  be  either 
constant  or  variable.  The  sum  of  the  three  angles  of  a  plane 
triangle  is  the  constant  two  right  angles,  while  the  sum  of  the 
sides  is  a  variable  that  may  have  any  length  between  the  lim- 
its zero  and  infinity;  but  the  sum  of  the  sides,  though  variable, 
is  no  less  real  than  the  sum  of  the  angles  though  constant. 

According  to  Parmenides,  the  changeable,  the  phenomenal 
universe  of  the  senses  does  not  exist;  but  if  it  has  no  existence, 
how  can  it  change?  It  is  not  being,  if  being  is  the  unchange- 
able. The  truth  is,  the  phenomenal,  the  appearance  through 
the  senses,  though  not  permanent,  is  real  as  appearance;  it 
finds  its  ground  and  explanation  in  the  truth  of  being,  the  un- 


16  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

changeable,  which  is  apprehended  by  reason.  An  event  has 
its  explanation  in  cause,  the  energy  of  substantial  being. 

Viewing  the  unchangeable  as  true  being,  and  the  changeable 
as  not-being,  Parmenides  could  not  reconcile  the  two,  and 
therefore  denied  existence  to  the  changeable.  Accordingly 
we  have  the  world  of  unity,  the  essential  real  world,  appre- 
hended by  reason,  and  the  phenomenal,  the  unreal  world  of 
the  senses.  Parmenides,  however,  did  not  save  the  phenomenal 
world  by  calling  it  the  world  of  appearances,  but  annihilated 
it  by  calling  it  not-being  in  the  sense  of  the  non-existent;  it 
exists,  if  changeable,  but  is  explained  by  the  essentially  un- 
changeable. Being,  not  the  inactive  dead-head,  but  substance, 
energetic  reality,  involving  power  or  capability  of  casual  ac- 
tivity, is  really  the  true  eternal  first  principle. 

3.  Zeno  (circ.  500-440.) — Zeno  was  not  only  a  philosopher, 
but  a  patriot,  and  died  a  martyr  in  the  defense  of  the  liberty  of 
Elea,  his  native  city.  He  is  to  be  distinguished  from  Zeno, 
the  founder  of  the  Stoic  philosophy. 

Zeno  may  be  called  the  logician  of  the  Eleatic  school,  as  Par- 
menides was  its  metaphysician.  Parmenides  affirmed  that 
reason  apprehended  the  unchangeable  as  the  real,  and,  there- 
fore, since  two  contradictories  cannot  both  be  true,  the  change- 
able must  be  unreal.  Zeno  undertook  to  prove,  by  the  re- 
ductio  ad  absurdum  method  of  reasoning,  that  the  changeable 
is  impossible. 

To  prove  the  impossibility  of  motion,  he  said  that  Achilles, 
the  swift-footed,  could  never  overtake  the  slow-going  tortoise. 
To  use  modern  measurements,  let  us  assume  that,  on  a  straight 
road,  the  tortoise  is  ahead  of  Achilles  one  furlong,  or  40  rods, 
the  length  of  one  side  of  a  square  field  containing  10  acres,  and 
that  both  are  running  in  the  direction  from  Achilles  to  the  tor- 
toise, Achilles  running  10  times  as  fast  as  the  tortoise.  When 
Achilles  has  reached  the  first  position  of  the  tortoise  it  is  not 
there,  but  is  1/10  of  a  furlong  ahead,  and  when  Achilles  has 
reached  that  second  position  of  the  tortoise,  it  is  1/100  fur. 
ahead,  and  when  Achilles  has  reached  that  third  position,  the 
tortoise  is  1/1000  fur.  ahead  and  so  on  ad  infinitum;  there- 
fore, in  finite  time,  Achilles  never  could  overtake  the  tortoise; 
but  as  he  does  overtake  it,  and  could  actually  pass  it,  we  have 
here  a  contradiction,  on  the  supposition  that  motion  is  real; 
hence  motion  is  not  real.  Let  us  see: 


THE  ELEATIC  SCHOOL  IT 

Let  t  denote  the  time  required,  and  that  Achilles  can  reach 
the  first  position  of  the  tortoise  in  1  minute,  then  he  can  reach 
the  second  position  in  1/10  of  a  minute,  after  reaching  the 
first,  and  the  third  in  1/100  of  a  minute  after  reaching  the  sec- 
ond, and  so  on;  hence, 

(1)  t  =1  +1/10  +1/100  +1/1000  +  .  .  .  ,  ad  infinitum. 
Multiplying  both  members  of  (1)  by  1/10,  we  have 

(2)  1/10  t  =1/10  +1/100  +1/1000  +  ...  ad  infinitum. 
Substracting  equation  (2)  from  (1),  member  by  member, 

we  have 

(3)  9/10  t=l;  .  '  .  t  =10/9  minutes  =1  1/9  minutes. 
Observe  that  excepting  the  term  (1)  the  second  members 

are  alike,  and  will  cancel  in  the  subtraction. 

To  show  that  the  sum  of  an  infinite  number  of  decreasing 
terms  may  not  exceed  a  finite  limit,  take  1/2  of  anything,  the 
half  of  the  remainder,  or  1/4  of  the  thing,  then  1/2  of  the  re- 
maining 1/4,  or  1/8  of  the  thing,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum,  and 
we  shall  have  1/2  +1/4  +1/8  +1/16  +  .  .  .  ,  ad  infinitum, 
which  can  never  exceed  1,  or  the  thing  itself,  since  we  never 
take  the  whole  of  what  is  left,  but  only  1/2  of  it. 

Zeno  said  a  finite  body  is  impossible;  for  let  it  be  divided 
into  an  infinite  number  of  parts,  the  sum  of  the  parts  should 
equal  the  whole.  The  parts  either  have  magnitude  or  no 
magnitude.  If  the  parts  have  magnitude,  the  sum  would 
have  infinite  magnitude,  since  there  are  an  infinite  number  of 
parts;  but  if  the  parts  have  no  magnitude,  the  whole  would 
have  no  magnitude,  since  the  sum  of  any  number  of  zeros  is 
zero.  To  refute  this  reasoning  let  the  body  b  be  divided  into 
n  parts,each  part  is  1/n  6, and  the  sum  of  the  parts  n  xl/n  b  =b 
whatever  be  the  value  of  n,  since  the  ns  cancel. 

Remarks:  1.  The  Eleatic  philosophy,  though  claiming  to 
be  based  on  reason,  was  one-sided  and  therefore  imperfect, 
and  doomed  to  failure. 

2.  A  reaction  was  inevitable,  and  this  appeared  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  Heraclitus. 


CHAPTER  III 

Heraclitus  and  Pythagoras 

These  philosophers  can  be  conveniently  treated  in  the  same 
chapter.  They  are  not  directly  related,  though  each  stands 
as  the  founder  and  embodiment  of  a  system. 

1.  Heraclitus  (circ.  535-475.) — Heraclitus,  the  son  of  Bly- 
son,  was  born  at  Ephesus,  and  was  of  noble  family.  He  was 
a  descendant  of  Androclus,  the  founder  of  Ephesus.  His 
hereditary  right  to  the  chief  magistracy  he  resigned  in  favor 
of  his  younger  brother  that  he  might  devote  himself  to  the 
study  of  philosophy,  despairing  also  of  accomplishing  any- 
thing for  the  state  on  account  of  the  corruptions  of  the  people. 

Heraclitus  stands  for  the  opposition  to  the  Eleatic  School, 
and  therefore  denied  the  permanent,  which  the  Eleatics  af- 
firmed, and  affirmed  the  changeable,  which  the  Eleatics  denied. 

The  Eleatics  could  not  reconcile  the  permanent  and  change- 
able, and  therefore  denied  the  changeable.  They  took  for 
their  principle  Being,  that  is  the  permanent,  the  unchange- 
able. They  called  the  changeable  not-being,  the  non-existent. 

Neither  did  Heraclitus  attempt  to  reconcile  the  permanent 
and  the  changeable.  He  therefore  denied  the  permanent, 
and  took  for  his  principle  Becoming,  unceasing  change,  such 
as  we  see  in  nature,  in  the  vicissitudes  of  summer  and  winter, 
day  and  night,  growth  and  decay.  Unceasing  change  is  go- 
ing on  in  everything,  though  at  different  rates.  Things  ap- 
parently permanent,  as  rocks,  have  internal  activities  which 
never  cease. 

Becoming,  the  principle  of  Heraclitus,  seems  therefore  more 
perfectly  to  represent  the  universe,  as  it  appears  to  us,  than 
Being,  the  principle  of  the  Eleatics.  Becoming,  however,  is 
known  to  us  empirically,  through  the  senses,  and  by  conscious- 
ness, and  is  not  therefore  a  principle  of  reason.  Back  of  all 
change  there  must  be  something  permanent,  the  First  Cause, 
the  origin  of  the  changing.  The  First  Cause,  though  essen- 
tially immutable,  in  its  essence,  is  not  therefore  dormant,  but 

18 


HERACLITUS  AND  PYTHAGORAS         19 

by  ceaseless  energy  is  carrying  forward  the  universe  to  its  final 
consummation.  Change,  however,  cannot  be  the  first  princi- 
ple. Every  change  requires  a  cause.  Motion  may  be  as 
natural  to  a  body  as  rest,  and  therefore  needs  no  explanation; 
but  every  change  in  motion,  whether  in  velocity  or  direction, 
requires  a  cause.  The  explanation  of  every  change  is  found 
in  cause,  the  essential  energy  of  substantial  being.  Change, 
therefore,  being  phenomenal  and  known  by  experience,  needs 
to  be  accounted  for,  and  cannot  be  the  first  principle,  the  true 
universal.  As  an  event,  any  change  needs  explanation. 
The  first  principle  is,  therefore,  not  change,  but  cause,  which 
is  apprehended  by  reason  as  energy  or  efficiency ,  and  manifests 
itself  in  every  movement  as  energetic  being.  The  principle 
of  change,  and  even  of  being  itself,  is  the  energy  which  main- 
tains its  own  existence  and  the  stability,  the  order,  and  the 
harmony  of  the  universe.  Cause  is,  therefore,  a  deeper  first 
principle  than  the  material  sensibles  of  the  Milesians,  or  the 
being  of  the  Eleatics,  or  the  becoming  of  Heraclitus.  In 
cause  we  reach  the  true  explanation  of  change. 

His  principle  of  incessant  change  and  his  love  of  paradox 
led  Heraclitus  to  affirm  contraries  of  the  same  object,  as  that 
a  thing  is  and  at  the  same  instant,  is  not.  Thus,  to  test  this 
hypothesis,  let  water  at  the  freezing  point  be  subjected  to  heat 
and  call  the  states  of  temperature,  A,  B,  C,  etc.,  then  Heracli- 
tus would  say:  A  is  not- A,  and  not- A  is  B;  B  is  not-B,  and 
not-B  is  C,  and  so  on. 

Let  us  subject  this  process  of  thought  to  a  little  vigorous 
logic :  If  A  is  not- A  and  not- A  is  B,  then  A  is  B;  if  B  is  not-B 
and  not-B  is  C,  then  B  is  0,  and  since  A  is  B,  then  A  is  (7,  and 
so  on  till  the  water  boils.  Then  the  water  is  freezing  and  boil- 
ing, and  at  the  same  instant,  has  all  intermediate  tempera- 
tures ! 

The  law  of  thought  that  conflictives  cannot  exist  in  the  same 
object,  at  the  same  time,  forbids  the  affirmation  that  A  is 
not- A,  but  no  law  of  thought  forbids  us  saying  that  not- A  is  B. 
Diverse  attributes  may  exist  in  the  same  object  at  the  same 
time,  but  not  conflictive  attributes,  since  they  would  destroy 
each  other.  A  body  may  be  both  spherical  and  red  at  the 
same  time,  but  can  not  be  at  the  same  instant,  both  spherical 
and  cubical. 

Heraclitus  uttered  many  profound  truths,  as:    "A  man's 


20  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

character  is  his  fate."     "Wisdom  is  the  foremost  virtue," 
"  Lovers  of  wisdom  should  know  many  things. " 

2.  Pythagoras  (circ.  580-500.) — Many  mythical  stories 
cling  about  the  life  of  Pythagoras,  but  from  the  most  reliable 
accounts,  those  given  by  Philolaus,  a  Pythagorean  and  a  con- 
temporary of  Socrates,  and  by  Aristotle,  and  later  by  Sextus 
Empiricus,  we  learn  that  he  was  the  son  of  Mnesarchus,  an 
engraver.  He  was  born  in  Samos,  one  of  the  principal  and 
most  fertile  of  the  islands  of  the  Aegean  Sea.  At  the  age  of 
twenty  he  traveled  for  twelve  years,  visiting  Ionia,  Phoenicia, 
and  probably  Egypt,  and  finally  settled  at  Crotona,  in  Magna 
Graecia,  or  Southern  Italy,  where  he  founded  a  school  of  phi- 
losophy. He  taught  mathematics,  physics,  astronomy,  and 
morals. 

According  to  Heraclitus,  Pythagoras  was  the  most  learned 
man  of  his  time.  Thales  introduced  geometry  into  Ionia, 
but  Pythagoras  raised  it  to  the  rank  of  a  science.  He  made 
many  mathematical  discoveries  among  which  is  the  celebrated 
theorem,  still  known  as  the  Pythagorean :  The  square  of  the 
hypotenuse  of  a  right  triangle  is  equivalent  to  the  sum  of  the 
squares  of  the  other  sides.  In  honor  of  this  discovery,  it  is  said, 
he  offered  a  hecatomb  of  oxen  as  a  sacrifice  to  the  immortal 
Gods.  In  astronomy,  Pythagoras,  or  more  probably  bis 
successors,  taught  the  theory  of  a  central  fire  around  which 
revolved  the  heavenly  bodies  including  the  sun  and  the  earth. 

In  his  school  at  Crotona,  Pythagoras  not  only  taught  math- 
ematics and  astronomy  and  philosophy,  but  inculcated  the 
importance  of  seeking  for  physical  and  mental  perfection,  and 
of  cultivating  the  art  of  self-control,  good  manners,  and  up- 
right moral  character. 

Silence  for  one  year  was  required  of  the  novitiate  in  the 
meetings  of  the  society  and  a  rigid  discipline  was  imposed  on 
all  the  members.  Women  were  admitted  to  his  school  on 
terms  of  equality  with  men,  a  remarkably  advanced  step  for 
that  early  age. 

Pythagoras  was,  therefore,  a  social,  moral  and  political  re- 
former, but  the  aristocratic  character  of  his  society,  its  secret 
methods  and  wide-spread  influence,  excited  suspicion,  and 
aroused  the  hostility  of  the  common  people.  The  society  was 
broken  up  by  a  mob,  and  its  members  dispersed.  Pythagoras 
went  to  Metapontum  where  he  spent  the  rest  of  his  life  in 
comparative  quiet. 


HERACLITUS  AND  PYTHAGORAS          21 

The  doctrines  of  Pythagoras  have  been  obscured  by  legends ; 
disregarding  the  myths,  we  may  still  derive,  from  the  most 
reliable  sources,  a  fairly  correct  knowledge  of  his  doctrines. 
To  account  for  the  order  of  the  universe,  Pythagoras  assumed 
number  as  the  first  principle.  Mathematical  relations  are 
found  everywhere,  and  seem  to  afford  explanation  of  the  order 
of  the  universe,  which  is,  therefore,  a  cosmos  abounding  in 
harmony  and  proportion.  Even  morals  were  represented  by 
geometric  symbols.  Thus  a  square  stood  for  justice  which 
may  throw  light  on  the  modern  expression,  "  T  will  do  it  on 
the  square, "  and  his  mathematical  principles  stood  for  moral 
truths.  His  first  principles  were,  however,  arithmetical 
rather  than  geometrical,  perhaps  because  the  properties,  even 
of  geometric  forms,  were  expressed  by  ratio,  which  is  essen- 
tially number.  Pythagoras  thus  conceived  number,  which  is 
present  in  all  things,  to  be  a  truer  first  principle  than  water,  or 
indeterminate  matter,  or  air,  the  principles  of  the  Milesians. 
A  principle  of  reason,  instead  of  a  material  principle,  was  as- 
sumed as  the  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  the  universe. 

It  is  evident,  however,  that  number  does  not  constitute  the 
essence  of  things.  Thus  take  ten  horses  and  ten  trees.  The 
number  is  the  same.  If  the  number  is  the  essence  the  two 
groups  ought  to  be  essentially  alike,  which  is  not  the  case. 
Number,  therefore,  does  not  account  for  the  difference,  nor 
for  the  peculiarity  of  anything  whatever;  it  affords  no  expla- 
nation of  essence. 

Pythagoras  regarded  number  as  consisting  of  two  parts  or 
elements,  unity  and  plurality,  the  one  and  the  many,  the  limit 
and  the  indefinite.  Take  the  number  ten.  Now  ten  is  one 
ten,  not  two  tens,  nor  three  tens,  nor  any  other  number,  of  tens, 
but  one  ten,  yet  this  one  ten  consists  of  ten  units,  and  this 
constitutes  its  plurality.  The  same  is  true  of  five  or  two;  but 
when  we  come  down  to  one,  the  element  usually  plural  reaches 
into  its  limit  one. 

Take  the  numbers  1,  2,  3,  4.  The  Pythagoreans  regarded 
1  as  standing  for  a  point  or  monad,  2  for  a  line  or  duad,  3  for  a 
surface  or  triad,  4  for  a  solid  or  tetrad.  They  also  noticed 
that  1 +2+3+4  =10  the  decad.  Unity  in  multiplicity  is, 
therefore,  the  key  to  the  Pythagorean  philosophy. 

The  Pythagoreans  discovered  many  remarkable  properties 
of  numbers.  Thus  the  striking  relations  subsisting  between 


M  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

the  three  series  of  numbers,  the  first  the  natural  numbers, 
the  second  the  odd  numbers,  the  third  the  square  numbers, 
were  probably  first  discovered  by  them.  Write  these  num- 
bers as  follows: 

1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9,  10.. .n 

1,  3,  5,  7,  9, 11,  13,  15,  17,  19...2n-l 

1,  4,  9,  16,  25,  36,  49,  64,  81,  100.. .n2 

Any  odd  number  is  found  by  multiplying  the  corresponding 
natural  number  by  2,  and  subtracting  1  from  the  product; 
and  any  square  number,  that  is  the  square  of  any  natural  num- 
ber, is  found  by  adding  the  corresponding  odd  number  to  the 
next  preceding  square  number. 

Pythagoras  also  accepted  the  doctrine  of  metempsychosis, 
or  the  transmigration  of  souls,  which  he  adopted  from  the 
Orphic  mysteries;  but  this  doctrine,  though  fascinating  to 
many  minds,  is  not  supported  by  valid  evidence. 

As  a  philosopher,  Pythagoras  was  a  remarkable  man,  and 
morally  he  was  well  worthy  the  veneration  he  received. 
Among  his  disciples  his  word  was  taken  as  authority,  and  when 
any  of  his  followers  could  say,  in  support  of  his  opinion,  Ipse 
dixit,  that  is,  Pythagoras  has  said  so,  that  closed  the  contro- 
versy. 

What  have  we  found  thus  far,  worthy  to  be  taken  as  the 
first  principle? 

If  we  add  energy,  intelligence,  and  will  to  the  Infinite  of 
Anaximander,  or  to  the  Being  of  the  Eleatics,  we  may  find 
the  First  Cause  or  principle  of  all  things;  but  the  first  princi- 
ple cannot  be  found  in  the  change  of  Heraclitus,  nor  in  the 
number  of  Pythagoras. 


CHAPTER  IV 

Empedocles,  Anaxagoras,  the  Atomists 

1.  Empedocles  (circ.  490-480.) — Empedocles,  a  native  of 
Agrigentum,  in  Sicily,  was  a  descendant  of  a  noble  family, 
and  a  man  of  imposing  personality  and  varied  attainments — a 
physician,  a  philosopher,  a  prophet,  a  magician. 

He  won  a  chariot  race,  as  his  father,  Meton,  had  done  before 
him.  He  gained  great  popularity  by  his  liberality  and  ad- 
vocacy of  the  rights  of  the  people.  All  eyes  were  turned  on 
him  wherever  he  appeared,  as  at  the  Olympic  games,  with 
priestly  robes,  a  golden  girdle,  and  a  Delphic  crown. 

His  love  of  distinction  and  desire  to  be  accounted  more  than 
human,  to  be  worshipped  as  a  god,  led  him  to  pose  as  a  mira- 
cle worker,  and  gave  currency  to  the  mythical  story  that  after 
a  banquet  given  in  his  honor,  in  his  old  age,  he  cast  himself  into 
the  crater  of  Mt.  Etna,  in  order  that  people,  not  knowing  his 
end,  might  believe  that  he  was  transported  to  the  gods  in  a 
blaze  of  glory.  The  volcano,  however,  it  is  said,  betrayed 
his  secret  by  casting  forth  his  brazen  sandals.  But  the  fact 
that  such  a  story  was  reported  shows  that  he  was  human  and 
notoriously  vain.  Undoubtedly  he  possessed  great  talents 
and  in  moral  character,  save  his  vanity,  he  may  be  ranked  with 
Heraclitus  and  Pythagoras. 

The  classing  of  Empedocles,  with  reference  to  the  schools 
of  philosophy  has  given  rise  to  considerable  discussion.  His 
poem  "On  Nature"  seems  to  place  him  in  an  intermediate 
position  between  the  Milesians  and  the  Eleatics.  He  held, 
moreover,  opinions  resembling  certain  other  schools,  though, 
as  we  shall  see,  he  had  original  views  of  his  own. 

Instead  of  a  single  principle,  as  water  or  air  of  the  Milesians, 
he  assumed  four  elements — fire,  air,  water,  earth.  To  account 
for  change,  the  four  elements  were  supposed  to  be  moved  by 
the  two  forces,  love  and  hatred,  which  Empedocles  probably 
regarded  as  attributes  of  the  four  elements,  and  not  as  ad- 
ditional elements.  Love  is  exhibited  in  attraction,  concord, 
union,  organization;  hatred  in  repulsion,  discord,  separation, 
dissolution. 

23 


24  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

With  the  Eleatics,  Empedocles  placed  a  low  estimate  on  the 
deliverances  of  the  senses,  holding  that  reason  alone  gives  true 
knowledge,  but  he  differed  from  them  in  admitting  the  reality 
of  change,  not  in  the  elements  themselves,  but  in  their  com- 
bination and  separation,  and  in  the  movement  of  bodies. 

Empedocles  held  that  the  knowing  subject,  and  the  known 
object  must  be  of  like  nature — an  assumption  that  has  exerted 
a  powerful  influence  on  speculation  from  his  time  to  the  pres- 
ent. Like,  according  to  Empedocles,  is  perceived  by  like. 
We  know  an  external  object  by  means  of  an  internal  cognate 
nature,  as  external  fire  by  internal  fire,  and  so  on  for  the  other 
elements,  or  their  mixtures.  The  fact,  however,  is  that  un- 
like things  act  more  powerfully  on  each  other  than  like,  as 
a  hot  and  cold  body  affect  each  other  more  than  two  hot  bodies 
or  two  cold. 

Empedocles  explained  perception  by  little  images  coming 
as  effluxes,  from  the  objects  perceived  through  the  senses. 
In  case  of  vision,  a  two-fold  efflux  takes  place,  one  from  the 
object  to  the  eye,  the  other  from  the  eye  to  the  object,  the 
perceived  image  is  the  result  of  the  meeting  of  the  two  streams. 
The  sensations  of  smell  and  taste  result  from  the  penetration 
of  particles  of  matter  into  the  organs  of  the  senses.  His  ex- 
planation of  perception,  though  crude,  was  the  beginning  of 
the  theory  of  the  knowledge  of  external  objects,  and  entitles 
Empedocles  to  be  called  the  first  psychologist. 

His  most  interesting  speculation,  however,  relates  to  the 
origin  of  plants  and  animals — love  combining  the  fit  elements, 
and  hate  separating  the  unfit  unions,  leaving  the  rare  com- 
binations of  parts  suitable  to  each  other,  somewhat  in  illus- 
tration of  Darwin's  theory  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest. 

With  Pythagoras,  Empedocles  held  the  theory  of  the  trans- 
migration of  souls,  and  with  Xenophanes,  he  objected  to  the 
anthropomorphic  conception  of  the  gods,  as  presented  in  the 
popular  mythology  of  the  poets.  He  declared  God  to  be  a 
pure  spirit,  without  body  or  members;  but  he  did  not  develop 
the  theistic  view  of  God  as  the  Novs,  or  reason,  or  as  the  effi- 
cient cause  of  the  universe,  as  did  Anaxagoras,  or  as  the  up- 
holder of  all  things  by  the  word  of  his  power.  Nevertheless, 
it  is  to  be  admitted  that  Empedocles,  by  his  originality,  gave 
philosophy  an  impulse,  and  hastened  its  evolution. 


EMPEDOCLES,  ANAXAGORAS,  THE    ATOMISTS  25 

3.  Anaxagoras  (circ.  500-428.) — Anaxagoras  was  a  native 
of  Clazomenae  in  Asia  Minor.  He  surrendered  his  prop- 
erty to  his  relatives  and  relinquished  his  prospects  of  political 
preferment  that  he  might  engage  in  the  pursuit  of  knowledge 
and  devote  himself  especially  to  the  study  of  philosophy. 
With  the  current  philosophical  systems,  he  was  well  versed. 

At  an  early  age  he  removed  to  Athens,  then  rapidly  becom- 
ing the  center  of  Greek  culture.  He  acquired  a  distinguished 
reputation  for  his  attainments  in  mathematics  and  astronomy 
and  by  his  dignity  and  uprightness,  he  gamed  the  warm  friend- 
ship of  Pericles  and  other  distinguished  citizens  of  Athens. 

His  explanation  of  celestial  phenomena,  as  eclipses,  by 
natural  causes,  led  the  people  to  suspect  that  he  disbelieved 
in  the  gods  of  the  popular  religion.  Bigots,  ready  to  accuse 
him  of  Atheism,  were  not  wanting.  He  was  charged  with  in- 
fidelity, and  though  eloquently  defended  by  Pericles,  was 
banished  from  the  city.  He  retired  to  Lampsacus,  where  he 
lived  greatly  respected  by  the  citizens,  who  at  his  death,  gave 
him  funeral  honors  and  caused  to  be  inscribed  on  his  tomb: 
"Here  lies  Anaxagoras,  who  of  all  men  penetrated  farthest  in- 
to the  celestial  world. "  His  memory  was  kept  alive  by  the 
fact  that  the  school  children  were  allowed  a  holiday  each  year, 
on  the  anniversary  of  his  death. 

In  respect  to  his  theory  of  knowledge,  he  held  that  while  the 
phenomena  gained  through  the  senses  are  to  be  accepted  as 
facts,  yet  they  are  delusive  and  untrustworthy  in  regard  to 
the  true  nature  of  objects,  reason  alone  giving  true  knowledge 
of  the  essence,  or  the  first  principles  of  things. 

Not  satisfied  with  a  single  principle,  as  water,  indeterminate 
matter,  or  air,  as  held  by  the  Milesians,  nor  with  the  four  prin- 
ciples, earth,  water,  air,  fire  of  Empedocles,  he  assumed  an 
indefinite  number  of  primitive  elements  or  germs,  originally 
so  intimately  mixed  that  if  any  portion  be  taken  that  portion 
would  contain  every  kind  of  element  included  in  the  whole, 
so  would  a  part  of  that  portion,  and  a  part  of  that  part,  and 
so  on  indefinitely,  however  small  the  parts;  that  is,  the  parts 
are  similar  in  kind  to  the  whole  and  to  each  other,  a  con- 
dition or  state  of  matter  called  by  Aristotle  o/wwo/Aepr?.  This 
homogeneous  mixture  (fuyfia),  a  chaos  of  elements,  may  be 
likened  to  the  atrupov  of  Anaximander. 


26  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

To  account  for  the  cosmos,  Anaxagoras  postulated  an  intelli- 
gent principle,  vovs,  mind,  or  reason,  separate  from  the  /u-y/ia 
the  mixed  mass.  The  vofc  knowing  all  things,  past,  present 
and  future,  reduced  the  chaos  to  cosmos,  arranging  everything 
with  design  according  to  reason.  The  original  elements  were 
thus  separated  and  rearranged  with  fitness,  till  the  solid  earth, 
the  water,  the  air,  and  the  fiery  ether  were  collected  together, 
all  in  their  proper  places;  and  organic  beings  of  the  vegetable 
and  animal  kingdoms  were  produced  and  endowed  with  life 
and  mind  according  to  their  rank.  According  to  the  Atom- 
ists,  the  cosmos  was  formed  by  the  combination  of  unlike  ele- 
ments, but  according  to  Anaxagoras  by  the  separation  of  un- 
like elements,  and  the  combination  of  the  like,  brought  about 
by  the  action  of  the  vov<s. 

Stars  were  thrown  off  from  the  earth  by  its  rapid  rotation, 
and  ignited  by  passing  through  the  fiery  ether.  The  sun  is 
a  fiery  mass,  much  larger  than  the  stars,  and  the  moon,  shining 
with  light  borrowed  from  the  sun,  is  a  habitable  world,  having, 
like  the  earth,  mountains  and  valleys,  and  bodies  of  water. 

Anaxagoras  makes  the  vovs  a  transcendent  being  who 
formed  the  cosmos  from  chaos  with  design,  according  to  a  ra- 
tional plan,  but  who  then  seems  to  abandon  it  to  physical  and 
mechanical  causes,  acting  according  to  natural  laws;  and  for 
this  he  was  censured  by  Aristotle,  who  nevertheless  praises 
him  for  the  hypothesis  of  an  original  intelligent  cause,  which 
acted  with  design  in  forming  the  cosmos  and  giving  to  it  law 
and  order.  Aristotle  says :  "  When  a  man  said  that  there  was 
in  nature,  as  in  animals,  an  intelligence  which  is  a  cause  of  the 
arrangement  and  order  of  the  universe,  this  man  alone  ap- 
peared to  have  preserved  his  reason,  in  the  midst  of  the  follies 
of  his  predecessors.  Now  we  know  that  Anaxagoras  first 
openly  maintained  these  views." 

Did  Anaxagoras  regard  the  vovs  as  material  or  as  spiritual? 
Probably  he  regarded  it  as  the  finest  and  purest  kind  of  matter 
as  certainly  did  Archelaus,  his  disciple.  But  by  making  sub- 
stance the  genus  of  which  matter  and  spirit  are  the  species, 
we  are  saved  from  confusion.  Matter  is  substance,  mechani- 
cally inert  and  impenetrable;  spirit  is  substance  endowed  with 
intellect,  sensibility  and  will,  manifested  in  thought,  feeling 
and  volition. 

No  system  of  philosophy  can  explain  change  without  pos- 
tulating cause  as  an  efficient  principle. 


EMPEDOCLES,  ANAXAGORAS,  THE  ATOMISTS     27 

In  the  Ionic  school  a  vital  force,  or  life,  was  assumed  as  an 
inherent  property  of  matter  to  account  for  its  rarification  or 
condensation.  In  the  Eleatic  school,  so  far  as  being,  or  un- 
changeableness,  was  considered  as  the  only  reality,  no  cause, 
or  active  principle,  was  required  to  account  for  its  actuality; 
but  even  the  Eleatics  admitted  some  cause  for  apparent  chang- 
es. Becoming,  or  the  continued  change  of  the  Heraclitean 
system,  requires  cause  for  its  explanation.  Number  of  the 
Pythagorean  system,  though  expressing  the  proportion  of 
things,  did  not  account  for  change,  which,  they  admitted, 
requires  cause.  Earth,  air,  fire  and  water,  the  four  elements 
given  by  Empedocles,  were  acted  on  by  love  and  hatred,  caus- 
ing union  and  separation.  The  Atomists  supposed  their 
atoms  endowed  with  the  forces  of  attraction  and  repulsion. 
Anaxagoras  assumed  voi)?  as  the  efficient  cause  of  the  har- 
mony and  the  changes  in  the  universe.  Really,  according  to 
all  the  schools,  cause  is  the  first  principle;  it  is  their  common 
essential  element. 

The  system  of  Anaxagoras  is  really  dualistic,  assuming,  as 
it  does,  two  principles — the  /uy/xa  and  the  vovs,  the  vovs 
transcendent,  apart  from  the  />tiy/Aa,  and  operating  on  it 
from  without.  The  immanence  of  the  vofc  is,  however,  a 
more  tenable  view  and  is  consistent  with  its  continued  action 
in  sustaining  and  controling  the  cosmos.  Calling  atoms  points 
of  energy  exerted  by  the  vovs,  we  have  Theistic  Monism. 

2.  The  Atomists. — Leucippus  and  Democritus  were  the 
principal  philosophers  of  the  Atomic  school — Leucippus,  the 
founder,  and  Democritus,  the  expositor. 

(1)  ^Leucippus  (circ.  490-  ) — Leucippus  assumed  two  first 
principles — space  and  atoms.  Space  by  itself,  apart  from 
atoms,  is  an  infinite  void,  or  extension  in  all  directions,  with- 
out limit.  An  atom  [ara/xos],  as  seen  by  the  derivation  of 
its  name,  is  an  indivisable  solid,  one  that  can  not  be  cut  into 
parts.  The  atomic  theory  of  matter  is  the  theory  which  as- 
serts that  bodies  are  made  up  of  atoms.  The  counter  theory, 
that  of  continuity,  asserts  that  a  body  can  be  divided  into 
halves,  each  half  into  halves  or  fourths  of  the  whole,  each 
fourth  into  eighths,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 

The  atomic  theory  conceives  the  atom,  whatever  be  its 
magnitude,  as  a  perfect  solid,  entirely  filling,  without  pores, 
or  vacant  spaces,  the  volume  enclosed  by  its  surface.  This 


28  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

theory  also  regards  atoms  as  without  qualitative  differences 
but  as  possessing  quantitative  differences  of  magnitude,  form, 
order,  position,  motion.  These  two  theories  correspond  to  the 
two  ways  of  regarding  quantity — the  arithmetical  and  the 
geometrical.  Numbers  are  discontinuous,  and  the  passage 
from  one  number  to  another  is  per  saltum,  but  a  geometrical 
magnitude,  as  a  line,  is  continuous.  The  question  now  is, 
which  of  these  conceptions  will  best  explain  the  constitution 
of  bodies? 

In  regard  to  the  limits  of  divisibility,  we  may  consider  four : 
The  practical  limit  is  reached  when  we  have  pulverized  a  body, 
by  grinding  it  into  as  fine  parts  as  possible  by  any  mechanical 
means  within  our  power.  The  physical  limit  is  the  molecule, 
which  cannot  be  divided  without  changing  the  nature  of  the 
body.  The  chemical  limit  is  the  atom,  two  or  more  of  which 
are  the  ultimate  elements  of  the  molecule.  The  metaphysical 
limit  is  zero.  To  understand  this  take  the  atom  as  solid  mat- 
ter without  pores,  which,  however  small,  has  magnitude, 
otherwise  it  is  nothing.  The  atom,  though  not  actually  divi- 
sible, is  divisible  in  thought  however  small  it  may  be,  since  it 
must  have  some  magnitude.  Its  half,  therefore,  has  magni- 
tude, and  is  divisible  in  thought,  likewise  its  fourth,  its  eighth, 
and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  The  parts,  as  the  process  of  division 
is  continued,  continually  decreasing  and  approaching  zero 
as  their  limit,  which  they  can  never  reach,  are  therefore  in- 
finitesimals, since  an  infinitesimal  is  a  decreasing  variable 
whose  limit  is  zero. 

The  latest  theory  of  matter  is  that  its  ultimate  elements 
are  electrical  points  thus  displacing  the  solid  atom — electrons, 
positive  and  negative,  the  probable  constituent  elements  of 
matter. 

(2)  Democritus  (circ.  470-380) — Democritus  of  Abdera,  the 
disciple  and  friend  of  Leucippus  was  an  extensive  traveler,  a 
voluminous  writer,  and  one  of  the  most  learned  men  of  his 
time.  He  elaborated  the  atomic  theory  and  applied  it  in 
explaining  both  physical  and  mental  phenomena.  According 
to  this  theory,  atoms  are  the  ultimate  components  of  all  things 
and  are  themselves  uncaused,  and  therefore  eternal.  They 
are  in  motion;  hence  space,  as  the  condition  of  motion,  is 
necessary  and  eternal.  Atoms  are  infinite  in  number,  but 
on  account  of  their  minuteness  being  infinitesimal  in  size,  do 


EMPEDOCLES,  ANAXAGORAS,  THE  ATOMISTS     29 

not  completely  fill  all  space,  as  proved  by  the  fact  of  their  mo- 
tion. By  their  interactions,  they  produce  the  various  bodies 
of  the  universe.  Solids  are  formed  by  rough  atoms  which, 
clinging  together,  are  held  firmly  in  their  places.  Liquids  are 
composed  of  smooth,  round  atoms  which  freely  move  among 
themselves.  In  gases,  the  action  between  the  atoms  is  re- 
pellent rather  than  attractive.  The  soul  is  composed  of  finer 
atoms.  The  earth  was  supposed  to  be  round,  not  like  a  ball, 
but  flat  like  a  great  wheel,  floating  on  the  air. 

To  Democritus  the  structure  of  the  human  body  was  an 
object  of  great  admiration,  yet  he  assigned  a  higher  value  to 
the  soul,  which  consisted  of  smooth,  round,  exceedingly  mi- 
nute particles  of  fire,  distributed  through  the  whole  body, 
and  is  replenished  by  the  act  of  breathing.  The  particular 
activities  of  the  soul  have  their  location  in  special  organs  of 
the  body.  He  explained  sight,  as  did  Empedocles,  by  the 
meeting  of  two  streams  of  effluxes,  one  from  the  eye  towards 
the  object,  the  other  from  the  object  to  the  eye.  In  the  other 
senses,  perception  arises  through  the  sensations  caused  by  the 
contact  of  the  effluxes  with  the  organs.  The  brain  is  the  seat 
of  thought,  the  heart  of  affection,  and  the  liver  of  desire. 

Democritus  discriminated  sharply  between  perception  and 
thought,  ascribing  to  thought  the  higher  value,  as  alone  giving 
us  true  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things.  This  accords  with 
the  definition:  Philosophy  is  the  rational  apprehension  and 
application  of  first  principles.  The  imperfection  of  sensible 
knowledge  is  the  chief  occasion  of  error;  for  all  knowledge  be- 
gins with  sensation,  and  there  is  nothing,  according  to  Democ- 
ritus, ever  to  be  found  in  thought,  that  has  not  been  acquired 
through  the  senses  by  the  experience  of  sensation. 

Democritus  held  that  the  soul  is  conscious  as  long  as  the 
soul-atoms  properly  combine,  in  sufficient  numbers,  within 
the  body,  and  that  sleep  follows  as  a  consequence  of  the  escape 
of  many  of  the  soul-atoms  from  the  body.  Death  occurs  when 
all  these  atoms  have  left  the  body,  and  though  they  still  exist, 
the  personality  is  broken  up  by  their  separation;  that  is,  the 
soul  does  not  survive  death.  This  conclusion,  however,  is 
drawn  from  the  hypothesis  of  the  separation  of  the  soul-atoms 
at  death,  which  is  by  no  means  certain;  for  the  supposition 
that  the  soul-atoms  can  leave  the  body  in  organic  union  is 
equally  tenable,  in  which  case  the  soul  would  survive,  and  the 


30  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

personality  be  preserved;  and  hence  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  is  not  disproved,  even  if  we  grant  the  material  hypothesis 
of  Democritus. 

The  popular  gods  of  mythology,  Democritus  did  not  accept, 
yet  he  supposed  that  there  are  beings  in  the  atmosphere  simi- 
lar to  men,  but  superior  to  them  in  knowledge  and  power, 
some  friendly  and  some  hostile,  and  that  they  can  cause 
dreams  by  sending  effluxes  to  the  soul-atoms  left  in  the  body 
of  the  sleeper.  These  beings,  though  longer  lived  than  man, 
are  still  not  immortal,  as  they  gradually  lose  their  soul-atoms; 
but  Democritus  did  not  know  but  that  these  beings  may  ac- 
quire, as  well  as  lose,  soul-atoms,  and  so  continue  in  being  and 
hence  be  immortal. 

Democritus  held  that  necessity,  or  fate,  is  above  all  gods, 
and  that  happiness  consists  in  a  serenity  of  mind  which  is  best 
secured  by  cheerfully  submitting  to  the  inevitable,  by  mod- 
eration of  desire  and  a  well-ordered  life. 

The  doctrines  of  the  Atomists  were  transmitted  through 
their  disciples:  by  Metrodorus  of  Chios,  who  drew  from  the 
Atomic  philosophy,  certain  skeptical  inferences  bearing  on 
the  possibility  of  knowledge;  by  Protagoras,  the  sophist;  by 
Anaxarchus,  who  accompanied  Alexander  in  his  victorious 
career;  by  Nausiphanus  who  instructed  Epicurus  in  the  phil- 
osophy of  Democritus;  by  Lucretius,  the  Latin  poet,  who  ac- 
cepted and  forcibly  promulgated  the  doctrines  of  Democritus 
and  Epicurus,  and  who  rejoiced  in  deliverance  from  super- 
stitions induced  through  belief  in  the  existence  of  the  gods. 

In  regard  to  void  space,  Democritus  disagreed  with  the 
Eleatics,  who  called  it  not-being,  and  asserted  its  impossibility, 
while  Democritus  affirmed  two  original  realities,  atoms  and 
void  space,  asserting  that  the  motion  of  atoms  implied  void 
space  between  them  into  which  they  could  move.  Of  course 
void  space  has  no  substantial  being,  but  were  all  sub- 
stances, whether  matter  or  spirit,  swept  from  existence,  in- 
finite space,  or  pure  extension,  would  remain. 

Democritus  advanced  the  theory  of  perception  and  hence 
of  knowledge  by  reducing  all  the  senses  to  that  of  touch.  In 
sight,  the  distant  object  perceived  is  not  in  touch  with  the  eye, 
but  light  from  the  object,  by  its  vibrations,  comes  in  contact 
with  the  retina.  In  hearing,  vibrations  of  the  air,  coming  from 
a  distant  object,  as  a  ringing  bell,  strike  the  drum  of  the  ear. 


EMPEDOCLES,  ANAXAGORAS,  THE  ATOMISTS     31 

In  touch,  of  course,  there  is  contact,  and  the  same  is  true  of 
taste  and  smell.  The  doctrines  of  the  Atomists  were  seized 
upon  by  Epicurus,  Lucretius  and  others,  as  the  means  of 
getting  rid  of  the  superstition  of  the  intervention  of  the  gods, 
as  the  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  nature,  by  giving  a 
natural  explanation.  An  echo  was  produced  by  the  reflection 
of  sound  waves,  and  not  by  the  mocking  voice  of  a  spirit. 
The  loss  to  poetry  was  a  gain  to  science. 


CHAPTER  V 

The  Sophists 

The  Sophists,  wise  men  according  to  the  literal  signification 
of  the  name,  were  superior  teachers,  who  took  pay  for  giving 
instruction  in  the  art  of  making  life  a  success.  They  claimed 
to  be  practical,  and  their  claim  was  generally  acknowledged 
to  be  just.  In  a  dialogue  called  after  his  name,  Protagoras, 
the  chief  of  the  Sophists,  is  represented  by  Plato,  who  was  not 
inclined  to  give  him  undue  credit,  as  saying:  "The  lesson 
which  I  have  to  teach  is  prudence  and  good  counsel,  both  in 
respect  to  domestic  matters,  that  the  man  may  manage  his 
household  aright,  and  in  respect  to  public  affairs,  that  he  may 
be  thoroughly  qualified  to  take  part,  both  by  deed  and  word 
in  the  business  of  the  state."  This  fairly  states  the  claim 
made  by  the  Sophists. 

The  subjects  taught  by  the  Sophists,  though  varying  some- 
what with  the  different  teachers,  included  philosophy,  the 
technical  points  of  legal  practice,  and  oratory,  including  dia- 
lectics, rhetoric,  and  elocution.  In  giving  instruction  in  these 
things,  the  Sophists,  for  a  considerable  period,  gained  great 
popularity.  Wealthy  young  men  flocked  to  their  lecture 
rooms  to  receive  the  advantages  of  their  instruction. 

As  teachers,  the  Sophists  constituted  a  class  or  profession, 
not  a  sect  or  school,  as  each  one  taught,  in  his  own  way,  what 
he  deemed  proper;  but  as  philosophers,  they  held  to  a  common 
principle,  though  differing  somewhat  in  the  details  of  their 
speculations. 

A  person  calling  himself  a  Sophist,  that  is,  a  wise  man,  over- 
steps the  line  of  modesty,  and  by  claiming  too  much,  naturally 
exposes  himself  to  criticism.  Thus  the  name  Sophist,  was 
brought  into  contempt,  and  came  to  signify  a  conceited  fellow, 
an  unsound  reasoner,  one  that  preferred  victory  to  truth. 

The  Sophists  have  been  often  charged  with  a  laxity  of  morals 
and  accused  of  corrupting  the  young  men  of  Athens;  but  the 
philosopher  Lewes,  and  Grote,  the  historian,  have  vindicated 

32 


THE    SOPHISTS  33 

their  personal  moral  character  and  clearly  freed  them  from 
the  charge  of  teaching  a  morality  unacceptable  to  the  Athe- 
nian people.  To  achieve  success,  as  public  teachers,  they  must 
conform  to  the  accepted  morality.  But  neither  Lewes  nor 
Grote  has  proved  the  soundness  of  their  philosophy,  nor  that 
the  drift  of  their  moral  teaching  had  not  a  tendency  to  laxity 
in  conduct. 

The  Sophists  inaugurated  the  era  of  criticism,  which  led  to 
the  philosophy  of  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle;  but  their 
critical  method  contained  the  seeds  of  skepticism,  which  germi- 
nating bore  rank  fruit. 

Of  the  Sophists  we  shall  treat  chiefly  of  the  principal  ones — 
Protagoras,  Prodicus,  Gorgias  and  Isocrates,  and  incidentally 
of  some  others. 

1.  Protagoras  (circ.  481-411.) — Protagoras,  a  native  of  Ab- 
dera,  was  a  friend  of  Democritus  of  the  same  city,  and  the  first 
to  call  himself  a  Sophist.  He  taught  in  various  cities,  and 
by  his  eloquence,  gained  great  reputation.  He  visited  Athens 
on  several  occasions,  and  enjoyed  the  friendship  of  Pericles. 

His  views  respecting  the  gods,  though  simply  agnostic,  not 
atheistic,  gave  great  offense  to  the  Athenian  people.  Fanatical 
opposition  was  aroused  against  Protagoras  who  like  Anaxag- 
oras,  was  banished  from  the  city,  and  died  in  exile,  and  his 
books  publicly  burned  in  the  market  place.  The  immediate 
cause  of  his  banishment  was  probably  the  following  passage 
found  in  his  book  entitled  Ilepl  0cuh>:  "Respecting  the 
gods,  I  know  neither  whether  they  exist  nor  what  are  their 
attributes;  the  uncertainty  of  the  subject,  the  shortness  of 
human  life  and  many  other  causes,  debar  me  from  the  knowl- 
edge. "  This  statement,  reasonably  moderate,  as  it  seems  to 
us  who  do  not  believe  in  the  mythic  gods,  could  not  be  toler- 
ated by  the  Athenians,  zealous  in  the  cause  of  their  national 
religion;  and  it  is  to  be  observed  that  Protagoras  was  ban- 
ished not  on  moral  grounds,  but  because  of  the  religious  in- 
tolerance of  the  people. 

It  is  not  with  Protagoras  as  a  teacher  that  we  are  to  deal, 
but  with  Protagoras  as  a  philosopher.  He  assumed  for  his 
principle  certain  doctrines  of  other  philosophers,  especially 
of  Heraclitus,  Democritus,  and  perhaps  that  also  of  Anaxag- 
oras,  that  mind  is  the  controlling  principle. 

According  to  Heraclitus,  "All  things  flow;"  the  flux  is  the 


34  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

real.  But  according  to  Democritus,  this  flux  is  phenomenal, 
subjective,  known  only  through  the  senses,  and  there  is  noth- 
ing in  thought  not  found  in  sensation;  but  sensation  is  known 
only  to  the  individual  himself;  it  is  his  own  experience;  no  one 
else  is  conscious  of  it;  but  sensation  is  known  by  mind,  the  real 
principle. 

When  Protagoras  announced  his  maxim:  Man  is  the 
measure  of  the  universe,  he  did  not  mean  by  man  the  class  man, 
but  the  individual  man,  and  he  knows  only  his  own  sensations. 
Whatever  sensation  any  man  has,  that  for  him  is  true,  and 
he  alone  can  know  its  truth,  as  a  fact  of  experience.  Each 
man,  is,  therefore,  the  sole  judge  of  his  own  good  or  evil.  What 
seems  good  or  bad  to  him  is  good  or  bad,  and  to  seek  the  good 
or  to  shun  the  bad  is  right,  but  to  seek  the  bad  or  to  shun  the 
good  is  wrong.  This  is  the  ethics  of  nature,  as  opposed  to  the 
ethics  of  society;  it  is  egoism,  not  altruism. 

Let  us  now  see  how  this  sensational  philosophy  becomes 
critical,  skeptical  and  immoral  in  its  tendency. 

The  Milesians  assumed  water,  indeterminate  matter,  or 
air,  as  their  first  principle  and  by  its  thickening  or  thinning, 
all  things  are  produced;  but  to  account  for  this  thickening  or 
thinning,  which  as  a  change,  required  a  cause,  they  postulated 
life.  Here,  as  we  believe,  comes  in  the  criticism  of  Protagoras 
who  says  to  the  lonians :  The  changing  phenomena  you  know 
through  the  senses;  but  you  do  not  know,  by  the  senses,  the 
cause  of  the  changing  phenomena.  You  assume  life,  but  this 
is  mere  hypothesis,  and  your  philosophy,  founded  on  an  as- 
sumption, has  no  solid  basis,  and  is  therefore  invalid. 

To  the  Eleatics,  Protagoras  would  say:  You  postulate 
being,  permanent  existence,  and  deny  change;  but  you  cannot 
by  sensation  know  this  so-called  being,  which,  as  unchange- 
able, is  a  dead-head,  and  cannot  explain  anything;  but  sensa- 
tion, as  phenomenal,  as  continually  changing,  the  only  thing 
you  can  know,  you  deny.  You  affirm  what  cannot  be  known 
and  deny  the  reality  of  the  only  thing  you  can  know.  Of 
what  avail,  therefore,  is  your  philosophy  as  an  explanation 
of  the  universe?  It  is  vain  and  preposterous. 

To  the  Pythagoreans,  Protagoras  could  say :  You  call  num- 
ber the  essence  of  things.  Take  three  men  and  three  trees, 
the  number  three,  which  you  call  one  three,  expresses  the  ratio 
of  the  collection  of  men  to  one  man,  the  unit  of  the  collection 


THE  SOPHISTS  35 

of  men,  or  the  ratio  of  the  collection  of  trees  to  one  tree,  the 
unit  of  the  collection  of  trees.  The  ratio  three  is  the  same  in 
the  two  cases;  but  are  the  two  collections  the  same?  Are  the 
men  and  the  trees  identical?  The  men  are  not  trees,  neither 
are  the  trees  men.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the  number  three 
which  expresses  their  numerical  sameness,  does  not  express 
their  essential  difference.  The  same  thing  holds,  in  like  cases, 
where  different  things  are  compared.  Number  is  not,  there- 
fore, the  essence  of  things,  and  the  Pythagorean  principle  of 
number  utterly  fails  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  the  uni- 
verse. 

To  Heraclitus,  Protagoras  would  say:  I  accept  your  prin- 
ciple of  change,  if  by  change  you  mean  change  in  sensations, 
which  is  the  only  change  we  know  anything  about;  but  as  a 
Hylozoist,  you  seem  to  hold  to  a  principle  of  life,  symbolized 
by  fire,  as  the  cause  of  change;  but  cause  is  not  known  by  sen- 
sation, and  is,  therefore,  not  known  at  all. 

To  Empedocles,  Protagoras  would  say:  Your  elements, 
earth,  water,  air,  fire,  you  suppose  to  be  actuated  by  love  or 
hatred  in  combining  or  separating.  You  know  love  and  ha- 
tred, as  subjective  phenomena;  but  you  do  not  know  them,  as 
causing  the  union  or  separation  of  your  supposed  elements, 
for  causes  are  not  known  by  sensation. 

To  the  Atomists,  Protagoras  would  say:  I  accept  your 
principle  that  all  knowledge  is  derived  through  sensation;  and 
by  this  principle,  which  you  first  clearly  stated,  I  criticize  all 
the  systems  of  philosophy,  yours  not  excepted;  for  what  do 
you  know  about  atoms?  Did  you  ever  see,  or  hear,  or  touch, 
or  taste,  or  smell  an  atom?  How  do  you  know  there  are 
atoms?  You  do  not  know  them  by  the  senses,  and  therefore 
do  not  know  them  at  all.  Your  philosophy  has  no  basis  in 
knowledge. 

To  Anaxagoras,  Protagoras  would  say:  You  assume  a 
chaos  of  matter  with  all  the  elements  intimately  mixed;  but 
you  know  nothing  of  this  matter  as  an  objective  thing;  all  you 
know  is  phenomenal,  subjective  experience  gained  through  the 
senses.  You  assume  vovs,  as  an  organizer  of  your  supposed 
mixed  matter,  as  the  principle  or  cause  which  rendered  the 
chaos  of  matter  the  cosmos,  or  universe  of  order;  but  what  do 
you  know  of  the  wws,  objective  to  yourself,  as  the  cause 
of  the  cosmos?  I  grant  subjective  intelligences;  for  I  am 


36  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

conscious  of  changing  sensations  which  are  all  that  can  be 
known.  Your  vovs  is,  therefore,  hypothetical,  and  your  phi- 
losophy void,  as  it  lacks  a  known  basis,  and  will  satisfy  no  one 
seeking  for  truth. 

Thus  the  philosophy  of  Protagoras  is  both  critical  and  skep- 
tical. Granting  the  assumption  that  all  knowledge  is  de- 
rived through  sensation,  all  the  systems  considered  crumble 
into  dust,  leaving  nothing  but  changing  elusive  sensations, 
not  even  the  senses  as  objective  organs.  This  conclusion  is 
melancholy  enough  to  please  the  most  thorough-going  skep- 
tic. 

Let  us  subject  to  criticism  the  assumption  that  all  knowl- 
edge is  derived  through  sensation,  and  the  skeptical  opinion 
held  by  the  majority  of  philosophers  that  sense  knowledge  is 
delusive.  The  Greek  philosophers  generally  have  exagger- 
ated the  physiological  differences  in  the  sense  organs  of  differ- 
ent individuals.  There  are,  of  course,  great  differences  in 
abnormal  individuals,  but  general  similarity  in  average  cases. 
Again  the  different  senses  are  mutually  corrective — a  false 
report  of  one  is  corrected  by  a  true  report  of  another.  A 
mere  visual  image  may  be  mistaken  for  a  material  object,  or 
the  reverse,  but  the  sense  of  touch  will  correct  the  false  testi- 
mony of  sight.  Salt  looks  like  sugar,  but  when  put  on  straw- 
berries, by  the  mistake  of  the  housekeeper,  the  taste  of  the 
guests  soon  detects  the  blunder.  The  assertion  that  sensa- 
tion is  the  only  source  of  knowledge,  making  all  knowledge 
valid  only  for  the  individual,  is  void  of  truth.  Man, the  gener- 
ic man,  also  the  individual,  has  a  rational  nature,  common  to 
all  men.  Reason  does  not  depend  on  the  organization  of  the 
senses,  is  not  affected  by  their  imperfection,  and  is  essentially 
the  same  in  all  normally  developed  human  beings.  Its  func- 
tion is  not  feeling,  but  is  the  apprehension  of  necessary  truth, 
relating  to  the  conditions  of  the  phenomenal,  deducing  logical 
consequences  from  admitted  premises,  or  rising,  by  induction, 
from  particular  cases  to  general  principles.  Do  not  all  rational 
minds  assent  to  the  principle  that  every  event  requires  a  cause? 
Do  not  all  who  understand  the  demonstrations  know  the 
truth  of  the  theorems  of  Geometry?  Have  not  large  induc- 
tions been  made  in  science,  such  as  the  law  of  universal 
gravitation?  These  inductions  furnish  the  major  premise 
for  deductions. 


THE    SOPHISTS  37 

Protagoras  assumed  that  man  is  simply  a  bundle  of  sensa- 
tions; it  would  be  better  to  say  man  is  a  sensibility;  the  par- 
ticular sensations  come  and  go,  and  depend  on  many  contin- 
gencies, but  the  sensibility,  the  susceptibility  of  sensation, 
abides;  yet  it  does  not  tell  the  whole  truth  to  call  man  a  sensi- 
bility; man  is  also  a  rational  being,  he  has  reason,  and  rational 
knowledge  of  necessary  truth.  Philosophy  should  not  over- 
look either  contingent  facts  or  necessary  truth. 

What  of  the  moral  tendency  of  sensational  philosophy?  If 
each  individual  man  is,  for  himself,  the  measure  of  the  uni- 
verse, the  sole  judge  of  his  own  truth,  will  he  not  be  inclined  to 
believe  that  his  own  good  is  paramount?  That  his  own  pleas- 
ure, his  individual  happiness,  and  not  the  welfare  of  society, 
is  the  proper  object  of  his  pursuit?  His  individual  pleasures 
and  pains  are  real  to  him;  the  restrictions  of  society  are  artifi- 
cial, arbitrary,  and  often  tyrannical.  Why,  then,  he  inquires, 
should  I  not  obey  the  superior  ethics  of  nature,  rather  than 
the  inferior  ethics  of  society?  Making  this  choice,  he  seeks 
for  sensational  pleasures,  regardless,  as  is  likely,  of  the  rights 
or  happiness  of  his  fellow  beings.  His  ethics  is  Hedonic 
Egoism.  This  tendency,  with  this  result,  was  found  in  Epi- 
cureanism. 

2.  Prodicus  (circ.  465-395.) — Prodicus  was  a  native  of 
lulis,  a  city  in  the  island  of  Ceos.  He  first  came  to  Athens 
as  the  accredited  agent  of  his  native  island,  when  he  was 
a  young  man.  He  soon  became  known  as  an  eloquent  speaker 
and  a  successful  teacher.  The  aim  of  his  instruction  was  to 
prepare  young  men  for  success  in  life.  He  was  himself 
a  good  illustration  of  a  successful  man,  as  he  acquired,  by  his 
teaching,  both  popularity  and  affluence.  His  moral  and  re- 
ligious teaching  did  not  arouse  opposition,  and  may,  therefore, 
be  considered  as  not  unacceptable  to  the  Athenian  people. 

Prodicus  is  a  good  illustration  of  the  fact  that  a  Sophist 
was  not  necessarily  immoral  or  irreligious,  as  the  Athenians 
understood  these  terms.  He  is  the  author  of  a  beautiful 
^ story  called  The  Choice  of  Hercules,  which  may  be  found  in 
NKenophon's  Memorabilia.  The  purpose  of  this  production  is 
to  incite  young  men  to  a  noble  ambition  for  a  life  of  virtue 
and  by  strenuous  effort  to  achieve  results  worthy  of  the  appro- 
bation of  the  wise  and  good,  and  of  the  gratitude  of  their  fel- 
low citizens.  This  clearly  shows  that  the  teaching  of  a  Soph- 


38  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

ist  may  be  better  than  that  to  which  their  philosophy  logically 
leads. 

Prodicus  considered  the  mythic  gods  to  be  personifications 
of  the  forces  of  nature;  hence  he  did  not  deny  or  doubt  their 
existence  as  personifications,  since  he  did  not  question  the 
existence  of  the  forces  of  nature.  He  was  a  good  rhetorician, 
both  as  a  writer  and  as  an  orator.  He  did  great  service  by 
his  clear  discriminations  as  to  the  meaning  and  proper  choice 
of  words,  and  in  his  suggestions  in  regard  to  style.  Less 
theoretical,  but  more  practical  than  Plato,  he  lived  a  useful 
and  honorable  life,  highly  respected  by  all  who  had  the  honor 
of  his  acquaintance. 

3.  Gorgias  (circ.  483-375.) — Gorgias  of  Leontini  in  Sicily 
was  sent  by  his  fellow  citizens,  at  the  head  of  the  embassy,  to 
ask  protection  for  their  city  against  the  encroachments  of  the 
Syracusans.  Having  accomplished  the  object  of  his  mission, 
he  chose  Athens  for  his  residence,  at  the  invitation  of  the  citi- 
zens, and 'engaged  in  giving  instruction  in  oratory.  Finally 
he  removed  to  Thessaly,  where  he  continued  to  teach  for  the 
rest  of  his  life.  As  an  orator  he  was  eloquent,  though  florid 
in  style  and  pompous  in  manner. 

In  philosophy  he  was  a  skeptic.  He  maintained  the  fol- 
lowing propositions: 

(1)  Nothing  exists.  (2)  If  anything  does  exist,  it  can- 
not be  known.  (3)  If  anything  exists  arid  is  known,  the  fact 
of  its  existence  cannot  be  communicated.  In  his  support  of 
these  propositions,  Gorgias  displays  unusual  logical  acumen, 
and  in  this  respect  he  compares  well  with  the  Eleatic  Zeno. 

His  proof  of  the  first  proposition,  so  far  as  it  can  be  gath- 
ered and  filled  out  from  a  fragmentary  report,  runs  thus :  If 
anything  exists,  it  is  either  being  or  not-being,  or  both  being 
and  not-being.  It  cannot  be  both  being  and  not-being,  for 
they  are  contradictory;  it  cannot  be  not-being,  for  not-being 
is  the  negation  of  existence;  if  anything  exists,  it  is  therefore 
being.  Now,  if  being  exists,  it  is  either  eternal,  or  it  began 
to  be;  if  it  began  to  be,  then  it  either  sprang  from  non-entity 
into  being,  or  was  produced;  it  did  not  spring  from  non- 
entity into  being,  for  non  entity  being  nothing,  cannot  spring; 
it  was  then  produced,  and  if  produced,  it  was  produced  either 
by  being  or  not-being,  but  not-being  has  no  power  of  pro- 
duction; therefore  it  was  produced  by  being,  which  is  the 
very  thing  to  be  accounted  for,  and  cannot  be  the  explana- 


THE    SOPHISTS  39 

tion  of  itself.  Being,  therefore,  did  not  begin  to  be,  and  hence 
is  eternal,  and  if  eternal,  then  infinite,  a  perfect  solid,  filling 
space  without  any  void,  which  leaves  no  room  for  anything 
else,  and  therefore  excludes  even  the  phenomenal  universe, 
the  only  thing  known  to  be  real;  hence  it  is  false  that  being 
exists;  therefore  it  is  true  that  being  does  not  exist;  that  is, 
nothing  exists. 

Gorgias  assumes  that  an  eternal  thing,  the  infinite  in  time 
involves  the  infinite  in  space,  which  is  not  necessarily  true; 
to  suppose  an  atom  eternal  is  not  to  suppose  it  infinitely  large. 
Now,  something  is,  for  the  phenomenal  is  immediately  and 
certainly  known,  and  is  therefore  real;  hence  something  is 
eternal;  for  if  not,  non-entity  must  have  jumped  into  being, 
which  is  impossible,  since  non-entity,  being  nothing,  cannot 
jump.  There  is,  therefore,  not  only  existence,  but  eternal 
existence.  If  one  should  inquire  for  the  cause  of  eternal  exist- 
ence, the  reply  is,  such  inquiry  supposes  eternal  existence,  not 
eternal.  An  eternal  existence,  having  no  beginning,  requires 
no  cause,  and  in  fact,  excludes  cause;  for  whatever  has  a  cause 
has  a  beginning  and  is  not  eternal. 

In  regard  to  the  second  proposition,  If  anything  exists,  it 
cannot  be  known,  Gorgias  accepts  the  principle  of  Empedocles 
that  the  knowing  subject  and  the  known  object  must  be  of 
like  nature,  also  the  Eleatic  signification  of  being,  as  the 
unchangeable.  He  then  argues  thus:  If  being  is  known 
by  thought,  then  thought  must  be  being,  and  if  thought  is 
being,  then  everything  we  think  exists,  which  is  not  true, 
for  we  can  think  of  the  non-existent,  which  makes  the  non- 
existent existent,  which  is  contradictory  and  impossible. 
Again,  if  thought  is  being,  it  is  unchangeable,  but  we  know 
that  thought  is  fleeting,  and  is,  therefore,  not  unchangeable, 
and  hence  it  cannot  be  being.  Therefore  the  supposition 
which  makes  being  knowable  is  false,  since  it  makes  change- 
able thoughts  unchangeable;  hence  being  is  unknowable; 
that  is,  if  anything  exists,  it  can  not  be  known. 

The  above  reasoning,  instead  of  proving  the  proposition 
that  if  anything  exists  it  cannot  be  known,  which  we  know  to 
be  false,  disproves  rather  the  principle  of  Empedocles,  on 
which  the  reasoning  is  based,  that  the  subject  and  object  of 
knowledge  must  be  of  like  nature;  it  also  disproves  the 
principle  of  the  Eleatics,  that  existing  being  is  unchangeable. 
Finite  existences  are  certainly  variable. 


40  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

In  support  of  the  third  proposition,  that  if  anything  exists 
and  is  known,  it  cannot  be  communicated,  Gorgias  urged 
the  inadequacy  of  language,  that  words,  at  best,  are  neither 
things  nor  the  ideas  of  things,  but  symbols  expressing  im- 
perfectly the  meaning  intended  to  be  conveyed.  The  hearer, 
therefore,  does  not  get  the  exact  thought  of  the  speaker,  and 
the  same  is  true  of  the  reader,  who  does  not  get  the  precise 
meaning  of  the  writer.  Words  are  incapable  of  expressing 
exact  thought. 

The  outcome  of  this  sweeping  criticism  is  skepticism;  for 
if  nothing  can  be  certainly  known,  what  is  called  knowledge  is 
simply  opinion,  and  when  opinions  clash,  there  is  no  test  for 
deciding  which  is  true.  A  low  estimate  is  placed  upon  truth, 
since  truth,  so-called,  is  resolvable  into  mere  probability. 
With  such  views,  a  sophist  would  strive,  not  to  establish  the 
truth,  but  by  plausible  arguments,  to  convince  his  hearers, 
and  gain  the  victory. 

Criticism,  however,  led  to  a  more  thorough  study  of 
thought  itself  in  the  analysis  of  the  reasoning  process,  and  in 
the  discrimination  between  valid  and  invalid  arguments, 
which  appeared  in  the  philosophy  of  Socrates  and  Plato,  and 
culminated  in  the  logic  of  Aristotle. 

4-  Isocrates  (436-338.)  Isocrates  was  not  a  sophist  in  the 
ordinary  acceptation  of  the  term;  he  was  greater,  and  wiser, 
and  better. 

Like  the  majority  of  the  sophists,  he  taught  oratory, 
though  not  the  pettifogging  oratory  of  the  law  courts,  but 
the  eloquence  of  the  statesman.  In  his  teaching,  he  sought 
to  enlarge  the  mental  horizon  of  his  students,  in  giving  them 
broader  views,  by  discoursing,  not  alone  on  Athenian  affairs, 
but  on  Hellenic  interests,  involving  the  welfare  of  all  the 
States  of  Greece. 

He  saw  the  folly  of  the  petty  ambition  of  the  several  Grecian 
cities,  Athens,  Sparta,  and  Thebes,  to  be  the  ruling  power  in 
Greece.  Had  the  States  of  Greece  formed  a  federal  Govern- 
ment, to  which  all  should  be  admitted  on  terms  of  equality, 
the  States  preserving  their  autonomy  in  local  affairs,  and 
cultivating  intelligence  and  moral  virtue,  there  seems  to  be 
no  reason  why  Greece  might  not  have  gained  supremacy 
in  the  world,  and  remained  to  this  day  the  dominant  power. 

It  was  the  desire  of  Isocrates  to  see  the  discordant  States 


THE    SOPHISTS  41 

of  Greece  lay  aside  their  jealousies,  and  unite  under  the 
leadership  of  Philip,  of  Macedon,  for  the  conquest  of  Persia. 
To  this  end  he  labored,  and  even  wrote  letters  to  Philip, 
urging  him  to  make  this  great  conquest. 

In  his  moral  teaching,  he  did  not  elaborate  a  philosophic 
basis  for  Ethics,  but  as  we  cannot  have  exact  knowledge  in 
practical  affairs  of  life,  he  held  that  we  must  be  content  with 
those  opinions,  which  are  most  reasonable,  knowledge,  so- 
called,  is  opinion,  and  truth  is  probability. 

He  was  a  thorough  instructor,  and  trained  the  learner  to 
rely  on  his  own  efforts  in  producing  satisfactory  results. 
His  own  essays  received  that  artistic  finish  in  literary  form, 
which  made  them  models  of  style  in  prose  composition.  His 
merits,  as  a  rhetorician,  were  recognized  by  Cicero,  through 
whom  his  influence  has  extended  to  the  literature  of  modern 
times. 

The  teaching  of  Isocrates  indicates  a  healthy  reaction 
against  the  extreme  teaching  of  the  Sophists,  and  a  transition 
to  sounder  views  and  better  practices.  He  may  be  regarded 
as  a  connecting  link  between  the  Sophistic  and  the  Platonic 
Philosophy. 

Of  other  sophists,  Hippias  of  Ellis,  distinguished  for 
rhetorical  talent  and  scientific  attainments,  said  that  law  is  a 
tyrant,  since  it  forces  men  to  do  contrary  to  nature;  Polus,  a 
rhetorician,  a  disciple  of  Gorgias,  was  distinguished  for  his 
style  of  oratory;  Thrasymachus  held  that  might  makes  right, 
as  seen  by  Plato's  report  of  him  in  the  first  book  of  the 
Republic. 


CHAPTER  VI 

Socrates  and  Immediate  Successors 

1.  Socrates  (469-399).  The  principal  sources  of  informa- 
tion respecting  Socrates,  since  he  left  no  writings  of  his  own, 
are  Xenophon's  Memorabilia  and  the  Dialogues  of  Plato.  In 
addition  to  these  sources,  we  have  also  the  cross-lights  of 
Aristophanes,  the  comic  poet,  and  the  biographical  references 
to  him  made  by  Aristotle. 

Aristophanes,  the  consummate  artist  that  he  was,  found 
Socrates  a  fine  subject  for  caricature,  which  he  employed 
with  telling  effect,  in  the  comedy  of  the  Clouds.  Aristophanes 
stood  for  the  old  regime  in  morals  and  religion,  and  despised 
the  sophists,  with  whom  he  reckoned  Socrates,  not  recogniz- 
ing the  difference.  Aristotle  really  gives  nothing  concerning 
Socrates  not  found  in  Plato,  but  what  he  says  of  him  is  valu- 
able by  way  of  confirmation. 

The  Memorabilia  of  Xenophon  is  apologetic,  intended  to 
vindicate  the  character  of  Socrates  from  the  unjust  reproach 
of  his  enemies,  by  giving  his  conversations  as  they  occurred. 
Xenophon  was  a  warm  friend  and  an  admiring  disciple  of 
Socrates.  He  was  not  a  philosopher,  but  a  historian  and  a 
military  officer,  and  though  he  intended  to  present  Socrates 
in  a  favorable  light,  there  is  no  reason  to  distrust  his  testi- 
mony. Plato  was  a  philosopher,  a  deep  thinker,  and  in  his 
dialogues,  Socrates  stands,  not  only  as  the  advocate  of  his 
own  opinions,  but  also  the  champion  of  those  of  Plato  who, 
in  many  respects,  had  advanced  beyond  the  teachings  of  his 
master,  so  that  it  is  difficult  to  determine  whether  the  opinion 
advanced  is  due  to  Socrates  or  to  Plato.  When  Xenophon 
and  Plato  agree  in  assigning  a  certain  opinion  to  Socrates, 
we  may  rely  on  their  united  testimony  as  substantially  true. 

Socrates  was  the  son  of  Sophroniscus,  a  statuary,  and  of 
Phaenarete,  a  midwife.  He  for  sometime  followed  the  pro- 
fession of  his  father.  A  draped  group  of  the  Graces,  pre- 
served in  the  Acropolis  to  the  time  of  Pausanius,  the  historian, 

42 


SOCRATES  AND  IMMEDIATE  SUCCESSORS    43 

A.  D.  160,  was  considered  to  be  the  work  of  Socrates.  In 
delivering  men  of  their  latent  thoughts,  he  likened  his  pro- 
fession to  that  of  his  mother. 

His  appearance  was  not  prepossessing.  His  low  stature, 
corpulent  figure,  protruding  stomach,  thick  neck,  flat  turned- 
up  nose,  spreading  nostrils,  projecting  eyes,  at  once  attracted 
attention,  and  quite  likely  incited  sarcastic  remarks  of  many 
whom  he  daily  encountered. 

Socrates,  no  doubt,  received  the  ordinary  education  of  the 
Athenian  youth,  and  probably,  for  a  time,  turned  his  atten- 
tion to  physical  science,  which  he  found  to  be  unsatisfactory, 
consisting  merely  of  speculations,  and  yielding  no  valuable 
results.  The  secrets  of  nature  he  regarded  as  beyond  the 
reach  of  human  knowledge,  and  to  pry  into  them  was  in  his 
opinion,  presumptuous  and  offensive  to  the  gods. 

He  was  undoubtedly  acquainted  with  the  astronomical 
theories  of  Anaxagoras,  and  his  doctrine  of  the  Nous,  also 
with  the  physical  opinions  of  Archelaus,  a  disciple  of  Anaxag- 
oras. He  probably  had  listened  to  the  lectures  'of  Protag- 
oras, and  took  lessons  in  language  of  Prodicus. 

While  the  teaching  of  the  sophists  gave  the  skill  requisite 
to  secure  victory  in  disputation,  and  to  achieve  a  successful 
career  in  life,  it  led  to  an  indifference  to  truth  and  a  laxity  of 
morals,  which  was  utterly  distasteful  to  Socrates,  who  there- 
fore turned  his  attention  to  the  study  of  man,  chiefly  in  his 
intellectual,  moral,  social  and  political  relations.  He  did 
not  call  himself  a  sophist,  a  wise  man,  for  he  asserted  his 
ignorance,  but  a  philosopher,  a  lover  of  wisdom,  a  learner 
seeking  after  knowledge.  As  an  investigator,  he  sought 
truth  wherever  it  was  to  be  found,  especially  truth  pertain- 
ing to  man.  Socrates,  therefore,  accepted  the  precept  in- 
scribed on  the  temple  at  Delphi,  yvw0i  o-envrov,  know 
thyself,  as  the  injunction  most  important  to  be  obeyed,  and 
was  the  first  to  proclaim  the  sentiment:  "  The  proper  study 
of  mankind  is  man. " 

The  Pythian  oracle  had  declared  him  to  be  the  wisest  of 
all  men.  Socrates  wondered  how  this  could  be,  when  he  was 
conscious  of  his  own  ignorance.  To  test  the  truth  of  the 
oracle,  and  thus  to  confirm  his  faith,  Socrates  questioned 
various  persons  reputed  for  wisdom,  as  statesmen,  poets, 
sophists,  and  found  them  ignorant  respecting  the  very  things 


44  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

of  which  they  professed  to  have  knowledge;  yet  he  failed  to 
convince  them  of  their  ignorance,  though  in  attempting  to 
do  so,  he  made  them  his  enemies.  He  then  concluded  that 
the  oracle  was  right  in  declaring  him  to  be  the  wisest  of 
men,  for  he  alone  knew  his  own  ignorance. 

He  was  a  great  humorist,  and  this  gave  a  relish  to  his 
conversation  to  the  delight  of  his  friends;  but  he  made  many 
enemies,by  occasionally  resorting  to  irony,  or  biting  sarcasm. 

He  professed  to  be  guided  by  a  Daemon,  that  is  by  a  genius, 
or  spirit,  whose  voice  he  implicitly  obeyed.  What  was  this 
genius?  This  is  a  question  which  has  occasioned  not  a  little 
controversy.  Was  it  a  guardian  angel,  his  conscience,  or  the 
reflex  of  his  own  thoughts?  It  is  sometimes  said  that  Socrates 
heard  this  voice  only  in  prohibition,  restraining  him  from 
doing  anything  that  was  not  best  to  be  done;  but  that  he 
received  positive  instructions  to  pursue  a  certain  line  of  con- 
duct is  evident  from  what  he  said  to  the  judges,  at  his  trial, 
as  reported  by  Plato  in  the  Apology :  "  I  should  tell  you,  with 
all  respect  and  affection,  that  I  will  obey  the  god  rather  than 
you,  and  that  I  will  persist,  until  my  dying  day,  in  cross- 
questioning  you,  exposing  your  want  of  wisdom  and  virtue, 
and  reproaching  you  till  the  defect  is  remedied. " 

Socrates  was  not  a  dogmatic  philosopher,  proclaiming  his 
own  opinions  as  if  they  were  known  to  be  true,  neither  was 
he  a  teacher  in  the  sense  that  he  poured  knowledge  into  the 
minds  of  his  pupils,  but  he  was  an  educator,  in  that,  by 
skillful  questions,  he  drew  out  what  was  latent  in  the  mind  of 
the  learner.  The  thing  that  was  latent,  however,  was  not 
the  knowledge,  but  the  ability  to  know,  or  the  act  of  knowing. 
First,  however,  he  led  him,  by  cross-questions,  to  see  his 
ignorance,  or  convinced  him  of  holding  erroneous  opinions, 
so  that  his  mind,  free  from  error,  was  in  condition  to  be  led, 
step  by  step,  to  apprehend  the  truth  for  himself.  The 
learner  then  did  not  passively  receive  the  truth,  but  made 
the  discovery  by  his  own  thought. 

Socrates  accepted,  with  the  sophists,  the  principle  that 
man  is  the  measure  of  the  universe,  but  differed  from  them  in 
regard  to  the  meaning  attached  to  the  word  man.  By  man 
the  sophists  meant  the  individual  man,  who  knew  immedi- 
ately only  his  own  sensations,  which  are  fleeting,  and  differ 
in  different  men;  but  by  man,  Socrates  meant  the  generic 


SOCRATES  AND  IMMEDIATE  SUCCESSORS    45 

man,  or  all  men  having,  not  only  fleeting  sensations,  but 
reason,  which  is  essentially  the  same  in  all,  and  that  this 
common  endowment,  reason,  is  the  essential  characteristic  of 
man,  and  is  a  far  better  measure  of  the  universe  than  the 
changing  sensations.  As  each  normal  man  has  reason,  in 
common  with  other  individuals  of  the  genus,  it  is  possible, 
therefore,  to  reach  conclusions  that  will  command  general 
assent. 

What  is  the  end  to  be  sought?  The  sophists  answered 
pleasure,  sensational  enjoyment,  but  pleasure  is  best  ac- 
quired by  a  successful  career,  by  securing  wealth,  attaining 
to  a  high  social  position,  political  power  or  influence.  These 
things,  according  to  the  sophists,  are  the  benefits  of  virtue. 
The  value  of  these  benefits  Socrates  did  not  deny,  but  con- 
tended that  there  are  other  benefits,  and  of  a  higher  order — 
the  rational  satisfactions  that  come  from  conduct  that  accords 
with  the  dictates  of  reason.  Though  Socrates  makes  happi- 
ness the  ultimate  end  of  right  conduct,  yet  it  is  not  chiefly 
hedonic  pleasure,  which  is  not  objectionable,  if  properly 
restricted  to  what  is  morally  lawful,  but  chiefly  the  pure 
satisfaction  resulting  from  the  discovery  or  apprehension  of 
truth,  from  the  consciousness  of  rectitude,  from  noble  achieve- 
ment or  heroic  effort.  Virtue  is  to  be  pursued,  because  it 
alone  gives  rational  satisfaction,  which  is  the  highest  happi- 
ness, the  ultimate  good.  To  be  worthy  of  happiness  is  happi- 
ness itself. 

Since  a  virtuous  life  yields  the  best  results,  why  do  not  men 
pursue  virtue?  Socrates  answered,  they  do  not,  because  of 
ignorance.  He  reasoned  thus:  All  men  seek  happiness;  but 
virtue  is  the  only  means  to  true  happiness;  therefore,  all  men 
would  be  virtuous,  or  do  right,  if  they  only  knew  what  is 
right;  hence  virtue  can  be  taught,  and  is  identical  with  true 
knowledge.  This  reasoning  would  hold  good,  if  all  men  were 
like  Socrates,  who  was  conscientious,  and  had  complete  con- 
trol of  himself;  but  he  seemed  not  to  realize  the  strength  of 
appetite  in  the  average  man,  nor  the  pressure  of  desire  for 
immediate  gratification,  while  the  rewards  of  virtue  are  less 
intense,  and  very  often  somewhat  remote.  It  is,  however, 
true  that  assured  high  moral  conduct  requires  the  supremacy 
of  reason. 

Socratcc  drew  around  him  a  throng  of  enthusiastic  dis- 
ciples of  the  better  class  of  the  young  men  of  Athens.  He 


46  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

frequented  the  gymnasia  and  the  market  places,  and  con- 
versed with  any  one  willing  to  hear  him  or  to  engage  in  argu- 
ment. A  crowd  soon  gathered  to  listen  to  the  dispute,  or 
to  enjoy  the  confusion  of  his  defeated  antagonist,  who  was 
drawn  on,  by  one  skillful  question  after  another,  till  he  was 
entangled  in  a  jungle  of  contradictions;  but  after  exposing 
error,  Socrates  led  on  to  positive  truth.  Socrates  showed  the 
importance  of  the  classification  of  objects  into  genera,  species 
and  individuals,  and  taught  how  to  frame  correct  definitions 
by  referring  the  object  defined  to  its  genus,  and  giving  its 
characteristic  or  differential  quality.  He  reasoned  from 
analogy,  also  by  induction;  but  he  differed  from  Bacon,  a 
leader  in  modern  science,  in  some  respects :  Bacon  said  inter- 
rogate nature  and  make  your  inductions  from  external 
phenomena.  Socrates  said  interrogate  man,  and  make  your 
inductions  from  internal  phenomena.  Bacon  said  study 
things.  Socrates  said  study  thoughts.  Both  performed 
a  service  of  inestimable  value. 

The  method  of  Socrates  was  such  as  to  make  enemies;  and 
though  he  was  a  law-abiding  citizen,  and  had  been  a  brave 
soldier,  he  was  accused  of  not  worshipping  the  gods,  whom 
the  city  worships,  of  introducing  new  divinities  of  his  own, 
and  of  corrupting  the  youth  of  Athens.  He  was  brought 
to  trial  on  these  charges,  and  found  guilty.  Making  no 
effort  to  conciliate  his  judges,  but  rather  to  exasperate  them, 
he  was  condemned  to  suffer  death.  The  part  of  his  speech 
he  made  after  his  sentence,  as  reported  by  Plato  in  the  Apol- 
ogy is  a  masterly  and  noble  effort,  and  in  passages  rises  even 
to  the  grandeur  of  sublimity. 

Socrates  could  not  be  put  to  death,  according  to  law,  till 
after  the  ship  should  return  that  had  sailed  to  Delos  the  day 
before,  for  the  festival  of  Apollo.  He  remained  in  prison 
during  the  interval,  which  was  thirty  days,  calmly  conversing 
with  his  friends,  as  reported  by  Plato  in  the  Phaedo  and  the 
Crito.  He  drank  the  poison  hemlock  without  change  of 
countenance,  walked  about  till  his  legs  became  weary,  then 
lay  down  and  calmly  fell  asleep.  Thus  died  Socrates,  the 
first  of  the  Ethical  Philosophers. 

It  now  remains  to  summarize :  Socrates  held  that  man  has 
not  only  a  sensibility,  with  varying  sensations,  but  also  a 
common  rational  nature,  and  can  apprehend  universal, 


SOCRATES  AND  IMMEDIATE  SUCCESSORS    47 

necessary  truth;  that  with  this  view  of  the  generic  man,  it 
can  be  truthfully  held  that  man  is  the  measure  of  the  universe; 
that  it  is  important  to  classify  things  into  genera,  species, 
and  individuals,  to  form  true  concepts  of  things,  and  to  em- 
body these  concepts  in  true  definitions;  that  reasoning  by 
induction,  deduction  and  analogy  reveals  the  truth;  that  the 
mind  must  see  its  ignorance,  and  relieve  itself  from  false 
opinions,  before  it  can  form  true  opinions;  that  self  knowledge 
is  the  most  important  knowledge;  that  vice  is  the  consequence 
of  ignorance,  and  virtue  of  knowledge;  that  the  ultimate  end 
is  rational  happiness;  that  happiness  is  secured  by  knowing 
the  wrong  and  avoiding  it,  and  by  knowing  and  doing  what  is 
right;  that  the  right  is  the  rational  pursuit  of  the  ultimate 
end;  that  Ethics  is  the  most  important  of  all  the  sciences, 
and  that  the  virtues  it  inculcates  are  to  be  exhibited  in  the 
practical  conduct  of  life. 

2.  Immediate  Successors  of  Socrates.  These  are  Euclid, 
Aristippus  and  Antisthenes. 

(1)  Euclid  (circ.  445.)  Euclid,  of  Megara,  was  the  found- 
er of  the  Megaric  school.  He  is  not  to  be  confounded  with 
Euclid,  the  famous  mathematician  of  Alexandria.  Euclid 
was  a  zealous  disciple  of  Socrates.  By  diligent  study  of  the 
works  of  Parmenides  and  Zeno,  the  Eleatic,  he  became  well 
versed  in  Eleatic  philosophy.  He  was  so  ardent  a  disciple 
of  Socrates,  that  though  the  citizens  of  Megara  were  forbid- 
den, on  pain  of  death,  to  visit  Athens,  Euclid,  disguised  as 
a  woman,  came  to  Athens  by  night  and  listened  with  delight 
to  the  conversations  of  Socrates.  After  the  death  of  Socrates, 
his  disciples,  through  fear  of  violence  from  the  Athenians, 
took  refuge  with  Euclid,  .for  a  time,  at  Megara. 

The  foundation  of  the  Megaric  philosophy  was  the  com- 
bination of  Being,  the  metaphysical  principle  of  the  Eleatics 
with  the  Good,  the  moral  principle  of  Socrates.  Being,  the 
immutable,  identical  with  the  Nous  of  Anaxagoras,  or  with 
</>pdn/o-ts,  wisdom,  or  0eos,  of  Socrates,  the  one  Good, 
iv  TO  ayaOov,  is  with  Euclid,  the  only  existent.  Evil  is 
not-being,  the  non-existent.  The  Good,  then,  is  identical 
with  the  God  of  Theism,  with  the  ultimate  reality  whose 
existence,  as  Spencer  declares,  is  of  all  things  the  most  certain, 
or  with  that  power  in  the  universe,  not  of  ourselves,  which 
works  for  righteousness,  according  to  Matthew  Arnold. 


48  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  combination  of  the  Eleatic  Being  with  the  Socratic 
Good  can  be  effected  only  by  attributing  goodness  to  being; 
but  this  Being,  vous,  or  0cos,  is  objective,  while  the  ulti- 
mate good,  according  to  Socrates,  is  subjective,  that  is, 
happiness  or  rational  enjoyment.  The  two  principles  can 
not  be  identified,  but  can  be  related  as  cause  and  effect. 
Let  the  vous,  the  0cos,  the  objective  goodness,  be  appre- 
hended by  reason,  and  loved  by  the  affections  of  any  man, 
who  renounces  vice  and  cherishes  virtue,  and  the  result  of 
this  mystic  union  of  the  divine  and  the  human,  is  religious 
experience,  the  ultimate  good,  the  highest  enjoyment  of 
which  man,  as  a  rational  being,  is  susceptible.  This  view, 
if  fully  comprehended,  is  likely  to  be  acceptable  to  all  Theists. 
The  good  is  genuine  religious  experience. 

Euclid's  dialectic,  or  science  of  thought,  differs  from  that 
of  Socrates,  in  that  he  repudiated  analogical  reasoning  as 
unsound,  while  he  employed  the  reductio  ad  absurdum  of 
Zeno,  which  Socrates  regarded  as  sophistical,  yet  it  is  power- 
ful when  used  in  refutation. 

Analogy  and  induction  may  be  advantageously  employed, 
if  regarded  as  giving  only  probable  conclusions,  to  be  tested 
by  experience  or  experiment.  The  reductio  ad  absurdum 
method  is  a  powerful  form  of  reasoning,  based  on  the  prin- 
ciple that  no  two  truths  can  conflict  with  each  other,  or  that 
all  truths  exist  in  harmony.  This  is  a  necessary  principle  of 
reason. 

The  chief  followers  of  Euclid  were  Eubulides,  the  inventor 
of  several  paradoxes,  the  instructor  of  Demosthenes  and  the 
opponent  of  Aristotle;  Diodorus  Chronus,  who  attempted  to 
prove  the  impossibility  of  motion;  and  Stilpo,  famous  for  his 
lectures. 

The  disputatious  character  of  the  Megaric  philosophers 
fastened  upon  them  the  name  eptorwcot,  wranglers,  and 
their  speculations  degenerated  into  trivial  sophisms,  as  for 
example  the  Sorites,  or  heap,  which  runs  thus :  Is  one  grain  of 
corn  a  heap?  No;  are  two  grains?  No;  are  three  grains?  and 
so  on,  till  the  answer  is,  yes,  there  is  now  a  heap.  Then 
one  grain  makes  the  difference  between  a  heap  and  no  heap 
at  all,  which  is  ridiculous,  if  not  absurd;  but  if  it  is  said,  no 
number  of  grains  will  make  a  heap,  that  is  still  more  ridicu- 
lous. 


SOCRATES  AND  IMMEDIATE  SUCCESSORS    49 

The  chief  merit  of  Euclid  and  of  the  Megaric  School  rests 
in  making  being,  the  wws,  or  0eos,  the  objective  good, 
and  harmony  with  universal  being  the  subjective.  The  sub- 
jective good,  according  to  Socrates,  is  rational  satisfaction. 
The  objective  0eos,  as  cause,  acting  on  the  rational  and 
moral  nature  of  man,  produces  the  highest  good,  the  most 
perfect  satisfaction  of  which  a  human  being  is  susceptible. 
The  highest  objective  good  is  God  himself;  the  highest  sub- 
jective good  is  the  enjoyment  of  the  love  of  God  which  he 
bestows  only  on  those  who  pursue  truth  and  love  righteous- 
ness. 

(2)  Aristippus  (435-356) .  Aristippus  of  Cyrene,  a  lux- 
urious city  of  northern  Africa,  was  the  founder  of  the  Cy- 
renaic  school  of  philosophy.  Sent  on  business  to  Greece  by 
his  father  Aristocles,  a  wealthy  merchant  of  Cyrene,  he 
attended  the  Olympic  games,  where  he  heard  of  Socrates, 
and  attracted  by  his  fame,  he  went  to  Athens  and  united 
with  the  other  disciples  of  the  great  master. 

Aristippus  accepted  the  teaching  of  Socrates,  that  happiness 
is  the  ultimate  end  of  conduct;  but  in  the  term  happiness, 
Socrates  included  all  kinds  of  enjoyment  from  sensational 
pleasure  to  rational  satisfaction.  To  render  the  conception 
of  happiness  more  definite,  Aristippus  restricted  it  to  sensa- 
tional pleasure,  for  even  the  aesthetic  pleasures  attending 
beauty  is  derived  through  the  senses.  While  holding  pleasure 
to  be  the  only  good,  and  pain  the  only  evil,  Aristippus  re- 
commended moderation,  or  self-control  in  the  pursuit  of 
pleasure.  He  held  that  both  pleasure  and  pain  are  positive; 
each  is  more  than  the  absence  of  the  other. 

Aristotle  calls  Aristippus  a  sophist,  probably  because  he 
accepted  the  principle,  that  we  have  no  certain  knowledge  of 
external  objects,  but  only  of  our  sensations,  and  that  there 
is  no  common  criterion  of  truth,  but  each  person,  knowing 
only  his  own  sensations,  is  for  himself  the  measure  of  the 
universe.  In  this  we  detect  the  influence  of  Protagoras 
but  in  devoting  his  attention  to  moral  conduct,  rather  than 
to  physical  science,  he  was  a  disciple  of  Socrates.  He  held, 
with  Socrates,  that  the  supreme  aim  of  each  man  is  to  secure 
his  own  happiness;  but  Aristippus  found  happiness  in  pleas- 
ure, while  Socrates  found  it  chiefly  in  rational  enjoyment. 
Aristippus,  however,  advocated  justice,  since  injustice  does 


50  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

not  pay;  for  it  incites  retaliation,  and  awakens  in  the  wrong- 
doer apprehension  of  danger;  therefore  to  secure  peace  of 
mind,  it  is  advisable  to  obey  the  laws. 

The  philosophy  of  Aristippus  is,  therefore,  a  combination 
of  the  sophistic  and  Socratic  teaching;  but  considered  as  a 
development  of  the  Socratic  philosophy,  it  is  partial,  or  one- 
sided. 

The  reason  why  the  Cyrenaic  philosophy  advocated  the 
pursuit  of  pleasure,  is  found  in  Aristippus  himself,  who  did 
not  take  happiness  as  embracing  both  sensational  pleasure 
and  rational  enjoyment.  Aristippus  was  by  nature  inclined 
to  pleasure,  and  he  had  formed  the  habit  of  luxurious  indul- 
gence; he  would,  therefore,  interpret  happiness  to  mean  sen- 
sational pleasure  rather  than  rational  enjoyment;  hence  the 
drift  of  the  Cyrenaic  philosophy  to  seek  present  momentary 
pleasure;  for  the  past  is  gone,  and  the  future  is  uncertain. 

Aristippus  taught  philosophy  to  his  daughter,  Arete,  who 
in  turn  taught  it  to  her  son,  Aristippus,  the  younger.  The 
Cyrenaic  philosophy  was  the  fore-runner  of  the  Epicurean 
philosophy. 

(3)  Antisthenes  (444-371).  Antisthenes,  the  founder  of 
the  Cynic  philosophy,  was  the  son  of  an  Athenian  of  the  same 
name,  and  a  Thracian  mother.  He  took  lessons  in  Rhetoric 
of  Gorgias,  and  afterwards  became  a  disciple  of  Socrates, 
whom  he  greatly  admired  for  his  independence  in  thought 
and  stern  moral  character. 

After  the  death  of  Socrates,  he  opened  a  school  to  which 
foreigners  and  half-breeds  were  admitted  in  the  gymnasium 
called  Cynosarges,  from  which  the  name  of  the  sect  is  sup- 
posed to  be  derived,  though  some  derive  it  from  *vwy,  a 
dog,  on  account  of  the  snappish  disposition  of  the  Cynics. 

Instead  of  making  pleasure  the  object  of  pursuit,  as  did 
Aristippus,  Antisthenes  regarded  virtue  as  the  only  thing 
worthy  of  human  effort,  since  it  alone  gives  rational  satis- 
faction. Pleasure  he  regarded  as  something  to  be  despised 
and  avoided.  Hence  the  Cynic  School  is  the  opposite  of  the 
Cyrenaic,  though  both  claimed  to  be  based  011  the  teaching 
of  Socrates.  The  explantion  is  this:  Socrates  made  happi- 
ness the  ultimate  end  of  action;  but  happiness  is  a  genus 
resolvable  into  two  species,  sensational  pleasure  and  rational 
satisfaction.  Aristippus  took  the  first,  sensational  pleasure, 


SOCRATES  AND  IMMEDIATE  SUCCESSORS    51 

as  representing  the  Socratic  conception  of  happiness,  and 
Antisthenes  took  the  second,  the  rational  satisfaction  of 
virtue. 

Antisthenes  despised  effeminacy,  luxury,  and  even  beauty, 
and  considered  it  virtuous  to  deny  himself  all  pleasure,  to 
endure  pain  and  hardship,  to  live  on  coarse  food,  and  for 
dress,  to  wear  a  single  rough  cloak,  ragged  and  dirty;  yet  he 
was  haughty  and  vain,  so  much  so  that  Socrates  said  to  him : 
"  I  see  thy  vanity,  Antisthenes,  peering  through  the  holes  of 
thy  cloak."  No  doubt,  Socrates,  by  his  own  example,  gave 
some  countenance  to  the  extreme  asceticism  of  Antisthenes. 
Though  Socrates  claimed  no  merit  for  his  manner  of  dress, 
yet  in  him  it  was  a  merit,  since  he  practised  economy  that  he 
might  be  able  to  teach  gratuitously. 

Admiring  virtue  for  its  own  sake,  and  despising  vice, 
Antisthenes  had  strength  of  will  and  energy  of  character  to 
carry  his  purpose  into  execution.  He  had  some  literary 
ability,  as  his  writings  were  commended  by  competent 
judges.  When  asked  to  state  the  advantage  of  Philosophy, 
he  replied:  "Philosophy  enables  a  man  to  be  company  for 
himself." 

Antisthenes  objected  to  definitions,  as  expressing  mere 
subjective  impressions,  and  not  the  objective  attributes  of 
things,  and  for  this  Aristotle  called  him  an  ignoramus. 
The  truth  is,  a  definition  expresses  our  knowledge  of  an 
object,  and  not  simply  our  sensations  or  impressions;  at  least, 
a  definition  expresses  our  understanding  of  an  object,  our 
conception,  opinion,  or  belief.  Of  course,  there  is  liability 
to  error,  in  our  judgment;  that  is  possible;  but  there  is  a  prob- 
ability of  correctness;  it  is  the  best  we  can  do.  Antisthenes 
carried  the  view  of  Socrates,  that  pleasure  is  inferior  to 
rational  satisfaction,  to  the  extreme  of  regarding  pleasure 
as  pernicious,  as  an  evil  to  be  avoided.  A  proper  discrimina- 
tion between  lawful  and  unlawful  pleasures  sets  the  whole 
matter  in  a  true  light. 

(4)  Diogenes  (circ.  412-328).  Diogenes  was  the  son  of  a 
banker  of  Sinope.  The  father  having  been  convicted  of 
debasing  the  coinage,  the  son,  implicated  in  the  same  act, 
fled  to  Athens.  Reduced  from  affluence  to  poverty,  and 
attracted  by  the  life  of  Antisthenes,  and  his  praise  of  poverty, 
Diogenes  offered  himself  to  Antisthenes,  as  a  pupil.  Antis- 


52  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

thenes  repelled  him,  and  raising  his  knotted  staff,  threatened 
to  strike.  Diogenes  replied:  "Strike,  but  your  staff  is  not 
hard  enough  to  conquer  my  perseverance."  The  reply  won 
the  admiration  of  Antisthenes,  and  gained  the  day,  and 
Antisthenes  received  Diogenes  as  a  disciple.  As  long  as 
Antisthenes  lived,  Diogenes  remained  with  him,  and  then 
set  up  for  himself,  living  in  a  tub,  which  served  for  a  house. 
The  Cynics  seemed  never  so  happy  as  when  they  were 
miserable. 

Diogenes  was  ignorant,  and  contributed  nothing  to  philoso- 
phy. Though  filthy  and  disgusting,  he  gained  reputation 
for  wit,  and  the  keenness  of  his  sarcasm.  The  following  will 
serve  as  specimens:  Going  through  the  streets  of  Athens  in 
the  daytime,  with  a  lighted  torch,  peering  into  the  faces  of 
those  he  met,  and  being  asked  what  he  was  looking  for,  replied 
a  man.  When  Zeno's  argument  against  motion  was  repeated 
to  him,  he  answered  it  by  getting  up  and  walking.  Alexan- 
der going  to  visit  him,  found  him  in  his  tub,  and  inquired: 
"What  can  I  do  for  you?"  Diogenes  replied:  "Get  out  of 
my  sun-shine."  Taken  captive  by  pirates,  he  was  asked 
what  he  could  do,  replied:  "Govern  men,  therefore,  sell  me 
to  a  man  who  needs  a  master. "  Xeniades,  a  wealthy  Corin- 
thian, struck  with  this  reply,  bought  him,  gave  him  his 
liberty,  and  made  him  tutor  to  his  children. 

Sometimes  he  found  more  than  his  match,  as  when  he 
entered  unbidden  into  the  parlors  of  Plato,  who  was  enter- 
taining company,  and  stamped,  with  his  dirty  feet,  on  the 
rich  carpets,  saying,  "Thus  I  trample  on  the  pride  of  Plato. " 
"Yes,"  said  Plato,  "with  greater  pride." 


CHAPTER   VII 

Plato 

Plato  (427-347.)  Plato,  the  son  of  Ariston,  was  a  descend- 
ant of  Solon,  and  a  relative  of  Critias,  one  of  the  thirty  tyrants 
of  Athens.  His  name,  at  first,  was  Aristocles,  which  was 
changed  to  Plato,  on  account,  it  is  said,  of  the  breadth  of  his 
shoulders,  or  perhaps  of  his  forehead. 

Having  received  a  good  elementary  education,  he  became, 
at  the  age  of  twenty,  a  disciple  of  Socrates  with  whom  he  con- 
tinued ten  years.  After  the  death  of  Socrates,  he  retired 
with  Euclid  to  Megara;  thence  he  went  to  Gyrene,  where  he 
studied  mathematics  with  Theodorus;  from  Gyrene  he  went 
to  Egypt,  and  conversed  with  the  priests,  but  was  not  favor- 
ably impressed  with  their  wisdom.  He  also  visited  Italy  and 
made  himself  acquainted  with  the  philosophy  of  Pythagoras. 

Returning  to  Athens,  after  an  absence  of  about  eight 
years,  he  found  young  men  waiting  for  his  instruction,  and  he 
opened  a  school  in  the  grove  of  Acadedemus,  a  beautiful 
park,  adorned  with  trees,  and  containing  a  temple  suitable 
as  a  place  for  giving  instruction,  which  was  presented  to  him 
as  a  gift  from  his  friends.  Here  he  lived,  and  taught,  and 
wrote,  for  the  greater  part  of  forty  years,  and  in  this  delight- 
ful retreat,  his  disciples  and  friends  gathered  for  instruction 
and  conversation. 

In  the  fortieth  year  of  his  age,  he  visited  Sicily,  chiefly  to 
see  Mt.  Etna,  and  went  to  Syracuse  at  the  invitation  of  the 
tyrant  Dionysius,  who,  taking  offense  at  the  plainness  of 
Plato's  speech,  ordered  him  to  be  sold  as  a  slave.  Anniceris 
of  Gyrene  bought  him,  and  immediately  gave  hinrhis  liberty. 
Plato  visited  Syracuse  in  the  reign  of  Dionysius  II,  hoping  to 
obtain  from  him  territory  sufficient  for  a  colony  in  which  he 
could  put  his  political  theories  to  a  practical  test,  but  the 
land  was  not  secured.  He  visited  Syracuse  a  third  time 
he  might  reconcile  Dionysius  and  his  uncle,  Dion,  wl^o 
become  enemies,  but  this  mission  also  proved 


54  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Plato  was  amply  equipped  for  his  work,  having  a  mind  of 
great  breadth  and  depth,  a  wonderful  command  of  language, 
an  extensive  knowledge  of  all  the  systems  of  philosophy,  and 
of  the  learning  and  literature  of  the  age.  With  Parmenides 
the  Eleatic,  he  accepted  being  as  the  immutable  truth  of 
reason,  with  Pythagoras,  number  and  mathematics,  with 
Heraclitus,  becoming,  ceaseless  change,  the  knowledge  gained 
by  the  senses,  with  Anaxagoras  the  vovs,  with  Socrates, 
Ethics  and  the  dialectic  method.  Plato  is  equal  to  the  sum 
of  all  of  them,  so  that  we  may  write : 

Plato  =  Parmenides  -f  Pythagoras  +  Heraclitus  +  Anaxag- 
oras +  Socrates. 

In  the  dialogues  which  are  generally  accepted  as  genuine, 
Plato  discussed  the  leading  doctrines  of  Parmenides,  Pythag- 
oras, Heraclitus,  Anaxagoras,  the  sophists,  and  subjected 
them  to  the  searching  criticism  of  the  Socratic  method. 
When  Socrates  is  introduced,  as  one  of  the  interlocutors,  he 
may,  in  general,  be  taken  to  represent  the  views  of  Plato. 

The  dialogue  form  largely  obviates  the  objection  raised  by 
Plato  himself  against  the  method  of  giving  instruction 
through  books,  that  books  can  not  talk,  nor  answer  questions, 
nor  satisfy  doubts,  nor  silence  objections,  but  in  a  dialogue, 
objections  can  be  anticipated  and  answered,  and  every  phase 
of  the  subject  presented  and  discussed.  The  fertile  mind  of 
Plato  could  do  this,  so  that  the  dialogue,  in  his  hands,  is  a 
vivid  representation  of  an  actual,  earnest  discussion. 

All  of  value  in  preceding  systems  were  introduced  into 
these  dialogues,  as  well  as  many  of  their  errors,  and  sub- 
jected to  a  searching  criticism,  by  arguments,  pro  and  con, 
presented  by  selected  champions.  This  is  well  shown  in  the 
first  book  of  the  Republic,  where  the  view  of  the  sophist, 
that  justice  is  the  will  of  the  strongest,  or  that  might  makes 
right,  is  presented,  with  great  assurance  by  Thrasymachus, 
and  ably  criticised  and  refuted  by  Socrates. 

We  shall  make  no  attempt  to  classify  the  dialogues  of 
Plato  according  to  their  subject-matter,  which  has  often 
been  tried  with  no  accordant  results,  but  shall  endeavor  to 
present  the  method  and  the  leading  doctrines,  so  far  as  posi- 
tive doctrines  can  be  found  in  the  writings  of  a  consummate 
critic,  who  takes  more  interest  in  the  discussion  than  in  the 
conclusion,  or  leaves  it  without  explicit  statement.  Our 


PLATO  55 

criticisms  deal  with  the  doctrines  generally  accepted  as 
Plato's,  rather  than  with  dates  or  the  genuineness  and 
authenticity  of  documents. 

To  return  to  the  Republic,  whatever  may  have  been  Plato's 
theories  of  civil  government,  his  more  mature  political  views 
are  presented  in  the  Laws,  the  Republic  presents  an  ideal 
government,  designed  rather  to  teach  ethics  than  politics. 
In  a  civil  state  there  are  workmen,  soldiers,  and  ruling  classes; 
and  the  health  and  prosperity  of  the  state  depends  on  the 
harmonious  co-operation  of  these  classes  according  to  the 
principles  of  justice,  each  class  performing  its  own  functions, 
and  refraining  from  encroaching  on  the  rights  of  the  other 
classes.  The  virtues  of  the  working  class  are  industry, 
temperance,  and  obedience;  the  virtue  of  the  soldiers  is 
courage  and  prompt  action,  so  that  they  may  assist  the  rulers 
in  maintaining  order  and  repelling  invasion;  the  virtue  of 
the  rulers  is  wisdom,  so  that  they  may  pass  wholesome  laws, 
and  justly  govern  the  state. 

According  to  this  analogy,  Plato  treats  of  the  individual, 
who  has  sensations,  appetites  and  desires,  which  liken  him 
to  the  workmen.  The  individual  also  has  combative  pro- 
pensities, corresponding  to  the  courage  of  the  soldiers;  and 
above  these,  he  has  reason,  represented  by  the  wisdom  of 
the  rulers  in  the  state,  who  should  be  characterized  by  prac- 
tical sagacity. 

The  Republic  may  be  regarded  as  a  polemic  against  the 
sophistic  view  of  virtue.  The  sophist  regarded  man  as 
individual,  as  sensational,  and  his  good  as  pleasure,  and 
hence  their  ethical  precept:  Get  as  much  pleasure  out  of  life 
as  possible;  but  this  precept  naturally  leads  to  lawless  grati- 
fication, and  this  was  the  tendency  of  their  teaching,  though 
some  of  the  wisest  of  the  sophists  recommended  obedience 
to  the  laws,  for  the  sake  of  avoiding  trouble;  but  as  the  law 
is  conventional,  be  unjust  if  it  will  bring  you  wealth  or  honor, 
provided  you  can  conceal  your  injustice,  and  so  escape  lia- 
bility to  the  law,  and  the  punishment  consequent  on  detec- 
tion. 

On  the  other  hand,  Plato  taught  that,  as  the  prosperity 
of  the  state  is  secured  through  the  wisdom  of  the  rulers,  and 
the  subordination  of  the  other  classes,  each  class  respecting 
the  rights  of  the  other  classes,  according  to  justice,  so  the 


56  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

welfare  of  the  individual  requires  that  reason  should  direct, 
the  will  enforce,  the  appetites  and  desires  submit,  all  working 
together  in  the  healthful  harmony  of  the  complete  virtues  of 
temperance,  courage  and  wisdom;  and  this  organic  virtue 
of  justice  constitutes  the  health  and  the  happiness,  and 
greatest  welfare  of  every  man,  and  the  welfare  of  the  state. 
The  sophist  held  that  injustice,  when  concealed,  would  be 
to  the  individual,  preferable  to  justice,  if  it  brought  greater 
worldly  prosperity;  but  Plato  denies  this  by  affirming  that 
injustice  mars  the  symmetry  of  the  soul,  introduces  discord, 
engenders  disease,  and  destroys  its  peace;  hence  no  external 
advantage  can  be  a  sufficient  recompense  for  the  loss  of  the 
virtue  of  justice.  Thus,  while  injustice  corrupts,  disorgan- 
izes, degrades,  condemns,  destroys,  justice  gives  peace  of 
mind,  the  consciousness  of  rectitude,  which  alone  is  satis- 
factory to  a  rational  being.  Therefore,  justice  should  be 
practiced  and  injustice  avoided  by  every  right-minded  man. 
It  should,  however,  be  remembered  that  justice  is  not  an 
abstraction,  but  is  fair  dealing;  it  has  for  its  end  the  good  of 
all  concerned.  Not  to  be  satisfied  with  justice,  but  to  seek 
to  do  injustice,  masks  a  corrupt  nature.  A  just  man  is  just 
because  justice  alone  satisfies  his  reason  and  conscience, 
affording  him  the  highest  and  the  purest  enjoyment,  and 
because  it  promotes  the  welfare  of  society. 
""The  doctrine  truly  distinctive  in  the  philosophy  of  Plato 
is,  however,  his  theory  of  ideas.  The  science  of  ideas  he 
calls  dialectic.  A  sensation  is  a  particular  feeling;  it  is  what 
it  is  felt  to  be,  and  nothing  else;  but  an  idea  is  general;  it 
represents  any  object  of  a  class.  Meeting  with  any  object 
of  a  known  class,  we  instantly  recognize  it,  as  belonging  to 
that  class,  because  it  corresponds  to  our  idea  or  concept  of 
that  class.  In  thinking,  we  go  beyond  a  particular  object,  and 
think  of  other  objects  like  it.  These  objects,  though  each 
has  individual  qualities  differing  from  any  qualities  of  the 
other  objects  of  the  class,  have  also  common  or  like  qualities 
which  entitle  them,  and  all  like  them,  to  be  taken  together 
as  constituting  a  class  characterized  by  the  common  qualities. 
The  conception  of  these  common  qualities,  taken  together, 
which  in  modern  philosophy  is  called  the  concept  of  the  class, 
Plato  called  an  idea,  and  AristoUe  the  form,  as  we  shall  here- 
after more  fully  explain.  The  iciea  is  expressed  in  the  defini- 
tions. 


PLATO  57 

There  is,  then,  in  every  object  of  a  class  a  particular  ele- 
ment, the  combination  of  the  qualities  peculiar  to  the  in- 
dividual, and  a  universal  element,  the  combination  of  all  the 
common  qualities  of  the  class;  and  the  conception  of  this 
combination  of  common  qualities  is  the  concept,  idea  or  form 
of  the  class.  Thus,  Plato  dealt  with  the  content,  or  com- 
bination of  the  common  qualities  of  a  class,  our  conception 
of  which  is  called  a  concept,  rather  than  with  the  extent  or 
the  class  itself,  including  the  objects  having  the  common 
qualities  corresponding  to  the  concept.  In  this  respect 
Plato  was  followed  by  Hegel. 

It  is,  however,  to  be  observed  that  Plato  gave  to  the 
combination  of  common  qualities,  which  he  called  idea,  an 
independent  existence,  apart  from  the  objects  of  the  class, 
also  from  the  human  mind,  and  from  the  mind  of  God.  The 
idea  is  thus  to  be  distinguished  from  the  concept;  for  the 
idea  has  a  real  objective  existence,  according  to  Plato,  while 
the  concept  is  the  notion  of  the  idea  formed  by  the  human 
mind  or  by  the  mind  of  God  The  idea  is  the  universal. 
Says  Zeller:  "This  universal  does  not  exist  merely  in  our 
thought  or  in  the  thought  of  Deity.  It  exists  purely  for 
itself  and  in  itself,  and  is  always  in  the  same  form,  subject 
to  no  change  of  any  kind;  it  is  the  eternal  pattern  of  that 
which  participates  in  it,  but  separate  from  it,  and  only  to  be 
contemplated  with  the  intelligence/'  In  the  objects  of  a 
class,  we  find  the  becoming,  the  fleeting  world  of  Heraclitus; 
in  the  ideas,  we  have  the  being,  the  permanent  world  of 
Parmenides. 

Ideas,  in  the  Platonic  sense,  can,  however,  be  regarded  as 
independent  of  the  human  mind,  only  as  God's  creations  or 
ideals,  the  patterns  to  which  the  objects  of  the  various  classes 
conform.  They  are  not  known  to  the  human  rnind  by 
intuition,  or  direct  contemplation,  as  Plato  supposed,  but 
by  an  examination  of  various  objects  of  a  class,  abstracting 
and  combining  the  common  or  similar  qualities,,  of  which 
combination  our  notion  is  the  concept.  The  individuals  of 
a  class  comprise  two  kinds  of  elements — the  common  elements 
of  the  class,  and  the  elements  peculiar  to  the  individuals. 
The  common  elements  classify,  the  peculiar  elements  identify. 
The  common  element  is  prominent  in  classification,  the 
peculiar  in  identification.  ,. 
i 


58  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  idea,  or  universal  element,  however,  cannot,  by  itself 
without  the  particular  element,  be  represented  by  the  imagi- 
nation; it  can  only  be  thought.  Thus,  take,  for  illustration, 
the  triangle,  a  polygon  having  three  sides  and  three  angles. 
The  three  sides  and  three  angles,  as  a  combination,  con- 
stitute the  Platonic  idea  of  triangle.  Now,  can  this  pure 
idea,  the  combination  of  the  sides  and  angles,  apart  from  the 
particular  elements,  be  represented  by  the  imagination?  If 
so,  it  can  be  exhibited  by  a  diagram  drawn  on  paper  or  on 
the  black-board;  but  when  the  diagram  is  drawn,  a  figure 
always  appears  having  particular,  as  well  as  universal 
elements;  it  will  have  one  right  angle,  or  one  obtuse  angle, 
or  all  the  angles  will  be  acute;  also  no  two  sides  will  be  equal, 
two  sides  will  be  equal,  or  all  three  sides  will  be  equal;  again 
a  triangle  may  be  conceived  so  small  as  to  be  invisible  to 
the  naked  eye,  or  so  large  that  its  sides  would  reach  the 
stars.  It  is  therefore,  evident  that  the  conceivable  particular 
triangles  are  infinite  in  number,  while  they  all  conform  to  the 
idea,  triangle  having  three  sides  and  three  angles.  The 
particular  triangle  may  be  erased,  as  having  no  particular 
importance,  but  the  idea  triangle  abides. 

With  Plato,  the  idea  is  the  essential  thing;  a  particular 
instance  is  non-essential  and  unimportant,  and  may  disappear 
from  existence  or  drop  from  thought  as  readily  as  a  particular 
diagram  can  be  erased  from  the  black-board.  This  is  per- 
haps the  reason  why  certain  philosophers  called  particular 
instances  not-being,*  that  t is,  not  unchangeable.  A  tree 
starting  from  a  seed  which  sprouts,  may  grow,  for  years  and 
for  centuries,  till  it  becomes  the  towering  monarch  of  the 
forest,  then  decline,  and  die  and  disappear. 

Plato  held,  with  Pythagoras,  the  doctrine  of  the  trans- 
migration of  souls,  and  by  it  attempted  to  account  for  our 
N  knowledge  of  ideas,  calling  them  innate  or  reminiscences 
brought  from  a  previous  state  of  existence;  but  the  theory  of 
transmigration  is  purely  mythical,  having  no  foundation  in 
fact.  Is  a  child  born  with  the  idea  of  a  triangle  or  of  a 
crocodile?  He  has,  of  course,  the  innate  power,  in  germ, 
which  when  developed,  will  give  him  these  ideas,  not  however, 
by  intuition  or  direct  contemplation,  but  as  derived  from 
the  objects  of  a  class  by  the  logical  processes  of  generaliza- 
tion and  induction. 


PLATO  59 

Plato's  doctrine  of  ideas  is  called  realism,  which,  however, 
is  not  to  be  confounded  with  realism  in  art,  or  with  realism, 
a  doctrine  that  we  have  immediate  knowledge  of  external 
material  objects.  In  opposition  to  Plato's  realism,  we  have 
the  theories  of  nominalism  and  conceptualism — nominalism 
holds  that  the  name  of  the  class  is  the  only  universal;  con- 
ceptualism holds  that  the  idea  or  concept  has  only  a  mental 
existence;  but  the  common  qualities,  corresponding  to  the 
concept,  exist  in  every  object  of  the  class.  The  very  mean- 
ing of  the  words  idea  or  concept  is  that  of  a  mental  existence. 
Idea  and  concept  may,  without  error,  be  regarded  as  identical 
in  thought,  though  they  have  been  conceived  as  formed  in 
different  ways. 

In  modern  usage,  an  idea  signifies  a  mental  picture  or 
image  formed  by  the  act  of  imagination  while  a  concept  is  a 
logical  construction,  formed  by  thought,  and  has  an  objec- 
tive correlate,  a  corresponding  reality  independent  of  the 
mind.  That  the  sum  of  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  is  equal 
to  two  right  angles  is  a  truth  independent  of  any  human  mind; 
but  a  knowledge  of  this  truth,  when  discovered,  is  a  sub- 
jective thought,  a  mental  fact,  the  mind's  own  possession. 
The  truth  of  a  triangle,  a  polygon  having  three  sides  and 
three  angles,  is  objective  and  is  the  common  or  universal,  or 
constant  element  of  every  actual  or  possible  triangle,  what- 
ever be  the  particular  or  accidental  values  of  the  sides  and 
angles.  The  conception  or  thought  of  this  truth  is  subjec- 
tive, and  is  the  idea  or  concept  of  the  class  triangle.  These 
illustrations  make  the  meaning  of  concept  clear. 

Though  the  Platonic  idea  of  concept  of  the  class  triangle, 
involving  only  the  essential  or  universal  elements,  cannot  be 
represented  by  the  imagination  as  an  image  or  mental  picture, 
yet  the  idea  of  a  particular  triangle,  involving  elements,  both 
the  essential  and  individual,  can  be  represented  as  an  image, 
or  mental  picture.  I  can  think,  but  cannot  represent,  as 
an  idea  or  mental  picture,  the  genus  man;  but  I  can  both 
think  and  represent  the  idea  or  image  of  a  particular  man 
whom  I  have  seen. 

The  truth  involved  in  ideas  or  concepts  is  real,  objective, 
necessary,  constant,  universal,  and  is  the  nexus  holding  to- 
gether the  individuals  of  the  class;  but  the  idea  or  concept  of 
the  class  is  subjective,  but  not  innate,  since  it  is  the  product 
of  the  mental  activity  of  comparison  and  generalization. 


60  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

If  the  idea  is  innate,  as  Plato  held,  it  is  subjective;  but  he 
also  held  the  idea  to  be  objective.  How  can  it  be  both  sub- 
jective and  objective?  The  necessary  eternal  truth  is  objec- 
tive; the  apprehension  of  this  truth  is  subjective,  though  not 
innate,  but  the  product  of  thought. 

What  is  the  relation  of  necessary  reality  to  the  Divine 
mind?  As  necessary,  it  is  eternal  and  therefore  coeval  with 
God,  whose  knowledge  of  it  is  an  eternal  idea  or  concept, 
the  divine  pattern  of  objective  things  stripped  of  their  particu- 
lar qualities.  As  a  divine  idea,  it  is  objective  to  the  human 
mind. 

Many  interesting  points  are  brought  out  in  the  various 
dialogues.  The  difficulty  of  framing  good  definitions  is 
illustrated  in  the  attempt  to  define  courage  in  the  Laches, 
modesty  in  the  Charmides,  and  friendship  in  the  Lysis. 

In  the  Protagoras  and  the  Meno,  the  question  is  raised, 
Can  virtue  be  taught?  The  conclusion  seems  to  be  reached 
that  there  is  a  natural  unconscious  virtue,  which  springs  up 
spontaneously  as  by  inspiration;  but  Protagoras  claims  that 
as  virtue  is  not  one  but  many,  he  can,  by  his  instruction, 
improve  men  in  the  practice  of  those  virtues  which  Providence 
has  bestowed  upon  them. 

.  Is  virtue  identical  with  knowledge?  That  they  are  not 
strictly  identical  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  men  of  little 
knowledge  are  sometimes  virtuous,  and  that  men  of  great 
knowledge  are  often  vicious.  Again  men  frequently  do 
wrong  with  their  eyes  fully  open  to  the  evil  consequences; 
and  here  is  ample  knowledge  but  a  lack  of  wisdom.  Rational 
morality,  however,  of  the  highest  type,  requires  rational 
knowledge  of  the  Science  of  Ethics.  The  science  of  virtue 
can  be  taught.  The  subjective  virtue,  which  chooses  always 
to  do  right,  is  freely  settled  by  the  person  himself.  The  dis- 
covery of  objective  virtue,  or  what  is  right  in  conduct,  is  an 
art  that  can  be  taught. 

Plato  gives  the  Socratic  view  that  all  knowledge  is  latent 
in  the  mind,  and  requires  only  to  be  brought  out,  which  may 
be  done  by  skillful  questions.  The  better  view  is  that  the 
power  of  discovering  truth  is  innate,  though  this  power, 
at  first  weak,  may  be  developed  and  strengthened  by  exercise. 
When  the  right  steps  are  taken  in  due  order,  so  as  to  bring 
out  the  evidence. 


PLATO  61 

In  the  Euthyphro,  the  questions  are  raised :  Does  God  love 
holiness  because  it  is  holy,  or  is  it  holy  because  God  loves  it? 
Does  God  will  righteousness  because  it  is  righteous,  or  is  it 
righteous  because  God  wills  it?  God  has  a  good  reason,  no 
doubt,  for  loving  holiness  and  for  willing  righteousness.  His 
love  is  not  arbitrary,  neither  is  his  will.  He  loves  what  is 
good  because  it  is  good,  and  wills  what  is  right  because  it  is 
right.  Hence,  as  God  loves  the  good,  and  wills  the  right; 
knowing  his  love  or  will,  we  know  the  good  or  the  right. 

The  Apology  is  a  great  work  of  art.  It  has  three  parts: 
(1)  What  Socrates  said  before  conviction.  (2)  What  he 
said  after  conviction,  and  before  the  sentence.  (3)  What 
he  said  after  the  sentence. 

Socrates  did  not  seek  to  gain  acquittal,  but  to  give  reasons 
for  his  manner  of  life.  After  conviction,  as  it  was  a  capital 
charge,  he  had  the  right,  before  the  sentence,  of  pleading  for 
the  mitigation  of  the  penalty;  but  instead  of  proposing  a 
milder  punishment,  he  boldly  claimed  that  he  was  entitled  to 
be  maintained  at  the  prytaneum,  as  a  public  benefactor. 
After  the  sentence,  he  declares  that  his  accusers  have  done 
an  unjust  act  for  which  they  will  pay  the  penalty;  but  that 
for  himself,  as  a  good  man,  no  evil  can  befalf  him,  and  that 
he  will  either  fall  into  an  eternal  sleep,  or  go  to  a  better  world 
where  there  are  no  unjust  judges. 

In  the  Meno  the  pre-existence  of  the  soul,  and  its  immortal- 
ity are  referred  to  as  traditional  beliefs;  but  reasons  for  these 
beliefs  are  given  in  the  Phaedo  which,  with  elaborate  art, 
exhibits  profound  faith  in  a  future  life. 

The  Symposium  discourses  of  love,  and  shows  its  deep 
signification  by  the  consequences,  as  offspring  in  natural 
love,  goodness  in  moral  love,  great  deeds  in  love  of  fame, 
perfection  of  character  in  love  of  excellence. 

The  Phaedrus  continues  the  discourse  on  love,  explains 
the  psychology  of  the  soul,  asserts  the  superiority  of  oral 
discourse  over  written  and  explains  the  relation  of  universals 
to  particulars. 

In  the  Gorgias,  the  antagonism  between  the  Socratic  and 
Sophistic  views  of  virtue  is  elucidated;  it  is  shown  that 
justice  is  not  the  same  as  the  will  of  the  strongest;  that 
pleasure  is  not  identical  with  the  good;  that  only  a  life  of 
philosophic  virtue,  not  the  art  taught  by  sophistic  rhetoric, 
will  avail  before  the  righteous  judge. 


62  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  Republic  continues  the  discourse  on  justice  in  the 
state  and  in  the  individual,  speaks  of  the  higher  education 
and  character  of  the  rulers,  and  describes  the  declension  of 
the  state  and  of  individuals,  through  descending  stages  of 
corruption,  to  that  of  tyranny,  the  stage  of  final  injustice. 

Plato's  writings  are  not  all  consistent  with  one  another. 
The  fact  is.  Plato  was  an  investigator,  an  inquirer  after  truth, 
in  the  acquisition  of  which  he  continued  to  make  progress 
all  his  life.  As  a  philosopher,  he  was  a  lover  of  justice, 
goodness,  truth  and  beauty,  and  recognized  the  idea  of  each 
as  an  objective  reality,  the  object  of  rational  knowledge; 
but  whether  any  particular  thing  is  just  good,  true  or  beauti- 
ful, is  a  matter  of  opinion. 

In  certain  dialogues  as  Euthydemus,  Philebus,  Theatetus, 
Sophist,  Statesman  and  Parmenides,  all  manner  of  questions 
concerning  virtue  and  knowledge,  being  and  not-being,  are 
raised  and  discussed,  the  details  of  which  need  not  be  given, 
but  they  mark  a  transition  stage  of  thought  from  the  Repub- 
lic to  the  Laws. 

Plato  shows  that  he'is  not  only  a  speculative  but  a  practical 
philosopher,  when  in  the  Laws,  he  describes  a  form  of  govern- 
ment which  he  hopes  will  be  'adopted  by  some  of  the  Grecian 
states,  and  thus  the  cause  of  truth  be  advanced,  and  human 
progress  promoted. 

In  Ethics,  Plato  accepted  the  extreme  views,  neither  of  the 
Cyrenaics  nor  of  the  Cynics.  Hedonism  is  refuted  by  the 
unsatisfactory  nature  of  sensational  pleasure,  and  Cynicism 
by  the  inseparable  connection  between  virtue  and  the  higher 
form  of  rational  enjoyment. 

Plato  held  with  Socrates  that  virtue  is  identical  with 
knowledge,  that  Ethics^is  a  science  that  can  be  taught;  but 
that  different  classes  of  the  people  require  different  virtues. 
The  rulers  need  the  virtue  of  wisdom;  the  mass  of  the  people 
the  virtue  of  temperance;  soldiers  that  of  valor;  and  all  the 
virtue  of  justice,  which  unites  and  harmonizes  the  powers  of 
the  individual  soul  as  well  as  the  different  classes  of  the  state. 
He  refuted  the  ethics  of  the  sophists,  by  showing  that  man's 
proper  nature  is  not  sensational,  but  rational,  and  that  his 
highest  good  must  come  from  conformity  to  his  proper 
nature. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Aristotle 

Aristotle  (384-322).  Aristotle  was  a  native  of  Stagira,  a 
Greek  City  on  the  western  side  of  the  Strymonic  gulf,  and 
near  Pella,  the  capital  city  of  Macedonia.  From  the  place 
of  his  birth,  he  is  often  called  the  Stagirite.  He  was  the  son 
of  Nicomachus,  eminent  for  his  learning  arid  authorship  of 
works  on  Medicine  and  Natural  History,  and  honored  as 
physician  to  Amyntas,  King  of  Macedon. 

After  the  death  of  his  parents,  Aristotle  was  assigned  to 
the  care  of  Proxenus,  who  instructed  him  in  all  the  known 
sciences  of  the  time.  After  the  death  of  Proxenus,  Aristotle 
went  to  Athens,  and  studied  philosophy  and  science  from 
the  costly  books  which  his  abundant  means  enabled  him  to 
purchase. 

On  the  return  of  Plato  from  his  long  journey  to  the  East 
in  search  of  light,  Aristotle  joined  his  school  at  the  Academia, 
and  remained  with  him,  an  attentive  listener  and  profound 
student,  for  about  twenty  years.  Plato  soon  recognized 
the  powers  of  his  eager  pupil  and  called  him  the  Mind  of  his 
School,  and  as  such  he  was  recognized  by  his  fellow  students. 

After  the  death  of  Plato,  Aristotle  went  to  the  court  of  his 
friend  Hermias,  ruler  of  Atarneus  in  Asia  Minor,  and  re- 
mained with  him  three  years,  when  he  was  appointed  by 
King  Philip,  tutor  to  his  son,  Alexander,  then  fifteen  years  of 
age.  Thus  the  greatest  conqueror  of  antiquity  had  the 
greatest  instructor. 

When  Alexander  started  on  his  career  of  conquest,  Aristotle 
opened  a  school  at  Athens  in  the  shady  walks  around  the 
temple  of  Lycean  Apollo,  from  which  his  school  was  called 
the  Lyceum.  Aristotle  was  not  appointed  successor  to 
Plato  in  the  Academy,  probably  on  account  of  some  diver- 
gencies of  opinion;  but  in  his  own  school,  he  was  free  to 
develop  his  own  philosophy  in  his  own  way.  Walking  with 
his  pupils  in  the  shady  paths,  he  conversed  with  them  on 


64  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

the  deep  truths  of  philosophy  and  science.  Thence  he  was 
called  the  peripatetic  philosopher,  and  his  school  of  philosophy 
the  Peripatetic  School. 

Here,  Aristotle  remained  thirteen  years,  ardently  engaged 
in  teaching  and  in  writing  those  great  works  which,  for 
hundreds  of  years,  stood  to  the  world  as  the  standards  of 
philosophic  and  scientific  truth. 

Aristotle  bequeathed  his  library,  including  his  own  works, 
to  Theophrastus,  his  nephew  and  chief  disciple,  who  suc- 
ceeded him  in  the  Lyceum,  and  who,  in  turn,  bequeathed 
them  to  Neleus,  a  peripatetic  scholar.  Neleus  took  the 
collection  to  his  home  in  Scepsis,  Asia  Minor,  and  concealed 
these  writings  in  a  vault  to  prevent  them  from  being  seized 
by  the  King  of  Pergamus,  who  was  collecting  books  for  his 
royal  library,  and  they  were  lost  to  the  world  for  187  years. 
About  100  years  B.  C.,  they  were  bought  by  Apellicon,  a 
wealthy  collector  of  books,  and  taken  to  Athens.  About  86 
B.  C.,  Sulla,  a  Roman  general,  on  taking  Athens,  seized  the 
library  of  Apellicon  and  sent  it  to  Rome. 

Tyrannion,  a  friend  of  Cicero,  collected  the  manuscripts 
of  Aristotle,  and  Andonicus  of  Rhodes,  arranging  the  scattered 
fragments  under  appropriate  heads,  published  the  authorized 
and  henceforth  accepted  edition  of  the  philosophic  and 
scientific  works  of  Aristotle. 

While  the  genuine  works  of  Aristotle  were  concealed  in  the 
vault,  many  forgeries  were  published  claiming  to  be  genuine, 
but  with  these  we  are  not  concerned.  Notwithstanding  the 
forgeries,  the  true  doctrines  of  Aristotle  were  quite  well- 
known,  even  while  his  books  were  concealed.  Some  of 
Aristotle's  works  have  been  lost  and  are  know  only  by  the 
quotations  made  from  them  by  early  writers. 

The  following  are  regarded  genuine:  Topics,  Prior  Analy- 
tics, Posterior  Analytics,  Sophistical  Refutations,  Art  of 
Rhetoric,  Nichomachean  Ethics,  Politics,  Art  of  Poetry,  A 
Physical  Discourse,  The  Heavens,  Generation  and  Destruc- 
tion, Meteorologies,  Researches  about  Animals.  The  Soul, 
Sense  and  the  Sensible,  Memory  and  Recollection,  Sleep  and 
Waking,  Dreaming  and  Prophecy  ing  in  Sleep,  Longevity  and 
Shortlivedness,  Youth  and  Old  Age,  Life  and  Death,  Respira- 
tion, Parts  of  Animals,  Organization  of  Animals,  The  Meta- 
physics. The  Categories  and  Interpretation  are  of  doubtful 
genuineness. 


ARISTOTLE  65 

The  philosophy  of  Aristotle  is  closely  related  to  that  of 
Plato.  Both  philosophers  regarded  the  agreements  of  the 
objects  of  a  class  as  their  essence,  and  of  more  importance 
than  their  differences,  the  universal  outranking  the  particu- 
lar. 

The  subjective  idea  of  a  class,  Plato  held  to  be  innate,  a 
reminiscence  from  a  pre-existent  state.  He  also  regarded 
the  idea  objective,  existing  apart  from  the  objects  of  the 
class,  as  the  pattern  after  which  they  were  formed,  to  which 
they  correspond,  and  by  which  they  are  identified  as  belong- 
ing to  that  class.  This  essential  characteristic  of  a  class, 
Aristotle  called  the  form,  and  held  that,  as  a  combination  of 
attributes,  it  has  an  objective  existence  in  every  object  of 
the  class.  The  form,  as  found  in  one  object  of  a  class,  is 
similar,  though  not  strictly  identical  to  that  found  in  every 
other  object  of  the  class.  Aristotle  held  that  the  concept 
of  the  form  of  a  class  is  subjective,  though  he  rejected  the 
mythical  notion  of  Plato  that  it  is  a  reminiscence  brought 
from  a  pre-existent  state. 

Plato  attached  great  importance  to  the  idea,  and  made 
little  account  of  the  individuals ;  Aristotle  found  the  form  in 
each  individual  of  the  class.  The  individuals  have  impor- 
tance as  exhibiting  the  form,  which  is  not  strictly  identical 
in  all  the  objects  of  a  class,  though  essentially  similar. 

How  does  the  human  mind  gain  a  knowledge  of  the  form, 
or  combination  of  similar  common  attributes?  Aristotle 
answers  by  careful  examination  of  individuals  of  a  class,  and 
finding  their  similar  characteristics,  the  combination  of  which 
is  the  objective  form.  The  subjective  idea  is  the  concept  of 
the  objective  form. 

In  the  idea  of  Plato  and  the  form  of  Aristotle,  we  find  the 
mental  peculiarities  of  these  two  great  philosophers.  Plato 
was  practical  and  ideal,  Aristotle  was  practical  and  real; 
Plato  was  literary,  Arisototle,  scientific;  Plato  soared  into  the 
regions  of  the  super-sensible,  Aristotle  kept  in  close  contact 
with  concrete  facts;  Plato's  writings  show  artistic  finish, 
Aristotle's  logical  thought;  Plato  is  read  for  pleasure,  Aristotle 
for  instruction;  each  in  his  way  is  surpassingly  great. 

Aristotle's  logical  treatises  were  called  by  Andronicus  The 
Organon.  There  were,  however,  good  logicians  before  Aris- 
totle, as  Zeno,  the  Eleatic,  who  was  called  by  Aristotle  him- 


66  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

self,  the  inventor  of  dialectic,  that  is,  of  logic,  as  he  seems 
to  be  the  first  systematically  to  employ  the  reductio  ad  ab- 
surdum  method;  but  this  method  was  afterwards  also  em- 
ployed by  Euclid,  the  Megarian.  All  the  mathematicians 
and  philosophers  are  reasoners.  Socrates  and  Plato  were 
skillful  and  cogent  reasoners.  Aristotle,  however,  was  the 
first  to  reduce  logic  to  an  exact  and  systematic  science. 
Under  his  treatment,  the  Syllogism,  the  type  and  test  of 
deductive  reasoning,  was  brought  to  such  perfection  that  it 
as  stood  the  test  of  two  thousand  years. 

The  question  will,  no  doubt,  occur  to  many  minds :  Has  not 
John  Stuart  Mill  proved  that  the  syllogism  always  involves 
the  fallacy  called  petitio  principii,  the  begging  of  the  question? 
With  all  due  respect  to  the  ability  of  Mr.  Mill,  it  may  be 
said,  unhesitatingly,  that  he  has  proved  no  such  thing.  He 
takes  the  following  for  criticism:  All  men  are  mortal;  Socrates 
is  a  man;  therefore  Socrates  is  mortal.  Mill  says:  If  you  do 
not  know  that  Socrates  is  mortal,  you  do  not  know  that  all 
men  are  mortal;  and  that  to  be  able  to  affirm  the  major 
premise,  All  men  are  mortal,  you  must  assume  the  conclusion, 
Socrates  is  mortal;  that  is,  you  must  beg  the  question. 

Mill  selected  the  most  favorable  case  for  his  criticism, 
where  the  major  premise  is  a  probable  induction;  but  to  reach 
this  induction,  we  do  not  have  to  examine  all  the  objects  of 
the  class,  but  only  such  a  number  as  will  make  the  conclusion 
highly  probable.  Let  us  slightly  vary  the  example  and 
raise  the  question,  is  Gabriel  mortal?  There  is  said  to  be 
an  angel  Gabriel,  and  I  knew  a  man  whose  name  was  Gabriel. 
Now  suppose  we  say:  All  men  are  mortal;  Gabriel  is  an 
angel;  nothing  follows;  but  let  us  say,  All  men  are  probably 
mortal;  Gabriel  is  a  man;  therefore,  Gabriel  is  probably 
mortal.  No  objection  can  be  urged  against  this  argument. 
We  did  not  even  have  to  think  of  Gabriel,  when  we  reached 
the  probable  induction,  All  men  are  probably  mortal.  The 
conclusion  is  even  stronger  than  the  major  premise,  for  the 
chance  of  failure  is  less. 

In  many  cases,  the  major  premise  is  not  a  probable  induc- 
tion, but  a  demonstrated  truth.  Thus,  it  is  proved  by 
Geometry,  that  the  square  of  the  hypotenuse  of  a  right 
triangle  is  equivalent  to  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  the  other 
sides.  Now  suppose  I  wish  to  know  the  length  of  the  hy- 


ARISTOTLE  67 

potenuse,  if  the  other  sides  are  3  and  4,  respectively.  Call- 
ing the  required  hypotenuse  h,  I  reason  thus:  The  square  of 
the  hypotenuse  is  equivalent  to  the  sum  of  the  squares  of 
the  other  sides;  but  the  other  sides  are  3  and  4  respectively, 
therefore  W  =  32  +  42  =  9  +  16  =  25;  therefore  h  =  5. 

Is  there  any  begging  of  the  question  here?  I  did  not 
have  to  know  that  this  particular  hypotenuse  is  5,  to  know 
the  major  premise,  which  was  demonstrated  without  any 
reference  to  this  particular  case. 

Again,  the  major  premise  may  be  established  as  a  fact  of 
observation.  Thus,  I  stand  on  a  hill,  by  the  side  of  a  lake, 
and  see  a  boat  about  a  mile  from  the  shore,  struggling  with  a 
violent  storm;  finally  the  boat  is  wrecked,  and  all  on  board 
are  drowned;  none  reached  the  shore  alive.  The  next  day, 
I  learn  from  the  testimony  of  a  friend,  that  he  saw  John 
Jones  on  board  that  boat  when  it  left  a  neighboring  port; 
suppose  this  fact,  that  John  Jones  was  aboard,  is  confirmed 
by  a  passenger  on  another  boat  that  met  the  boat  that  was 
wrecked  a  half-hour  before  Now  I  can  say  all  on  board  a 
certain  boat  at  a  certain  time,  were  drowned;  John  Jones 
was  aboard  that  boat  at  that  time;  therefore,  John  Jones 
was  drowned. 

I  did  not  have  to  know  that  John  Jones  was  drowned,  to 
know  that  all  on  board  were  drowned;  for  I  did  not  even 
know  that  John  Jones  was  aboard.  There  is  no  begging  of  the 
question  here. 

To  vindicate  Aristotle,  it  is  necessary  to  prove  the  validity 
of  the  syllogism,  that  it  involves  no  fallacy. 

Others  say  we  learn  nothing  new  by  the  syllogism ;  but  the 
examples  above  given  prove  the  falsity  of  this  assertion. 
In  fact,  we  repeatedly,  make  discoveries,  that  is,  learn  new 
facts,  by  deduction.  One  principle  will  often  give  an  indefi- 
nite number  of  deductions,  as  in  the  case  of  finding  the 
hypotenuse  of  a  right  triangle,  when  the  other  sides  are 
given.  Pythagoras  should  not  be  blamed  for  offering  a 
hecatomb  of  oxen  in  view  of  his  great  discovery. 

Induction  and  deduction  are  complementary  divisions  of 
logic.  It  was  glory  enough  for  Aristotle  that  he  perfected 
the  theory  of  deduction.  The  theory  of  induction  was  left 
for  the  moderns,  as  Bacon,  Galileo,  Whewell  and  Mill ;  yet, 
Aristotle  employed  induction,  though  he  did  not  perfect  its 
theory. 


68  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Aristotle's  distinction  of  causes  as  four,  material,  formal, 
efficient,  and  final,  has  exerted  no  little  influence  on  the 
course  of  speculation.  The  material  cause  is  the  kind  of 
matter  or  substance  out  of  which  a  thing  is  formed;  the 
formal  cause,  corresponding  to  the  idea,  form,  or  concept,  is 
that  combination  of  attributes  in  the  thing  which  identifies 
it  as  belonging  to  a  certain  class;  the  efficient  cause  is  the 
energy  which  produces  an  event;  the  final  cause  is  the  pur- 
pose or  end  for  which  a  thing  exists  or  was  made.  These 
are  the  main  points  in  Aristotle's  Metaphysics. 

The  distinction  of  propositions  as  conditional  and  cate- 
gorical, and  of  categorical  as  universal  and  particular,  affirma- 
tive and  negative,  and  their  opposition  as  contrary  or  con- 
tradictory, the  laws  of  distribution  of  terms,  the  conversion 
of  propositions,  the  dictum,  the  doctrine  of  figure  and  mood, 
the  detection  of  fallacy  are  all  valuable  and  permanent  con- 
tributions made  by  Aristotle  to  the  science  of  logic. 

The  categories  are  those  distinct  predicates  which  may  be 
affirmed  of  a  subject.  Aristotle  named  ten:  substance, 
quantity,  quality,  relation,  action,  passion,  place,  time, 
position,  possession.  These  are  of  no  great  importance, 
as  the  number  may  be  increased  by  adding  degree,  necessity, 
actuality,  probability,  possibility  and  so  on  or  diminished, 
as  place  and  position  run  into  one  another.  It  is  evident 
that  the  topics  are  heads  of  discourse,  or  commonplaces, 
more  suitable  for  rhetoric  than  for  logic. 

In  Sophistical  refutations,  Aristotle  exposes  fallacy  in 
such  an  exhaustive  and  thorough  manner,  that  scarcely  an 
example  of  unsound  reasoning  can  be  found  that  is  not 
reducible  to  one  of  the  specific  classes.  Aristotle  calls  eristic, 
arguing  for  victory;  and  sophistry,  arguing  for  gain. 

In  regard  to  Ethics,  it  is  instructive  to  compare  the  views 
of  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Socrates  identified  virtue 
with  knowledge  and  held  that  as  man  seeks  his  own  happiness, 
which  can  be  secured  only  by  doing  right,  therefore  a  man 
would  always  do  right,  if  he  only  knew  what  is  right.  The 
objection  to  this  view  is  that  in  many  instances,  persons 
knowing  the  right,  refuse  to  do  it;  under  the  stress  of  appetite, 
passion  or  desire,  they  deliberately  do  what  they  know  to  be 
wrong.  It  is,  however,  true  that  the  highest  moral  action 
must  accord  with  moral  insight;  but  there  must  also  be 


ARISTOTLE  69 

a  willingness  to  do  the  right,  and  the  right  must  be  carried 
out  into  conduct  by  executive  act.  Virtue  requires  knowl- 
edge, will  and  conduct,  but  accurate  knowledge,  a  willingness 
to  do  right,  and  skill  in  execution  are  the  elements  of  wisdom. 
If  Socrates  had  identified  virtue  with  wisdom,  little  objec- 
tion could  be  made  to  it;  and  this  reminds  us  of  the  saying  of 
Solomon:  "Wisdom  is  the  principal  thing."  To  know  the 
right,  to  will  the  right,  and  to  do  the  right  is  to  be  virtuous, 
is  to  be  wise.  The  intellectual  virtue  of  clear  insight  is 
essential  to  the  practical  virtue  of  right  conduct  determined 
by  right  will. 

Plato's  analysis  of  man  as  a  three-fold  being,  sensitive, 
combative  and  rational,  lead  to  his  view  that  virtue,  which 
he  identified  with  the  health  and  happiness  of  man,  is  best 
secured  by  placing  the  reins  of  government  in  the  hands  of 
reason.  This  view  goes  far  in  the  identification  of  virtue  with 
wisdom;  but  he  did  not,  however,  sufficiently  recognize  the 
function  of  the  will,  though  his  theory  is  a  noble  view  of 
virtue  as  the  perfection  of  moral  excellence. 
Aristotle's  theory  of  Ethics  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  anta- 
gonistic to  Plato's;  it  is  an  extension;  he  did  not  question 
the  fact  that  reason  ought  to  rule,  but  showed  why  it  should 
rule.  What  is  the  chief  good  or  ultimate  end  of  man?  Aris- 
totle unhesitatingly  answers  happiness.  As  the  distinguish- 
ing, characteristic  of  man  is  not  life,  which  is  possessed  by  a 
vegetable,  nor  sensation,  which  is  felt  by  an  animal,  but 
reason  which  he  alone  possesses,  his  happiness,  in  its  highest 
or  characteristic  form,  must  be  rational  satisfaction.  Aris- 
totle says:  "We  may  safely  then  define  a  happy  man  as  one 
whose  activity  accords  with  perfect  virtue,  and  who  is  ade- 
quately furnished  with  external  goods,  not  for  a  casual  period 
of  time,  but  for  a  complete  or  perfect  lifetime. " 

Aristotle  attaches  importance  to  the  will  as  well  as  to  the 
reason.  ^  Virtue  requires  that  the  will  freely  choose  according 
to  the  light  of  reason;  and  in  this  choice,  the  mean  is  to  be 
followed  rather  than  either  extreme.  Thus  true  courage  avoids 
the  extremes,  rashness  on  the  one  hand,  and  cowardice  on 
the  other;  gene  rosily  is  neither  prodigal  nor  stingy;  hence, 
Aristotle  makes  moderation  or  temperance  the  essence  of  all 
virtue.  By  moderation  or  temperance,  Aristotle  evidently 
means  self-control,  that  rational  will  power  by  which  a  man 


70  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

keeps  himself  in  the  true  path  of  duty.  Aristotle  insists  on 
the  practice  of  virtue.  A  child  is  without  moral  character; 
this  is  to  be  formed  by  a  proper  education;  that  is,  he  should 
be  taught,  not  only  to  know,  but  be  trained  to  do  the  right, 
and  in  this  respect,  Aristotle  is  again  in  agreement  with 
Solomon;  "Train  up  a  child  in  the  way  he  should  go." 
Training  in  the  way  he  should  go  forms  right  habits  and 
right  habits  crystallize  into  good  character,  and  good  charac- 
ter tends  to  permanenceTl 

As  a  man's  chief  go"oo:  can  not  be  attained  by  him  in  a 
state  of  isolation,  but  only  in  society,  under  a  government, 
Aristotle  passes  from  Ethics  to  Politics.  He  emphasizes 
the  value  of  friendship  and  describes  man  as  a  politic^ 
animal.  In  treating  of  politics,  he  first  reviews  what/lias 
already  been  done  by  other  writers  on  this  subject,  aj*fl  then 
proceeds  to  state  his  own  views. 

The  work,  though  unfinished,  is  full  of  interest,  and  throws 
great  light  on  Grecian  history.  The  book  displays  great 
knowledge  of  human  nature;  it  gives  to  theXndividual  and 
the  family  their  due  importance,  and  regrets  the  tendency 
to  communism-£efl$d  in  Plato's  Repul 

Aristotle  ^ronjgl^^phej^tjie.jn^itut i on  of  slavery,  as 
based  on  mrt*&fer"'find  narrowly  denounced  the  taking  of 
interest  for  the  use  of  money.  His  ideal  state,  however, 
compares  favorably  with  that  of  Plato. 

Aristotle  wrote  on  Rhetoric  and  Poetry,  and  on  the  various 
branches  of  science.  For  the  illustrations  of  his  works  on 
Natural  History  and  other  branches  of  science,  the  patronage 
of  Alexander  furnished  him  with  ample  means. 

After  the  death  of  Alexander,  the  Athenians  accused 
Aristotle,  of  Macedonian  tendencies  and  of  Atheism.  He 
retired  to  Chalcis  in  Euboea,  which  was  under  Macedonian 
rule,  and  there  closed  the  life  of  the  most  learned  and  accurate 
scholar,  the  most  profound  and  original  philosopher  of  An- 
tiquity. 

After  the  death  of  Aristotle,  the  Peripatetic  School  was 
continued  by  Theophrastus,  Strato,  and  others. 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Epicurean  and  Stoic  Schools 

1.  Epicurus  (342-270.)  Epicurus  was  a  native  of  Samos, 
and  the  son  of  Neocles,  a  teacher  of  grammar. 

When  only  thirteen  years  of  age,  on  being  told  that  all 
things  arose  out  of  Chaos,  he  asked:  Whence  came  Chaos? 
He  was  referred  to  philosophy  for  the  answer.  To  the 
philosophy  of  Democritus  he  applied  himself,  but  found 
nothing  back  of  a  chaos  of  atoms,  and  void  spaces  between 
the  atoms;  for  here  Democritus  began. 

At  the  age  of  eighteen,  he  visited  Athens,  where  he  re- 
mained one  year.  Thence  he  went  to  Colophon,  Mitylene, 
and  Lampsacus,  and  finally  returned  to  Athens,  when  he 
was  thirty-six  years  of  age,  where  he  opened  a  school  in  a 
quiet  garden,  and  remained  there  the  rest  of  his  life. 

The  philosophy  of  Plato  or  of  Aristotle  was  too  deeply 
reasoned,  too  difficult  to  understand,  to  become  popular, 
and  a  reaction  was  inevitable.  Something  more  easily  to  be 
understood,  something  more  practical  was  called  for,  which 
would  serve  as  a  comprehensible  guide  to  life. 

The  Epicurean  School  of  philosophy,  so-called  from  the 
name  of  its  founder,  may  be  regarded  as  an  out-growth, 
modification,  and  improvement  of  the  Cyrenaic  School 
founded  by  Aristippus.  It  is  a  combination  of  the  atomistic 
philosophy  of  Democritus  with  the  Hedonic  theory  of  Aris- 
tippus. Happiness  was  considered  by  Epicurus  as  the  end 
of  human  pursuit.  He  did  not,  however,  restrict  happiness, 
as  did  Aristippus,  to  sensational  pleasure,  but  extended  it  to 
the  higher  pleasures  of  the  intellect  and  of  friendship.  He 
also  taught  that  pleasure  is  to  be  enjoyed  in  moderation, 
since  excess  results  in  disaster. 

Epicurus  was  himself  a  temperate  man.  He  was  satisfied 
with  plain  fare,  and  with  his  trusted  friends,  he  passed  a 
peaceful  and  happy  life.  He  taught  the  importance  of 
banishing  from  the  mind  all  care  and  worry,  as  the  fear  of 

71 


72  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

death  or  of  the  gods.  He  said  when  we  are  alive,  death  is 
absent,  and  when  death  comes,  we  no  longer  exist.  Why 
fear  the  gods?  They  are  too  much  taken  up  with  their  own 
affairs  to  trouble  themselves  with  the  affairs  of  mortals. 
Religion  is  resolvable  into  superstition. 

By  happiness  Epicurus  meant  freedom  from  pain,  fear, 
anxiety  or  trouble,  and  not  only  so,  but  the  positive  enjoy- 
ment of  intellectual,  social  or  sensational  pleasure.  He  con- 
sidered free  will  and  prudential  wisdom  the  essence  of  virtue. 
Thus,  virtue  leads  one  to  avoid  crime,  to  obey  the  laws,  and 
comply  with  the  accepted  moral  customs  of  society,  for  thus 
he  would  escape  the  danger  of  detection  and  punishment  for 
crime,  and  gain  the  reward  attending  a  good  reputation, 
that  is,  one  avoids  crime  only  because  of  fear  of  detection 
and  punishment.  No  estimate  is  made  of  the  approval  or 
condemnation  of  conscience.  Then  morality  proceeds  from 
a  calculation  of  advantage.  This  is  not  high  rational  ethics; 
it  is  not  even  utilitarianism;  it  is  hedonism,  or  the  placing  of 
happiness  in  sensational  enjoyments. 

The  Epicureans  have  fallen  into  bad  repute,  partly  through 
their  own  fault,  and  partly  through  the  misrepresentations  of 
the  rival  schools.  In  fact,  they  are  too  much  the  devotees  of 
pleasure,  which  is  quite  likely  to  degenerate  into  sensational 
pleasure  of  the  lowest  sort.  The  word  Epicure  has  come  to 
signify  one  given  to  the  pleasures  of  the  table.  The  Epicur- 
eans have  been  stigmatized  by  their  opponents  as  sensualists. 
Epicurus  himself,  however,  recommended  the  higher  virtues, 
and  lived  a  moral  life. 

The  truth  is,  the  lower  pleasures,  as  those  of  the  table, 
may  be  innocently  enjoyed,  when  lawful  and  restricted 
within  reasonable  limits;  but  the  purer  and  higher  enjoy- 
ments come  from  intellectual  pursuits  and  a  life  of  good  will 
and  righteous  conduct. 

Epicurus  was  a  voluminous  waiter,  but  his  works,  except 
fragments  and  quotations,  have  been  lost,  enough,  however, 
can  be  gathered  from  the  fragments  to  reveal  his  system. 
He  regarded  philosophy  as  the  art  of  life,  and  not  the  Science 
of  truth,  as  it  was  considered  by  Plato  and  Aristotle.  The 
conception  of  Epicurus  is  that  of  practical  life,  that  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle  is  the  conception  of  theoretical  philosophy. 
The  thinking  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  was  on  a  much  higher 
plane  than  that  of  Epicurus. 


THE  EPICUREAN  AND  STOIC  SCHOOLS        73 

In  justice  to  Epicurus,  it  is  to  be  said  that  he  held  that  the 
true  art  of  life,  put  in  practice,  would  secure,  not  simply  the 
pleasures  of  the  moment,  but  lasting,  even  life-long,  satis- 
factions. This  requires  a  knowledge  of  science  and  freedom 
from  superstition  and  needless  fears.  Reason  is  required 
to  know  and  will  to  do.  Knowledge  supplants  ignorance, 
and  the  will  carries  into  execution  the  decisions  of  reason. 
The  agreeable  is  to  be  sought  for,  and  the  disagreeable  is  to 
be  avoided,  but  not  the  momentarily  agreeable,  followed  by 
lasting  pain.  The  greatest  good  for  the  entire  life  is  the  ac- 
cepted motto  for  conduct;  but  common  sense,  which  is, 
according  to  Epicurus,  the  best  philosophy,  is  the  guide  in 
the  practical  affairs  of  life,  and  the  surest  means  of  finding 
the  greatest  possible  amount  of  happiness. 

The  Epicurean  philosophy,  notwithstanding  its  defects,  had 
some  truth,  which  appealing  to  common  sense,  gave  it 
strength  and  increased  its  following,  till  its  adherents  were 
widely  spread  over  the  world. 

The  most  renowned  advocate  of  Epicureanism  was  the 
Roman  poet  Lucretius,  who  in  his  great  poem,  De  Rerum 
Natura,  hailed  the  doctrine  of  Epicurus  as  the  deliverance 
from  superstitious  fears.  The  atomistic  explanation  of  the 
universe  by  Democritus  would  banish  the  gods  from  the 
world,  and  restore  tranquillity  to  the  mind  of  man.  If  to 
banish  false  gods  is  deliverance  from  fear,  faith  in  the  true 
God  is  the  joy  of  hope. 

Epicureanism,  as  a  theory,  and  as  actual  life,  has  had 
more  votaries,  counting  all  those  in  pursuit  of  pleasure,  than 
any  other  system  of  philosophy  the  world  has  ever  seen. 

2.  Zeno  (342-270).  Zeno,  a  native  of  Citium  in  the 
island  of  Cyprus,  was  the  founder  of  the  Stoic  school  of 
philosophy,  so  called  from  oroa  the  porch  in  Athens,  where 
he  taught.  The  Stoic  school  is  an  out-growth  of  the  Cynic 
philosophy,  a  one-sided  development  of  the  Socratic  doctrine. 

Zeno,  who  had  been  a  merchant,  having  lost  his  goods  by 
a  shipwreck,  became  a  disciple  of  Crates,  a  philosopher  of 
the  Cynic  school. 

Becoming  dissatisfied  with  Crates,  he  joined  the  school  of 
Stilpo  of  M egara  Not  yet  satisfied,  he  entered  the  Academy 
then  conducted  by  Xenocrates  and  afterwards  by  Polemo, 
where  the  Platonic  Philosophy  was  taught. 


74  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

After  twenty  years  of  laborious  study,  at  these  various 
schools,  he  opened  a  school  of  his  own  in  the  porch.  His 
school  was,  at  least  in  part,  the  product  of  the  interaction  of 
oriental  speculation  and  Greek  thought,  which  took  place 
after  the  time  of  Alexander. 

The  philosophy  of  the  Academy  and  that  of  the  Lyceum 
still  existed,  but  these  were  eclipsed  by  the  more  intelligible 
doctrines  of  Epicurus  and  Zeno,  as  these  were  regarded  the 
more  practical. 

The  school  of  the  Stoics  may  be  divided  into  three  periods, 
the  old  stoa,  developed  and  directed  by  Zeno,  Cleanthes,  and 
Chrysippus;  the  middle  stoa,  or  the  transition  period,  direct- 
ed by  Diogenes  of  Seleucia,  Boethius  of  Sidon,  Posidonius, 
and  Panaetius,  who  carried  the  doctrine  to  Rome;  the  later 
or  Roman  stoa  of  which  the  chief  ornaments  were  Seneca, 
Musonius  Rufus,  Epictetus,  and  the  Emperor  Marcus  Aure- 
lius. 

Zeno  began,  as  a  Cynic,  in  discarding  pleasure,  avoiding 
all  perturbation,  and  in  making  reason  the  guide  of  life.  He 
declared  apathy  or  indifference  to  the  joys  or  sorrows  of  life 
to  be  the  proper  state  of  mind  for  a  philosopher.  A  sage  is 
characterized  by  magnanimity,  serenity  and  wisdom,  in 
dealing  with  his  fellow  men,  or  with  the  ordinary  affairs  of 
life.  In  regard  to  pleasure  or  pain,  wealth  or  poverty,  honor 
or  obscurity,  or  other  accidental  circumstances,  he  is  to 
manifest  the  apathy  of  entire  indifference.  It  is,  however, 
true  that  the  Stoics  cultivated  the  friendship  of  those  of  their 
own  persuasion;  but  for  people  in  general,  their  attitude 
was  neither  that  of  sympathy  nor  antipathy,  but  apathy, 
the  coldness  of  entire  disregard. 

Why  did  the  Stoics  encourage  suicide?  Pain  is  not  to  be 
desired,  but  rather  to  be  avoided;  yet  when  unavoidable,  it 
is  to  be  borne  without  murmuring.  Certain  disabilities,  as 
the  loss  of  health  or  a  limb,  the  Stoic  considered  as  an  indica- 
tion of  providence  that  he  is  no  longer  on  duty,  and  by  the 
act  of  suicide,  he  proved  that  life  itself  was  regarded  with 
indifference. 

In  common  with  the  philosophers  of  other  schools,  the 
Stoics  said:  Live  according  to  nature;  but  they  held  with 
Socrates  that  the  characteristic  nature  of  man  is  reason,  not 
feeling;  hence,  a  rational  life,  not  a  life  of  pleasure,  is  the 


THE  EPICUREAN  AND  STOIC  SCHOOLS        75 

true  life  of  man.  For  the  Stoics,  the  ideal  end  is  virtue;  for 
the  Epicureans,  pleasure.  Both  said:  Follow  nature;  but  in 
case  of  the  Stoics,  the  true  nature  is  reason,  leading  to  a 
virtuous  life;  while  in  case  of  the  Epicureans,  the  true  nature 
is  sensibility,  leading  to  a  life  of  pleasure. 

Both  systems  are  one-sided.  Man  has  both  reason  and 
sensibility;  he  can  pursue  virtue,  or  enjoy  pleasure.  Why 
ignore  either  part  of  man's  nature?  Evidently  this  should 
not  be  done,  if  the  precept,  Follow  nature,  is  right.  The 
question  is,  which  shall  have  sway?  Shall  appetite,  or  pas- 
sion, or  desire?  Man  has  sensibility  in  common  with  the 
brute;  his  reason  is  characteristic  of  himself,  and  as  the  higher 
attribute,  as  that  which  is  distinctively  human,  it  is  entitled 
to  control.  It  may,  therefore,  be  concluded  that  under  the 
guide  of  reason,  man  may  properly  enjoy  the  satisfaction 
that  comes  from  the  lawful  gratification  of  his  sensibility,  or 
from  the  exercise  of  any  of  his  powers.  Banquets  may  be 
the  means  of  dissipation;  feasting  may  be  carried  to  excess; 
but  to  take  a  modern  illustration,  what  reasonable  objection 
can  be  urged  against  a  family  Thanksgiving  dinner,  or  to  the 
Christmas  turkey? 

Zeno,  though  a  one-sided  philosopher,  was  highly  esteemed 
by  the  Athenians,  wrho  entrusted  him  with  the  keys  of  their 
city,  and  on  his  monument  they  carved  the  inscription: 
His  life  was  in  accord  with  his  teaching. 

3.  Cleanthes  of  Assos  in  Troas,  originally  a  boxer,  first 
attended  the  lectures  of  Crates,  the  Cynic, -and  afterwards 
those  of  Zeno.  Being  poor,  he  worked  at  night  that  he 
might  support  himself  while  attending  by  day  the  lectures  of 
Zeno.  His  apparent  idleness  awoke  suspicion,  and  he  was 
brought  before  the  Areopagus,  but  the  facts  becoming  known, 
he  was  offered  a  present  of  ten  minae,  which  he  refused.  He 
was  slow  to  learn,  but  held  fast  what  he  acquired.  He 
attended  the  lectures  of  Zeno  nineteen  years,  but  his  per- 
severance and  high  moral  qualities  were  amply  rewarded; 
for  on  the  death  of  Zeno,  he  was  chosen  to  be  the  head  of  the 
Stoic  School. 

His  most  original  contribution  to  philosophy  was  the 
enunciation  of  the  principle  that  the  varying  tension  of  the 
one  substance,  a  purely  physical  fact,  produced,  by  its  stress, 
all  the  changes  of  the  universe.  This  fertile  principle  was 


76  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

employed  with  effect  by  the  Stoics.  It  may  be  identified 
with  the  ether  of  science,  the  one  substance  of  Spinoza,  the 
ultimate  reality  of  Spencer,  or  by  making  it  spiritual,  with 
the  God  of  Theism. 

Cleanthes  believed  that  Jupiter  had  his  throne  in  the  sun. 
He  wrote  a  sublime  hymn  to  Zeus,  from  which  it  is  usually 
said  that  Paul  quoted  in  his  speech  at  Athens,  that  we  are 
the  offspring  of  God.  It  was,  no  doubt,  the  sentiment  of 
Cleanthes;  but  Paul  quoted  exactly  from  the  poet  Aratus: 
TOT;  yap  KOI  yevos  ecr/txev. 

4-  Chrysippus  succeeded  Cleanthes  as  the  leader  of  the 
Stoic  School.  He  elaborated  and  systematized  the  Stoic 
doctrine  and  fortified  it,  so  as  to  make  it  secure,  as  he  sup- 
posed, against  all  attacks.  Zeno  had  declared  that  grammar 
and  mathematics  were  useless;  but  Chrysippus  saw  that  this 
narrow  Cynic  view  would  not  do  for  a  system  which  aspired 
to  be  a  great  school  of  philosophy,  and,  therefore,  set  himself 
to  improve  all  branches  of  learning.  He  held,  however,  that 
the  sciences  were  not  to  be  cultivated  for  their  own  sake, 
nor  to  satisfy  an  idle  curiosity,  but  because  of  their  bearing 
on  life,  and  that,  therefore,  Ethics  is  the  crowning  science, 
Logic  and  Physics  were  to  be  held  as  subordinate. 

Stoicism  is  dynamic  materialism,  and  as  matter  is  the 
only  existence,  according  to  the  Stoics,  it  is  monism  or  pan- 
theism. The  Stoics  do  not  call  in  question  the  fact  of  the 
soul,  but  assert  that  it  is  material.  In  asserting  that  all 
substance  is  corporal,  the  Stoics  are  in  agreement  with  the 
Epicureans;  but  the  idea  that  the  tension  of  matter  is  the 
cause  of  the  ceaseless  change  in  nature  is  peculiar  to  stoicism. 
Matter  is  acted  upon  by  matter,  and  as  the  Stoics  held  by 
matter  only. 

Instead  of  the  ten  categories  of  Aristotle,  the  Stoics  offered 
four:  Substance,  essence,  mode,  relation.  They  were  adepts 
at  analysis,  and  noted  for  their  skill  in  hair-splitting.  Along 
with  logic,  they  cultivated  Grammar,  Rhetoric,  and  Dia- 
lectic, or  the  art  of  disputation.  Many  of  their  distinctions 
are  still  in  vogue. 

The  growing  influence  of  skepticism  awoke  the  Stoics  to 
the  importance  of  finding  some  criterion  for  truth,  which 
would  enable  them  to  discern  the  difference  between  knowl- 
edge and  opinion.  They  rejected  the  ideas  of  Plato,  adopting 


THE  EPICUREAN  AND  STOIC  SCHOOLS        77 

with  some  modifications,  the  doctrine  of  forms,  as  taught  by 
Aristotle,  that  our  notions  or  concepts  of  things  are  derived 
from  an  examination  and  comparison  of  the  objects  of  a  class, 
by  finding  their  essence  or  formal  cause;  and  by  this  principle 
we  are  enabled  to  form  objects  into  classes. 

The  Stoics  endeavored  to  answer  the  queries  of  the  skeptics: 
How  does  the  mind  perceive?  What  is  the  relation  between 
sense  and  the  object?  How  do  we  know  that  the  appearance 
corresponds  to  the  reality?  A  square  tower,  at  a  distance, 
appears  round,  from  which  it  appears  that  perception  does 
not  apprehend  the  object  as  it  is,  but  that  it  gives  a  picture 
of  our  conception  of  the  object.  The  Stoics  insisted  on 
clearness  and  distinctness,  qualities  which  Descartes,  long 
after,  employed  as  tests  of  truth. 

The  hypothesis  of  Empedocles  that  there  are  images  de- 
tached from  the  objects,  and  representing  them,  through 
whose  intervention  the  objects  are  seen,  is  not  satisfactory 
for  we  might  as  well  perceive  the  objects  as  their  images;  but 
if  we  perceive  the  images  and  not  the  objects,  how  do  we 
known  that  the  images  fairly  represent  the  objects?  This 
we  could  not  know,  unless  we  have  antecedent  and  separate 
knowledge  of  the  objects,  in  which  case  the  images  are  alto- 
gether superfluous. 

The  theory  that  there  are  three  kinds  of  opinions,  the 
probable,  the  improbable,  and  the  neither  probable  nor 
improbable,  proposed  by  the  Stoics,  gave  no  certain  criteria 
by  which  to  distinguish  the^true  from  the  false.  As  no 
criterion  sufficiently  certain  and  of  universal  application, 
could  be  found,  the  Stoics  fell  back  on  common  sense,  as  the 
best  that  could  be  done. 

Let  us,  at  this  convenient  point,  study  the  process  of 
perception.  Of  course,  perception  begins  as  a  psychical  act, 
with  sensation.  If  external  objects  did  not,  in  some  way, 
affect  us,  giving  us  sensations,  we  should  not  be  aware  of 
their  existence;  but  before  sensation,  if  perception  be  a  fact, 
we  must  postulate  the  physical  object  to  be  known,  and  the 
subject  which  knows  with  its  physiological  sense  organs  and 
mental  powers  of  perception.  There  must  then  be  the 
synthesis  of  subject  and  object,  not  their  identity,  but  a 
relation  allowing  the  mechanicalfaction  of  the  object  and 
the  reaction  of  the  organ,  as  when  light^is  radiated  or  reflected 


78  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

from  the  object  to  the  eye,  or  when  waves  of  air  propagated 
by  a  vibrating  body  reach  the  ear,  or  an  object  in  contact 
with  the  organ  of  touch,  and  so  on  for  taste  and  smell.  The 
excitement  of  the  organ,  caused  by  the  object,  is  accom- 
panied by  the  sensation  or  feeling  of  which  we  are  conscious. 
Reason  now  intervenes  and  apprehends  the  necessity  of  a 
foreign  cause,  since  the  soul  is  passive  in  sensation,  a'so  the 
necessity  of  the  subject  of  the  sensation,  which  it  identifies 
with  itself,  the  Ego  or  what  one  means  when  one  says  I. 
The  judgment,  then,  guided  by  experience,  infers  what  the 
particular  cause  is  which  produces  the  sensation;  and  now 
the  imagination  ideates  or  pictures  the  cause,  according  to 
the  inferential  judgment,  and  thus  completes  the  act  of 

Eerception.     All  this  is  done,  so  readily  and  spontaneously, 
rom  the  habit  of  continual  practice,  that  the  complex  act 
seems  like  immediate  apprehension. 

The  liability  to  mistake  lies  in  the  judgment  as  to  the 
objective  cause,  which  approaches  certainty  only  in  familiar 
cases,  or  when  one  sense  re-enforces  another,  as  the  report  of 
the  eye  is  supported  by  that  of  touch.  If  there  is  a  mistake 
in  the  judgment,  the  ideated  picture  is  incorrect. 

The  idea  is  not  something  perceived;  it  has  no  existence 
previous  to  the  perception,  but  is  the  result  of  the  act  of 
perception,  and  is  constructed  by  the  imagination  to  embody 
our  discoveries,  knowledge,  or  belief  respecting  the  object 
perceived;  the  idea  is  conceived  rather  than  perceived;  it  is 
constructed  as  a  mental  picture  representing  what  we  know 
or  believe  we  know.  In  the  judgment,  as  to  the  cause  of  the 
sensation,  is  found,  as  before  said,  the  element  of  uncertainty; 
for  the  judgment,  in  general,  gives  only  the  more  or  less 
probable;  but  the  probability  varies  between  the  limits 
impossibility  and  certainty,  and  the  degree  of  probability  is 
estimated  by  experience.  Some  images  are  known  to  be 
mere  phantasms;  others,  as  the  appearance  of  well  known 
objects,  are  held  to  be  decisive  as  to  the  actual  presence  of 
the  objects,  as  when  we  speak  to  a  friend  and  receive  a  reply. 
The  reply  does  not  come  from  our  idea,  but  is  proof  of  the 
actual  existence  of  the  person  addressed. 

Perception  is  to  be  taken  for  what  it  is  worth;  we  have  in 
it  probability  approaching  impossibility  on  the  one  hand,  or 
certainty  on  the  other;  but  universal  absolute  skepticism 


THE  EPICUREAN  AND  STOIC  SCHOOLS        79 

can  not  be  accepted  by  the  human  mind;  for  to  accept  it  is 
to  overthrow  it,  paradoxical  as  that  may  seem.  If  it  is  cer- 
tain that  nothing  is  certain,  one  thing,  at  least,  is  certain, 
that  nothing  is  certain;  if  it  is  really  uncertain  whether  any 
thing  is  certain  or  not,  then  it  is  certain  that  it  is  uncertain 
whether  anything  is  certain  or  not.  Reality  of  some  kind 
there  must  be,  even  if  all  is  illusion,  for  then  illusion  is  the 
reality;  it  is,  therefore,  certain  that  there  must  be  reality  of 
some  kind.  Then  one  thing,  at  least,  is  certain. 

It  now  remains  for  the  human  mind  to  ascertain  what  the 
reality  is;  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  great  success  has 
been  attained,  as  in  Geometry,  Sextus  Empiricus  to  the 
contrary  notwithstanding.  Neither  the  skepticism  of  Pyr- 
rho,  nor  that  of  Sextus  has  shaken  the  faith  of  mankind  in 
the  truth  of  mathematical  theorems;  but  more  of  this  here- 
after. 

Reason  in  man  harmonizes  with  the  reason  displayed  in 
nature,  but  whether  man  conforms  to  the  universal  law  of 
reason  depends  upon  himself  and  here  the  determinism  of 
physics  is  confronted  with  the  indeterminism  of  Ethics. 
We  can  not  tell  whether  an  entire  stranger  is  honest  or  dis- 
honest; but  knowing  the  character  of  a  man,  we  can  predict 
his  conduct  in  certain  circumstances.  A  thief  will  steal,  if  he 
has  opportunity,  and  if  he  thinks  he  can  probably  escape 
detection;  an  honest  man  will  respect  the  rights  of  his  neigh- 
bor. We  can,  however,  predict  the  consequences  of  conduct. 
Reason,  not  impulse,  is  the  rightful  guide,  and  wisdom, 
the  union  of  theoretical  knowledge,  good  will,  and  practical 
skill  in  executive  conduct,  is  the  crowning  virtue.  "Wisdom 
is  the  principal  thing,  therefore  get  wisdom. " 

Irrational  action  is  often  willed  and  deliberately  entered 
upon  from  free  choice.  Sometimes  action  from  habit  or 
sudden  impulse  takes  place  without  reflection  or  deliberate 
decision.  It  is,  however,  the  business  of  education  to  break 
up  bad  habits,  and  confirm  those  that  are  good;  and  the 
ethical  education  of  self  is,  to  learn  to  act,  when  circum- 
stances permit,  from  reflection  instead  of  impulse.  Sudden 
emergencies,  however,  may  occur,  when  instantaneous,  or 
impulsive  action,  alone  is  possible. 

To  carry  out  the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  soul,  the 
Stoics  taught  the  necessity  of  suppressing  the  chronic  ail- 


80  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

ments  such  as  avarice  and  ambition,  to  avoid  infirmities, 
to  strengthen  the  weak  powers,  to  correct  erroneous  opinions, 
and  to  cultivate  the  disposition  to  conform  to  nature,  that 
is,  to  the  light  of  reason. 

The  perfection  of  man,  according  to  the  Stoics,  is  the  inner 
perfection  of  the  soul.  Make  the  soul  right,  and  the  life  will 
be  right.  "Out  of  the  heart  are  the  issues  of  life."  Pleas- 
ures need  not  be  sought.  Virtue  is  its  own  reward.  Future 
rewards  and  punishments,  according  to  the  Stoics,  are  moral 
bugbears.  Virtue  or  right  reason,  and  firmness  of  will,  or 
the  combination  of  wisdom,  courage,  temperance  and  justice, 
is  the  only  good  for  man,  and  vice,  the  opposite  of  these 
virtues,  is  the  only  evil.  Other  things  are  indifferent,  though 
they  may  be  classified  according  to  a  certain  scale  of  values 
as  health,  wealth,  social  position  and  political  preferment; 
yet  if  not  attainable,  the  essential  well-being  of  the  soul  is  not 
disturbed. 

The  Stoics  were  social,  among  themselves,  and  were  desir- 
ous of  forming  a  cosmopolitan  citizenship,  embracing  all  the 
good  in  one  brotherhood  of  minds,  actuated  by  the  principles 
of  the  Stoic  philosophy,  regardless  of  nationality  or  race. 
In  reality,  such  a  society  is  a  church  fellowship,  with  Zeno 
as  the  founder,  or  high  priest.  The  Greek  mythic  divinities, 
the  Stoics  explained  allegorically,  as  personifications  of  the 
powers  of  nature.  Divination  and  oracles  afforded  the 
means  of  communication  between  God  and  man.  When 
the  objection  was  urged  that  if  all  things  are  foreordained, 
divination  is  superfluous,  Chrysippus  replied  that  divination 
and  our  conduct  under  it  were  also  foreordained. 

The  middle  Stoa  was  one  of  inaction,  or  at  best  of  defensive 
action -against  the  Skeptics,  or  a  continuation  of  the  discussion 
of  psychological  or  cosmological  problems,  as  the  universal 
confligation  and  renewal  of  all  things  in  an  ever  recurring 
cycle. 

Ordinary  actions,  according  to  nature,  as  eating  and  drink- 
ing, though  not  of  themselves  morally  good,  were  yet  the 
conditions  of  the  good;  for  the  end  of  the  natural  is  the  moral. 
The  possessor  of  one  virtue  is  the  possessor  of  virtue  in  its 
completeness.  A  person  morally  lacking  in  one  virtue  is 
wanting  in  all ;  that  is,  he  is  morally  unsound,  and  can  not,  in 
any  respect,  be  depended  upon.  He  that  offends  in  one 
point  is  guilty  of  all. 


THE  EPICUREAN  AND  STOIC  SCHOOLS        81 

Of  the  later,  or  Roman  Stoa,  Seneca  undertook  to  vindicate 
the  ways  of  God  to  man;  he  was  the  first  writer  on  Theodicy. 
Musonius  Rufus  taught  that  virtue  is  the  sole  end,  and  that 
virtue  may  be  gained,  without  theory,  by  habit  and  training, 
till  the  character  is  established.  Epictetus  taught  that  we 
should  have  no  concern  for  things  beyond  our  control,  since 
we  are  not  responsible  for  them,  they  would  not  affect  our 
moral  character;  but  for  the  things  within  our  control,  we 
should  be  careful,  lest  we  go  wrong.  The  Emperor  Marcus 
Aurelius  writes  on  the  vanity  of  human  life,  and  the  duty 
of  submission  to  the  will  of  God. 

A  comparison  of  the  Epicurean  and  Stoic  philosophy 
shows  their  contrasts,  and  sets  each  in  a  clearer  light.  An 
Epicurean  would  say:  Pain  is  the  only  evil  and  pleasure  the 
only  good,  and  that  virtue  consists  in  such  a  life  as  gives  the 
minimum  of  pain  and  the  maximum  of  pleasure.  A  Stoic 
would  say:  Pain  is  no  moral  evil  and  pleasure  is  no  moral 
good;  that  the  only  good  is  virtue,  a  life  according  to  nature, 
guided  by  reason. 

A  Stoic  would  say:  Nothing  can  happen  contrary  to  the 
will  of  a  wise  man;  for  a  wise  man's  will  assents  to  the  will  of 
God,  and  nothing  can  happen  contrary  to  the  will  of  God. 
An  Epicurean  would  say:  God  cares  nothing  at  all  about  the 
matter.  The  four  schools,  the  Academy,  the  Lyceum,  the 
Garden  and  the  Porch,  gave  place  to  Eclecticism,  Neo- 
Platonism  and  Skepticism. 


CHAPTER  X 

Skepticism  in  Philosophy 

Ancient  philosophic  skepticism  divides  into  two  branches 
— Pyrrhonic  and  Academic;  that  is,  into  the  skepticism  of 
that  school  of  which  Pyrrho  was  the  head,  and  the  skepticism 
of  the  second  and  third  Academies,  whose  heads  were  Arcesi- 
laus  and  Carneades. 

The  chief  philosophers  of  the  Pyrrhonian  School  were 
Pyrrho,  Timon,  Aenesidemus,  Agrippa,  and  Sextus  Empiri- 
cus. 

1.  Pyrrho.  (circ.  360-270).  Pyrrho  of  Elis  had  been  in- 
structed in  the  doctrines  of  the  Eleatic  and  Megaric  Schools 
when  he,  with  Anaxarchus  of  the  Atomic  School  of  Democri- 
tus,  accompanied  Alexander  in  his  career  of  conquest;  and 
returning  home,  he  opened  a  school  of  his  own  in  Elis,  his 
native  city;  but  as  he  left  no  written  works,  his  doctrines  are 
known  only  through  the  writings  of  others,  especially  those 
of  Timon,  Aenesidemus  and  Sextus  Empiricus. 

Pyrrho  criticized  the  dogmatic  teaching  of  the  other  schools, 
and  believing  that  nothing  can  be  certainly  known,  he  held 
that  the  proper  course  to  take  is  to  obey  the  laws,  and  to 
comply  with  the  accepted  customs  of  society  and  the  rules  of 
morality.  He  lived  a  long  and  peaceful  life,  highly  respected 
by  his  fellow  citizens. 

Pyrrho  had  some  ground  for  his  skepticism.  Thales  had 
taught  that  water  was  the  principle  of  the  universe;  Anaxi- 
mander,  indeterminate  matter;  Anaximenes,  air;  the  Eleatics, 
being  or  permanence;  Heraclitus,  change  or  becoming,  sym- 
bolized by  fire;  Pythagoras,  number;  Empedocles  assumed 
for  elements,  earth,  air,  fire,  water;  Anaxagoras  assumed 
vovs  or  reason;  the  Sophists  taught  that  man,  each  man 
for  himself,  is  the  measure  of  the  universe,  that  each  was 
the  judge  of  his  own  good,  and  that  man  is  a  bundle  of  sen- 
sations; Socrates  taught  that  man  is  the  measure  of  the 
universe,  but  that  reason  is  the  characteristic  of  man;  Plato 

82 


SKEPTICISM    IN    PHILOSOPHY  83 

and  Aristotle,  in  this  agreed  with  Socrates,  but  differed 
somewhat  from  him  in  other  respects;  the  Epicureans  pur- 
sued pleasure;  the  Stoics  followed  duty. 

Is  it  any  wonder  that  Pyrrho  was  a  skeptic  in  philosophy, 
and  that  he  concluded  that  nothing  could,  with  certainty,  be 
known?  Though  these  philosophers  did  not  succeed  in  find- 
ing out  the  secret  of  nature,  yet  they  all  had  a  philosophic  aim 
—to  find  the  fundamental  truth  which  would  reduce  the 
multiplicity  of  the  universe  to  unity,  or  at  least  to  harmony. 

2.  Timon  (cue.  330-240).     Timon  of  Phlius,  a  Sillograph, 
or  Satirist,  studied  philosophy,  first  under  Stilpo,  the  Megar- 
ian,  then  with  Pyrrho.     He  was  the  author  of  numerous 
works  in  prose  and  poetry,  and  satirized  all  the  philosophers 
except  Xenophanes  and  Pyrrho. 

He  said  that  to  live  happily  from  actual  knowledge,  we 
ought  to  know  three  things — the  nature  of  things,  how  we  are 
related  to  them,  and  what  we  can  gain  from  them;  but  as 
the  nature  of  things  is  unknown  to  us,  also  our  relations  to 
things,  our  right  attitude  is  that  of  indifference  towards 
things,  maintaining  good  temper,  cultivating  virtue,  and  so 
find  happiness  in  tranquillity.  Live  according  to  nature  and 
custom. 

3.  Aenesidemus  of  Cnossus,  whose  exact  date  is  unknown, 
collected,  about  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  era,  the  results 
of  the  teaching  of  Pyrrho  and   Timon,  which  together  with 
his  own  speculations,  he  published  in    systematic  form,  as 
the  ten  tropes,  or  turns  of   thought,  which   led   to  «rox>/, 
or  suspension  of  judgment  with  respect  to  truth.     He  held 
that   drapa^ta,   or  tranquillity  followed   *Vo;<>y,   as  a  shadow 
follows  a  body. 

The  Pyrrhonians  did  not  deny  sensations,  or  feelings,  but 
with  them  every  thing  was  phenomenal,  and  phenomena 
implied  nothing  with  regard  to  their  causes,  which  were 
wholly  unknown.  To  attain  to  «r<>x>/,  or  suspension 
of  opinion,  argument  was  placed  in  opposition  to  argument, 
phenomena  to  phenomena,  argument  to  phenomena,  and  phe- 
nomena to  argument,  and  the  result  was  uncertainty,  and 
hence  followed  the  tranquillity  of  indifference. 

The  ten  tropes  of  Aenesidemus,  which  led  to  suspension  of 
judgment,  were  based  on  the  following  considerations:  The 
variety  of  animals;  the  difference  in  men;  the  difference  in 


84  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

the  constitution  of  the  sense  organs;  circumstances;  position, 
distance,  place;  mixtures;  quantities  and  constitution  of 
objects;  relation;  frequency  or  rarity  of  occurrence;  systems, 
customs,  laws,  myths,  dogmas. 

Aenesidemus  also  gave  eight  tropes  on  Aetiology,  or  theory 
of  causation,  founded  on  the  denial  that  phenomena  reveal 
their  causes.  The  fundamental  objection  to  the  reasoning 
from  effects  to  their  causes  is  that  the  method  is  hypothetical, 
and  that  more  than  one  cause  may  be  offered  to  account  for 
the  same  phenomenon;  also  that  causes,  apart  from  their 
effects,  do  not  manifest  themselves  to  any  of  the  senses. 
Though  denying  any  knowledge  of  cause,  he  accepted  the 
fact  of  change,  as  manifest  to  the  senses,  and  thus  favored 
the  doctrine  of  Heraclitus. 

4-  Agrippa  was  later  than  Aenesidemus,  though  his  exact 
date  is  not  known.  He  is  mentioned  by  Diogenes  Laertius, 
though  not  by  Sextus  Empiricus,  as  the  originator  of  five 
tropes.  They  show  an  advance  in  logical  power  of  the  skep- 
tical school,  and  have  the  following  bases:  Discord;  regressus 
in  infinitum,  Relation,  hypotheses;  circulus  in  probando. 

5.  Sextus  Empiricus  flourished  about  200  A.  D.  He  was 
a  learned  physician,  a  writer  on  the  history  of  philosophy,  and 
the  head  of  the  Pyrrhonean  School,  in  his  time,  located  prob- 
ably in  Rome.  Sextus  was  an  agnostic. 

In  his  work  entitled  Ilvppwi/aoi  vTrorvTrdjo-as,  which  may  be 
translated  Pyrrhonean  expositions,  Sextus  sharply  criticized 
the  various  dogmatic  schools  of  philosophy,  and  held 
that  the  true  attitude,  the  one  of  Pyrrhonism,  of 
balancing  arguments  pro  and  con,  was  the  only  true  one, 
since  it  led  to  ^ro^,  the  suspension  of  judgment, 
neither  affirming  nor  denying,  and  that  this  resulted  in 
drapa^ox,  or  repose  of  soul.  Sextus  also  wrote  a  treatise 
entitled  adversus  mathematicos,  against  the  mathematicians. 

Sextus  takes  up  the  ten  tropes  and  discusses  them  in  order. 
We  give  the  substance  of  what  he  says. 

(1)  On  the  differences  of  animals,  as  to  origin,  their  senses, 
their  preferences  for  different  food,  Sextus  says  substantially: 
Some  animals  are  carnivorous,  some  herbivorous;  the  sense  of 
sight  is  keen  in  the  greyhound,  the  sense  of  smell  in  the  blood- 
hound; cows  eat  cabbage,  pigs  do  not.  Some  animals  live  on 
land,  some  in  water,  and  birds  fly  in  the  air.  Some  animals 


SKEPTICISM    IN    PHILOSOPHY  85 

are  gregarious,  others  solitary.  Many  animals,  as  the  horse, 
seek  the  fresh  grass  for  food;  the  vulture  seeks  carrion.  Are 
things  pleasant  to  one  class  of  animals  always  pleasant  to 
another?  Does  nature  appear  the  same  to  all  classes  of  ani- 
mals. To  which  of  them  does  it  appear  as  it  is?  Have 
animals  correct  ideas  of  nature?  Has  man  correct  ideas  of 
nature?  It  is  true  that  our  sensations  are  as  we  experience 
them;  our  ideas  are  as  we  are  conscious  of  them;  but  do  they 
reveal  the  truth?  As  we  can  not  prove  that  our  ideas  corres- 
pond to  the  reality,  the  only  proper  attitude  is  suspension  of 
judgment. 

The  reply  to  the  above  is  that  sense  knowledge  is  relative, 
and  the  different  animals,  as  well  as  man,  have  relative 
truth.  Objects  are  to  us  as  they  appear;  that  is,  objects  are 
such  as  affect  us  in  certain  ways.  Man,  however,  differs 
from  animals  in  that  he  seeks  for  causes  of  phenomena,  while 
animals  probably  do  not. 

Sextus  raises  the  question:  Have  the  so-called  irrational 
animals  reason?  In  discussing  this  question,  Sextus  selects 
the  dog  for  comparison  with  man,  and  reaches  the  conclusion 
from  numerous  illustrations,  that  the  dog  is  equal,  if  not 
superior,  to  man  in  the  accuracy  of  his  perceptions,  and 
facetiously  remarks:  "It  is  for  this  reason,  it  appears  to  me, 
that  some  philosophers,  (the  Cynics)  have  honored  them- 
selves with  the  name  of  this  animal."  Sextus  concludes  the 
comparison  of  man  and  animals  with  the  statement:  "I  shall 
be  able  to  say  how  each  object  appears  to  me,  but  in  regard 
to  what  it  is  by  nature,  I  shall  be  obliged  to  suspend  my 
judgment."  It  is  by  nature  such  as  to  affect  me  in  a  certain 
manner. 

(2)  In  regard  to  the  second  trope  founded  upon  the 
differences  in  men,  Sextus  says,  substantially:  There  is  no 
unanimity  among  men  in  regard  to  the  characteristics  of 
external  objects.  Men  differ  in  body  and  mind,  and  delight 
in  different  things.  The  races  of  mankind  have  their  pecul- 
iarities, and  men  of  the  same  race  differ  in  their  preferences, 
in  intellectual  and  moral  endowments,  in  their  philosophy 
in  their  religious  beliefs.  They  place  different  values  on  the 
same  things.  What  then  is  the  truth  concerning  these 
things?  A  Platonist  would  say,  agree  with  Plato;  an 
Epicurean,  agree  with  Epicurus;  but  Sextus  says:  Suspend 
judgment. 


S6  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  answer  to  this  trope  is,  men  generally  choose  accord- 
ing to  relative  truth,  what  seems  good  to  them.  It  is  true, 
however,  that  things  are  not  all  of  equal  worth.  Knowledge 
outweighs  ignorance,  wisdom  folly;  character,  money.  Those 
things  are  to  be  preferred  that  tend  to  the  perfection  of  man 
as  a  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral  being,  and  satisfaction 
varies  with  perfection. 

(3)  In  regard  to  the  third  trope  that  different  senses  give 
different  reports  concerning  the  same  object,  Sextus  says: 
"To  the  different  senses,  an  apple  may  appear  smooth, 
fragrant,  sweet,  yellow.  A  painting  appears  to  the  eye  with 
fields  and  trees,  and  buildings,  and  streams  of  water,  with 
bridges,  and  cattle  grazing  in  the  fields,  and  a  distant  moun- 
tain range.  To  the  touch,  it  is  all  one  fiat  surface.  Which 
is  the  lying  sense?  A  person  with  a  greater  or  less  number  of 
senses  than  we  have,  would  have  a  different  idea  of  the 
world.  What  then  is  the  nature  of  the  world?  "The  dogma- 
tists are  conceited  enough  to  think  that  they  should  be  pre- 
ferred to  other  men  in  their  judgment  of  things,  we  know 
that  their  claim  is  absurd,  for  they  themselves  form  a  part 
of  the  disagreement."  Hence,  suspension  of  judgment  fol- 
lows in  regard  to  external  objects. 

In  reply  to  this,  it  is  evident  that  Sextus  himself  dogma- 
tized, when  he  said,  we  know  that  the  claim  of  the  dogmatists 
is  absurd.  He  should  have  said :  The  claim  of  the  dogmatists 
appears  to  us  absurd.  Does  even  the  modified  statement 
escape  dogmatism?  But  let  this  pass.  The  answer  is,  each 
sense  reports  the  quality  related  to  it,  so  that  we  can  say 
the  apple  has  qualities  which  affect  the  touch,  smell,  taste  and 
sight  in  certain  ways  These  qualities  do  not  conflict,  and 
may  all  exist  in  the  apple.  The  objective  cause  of  the  sensa- 
tion may  be  occult,  as  in  the  taste  of  salt  or  sugar,  and  we 
can  only  surmise  that  the  sensation  is  due  to  the  size  of  the 
molecules,  to  their  forms,  to  their  motions,  or  to  their  chemi- 
cal action  on  the  organs  of  taste,  yet  we  know  positively  that 
the  peculiarity  of  the  sensation  is  due  to  some  cause  in 
the  object,  since,  the  organ  being  the  same,  the  taste  of  salt 
differs  from  that  of  sugar.  Nature  and  man  are  so  corre- 
lated that  certain  uniformities  in  results  follow  their  inter- 
action, and  we  are  enabled  to  predict,  and  this  is  the  mark 
of  science. 


SKEPTICISM    IN    PHILOSOPHY  87 

(4)  The  fourth  trope  is  based  upon  circumstances  or 
conditions.     In  regard  to  this  trope,   Sextus   says    many 
useful  things:  The  same  sense  reports  differently  in  different 
persons,  or  in  the  same  person  in  the  different  circumstances 
of  health  or  sickness,  youth  or  age,  sleeping  or  waking,  in 
hunger  or  satiety.     Actions  of  others  are  reported  according 
to  our  opinion  of  them.     Our  state  of  love  or  hatred,  joy  or 
sorrow,  courage  or  fear,  affect  our  opinions  and  our  conduct. 
Our  subjective  states  which  modify  our  judgments,  whether 
produced  by  physical  or  mental  conditions,  are  continually 
changing.     Disease  such  as  jaundice  or  the  mumps  affects 
our  relish  for  food.     Children  have  their  toys,  and  love  them, 
as  the  hoop  or  cross-bow  for  boys,  and  dolls  for  girls.     Men 
and  women  have  their  toys,  and  love  them  too,  and  in  their 
pursuit  of  baubles,  miss  the  true  riches  of  a  moral  character 
and  a  righteous  life.     He  who  prefers  one  thing  to  another, 
does  so  by  some  criterion,  test  or  proof;  but  the  criterion 
itself  needs  a  criterion,  the  test  needs  to  be  tested,  the  proof 
needs  to  be  proved.     Hence,  again,  the  result,  suspension  of 
opinion. 

All  this  should  have  due  weight,  and  Sextus  is  entitled  to 
thanks  for  such  an  ample  expose  of  the  dangers  which  beset 
our  opinions;  but  these  liabilities  to  error  apply  only  to  sense 
knowledge  or  inferences  from  phenomena.  A  rational  intui- 
tion, such  as,  Every  event  must  have  a  cause,  or  a  logical 
demonstration,  as  found  in  Geometry,  is  not  effected. 
Moral  truth  is  not  affected,  as:  It  is  right  to  seek  the  highest 
good  for  all  within  our  influence. 

(5)  As  to  the  fifth  trope  based  upon  position,  distance 
and  place,    Sextus  says:    The  same  ship  appears  small  and 
motionless  at  a  distance,  but  large  and  in  motion  when  near, 
and  the  same  tower  appears  round  from  a  distance  but  square 
when  we  are  near  to  it.     The  oar  seems  straight  in  the  air, 
but  bent,  when  thrust  obliquely  into  the  water.     The  color 
of  the  feathers  on  a  dove's  neck  changes  its  shade  as  it  walks 
by  us.     A  portrait  can  be  so  painted  that  the  eyes  will  follow 
us  as  we  walk  round  the  room.     Here  also  we  should  suspend 
judgment  as  to  the  objective  facts. 

The  true  answer  to  this  trope  is,  Observe  caution,  and  cor- 
rect your  judgments;  but  the  skeptic  will  reply,  Is  there 
not  still  liability  to  error?  Yes,  that  is  true;  but  the  error 


88  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

can  be  reduced,  if  not  avoided  altogether.  The  tower  ap- 
parently round  at  a  distance  is  found  to  be  square.  Will  the 
skeptic  say  it  is  not  square,  or  that  it  is  not  known  to  be 
square?  Inferences  from  facts  are  liable  to  error.  We  hear 
a  noise;  the  rational  intuition  that  the  noise  has  a  cause  is 
not  error;  but  the  inference,  what  the  particular  cause  is 
may  be  wide  of  the  mark.  This  leads  us  to  observe  that 
errors  of  perception  arise  from  the  judgment,  or  inference 
from  the  sensation.  We  are  not  mistaken  as  to  the  fact  of 
sensation;  we  are  not  mistaken  as  to  the  necessity  of  a  cause 
of  the  sensation,  nor  as  to  the  necessity  of  a  subject  or  ego 
that  experiences  the  sensation ;  we  may  be  mistaken  as  to  the 
special  cause  of  the  sensation;  we  ideate  or  picture  the  object 
according  to  our  judgment  as  to  the  cause;  the  idea  or  picture 
will  be  correct  or  incorrect,  according  as  the  judgment  is  true 
or  false.  Our  ordinary  perceptions,  tested  as  they  have  so 
often  been  by  experience,  are  in  general  correct,  and  can  be 
relied  on;  but  whatever  be  the  errors  in  perception,  rational 
knowledge  is  not  affected.  A  wolf  at  a  distance  may  be 
mistaken  for  a  dog,  but  that  does  not  affect  the  demonstra- 
tions of  Geometry. 

(6)  As  to  the  sixth  trope  based  on  mixtures,  Sextus  says, 
These  mixtures  are  either  outward,    as  in  the  air,   or  inward 
as  in  the  organs.     The  air  may  be  transparent  or  filled  with 
fog,  the  eye  is  affected  by  jaundice,  the  taste  by  mumps. 
Hearing  and  smell  are  both  affected  by  catarrh.     The  senses, 
in  such  cases,  report  falsely;  hence  trust  them  not;  suspend 
judgment. 

The  proper  thing  to  do,  is  to  ascertain  the  presence  of 
these  mixtures,  allow  for  them,  and  be  on  our  guard  against 
deception,  and  be  cautious  in  entertaining  opinions,  but  in 
all  such  cases,  rational  knowledge  is  not  disturbed. 

(7)  The  seventh  trope  is  based  on  quantity  and  composi- 
tion;   and  says  Sextus,    our  perceptions  are  changed  with 
the  quantity  and  composition.     A  few  grains  of  salt  may  be 
tasted  with  pleasure,  but  a  spoonful  put  into  the  mouth  is 
too  much  of  a  good  thing.     The  seasoning  put  into  food 
affects  our  relish  for  it,  and  we  judge  of  it  accordingly.     The 
color  of  the  liquid  seen  in  a  vase  in  a  show  window  of  a  drug 
store  looks  dark  when  seen  through  the  large  part,  but  as 
the  vase  runs  down  to  a  slender  stem,  the  liquid  looks  light, 
or  like  water  slightly  tinged.     Food  taken  in  different  quanti- 


SKEPTICISM    IN    PHILOSOPHY  89 

ties  produces  different  effects,  as  when  the  amount  is  due, 
or  deficient,  or  superabundant.  A  certain  combination  of 
elements  produces  a  useful  medicine;  a  change  in  the  ratio  of 
the  same  elements  may  produce  a  poison.  Our  judgments 
of  external  objects  are  thus  often  unreliable;  hence  suspend 
judgment. 

The  answer  is,  try  by  experiment,  judge  from  facts  properly 
tested,  be  cautious,  and  act  accordingly. 

(8)  The  eighth  trope  is  based  on  relation;  but  as  Sextus 
says,    every  thing  is  related  to  something  else,    as  a  species 
to  its  genus,  or  as  an  individual  to  its  species.     Things  are 
related  as  cause  and  effect,  as  the  condition  and  the  conditioned, 
as   antecedent    and    consequent,    as  the    premises    to    the 
conclusion,  as  the  present  generation  to  the  past  or  future 
generations.     The  relationship  of  kindred  affects  the  con- 
duct of  people  toward  each  other.     A  woman  gives  to  her 
own  son,  sugar,  to  her  step-son,  a  cuff.     A  man  thinks  his 
own  horses  better  than  those  of  his  neighbors.      Political 
partisans    find  nothing  but  good  in  their  own  party,  and 
nothing  but  corruption  in  the  party  of  the  opposition. 

These  are  warnings  that  we  ought  to  heed,  thanks  to 
Sextus.  So  keep  a  level  head,  be  not  biased  by  self-interest, 
prejudice,  or  affection,  judge  not  wholly  from  appearances, 
but  judge  righteous  judgment. 

(9)  The  ninth  trope  relates  to  the  frequency  or  rarity 
of  events,  to  their  regularity  or  irregularity.     Sextus  says, 
we  are    more  astonished  at  a  comet  than  at  the  sun,  which 
is  a  much  more  magnificent  object;  the  rise  and  fall  of  the 
tides,  on  account  of  their  regularity,  are  regarded  as  a  matter 
of  course.     A  great  flood,  on  account  of  its  rarity,  is  not 
anticipated  but  when  it  occurs,  is  talked  about  for  a  month. 
A  cyclone  or  an  earthquake  causes  terror.     To  barbarians, 
an  eclipse  is  a  harbinger  of  a  dire  calamity;  to  an  enlightened 
mind,  it  is  a  phenomenon  of  unusual  interest.     How  are  we 
to  regard  wars,  and  famines,  and  pestilences?     Sextus  says, 
suspend    judgment,    or  have  no  opinion  in  regard  to  these 
things. 

The  right  thing  to  do  is  to  search  for  the  truth,  to  make 
thorough  investigations,  and  to  decide  according  to  the  light 
of  reason,  or  according  to  the  greatest  probability,  when 
certainty  is  out  of  the  question.  Look  not  for  infallibility 
in  such  cases. 


90  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

(10)  The  tenth  trope  relates  to  Laws,  opinions,  belief, 
customs,  which  influence  our  judgments  with  regard  to  other 
nations,  or  classes  of  men.  Sextus  proceeds  to  invalidate 
any  opinion  with  regard  to  these  things  by  opposing  law  to 
law,  custom  to  custom,  belief  to  belief,  opinion  to  opinion, 
or  law  to  custom,  belief  to  law,  and  so  on.  Some  tribes 
tattoo  their  children  to  add  to  their  beauty;  we  consider  that 
the  practice  disfigures  them.  The  Egyptians  were  allowed 
to  marry  their  sisters;  we  forbid  the  practice.  The  standard 
of  opinions  and  practice  in  one  nation,  party,  church,  or 
society,  is  opposed  to  those  of  another  nation,  party,  church 
or  society.  The  morals  on  one  side  of  a  range  of  mountains 
are  opposed  to  those  on  the  other  side.  One  church  permits 
its  members  to  dance  or  play  cards,  another  church  forbids 
such  practices.  What  is  true  and  right  is  uncertain;  hence, 
suspend  judgment. 

Suspend  judgment  till  you  can  form  a  judgment  that  is 
at  least  probably  true,  and  leave  it  open  to  correction;  but  be 
not  hasty  in  forming  an  opinion  or  in  modifying  an  opinion 
once  formed. 

The  tenth  trope  tends  to  broaden  our  views  and  give  us 
charity;  but  it  does  not  show  that  all  laws  are  equally  bene- 
ficial, or  that  one  custom  may  not  be  preferable  to  another. 
These  things  are  tested,  in  the  long  run,  by  their  consequences, 
and  we  can  judge  of  them  accordingly.  We  have  now 
reached  a  period  in  the  world's  history  when  action  and  re- 
action are  powerful,  and  the  probability  is  that  in  the  course 
of  time,  all  nations  and  people  will  accept  the  best  form  of 
government,  enact  the  most  beneficial  laws,  adopt  the  most 
useful  customs,  and  comply  with  the  highest  standards  of 
morality. 

The  eight  tropes  of  Aetiology  formulated  by  Aenesidemus 
against  the  theory  of  causality  are  chronologically  anterior 
to  the  five  tropes  of  Agrippa,  though  Sextus  reverses  the 
order  and  treats  the  five  tropes  first,  and  then  returns  to  the 
eight. 

The  five  tropes  of  Agrippa  are  of  a  higher  order  than  the 
ten  of  Aenesidemus,  and  show  a  logical  advance  in  the  skepti- 
cal school.  The  relation  of  the  ten  tropes  to  the  five  is  that 
of  the  empirical  to  the  rational;  the  ten  are  derived  from 
objective  relativity,  the  five  from  subjective  logical  principles. 


SKEPTICISM    IN    PHILOSOPHY  91 

The  originality  of  Agrippa,  in  regard  to  the  five  tropes, 
relates  to  their  formulation  and  use  for  skeptical  purpose, 
and  not  in  regard  to  their  substance. 

Of  the  five  tropes  based  011  contradiction,  on  the  regressus 
in  infinitum,  on  relation,  on  the  hypothetical,  on  the  circulus 
in  probando;  the  first  and  third  are  in  the  list  of  the  ten  already 
discussed,  then  only  the  (2,  (4)  and  (5)  need  be  considered 
in  the  present  discussion. 

In  regard  to  the  regressus  in  infinitum,  Sextus  says:  The 
proof  brought  forward  for  the  thing  set  before  us  calls  for 
another  proof,  and  that  for  another  and  so  on  to  infinity, 
so  that  not  having  anything  from  which  to  begin  the  reason- 
ing, suspension  of  judgment  follows. 

The  answer  to  this  is  that  in  tracing  the  reasoning  in  a 
regress  order,  we  ultimately  reach  axioms,  or  self-evident 
propositions  that  need  no  proof.  The  consensus  of  opinion 
of  the  best  minds  of  the  world  establishes  the  fact  that 
demonstration  is  not  only  possible  but  actual,  as  in  Geometry, 
and  this  overthrows  the  hypothesis  that  reasoning  runs  back 
in  an  infinite  series,  and  establishes  the  fact  of  ultimate 
axiomistic  bases  for  the  reasoning,  which  are  'he  starting  points 
in  the  direct  order. 

(4)  In  regard  to  the  fourth  trope,  based  on  the  hypotheti- 
cal, Sextus  asserts  that  we  can  escape  the  regressus  in  infini- 
tum, only  by  the  hypothetical,  but  in  this  case,  other  hy- 
potheses are  possible,  and  we  are  thrown  into  a  state  of  doubt, 
as  to  which  hypothesis  is  the  true  one,  and  suspension  of 
judgment  follows. 

In  regard  to  this  it  may  be  said  that  though  several  hy- 
potheses may  be  possible,  they  are  not  all  equally  tenable. 
In  fact,  hypotheses  sometimes  admit  of  verification  or  refuta- 
tion. For  example,  Kepler  made  eighteen  hypotheses  in 
regard  to  the  connection  of  the  distances  of  the  planets 
from  the  sun,  with  the  time  of  their  revolution,  before  he 
found  the  true  one,  admitting  of  verification,  that  the  squares 
of  the  periodic  times  are  proportional  to  the  cubes  of  their 
mean  distances  from  the  sun.  The  other  hypotheses  were 
refuted  by  the  facts. 

Sextus  held  that  to  prove  the  hypothesis  is  to  go  back  to 
the  regressus  in  infinitum.  The  regressus  in  infinitum  is  a 
bug-bear,  as  we  have  already  shown,  Kepler  verified  his  hy- 
pothesis, and  did  not  go  back  to  infinity  either. 


92  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

(5)  The  circulus  in  probando,  or  reasoning  in  a  circle, 
Sextus  correctly  says,  arises  when  the  thing  which  ought 
to  prove  the  thing  sought  for,  needs  to  be  sustained  by  the 
thing  sought  for,  and  as  we  are  unable  to  take  the  one  for 
the  proof  of  the  other,  we  suspend  our  judgment  in  regard  to 
both. 

Reasoning  in  a  circle  is  a  fallacy  which  ought  to  be  avoided, 
and  is  avoided  by  all  sound  logicians.  It  is  a  favorite  objec- 
tion to  the  syllogism,  and  hence  to  all  deductive  reasoning, 
which  always  can  be  reduced  to  the  syllogistic  form. 

Even  so  good  a  logician  as  John  Stuart  Mill  maintained 
that  the  syllogism  involves  the  fallacy  of  begging  the  question, 
that  is,  reasoning  in  a  circle,  that  to  know  the  major  premise, 
we  must  first  know  the  truth  of  the  conclusion;  but  the  fact 
is,  the  major  premise  can  be  established,  without  any  refer- 
ence to  the  conclusion. 

Suppose  I  wish  to  know  how  many  diagonals  can  be 
drawn  in  a  chiliagon,  or  a  polygon  of  a  thousand  sides,  I  first 
establish  the  formula,  which  is  the  major  premise,  giving 
the  number  of  diagonals  that  can  be  drawn  in  a  polygon  of 
n  sides. 

From  any  one  vertex,  a  diagonal  can  be  drawn  to  all  the 
vertices  except  three — the  vertex  itself  and  the  two  adjacent 
vertices,  and  since  there  are  n  vertices,  I  can  draw,  from  any 
vertex,  n-3  diagonals;  hence  from  the  n  vertices  I  can  draw 
n(n-S)  diagonals;  but  this  by  going  round  the  polygon, 
counts  each  diagonal  twice,  that  is,  from  the  two  ends;  hence, 
the  whole  number  of  diagonals  in  a  polygon  of  n  sides  is 
}/%  n  (n-3),  which  is  the  major  premise.  In  a  chiliagon, 
n  =1000;  then  y#i  =500,  and  n-3  =997;  ...  in  a  chiliagon, 
I  can  draw  500  x  997  =  498,500  diagonals.  I  did  not  have  to 
know  this  number  to  know  the  major  premise.  Hence,  also 
the  syllogism  reveals  truth  before  unknown,  without  begging 
the  question. 

Sextus  held  that  the  five  tropes  includes  all  cases,  whether 
of  sense,  or  of  the  understanding,  or  of  both.  Protagoras 
and  Epicurus  say  that  only  things  of  sense  are  true;  Plato 
says  that  only  things  of  thought,  or  ideas;  Aristotle  and  the 
Stoics  say  that  both  are  true,  so  that,  in  any  case,  discord 
arises,  and  the  proof  must  rest  on  hypothesis,  or  run  into  the 
regressus  in  infinitum,  or  involve  the  circulus  in  probando. 
Hence,  these  five  tropes  lead  to  a  suspension  of  judgment, 


SKEPTICISM    IN    PHILOSOPHY  93 

that  is,  to  the  uncertainty  whether  anything  is  proved  or 
not.  Now,  if  Sextus  has  proved  that  nothing  can  be  proved, 
he  has,  at  least,  proved  one  thing — that  nothing  can  be  proved; 
if  he  has  only  proved  the  uncertainty  of  proof  of  anything, 
then  he  has  proved  that  uncertainty. 

Skepticism  runs  into  dogmatism,  and  in  spite  of  itself,  eats 
itself  up;  but  this  dogmatism,  Sextus  failed  to  see.  Give 
skepticism  rope  enough,  and  it  will  always  commit  suicide. 

An  attempt  was  made  to  reduce  the  tropes  to  two,  due  to 
Menodotus.  Everything  that  is  comprehended  is  com- 
prehended either  through  itself  or  through  something  else. 
That  nothing  can  be  understood  through  itself  is  evident, 
Sextus  says,  through  the  disagreement  of  physicists  in 
regard  to  it;  it  is  evident,  moreover,  that  a  thing  is  not  the 
cause  of  itself.  It  can  not  be  understood  through  anything 
else;  for  that  something  else  would  need  to  be  accounted  for, 
and  so  on,  which  throws  us  into  the  regressus  in  infinitum  or 
the  circulus  in  probando. 

These  objections,  we  have  already  answered. 

At  this  point  of  the  discussion,  Sextus  returns  to  the  eight 
tropes  of  Aetiology,  formulated  by  Aenesidemus,  and  directed 
against  the  theory  of  causes.  These  tropes  are  based,  as 
Photius  says,  on  the  fact  that :  There  are  no  visible  signs  of 
the  unknown,  and  those  who  believe  in  their  existence  delude 
themselves,  and  are  the  victims  of  a  vain  illusion. 

Sextus  states  these  eight  tropes  separately,  and  concludes 
by  saying:  Perhaps  the  five  tropes  of  eVo^i?  are  sufficient 
to  refute  aetiology. "  He  also  says,  "that  one  who  accepts  the 
theory  of  cause  will  be  thrown  into  the  regressus  in  infinitum 
or  the  circulus  in  probando. 

The  ablest  skeptic  of  Modern  times  was  Hume,  who  held 
that  we  have  no  warrant  for  inferring  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect,  in  the  sense  that  the  cause  is  efficient  in  produc- 
ing the  effect;  hence  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  is  resolv- 
able into  that  of  antecedence  and  consequence.  Hume 
showed  that,  according  to  Locke's  philosophy  which  he 
accepted,  we  can  not  have  the  idea  of  cause,  as  efficiency 
but  we  do  have  this  idea;  hence  Locke's  Philosophy  is  defect- 
ive. If  a  cause  is  a  mere  antecedent,  having  no  influence  in 
producing  the  event,  it  might  as  well  be  absent;  but  when 
absent,  the  event  does  not  take  place;  hence  a  cause  has 
influence,  or  is  efficient,  and  not  a  mere  antecedent. 


94  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

We  get  the  idea  of  cause  as  energy  or  efficiency  by  experi- 
ence, whenever  we  make  an  effort,  as  in  raising  a  weight;  we 
know  that  every  event  requires  a  cause  by  rational  intuition; 
for  an  event  has  no  existence  before  it  occurs,  and  non-entity 
can  not  jump  into  existence. 

II.  The  skepticism  of  the  Academy,  having  its  seed  in 
Plato  himself,  arose  under  Arcesilaus,  the  leader  of  the 
Second  or  Middle  Academy,  and  was  further  developed 
under  Carneades,  the  leader  of  the  third  or  New  Academy. 

1.  Arcesilaus  (316-241).  Arcesilaus  of  Pitane  in  Aeolia, 
received  careful  training  under  Autolychus,  the  mathematic- 
ian. He  then  studied  under  Theophrastus  of  the  Peripatetic 
School,  but  was  gained  over  to  the  Academy  by  Grantor  for 
whom  he  had  a  strong  friendship.  He  also  studied  with 
Polemo  and  with  Crates  whom  he  succeeded  as  leader  of  the 
Academy. 

Arcesilaus  changed  the  method  of  teaching  from  lectures 
to  discussions,  returning,  as  he  claimed,  to  the  Socratic 
method  of  conversation. 

His  doctrine  was  skeptical;  he  reached  the  conclusion  that 
he  could  not  know  anything,  not  even  his  own  ignorance; 
but  this  is  dogmatic;  for  it  amounts  to  saying  that  he  knew 
that  he  could  not  know  anything,  not  even  his  own  ignorance; 
that  is,  he  knew  one  thing,  he  knew  that  he  could  not  know. 

But  to  go  back  for  a  moment,  Sextus  says :  the  Academic 
formulae  rest  on  a  dogmatic  basis,  but  the  skeptical  formulae 
do  not,  as  they  refute  themselves,  and  are  like  cathartic 
medicines  which  carry  themselves  off  with  the  humors  they 
purge;  but  when  Sextus  says,  he  is  uncertain  with  regard  to 
everything,  he  includes  this  uncertainty,  so  that  he  is  either 
certain  of  this  uncertainty,  which  gives  one  certainty,  or  he  is 
uncertain  whether  he  is  uncertain  or  not,  which  is  a  new 
uncertainty,  and  in  like  manner  he  is  uncertain  with  regard 
to  this  new  uncertainty,  and  so  on,  ad  infinitum.  Ah! 
Sextus,  if  you  reject  all  certainty,  you  yourself  are  thrown 
into  the  regressus  in  infinitum,  into  which  you  were  so  fond  of 
throwing  the  dogmatist,  and  you  can  escape  it  only  by  the 
hypothetic,  or  by  the  circulus  in  probando,  both  of  which  you 
have  amply  shown  are  fallacies  of  which  the  dogmatists  are 
so  often  guilty. 


SKEPTICISM    IN    PHILOSOPHY  95 

2.  Carneades  (213-129.)  Carneades  of  Cyrene  studied 
first  with  the  Stoic  School,  and  is  reported  to  have  said:  "If 
Chrysippus  had  not  been,  I  had  not  been  either. "  Finally  he 
became  the  head  of  the  Academy,  and  so  carried  out  his 
principles,  both  negatively  and  positively,  with  such  skill  and 
power,  that  he  is  justly  called  the  founder  of  the  New  Acad- 
emy. 

An  interesting  incident  in  his  life  occurred  when  he  was 
sent  on  an  embassy  to  Rome.  He  gave  an  eloquent  oration 
eulogizing  virtue,  which  greatly  charmed  the  Roman  youth; 
the  next  day  he  astonished  them  by  refuting  his  arguments 
of  the  preceding  day.  No  wonder  that  the  wrath  of  the 
stern  old  Cato  was  so  roused  that  he  moved  that  the  Greek 
philosophers  be  expelled  from  Rome,  lest  they  corrupt  the 
Roman  youth. 

The  negative  side  of  the  philosophy  of  Carneades  is  a 
polemic  against  the  Stoic  theory  of  knowledge.  He  held 
that  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  between  the  false  and  the 
true.  There  is  no  criterion  of  truth.  The  positive  side  of 
his  doctrine  resembles  that  of  Arcesilaus.  Knowledge  being 
impossible,  a  wise  man  will  suspend  judgment;  but  the 
statement:  knowledge  is  impossible  is  a  dogma  which  can 
not  be  considered  certain,  unless  it  is  itself  axiomatic,  or  can 
be  traced  back  till  it  is  found  to  rest  on  an  axiom  from  which 
it  may  be  logically  derived;  for  otherwise  it  will  run  into  the 
regressus  in  infinitum,  or  the  circulus  in  probando. 

Carneades  criticized  the  doctrines  of  Final  cause  and  of 
Providence,  by  showing  their  inconsistency  with  the  evil  in 
the  world,  but  this  criticism  reveals  his  ignorances  and 
finally  he  called  in  question  the  existence  of  God,  by  pointing 
out  the  inconsistency  of  infinity  with  personality.  He  has 
not  proved  that  infinity  is  inconsistent  with  personality. 
He  taught  that  virtue  consists  in  directing  the  activities 
towards  the  satisfaction  of  the  natural  impulses.  In  truth, 
virtue  consists  in  directing  the  activities  towards  the  lawful 
satisfaction  of  all  our  desires  and  to  the  good  of  others,  giving 
the  intellectual  and  moral  powers  their  due  supremacy  and 
control.  This  dogma  will  stand  fire. 


CHAPTER  XI 

Eclecticism,  Neo-Platonism,  Gnosticism 

A  thorough-going  skepticism  is  impossible  to  the  human 
mind;  it  is  contrary  both  to  psychological  laws  and  to  the 
laws  of  language. 

In  saying  that  he  affirmed  nothing,  Sextus  affirmed  that 
he  affirmed  nothing;  he  dogmatized  in  condemning  dogma- 
tism. In  saying  that  everything  is  uncertain,  Sextus  included 
this  statement  itself;  then  it  is  uncertain  that  everything  is 
uncertain,  which  is  a  new  uncertainty;  then  this  new  uncer- 
tainty is  uncertain,  and  so  on,  ad  infinitum;  hence,  the 
regressus  in  infinitum,  which  Sextus  used  with  such  destruct- 
ive effect  against  the  dogmatists,  becomes  a  boomerang 
against  himself. 

Another  view  can  be  taken:  Sextus  had  no  business  to  say: 
everything  is  uncertain,  unless  he  held  that  it  is  certain  that 
everything  is  uncertain;  but  as  he  said,  this  statement,  that 
everything  is  uncertain,  includes  itself;  then  it  is  uncertain 
that  everything  is  uncertain;  hence  the  contradiction:  It  is 
certain  that  everything  is  uncertain;  and  it  is  uncertain  that 
everything  is  uncertain.  This  contradiction  justifies  the 
statement  of  Aenesidemus,  which  Sextus  condemns,  that 
skepticism  led  to  the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus,  that  contrary 
predicates  are  applicable  to  the  same  object.  It  is  true  that 
diverse  attributes  may  belong  to  the  same  object,  as  the 
same  body  may  be  both  spherical  and  red,  but  contrary 
attributes  can  not  belong  at  the  same  time  to  the  same 
object,  as  a  body  can  not,  at  the  same  instant,  be  both  spheri- 
cal and  cubical. 

In  destroying  dogmatism,  skepticism,  whether  Pyrrhonean 
or  Academic,  destroys  itself.  The  human  mind  cannot 
rest  in  negations;  after  criticism,  comes  reconstruction.  The 
progressive  order  of  human  thought,  as  shown  by  the  facts  of 
history,  seems  to  be:  Construction,  criticism,  reconstruction, 
and  the  same  repeated. 

96 


ECLECTICISM,  NEO-PLATONISM,  GNOSTICISM  9? 

1.  Eclecticism.  The  first  step  towards  reconstruction  is 
eclecticism.  It  was  found  that  the  various  schools,  notwith- 
standing their  divergencies,  had  many  points  of  agreement. 
The  Academy,  the  Lyceum,  the  Porch  and  the  Garden,  all 
sought  happiness;  in  this  they  agreed,  though  they  did  not 
agree  in  what  happiness  consists.  Even  Pyrrhonism  had  a 
theory  of  happiness,  that  it  consisted  in  peace,  quietude,  con- 
tent, or  as  they  called  it  drapo^ta,  the  absence  of  per- 
turbation, and  with  them  this  was  the  only  reasonable  atti- 
tude, since  knowledge  was  denied  them.  The  Stoics  found 
happiness  in  virtue;  the  Epicureans  in  pleasure;  the  Peri- 
patetics in  knowledge,  together  with  favorable  circumstances; 
the  Academics  in  reason;  the  Pyrrhoneans  in  peace.  All 
made  happiness,  in  some  form,  the  end  of  their  efforts;  and 
happiness,  in  some  form,  high  or  low,  is  the  aim  of  every  one. 

This  common  agreement,  to  which  great  weight  must  be 
assigned,  points  unmistakably  to  the  fact  that  happiness  is 
the  ultimate  object  of  human  pursuit;  but  this  happiness  is 
not  necessarily  sensational  pleasure.  As  man  is  character- 
istically rational  and  moral,  his  happiness,  his  good,  must  be 
the  satisfaction  that  springs  from  his  rational  and  moral 
nature.  Other  agreements,  such  as  the  precept,  follow 
nature,  were  found  in  all  the  schools  of  philosophy. 

The  successful  attacks  of  Carneades  on  the  distinctive 
doctrines  of  the  schools,  led  philosophers  to  those  common 
convictions  about  which  men  were  generally  agreed.  Eclec- 
ticism, beginning  with  the  Stoic  School,  found  its  way  into  the 
Academic  and  Peripatetic  Schools.  The  Stoics  allowed  devia- 
tions from  their  doctrines.  Panaetius  was  an  admirer  of 
both  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  Posidonius  was  not  only  an 
admirer  of  Plato  but  followed  him  in  the  psychology  of  the 
passions. 

The  Academy  itself  became  the  chief  seat  of  Eclecticism, 
and  the  Academicians  abandoned  the  teaching  of  Carneades, 
that  things  are  absolutely  unknowable,  and  admitted  that  it 
was  a  self-contradiction  to  prove  that  nothing  can  be  proved. 
Where  then  is  truth?  Antiochus,  the  Academic,  answers: 
"In  those  things  about  which  all  important  philosophers  are 
agreed."  He  maintained  that  the  Academic,  Peripatetic 
and  Stoic  systems  differed  in  unimportant  points  rather  than 
in  essentials.  Admitting  with  the  Stoics  that  virtue  is  suffi- 


98  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

cient  for  happiness,  yet  for  the  highest  degree  of  happiness, 
bodily  pleasures  and  external  goods  are  also  requisite,  which 
is  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle. 

The  discovery  and  publication  by  Andronicus  of  the  genuine 
works  of  Aristotle  gave  an  impulse  to  the  earnest  study  of 
his  works;  but  the  Peripatetic  School  yielded  to  the  eclectic 
tendency  of  the  times,  though  to  a  less  degree  than  the 
Academic,  and  admitted  foreign  elements  into  the  body  of 
its  teaching. 

Cicero  is  good  historical  authority  for  the  fact  of  the  pre- 
vailing eclecticism.  Though  he  opposed  the  Epicurean 
theory  of  morality,  he  admired  the  Stoic  view,  and  practically 
adopted  the  Academic-Peripatetic  doctrines. 

In  the  early  centuries  of  the  Christian  era,  the  various 
schools  of  philosophy  continued  their  separate  organizations, 
which  were  stimulated  by  the  renewed  activity  in  the  study 
of  the  works  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  maintained  by  the 
endowment  of  chairs  of  philosophy  for  the  four  principal 
schools  at  Athens,  made  by  the  Emperor  Marcus  Aurelius. 
There  were  also  revivals  of  Pythagoreanism  and  Cynicism, 
called  out  and  justified  by  the  corruption  of  the  times. 
Though  maintaining  their  separate  existence,  the  various 
schools,  by  interchange  of  thought,  approximated  towards 
mutual  understanding,  and  the  inculcation  of  common  views, 
especially  in  regard  to  practical  matters  and  ethical  conduct. 

The  precursors  of  Neo-Platonism  present  several  items  of 
historic  interest.  Jewish  religion  and  Greek  philosophy  have 
several  important  points  of  contact — the  being  of  God,  his 
relations  to  the  world,  the  belief  in  revelation  and  prophecy, 
the  doctrine  of  angels  and  demons.  There  is  also  a  resem- 
blance between  the  Essenes  and  the  Pythagoreans,  in  their 
seclusion,  mythical  doctrines  and  purity  of  life. 

The  city  of  Alexandria  was  a  suitable  place  for  the  inter- 
mingling of  the  streams  of  Jewish  and  Greek  thought;  and 
this  was  aided  by  the  Septuagint  translation  into  Greek  of 
the  Hebrew  sacred  scriptures. 

Philo  (30  B.  C.-50  A.  D.).  Philo,  of  Alexandria,  while 
holding  Moses  and  the  scriptures  in  the  highest  veneration, 
was  also  an  admirer  of  the  great  Greek  philosophers,  Par- 
menides,  Pythagoras,  Empedocles,  Plato,  Zeno  and  Cleanthes. 
The  truth  held  by  these  in  common,  he  believed  is  found,  in 
its  purity,  only  in  the  Hebrew  scriptures. 


ECLECTICISM,  NEO-PLATONISM,  GNOSTICISM  99 

The  idea  of  God  is  the  point  of  departure  in  the  philosophy 
of  Philo.  The  problem  was  to  find  the  relation  of  God,  the 
high,  the  holy,  the  perfect,  the  infinite,  the  ineffable  being, 
to  the  world  of  finite  beings,  and  to  the  material  universe, 
so  infinitely  inferior.  Philo  assumed  intermediate  beings, 
8vva/x«s,  powers,  described,  on  the  one  hand,  as  ideas 
or  thoughts  of  God,  and  on  the  other,  as  beings,  angels,  or 
messengers  of  God,  sent  forth  to  do  his  will.  To  identify 
the  ideas  of  God  with  personal  beings  was  difficult,  if  not 
impossible;  yet  Philo  made  the  attempt  in  his  doctrine  of 
the  Logos,  the  embodiment  of  reason,  the  collective  wisdom 
of  God,  the  power  comprising  all  powers,  the  viceroy  of  God, 
the  highest  of  the  angels,  the  image  of  the  invisible  God,  by 
whom  all  things  were  created,  and  by  whom  all  things  con- 
sist. How  nearly  identical  is  the  Logos  of  Philo  with  the 
Logos  of  the  Apostle  John,  or  with  the  Son  of  God  of  the 
Apostle  Paul,  may  be  seen  by  referring  to  the  first  chapters 
of  John's  gospel  and  to  the  Epistle  to  the  Colossians. 

Is  the  Logos  of  Philo,  a  personal  being  distinct  from  God, 
or  an  impersonal  manifestation  of  divine  power,  wisdom  and 
goodness?  However  this  may  be  answered,  Philo  held  that 
by  the  mediation  of  the  Logos,  God,  who  is  infinitely  above 
nature,  formed  the  world  out  of  the  chaotic  mixture. 

Philo  held  to  the  doctrine  of  the  fall  of  souls,  the  incorporeal 
life  of  purified  souls  after  death,  the  transmigration  of  those 
needing  purification,  the  kinship  of  the  human  spirit  with 
the  divine,  the  freedom  of  the  will,  the  tendency  to  sin  while 
the  soul  inhabits  the  body,  and  hence  the  need  of  extirpating 
the  passions  by  the  help  of  God,  who  alone  works  all  good 
in  us  through  our  trust  in  Him. 

We  attain  to  the  highest  good  when  we  pass  the  intermedi- 
ate stages  of  consciousness  into  that  of  ecstacy,  and  receive 
the  higher  illumination  into  ourselves,  and  see  God  in  his 
unity,  and  in  the  ineffable  perfections  of  his  being. 

2.  Neo-Platonism.  The  names  distinguished  in  this 
school  of  philosophy  are  Ammonius,  Plotinus,  Porphyry, 
Jamblicus  and  Proclus. 

1.     Ammonius  ( 241).     Ammonius  was  surnamed  Sac- 

cas,  because  in  early  life  he  supported  himself  as  a  porter,  in 
carrying  sacks  in  the  market  place  of  the  city  of  Alexandria. 
According  to  Porphyry,  he  was  originally  a  Christian. 


100  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

After  long  study,  he  opened  a  school  of  philosophy  in 
Alexandria  where  he  taught  many  years.  Among  his  pupils 
were  some  who  afterwards  became  distinguished,  as  Long- 
inus,  the  rhetorician  and  philosophical  critic,  and  Plotinus, 
the  most  celebrated  of  the  Neo-Platonic  philosophers. 

Ammonius  wrote  nothing,  keeping  his  doctrines  secret, 
after  the  example  of  Pythagoras.  As  we  learn  from  notes  of 
Hierocles,  preserved  by  Photius,  his  method  was  eclectic, 
combining  the  doctrines  of  Plato  and  Aristotle. 

He  claimed  that  a  system  of  philosophy,  higher  than  either 
that  of  Plato  or  of  Aristotle,  might  be  deduced  from  doctrines 
common  to  them,  thus  reconciling  their  views,  and  putting  an 
end  to  the  controversies  between  the  Academic  and  Peripa- 
tetic Schools. 

As  Ammonius  left  no  writings,  his  peculiar  doctrines  can 
be  known  only  through  the  works  of  his  successors,  chiefly 
Plotinus  and  Proclus,  and  they  added  many  new  elements. 
The  chief  interest  in  Ammonius  centers  in  the  fact  that  he 
was  the  originator  of  the  mystical  doctrines  of  the  Neo- 
Platonic  School. 

2.  Plotinus  (205-270).  Plotinus,  a  native  of  Lycopolis 
in  Egypt,  having  been  directed  to  Ammonius,  when  in  search 
of  a  teacher,  said:  "This  is  the  man  I  was  seeking. " 

He  remained  with  Ammonius  eleven  years,  and  then  he 
joined  the  army  of  the  Emperor  Gordianus  in  its  march 
against  Persia.  When  about  forty  years  of  age,  Plotinus 
went  to  Rome,  and  opened  a  school  of  philosophy,  in  which 
he  taught  by  conversation,  rather  than  by  lectures.  By  his 
disciples,  and  it  is  said  also  by  the  oracle  of  Apollo,  he  was 
called  "good  and  gentle,  and  benignant,  in  a  very  high  degree, 
and  pleasant  in  his  intercourse." 

Neither  the  contentions  of  the  schools,  the  criticisms  of 
Pyrrhonism,  nor  Eclectic  Syncretism  satisfied  the  demands 
of  the  times.  Another  system  seemed  called  for,  another 
method  was  inevitable. 

Plotinus  began  to  write  when  about  fifty  years  of  age. 
He  left  fifty-four  treatises,  which  were  afterwards  arranged 
by  his  disciple  Porphyry  in  six  Enneads,  each  consisting  of 
nine  books. 

Neo-Platonism  is  dialectic,  so  far  as  it  follows  the  method 


ECLECTICISM,  NEO-PI ATONJS^,  GNpSTl.CJSM  101 

of  Plato;  it  is  mystic  in  its  methods  of  apprehending  God;  it 
is  pantheistic  in  its  results.  It  has  two  divisions,  the  theoret- 
ical and  practical. 

The  theoretical  part  begins  with  God  the  transcendent 
One  from  whom  came  forth,  by  emanation,  the  Novs,  the 
Xoyot  or  inferior  gods,  and  the  universe.  The  soul  is 
an  emanation  from  the  Novs ;  hence  its  high  origin;  and  in  its 
fall,  or  lapse  into  sin,  it  is  associated  with  the  body,  and  is  in 
a  state  of  departure  from  God. 

The  practical  part  points  out  the  way  by  which  the  soul 
may  return  to  God,  the  eternal  source  of  all  blessedness. 
The  steps  are  perception,  reasoning,  and  mystical  intuitions. 
Through  perception,  we  see  in  the  order  and  harmony  of  the 
world,  an  indication  of  its  divine  origin;  reasoning  brings  us 
to  the  threshold  of  mystic  intuition  by  which  the  soul  in 
divine  contemplation  and  ecstatic  emotion,  experiences  the 
ineffable  One  with  whom,  for  the  time,  its  own  identity  seems 
to  be  lost. 

Plotinus  raises  the  questions:  What  is  evil?  Whence  comes 
it?  Is  it  positive,  the  doing  of  wrong,  or  is  it  negative,  the 
failure  to  do  right?  Is  it  in  matter  or  in  the  soul?  Is  there 
an  archetypical  evil  ?  What  is  the  real  conflict  of  life  ?  What 
is  victory?  What  is  final  defeat? 

Plotinus  gives  us  his  thoughts  about  these  things,  and  an 
insight  into  his  earnest  struggles  with  evil,  rather  than  dog- 
matic answers,  and  this  is  far  more  satisfactory.  The  fall 
of  the  soul  is  found  in  its  subjection  to  the  body,  yet  the 
tendency  to  fall  is  found,  not  in  the  body,  but  in  the  soul 
itself,  perhaps  in  its  desire  for  pleasure. 

The  order  of  the  world  is  perfect,  divine,  eternal;  and  the 
great  movements  of  nature,  which  are  a  terror  to  the  ignor- 
ant, bring  joy  to  the  enlightened  mind.  Evil  is  discord,  good 
is  harmony. 

Plotinus  besought  the  Emperor  Gallienus,  with  whom 
he  was  on  terms  of  intimacy,  to  rebuild  a  city  in  Campania, 
a  former  resort  of  philosophers,  to  be  called  Platonopolis 
and  to  permit  its  citizens  to  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  Plato, 
but  the  plan  was  frustrated  by  the  envy  of  the  courtiers. 

The  labors  of  Ammonius  and  Plotinus  carried  Neo-Platon- 
ism  through  its  first  period. 

3.     Porphyry    (233-303.)      Porphyry,  a   native   of   Tyre, 


102  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

studied  philosophy  for  five  years  under  Plotinus  at  Rome. 
He  spent  two  years  in  Sicily  where  he  wrote  against  Chris- 
tianity. Returning  to  Rome  he  engaged  in  teaching;  he  also 
edited  the  works  of  Plotinus,  and  wrote  several  treatises  of 
his  own. 

He  was  a  fine  writer,  and  had  a  great  talent  for  literary 
research.  He  critically  studied  the  Christian  writings,  and 
was  a  bitter  opponent  of  the  Christian  religion. 

The  system  of  Porphyry  was  more  popular,  practical  and 
religious  than  that  of  Plotinus,  though  his  religion  was  a 
refined  Polytheism. 

The  origin  of  evil  and  the  guilt  of  sin  are,  according  to 
Porphyry,  not  found  in  the  body,  but  in  the  desires  of  the 
soul  for  pleasure.  The  aim  of  philosophy  is  the  salvation 
of  the  soul;  and  to  accomplish  this  salvation,  not  only  philoso- 
phy, but  the  strictest  morality  is  required. 

He  did  not  share  in  the  gross  popular  views  of  Polytheism, 
yet  he  advocated  the  pure  worship  of  the  many  gods,  and 
made  Neo-Platonism  entirely  subservient  to  Polytheism, 
which  he  defended  against  the  vigorous  assaults  of  the 
Christian  Theologians.  His  writings  are  lost  except  the 
quotations  from  his  works  found  in  the  books  of  Christian 
authors. 

4-  Jamblichus  ( 332.)  Jamblichus,  a  native  of  Chal- 

cis  in  Caele-Syria,  studied  under  Porphyry.  He  opened  a 
school  in  Chalcis,  and  drew  a  large  number  of  disciples  from 
various  nations. 

He  wrote  commentaries  on  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  a 
treatise  on  Chaldean  Theology,  and  another  on  Pythagorean 
philosophy,  most  of  which  are  lost.  Books  on  Egyptian 
mysteries,  originating  in  his  school,  were  ascribed  to  him, 
though  there  is  doubt  of  its  truth,  on  account  of  difference 
in  style.  He  was  much  esteemed,  and  was  often  called  the 
divine.  The  Emperor  Julian  esteemed  him  not  inferior  to 
Plato,  and  said  he  would  give  all  the  gold  in  Lydia  for  one 
epistle  of  Jamblichus. 

The  speculative  character  of  Neo-Platonism  was  settled  by 
Plotinus,  but  Jamblichus  carried  it  out  in  more  minute  sub- 
divisions, assimilating  more  Mystic  and  Oriental  elements, 
giving  it  more  of  a  Polytheistic  and  even  magical  character, 
till  in  his  hands  philosophy  degenerated  into  superstitious 
theurgy. 


ECLECTICISM,  NEO-PLATONISM,  GNOSTICISM  103 

At  the  head  of  his  system,  Plotinus  placed  God,  the  trans- 
cendent One,  from  whom  emanated  the  Novs,  or  intellect, 
the  first  begotten  of  God;  from  the  Novs  emanated  tyuxn* 
the  soul,  which,  in  turn,  gave  birth  to  </>ixn«,  or  nature; 
but  immediately  after  the  absolute  One,  Jamblichus  placed  a 
second  super-existent  unity,  the  producer  of  intellect,  between 
the  Absolute  and  the  many,  and  made  intellect,  soul  and 
nature,  undergo  various  modifications,  as  intellectual,  super- 
mundane and  mundane  gods,  which  were  divided  and  sub- 
divided in  triads  and  hebdomads,  till  lost  in  the  minute  sub- 
divisions, we  marvel  and  repudiate  the  superstition. 

Jamblichus  never  attained  to  that  ecstatic  communion 
with  the  Deity  which  Plotinus  enjoyed  four  times,  and 
Porphyry  once.  In  recognizing  God,  the  deepest  truth,  by 
mystic  intuition,  rather  than  by  rational  intuition,  that  is, 
by  the  intuition  of  the  heart  rather  than  that  of  the  head, 
the  Neo-Platonists  made  feeling  a  deeper  element  in  human 
nature  than  reason,  and  more  intimately  related  to  self. 

5.  Proclus  (410-485.)  Proclus  was  born  in  Constanti- 
nople and  died  in  Athens.  What  Chrysippus  was  to  the 
Stoics,  Proclus  was  to  the  Neo-Platonists.  By  his  industry, 
learning  and  logical  power,  he  brought  the  Neo-Platonic 
philosophy  to  its  formal  completeness  and  conclusion.  From 
his  knowledge  of  the  history  of  the  school,  and  by  his  great 
ability,  he  reduced  the  system  to  a  cohering  mass,  supplying 
defects  and  reconciling  contradictions. 

With  others  of  his  school,  he  was  a  religious  enthusiast, 
sharing  in  their  faith,  in  their  superstition,  in  their  love  for 
Orphic  poems  and  Chaldean  oracles.  Seeking  perfection 
led  to  high  ethics;  despising  facts,  to  low  science. 

His  system  is  constructed  according  to  the  laws  of  triadic 
development.  The  effect  is  like  the  cause;  for  since  the 
cause  goes  into  the  effect,  the  thing  produced  is  like  that 
which  produced  it;  and  the  thing  produced  is  also  unlike  the 
thing  which  produced  it,  since  the  derived  is  different  from 
the  original,  not  identical  with  it. 

As  the  effect  is  like  the  cause,  it  returns  to  it,  that  is  imitates 
it  on  a  lower  scale,  and  produces  something  both  like  and 
unlike  itself,  and  so  on,  in  an  endless  series.  A  thing  then 
exists  in  its  cause,  departs  from  it,  and  returns  to  it  by  imita- 


104  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

tion  by  producing  something  else  both  like  and  unlike  itself, 
and  by  the  repetition  of  these  three  movements,  everything 
is  produced. 

Between  the  Original  One  and  the  intelligible,  Proclus 
interposes,  with  Jamblichus,  an  intermediary  unity.  Then 
we  have  avTorcAas  and  the  evaSes,  which  are  the  highest  Gods, 
and  after  them  the  vovs,  the  ^X7?*  and  the  Averts,  that  is 
reason,  soul  and  nature.  Proclus  divides  the  province  of 
the  vovs  into  three  spheres,  VOT/TOI/  the  intelligible,  the 
intellectual-intelligible,  and  the  voepov  the  intellectual; 
that  is,  into  being,  life,  and  thought.  Of  the  three  spheres, 
the  first  and  second  are  divided  into  three  triads,  and  each 
triad  into  seven  hebdomads,  which  are  the  gods  of  the 
nations.  The  j^x?/  or  soul  comprises  three  classes  of  souls, 
divine,  demoniac  and  human,  and  these  again  are  sub- 
divided, according  to  the  same  law,  and  so  on. 

Plotinus  supposed  matter  to  be  created  by  the  soul,  Proclus 
derives  it  from  the  unlimited,  the  airupov  of  Anaximander. 

His  system  of  Ethics  requires  the  ascent  through  the  five 
virtues  to  the  supersensible,  leading  to  the  mystic  union 
with  the  Divine,  and  this  turns  his  ethics  into  theology,  and 
morals  into  religion 

With  Proclus  Neo-Platonism  was  finished,  and  no  further 
development  seemed  possible.  The  method  throughout  is 
deductive,  beginning  with  the  highest  abstraction,  and  so 
descending,  giving  at  every  step,  room  for  imagination,  wild 
conjecture  and  superstition.  Can  the  gods  and  demons  of 
Mythology  be  verified  by  appealing  to  facts?  Such  a  system, 
which  can  scarcely  be  understood  by  superior  minds,  was 
doomed  to  inevitable  defeat  in  contending  with  Christianity 
which  brought  salvation  to  the  masses. 

The  Emperor  Justinian  did  well,  when  forty-four  years 
after  the  death  of  Proclus,  he  ordered  the  Neo-Platonic 
School  at  Athens  to  be  closed. 

3.  Gnosticism.  The  term  Gnosticism,  from  yvuio-is, 
knowledge,  yvworiKos,  one  who  knows,  applies  to  the 
system  of  a  philosophic  school  that  claimed  to  know  the 
truth  by  combining  Oriental  speculations  with  Greek  philoso- 
phy and  Christian  doctrine. 

The  Gnostics  were  the  originators  of  systematic  investi- 
gations in  Rational  Theology  and  Comparative  Religion, 


ECLECTICISM,  NEO-PLATONISM,  GNOSTICISM  105 

and  may,  therefore,  be  called  religious  philosophers.  Gnos- 
ticism is  not  strictly  a  heresy,  as  the  Gnostics  were  outside 
of  the  church,  yet  it  was  Christian  doctrine  that  gave  it 
impulse  and  life. 

The  Gnostics  were  divided  into  many  sects,  or  branches 
of  a  common  system,  to  which  the  tille  Ophites,  fromophis, 
a  serpent,  is  appropriately  applied,  as  the  serpent  was  a 
common  symbol  with  them  all  of  a  redeeming  power.  The 
evil  characters  of  the  Old  Testament,  with  Cain  at  the  head, 
were  accounted  true  spiritual  heroes,  and  Judas  Iscariot  of 
the  New  Testament  is  represented  as  alone  knowing  the  truth 
and  therefore  betrayed  the  Savior  that  his  good  work  of 
redemption  might  be  completed.  These  extravagances, 
however,  applied  only  to  the  earlier  stages  of  the  system  in 
which  evil  was  put  for  good. 

Early  in  the  second  century,  the  Gnostics  established  three 
main  centers  at  Antioch,  at  Alexandria,  and  at  Pontus  in 
Asia  Minor.  The  school  at  Antioch  was  founded  by  Menan- 
der,  who  was  supposed  to  be  a  disciple  of  Simon  Magus. 

The  school  at  Alexandria  was  represented  by  Basilides  and 
Valentinus,  who  were  men  of  learning  and  ability.  The 
school  at  Pontus  was  especially  represented  by  Marcion,  the 
son  of  a  Christian  bishop,  by  whom  he  was  excommunicated. 

The  questions  considered  by  the  Gnostics  were  those  which, 
in  all  ages,  have  awakened  inquiry  and  baffled  speculation — 
the  beginning  of  life,  the  origin  of  evil,  how  a  world  so  full  of 
evil,  could  spring  from  an  all-wise  and  holy  being. 

The  essential  corruption  of  matter  is  a  fundamental  princi- 
ple of  Gnosticism;  hence  all  Gnostics  agree  in  holding  that 
this  world  did  not  spring  immediately  from  the  Supreme 
Being;  hence  they  maintained  that  the  world  and  God  are 
separated  by  a  vast  gulf  which  they  attempted  to  bridge  in 
various  ways,  but  chiefly  by  a  series  of  emanations  of  spirits 
or  aeons  from  the  Supreme  Being,  and  to  these  Spirits  they 
attributed  the  work  of  creation. 

The  Gnostic  philosophy  exerted  a  powerful  influence  on 
Christian  thought,  chiefly  in  compelling  Christian  thinkers 
to  face  the  great  problems  common  to  Philosophy  and  Theo- 
logy. It  taught  men  like  Irenaeus,  Clement  and  Origen  to 
understand  that  the  doctrines  of  Christianity  could  not 
safely  be  left  to  win  their  way  by  authority,  but  must  be 


106  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

vindicated  by  reason,  at  least  must  be  shown  not  to  be 
unreasonable.  Gnostic  philosophy  thus  stimulated  the 
development  of  Christian  Theology.  Antioch  and  Alexandria, 
the  chief  seats  of  Gnosticism,  became  the  first  centers  of 
Christian  Theologic  Schools.  As  the  name  Sophist,  primarily 
signifying  a  wise  man,  gave  way  to  that  of  philosopher,  denot- 
ing a  lover  of  wisdom,  so  the  name  Gnostic,  signifying  one 
who  knows,  has  given  way  to  that  of  Agnostic,  meaning  one 
who  does  not  know,  thus  indicating  that  the  attempt  to 
solve  the  mystery  of  the  universe,  by  speculation,  has  at 
least  by  these  philosophers,  been  given  up  as  hopeless. 
Truly  the  world  by  wisdom  knows  not  God. 

The  Philosophy  of  Philo,  the  Jewish  section  of  the  Alexan- 
drian School,  Neo-Platonism  and  Gnosticism  are  related  in 
the  fact  that  they  all  are  mystical.  They  differ  in  their 
affinities;  the  philosophy  of  Philo  consisted  of  a  Jewish 
nucleus  with  an  envelope  of  oriental  mysticism  and  Greek 
thought;  the  Neo-Platonic  philosophy  was  more  purely 
Greek,  though  tinged  with  Oriental  mysticism;  the  Gnostic 
philosophy  was  a  combination  of  mysticism  with  Christian 
doctrine. 


CHAPTER  XII 

Patristic  Philosophy 

By  Patristic  Philosophy  we  are  to  understand  the  Christian 
Philosophy  of  the  Church  Fathers  of  the  period  between  the 
times  of  the  Apostles  and  the  rise  of  Scholasticism. 

By  the  attacks,  especially  of  Neo-Platonism,  the  Christian 
Theologians  were  put  on  the  defensive;  they  must  justify 
theology  in  the  light  of  reason,  or  show,  at  least,  that  it  is 
not  unreasonable. 

As  Gnosticism  was  somewhat  hostile  to  the  church,  or  at 
least  an  outside  matter  for  which  the  church  was  not  responsi- 
ble, the  Christian  Theologians  could  not  accept  the  Gnostic 
solution  of  theological  problems,  but  must  solve  them  from  a 
Christian  point  of  view,  in  harmony  with  the  principles  of 
reason. 

If  any  principle  can  be  accepted  as  fundamental,  and  held 
to  be  valid,  because  at  once  apprehended  as  true  by  rational 
intuition,  it  is  the  principle  that  all  truths  exist  in  harmony. 
No  truth  can  conflict  with  another  truth;  and  by  this  we 
mean  that  no  truth  can  involve  the  falsity  of  another  truth. 
If  two  truths  conflict,  tha';  is,  if  the  truth  of  each  involves 
the  falsity  of  the  other,  then  we  shall  have  both  true  by 
hypothesis,  and  both  false,  as  the  logical  consequence  of  the 
truth  of  the  other,  then  each  would  be  both  true  and  false 
at  the  same  time,  and  taken  in  the  same  sense,  which  is 
self-destructive,  absurd  and  therefore  impossible. 

No  authority,  however  great,  can  compel  reason  to  accept 
absurdities.  Hence  Philosophy  has  a  right  to  demand  that 
Theological  doctrines  be  kept  free  from  contradictions, 
which  are,  in  fact,  absurdities,  since  it  is  absurd  to  suppose 
that  one  truth  can  contradict  another  truth,  though  it  does 
not  object  to  mysteries,  if  supported  by  evidence,  even  if  it 
does  not  accept  them.  It  simply  demands  that  the  contra- 
dictory, the  absurd,  the  irrational,  be  eliminated  from  the 
body  of  received  doctrine;  and  in  making  this  demand, 
philosophy  does,  for  theology,  a  very  great  service,  by  re- 
moving the  insuperable  objections  of  rational  minds. 

107 


108  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Theology,  as  the  theory^)!  religion,  is  for  the  sake  of  reli- 
gion, which  is  theThing  most  sacred  and  precious  to  the 
human  heart  As  the  deepest  necessity  of  man's  nature, 
religion  is  in  the  world  to  stay;  and  it  is  the  high  calling  of 
theology  to  harmonize  it  with  the  fundamental  principles  of 
reason,  set  forth  and  vindicated  by  the  deepest  philosophical 
thought,  thus  removing  all  discord  between  the  affections 
and  the  reason  of  humanity. 

There  is  no  necessity  for  any  one  declaring,  as  did  Jacobi : 
"With  the  head  I  am  a  heathen,  but  with  the  heart  a  Chris- 
tian." Religion  should  not  be  irrational  and  philosophy 
should  not  be  irreverent.  Philosophy  is  able  to  show  that 
faith  in  God  is  not  in  conflict  with  any  philosophical  principle 
that  reason  affirms  to  be  true. 

Theology  is,  however,  under  no  obligation  to  reconcile  its 
doctrines  with  every  new  phase  of  Philosophy.  This  would 
be  a  needless  task,  if  not  endless;  for,  as  it  has  been  true  in 
the  past,  and  is  likely  to  be  true  in  the  future,  a  system  of 
philosophy  may  flourish  for  a  time,  then  give  way  to  another 
system.  What  system  can  be  regarded  as  both  true  and 
complete?  Is  it  that  of  Plato,  or  Aristotle,  or  Zeno,  or 
Epicurus,  or  Pyrrho,  or  Philo,  or  Plotinus,  or  Valentinus,  or 
Bacon,  or  Descartes,  or  Spinoza,  or  Leibnitz,  or  Locke,  or 
Berkley,  or  Hume  or  Kant,  or  Reid,  or  Hamilton,  or  Ficte, 
or  Hegel,  or  Schleiermacher,  or  Schopenhauer,  or  Hart- 
mann,  or  Lotze,  or  Mill,  or  Spencer? 

No  doubt  all  these  systems  have  more  or  less  truth.  A 
true  Eclecticism,  seizing  on  the  central  truth,  as  a  funda- 
mental, vital,  organizing  principle,  might  collect  and  arrange 
the  various  truths  scattered  through  the  different  systems, 
and  organize  them  into  a  symmetrical  system,  practically 
complete.  Till  this  is  done,  so  that  the  principles  of  philoso- 
phy are  generally  accepted,  theology  need  not  make  haste 
to  adjust  itself  to  philosophy,  nor  endeavor  so  long  as  it 
keeps  its  doctrines  free  from  absurdities,  to  harmonize  them 
with  the  passing  novelties  of  the  successive  systems  of  philoso- 
phy. 

To  require  that  faith  should  accept  only  what  reason  has 
demonstrated,  is  to  demand  that  faith  be  no  longer  faith, 
but  that  it  be  transformed  into  knowledge.  Faith,  however, 
requires  a  basis  of  knowledge;  but  when  the  veracity  of  the 


PATRISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  109 

authority  which  claims  our  faith  has  been  proved  in  all 
verifiable  cases,  it  is  unreasonable  to  withhold  our  assent,  for 
instances  not  yet  verified.  But  a  doctrine  is  not  to  be  ac- 
cepted by  faith  simply  because  not  self -contradictory;  for 
many  things  not  true  are  not  self-contradictory,  but  because 
it  has  for  its  basis  an  authority  that  has  given  satisfactory 
proof  of  its  veracity;  that  is,  there  must  be  positive  and 
sufficient  grounds  for  faith,  in  addition  to  the  negative 
condition  that  the  doctrine  does  not  conflict  with  any  known 
truth.  The  ground  may  be  revelation,  or  nature,  or  history, 
or  the  instincts  of  the  soul,  or  the  testimony  of  reliable  wit- 
nesses. 

Has  philosophy  in  the  past  shown  by  its  history  that  it 
has  exerted  any  influence  on  the  doctrines  of  theology? 
We  believe  it  has. 

The  early  defenders  of  Christianity  were  styled  Apologists, 
and  their  works  Apologies.  The  aim  of  these  writers  was 
conciliatory,  to  remove  misapprehensions  from  the  minds  of 
their  opponents,  and  to  place  the  doctrines  of  Christianity 
in  a  favorable  light  before  the  eye  of  reason. 

1.  Justin  (103-167).  Justin  Martyr,  so-called  because 
he  suffered  martyrdom  for  his  religion,  was  instructed  in  the 
philosophy  of  the  Stoic  and  Platonic  Schools.  Impressed 
with  the  steadfastness  of  the  Christians  under  persecution, 
and  distrusting  the  reliability  of  human  reason,  he  embraced 
Christianity  and  defended  it  against  heretics,  Jews  and  pagans. 

His  principal  works  are  his  two  Apologies  addressed  to 
the  Emperors  Antoninus  Pius  and  Marcus  Aurelius,  and 
his  dialogue  with  Typho  the  Jew.  Justin  held  that  Christ 
was  the  Logos  incarnate,  in  whom  the  entire  human  race 
has  an  interest,  and  that  all  who  have  lived  in  communion 
wiiJi  him  are  Christians,  as  Heraclitus  and  Socrates.  He 
believed  that  the  early  Greek  philosophers,  as  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  were  acquainted  with  the  writings  of  Moses,  but  of 
this  there  is  no  evidence.  The  later  Greek  philosophers,  as 
the  Neo-Platonists,  had  access  to  the  sacred  writings. 

The  Apologies  of  Justin  were  written  in  defence  of  Chris- 
tians who  were  denounced  as  atheists,  rebels  and  evil-doers. 
Justin  admitted  that  the  Christians  were  Atheists,  if  it 
made  them  atheists,  not  to  worship  the  heathen  gods;  but  he 
maintained  that  they  were  no  atheists,  since  they  worship 


110  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

the  God  of  truth  and  righteousness.  To  acknowledge  Christ 
as  their  spiritual  King  did  not  prevent  them  from  being 
loyal  to  the  Emperor,  their  temporal  prince;  he  maintained 
that  they  were  law-abiding  citizens. 

In  his  dialogue  with  Typho,  Justin  shows,  from  the  Old 
Testament  scriptures,  that  Jesus  is  the  Christ,  the  promised 
Messiah.  Though  the  norm  of  moral  and  religious  life 
existed  under  the  form  of  law,  yet  the  ceremonial  law  was 
abolished  in  Christ,  who  substituted  the  moral  law  in  its  place. 

In  his  writings  Justin  employs  philosophy  to  enforce  his 
views. 

2.  Irenaeus  (160-202).     Irenaeus,  a  pupil  of  Polycarp,  the 
disciple  of  St.  John,  defends  the  Christian  doctrines  against 
the  theories  of  the  Gnostics.     He   also  wrote   against    the 
antinomian  doctrine,  as  tending  to  immorality.      He  held 
that  God  is  identical  with  the  Creator  of  the  world;  that 
the  Logos  or  Son,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  are  one  with  the  Father; 
that  the  Mosaic  law  was  a  preparation  for  the  Gospel;  and 
that  the  moral  law  applies  to  the  intentions  as  well  as  to  works, 
or  outward  conduct.     Men  freely  decide  for  or  against  the 
Divine  law,  and  for  their  decision  and  life  are  rewarded  or 
punished  in  the  future  life. 

Among  the  Apologists  of  Christianity,  in  the  second 
century,  perhaps  a  little  earlier  than  Irenaeus,  may  be 
mentioned  Tatianus,  the  Assyrian,  Theophilus  of  Antioch, 
and  Athenagoras  of  Athens.  Tatianus  over-estimated  the 
value  o  Oriental  ideas,  despised  Hellenic  culture,  and  tended 
toward  ascetic  practices.  Theophilus  discussed  the  subject- 
ive conditions  of  faith,  and  the  dependence  of  religious  ex- 
perience on  purity  of  heart,  Athenagoras  combines  Chris- 
tian thought  with  Attic  elegance  of  expression.  We  see  in 
these  three  writers  the  eddies  in  the  current  of  Christian 
thought. 

3.  Tertullian  (160-220).     Tertullian,  a  presbyter  of  Car- 
thage, was  opposed  to  Gnosticism,  and  in  fact,  to  all  specula- 
tion.    He  considered  philosophy  the  mother  of  heresies,  and 
went  so  far  in  opposition  to  it  as  to  say :  Credo  quia  absurdum. 
He  stands  for  the  reaction  against  philosophy;  but  an  absurd- 
ity is  no  ground  for  faith;  it  cannot  be  accepted  by  reason. 

4.y^Clement( 217).  Clement  of  Alexandria,  a  presby- 
ter, a  man  of  great  learning,  and  especially  well  acquainted 


PATRISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  111 

with  Greek  literature  and  philosophy,  did  not  hesitate  to 
draw,  from  all  sources,  arguments  and  illustrations  of  Chris- 
tian doctrine.  The  Greek  philosophy  was  accounted  by 
him  a  preparation  for  Christianity.  Christ,  the  Divine  Logos, 
was  the  manifestation  of  the  ineffable  Father.  Faith  is 
based  on  knowledge;  but  as  knowledge  is  imperfect,  faith, 
when  well  founded,  may  go  beyond  knowledge,  and  in  simple 
obedience,  may  do  many  things  without  knowing  the  reason 
why,  only  that  God  commands  them.  Faith  leads  from  fear, 
the  chief  motive  under  the  old  dispensation,  to  love,  the 
attractive  power  in  the  new.  A  Christian  must  needs  re- 
nounce evil,  and  advance  towards  perfection,  and  this  up- 
ward movement  is  to  continue,  not  only  in  this  world,  but 
in  that  which  is  to  come. 

6.  Origen  (185-254).  Origen,  a  pupil  of  Clement,  and 
probably  also  of  Ammonias  Saccas,  the  founder  of  the  Neo- 
Platonic  School,  is  chiefly  distinguished  by  his  method  of 
interpreting  Scripture,  and  by  his  answer  to  Celsus,  an  able 
and  bitter  opponent  of  Christianity. 

In  addition  to  the  historical  and  moral  interpretation  of 
Scripture,  Origen  resorted  to  the  speculative  or  allegorical 
interpretation;  but  this  led  to  fanciful  conjectures,  or  to  any 
meaning  the  imagination  might  invent.  His  work  against 
Celsus  displays  great  learning  and  ability.  In  fact  the 
nature  of  the  criticisms  of  Celsus  are  now  known  only  through 
the  works  of  Origen.  He  regards  the  genesis  of  the  Son  as 
eternal,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  as  raised  far  above  all  creatures. 
He  teaches  the  existence  of  many  other  worlds  previous  to 
the  present;  but  this  view  logically  leads  to  an  infinity  of 
worlds  before  the  present;  for  granting  one  world  before  the 
present,  which  must  have  come  to  an  end  to  make  way  for  the 
present,  there  would  be  needed  for  the  same  reason,  whatever 
that  might  be,  another  world  before  that,  and  so  on,  ad 
infinitum.  This  may  do  as  a  speculation,  like  the  pre-exist- 
ence  of  the  soul,  but  we  have  no  knowledge  of  its  truth. 

6.     Arius  ( 330).     Arius,  a  presbyter  of  the  Church  of 

Alexandria,  is  noted  for  his  doctrine  of  the  relation  of  the 
Father  and  Son,  and  for  his  controversies  with  his  bishop, 
Alexander,  and  with  Athanasius,  the  Theologian. 

His  views  can  be  best  understood  from  two  of  his  letters, 
one  addressed  to  Eusebius,  the  church  historian,  and  the 
other  to  Bishop  Alexander. 


1*  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

He  writes  ;to  Eusebius:  "Wljat  do  we  maintain?  That 
the  Son  is  not  unoriginate,  nor  a  part  of  the  Unoriginate,  nor 
made  of  any  previously  existing  substance,  but  that  by  the 
will  and  purpose  of  God.  He  was  in  being  with  the  perfect 
God  before  time,  the  only  begotten;  that  before  this  genera- 
tion, he  was  not. " 

In  a  letter  to  Alexander,  Arius  says:  "We  believe  in  one 
God  alone  without  birth,  alone  everlasting,  alone*  unoriginate 
.  .  .  We  believe  that  this  God  gave  birth  to  the  only 
begotten  Son,  before  eternal  periods,  through  whom  he  made 
these  periods, -and  all  things  else  .  .  so  that  while  there 
are  three  persons,  yet  God  is  alone  the  cause  of  all  things, 
and  unoriginate.  The  son  is  originate,  begotten  by  the 
Father.  God  is  before  all  things,  as  single  and  the  principle 
of  all,  and  therefore  before  Christ  also." 

The  doctrines  of  Arius  have  had  various  fortunes,  and  at 
one  time  they  were  considered  orthodox  by  the  eastern 
church,  though  never  accepted  by  the  western.  At  the 
present  day,  they  are  the  central  principles  of  the  Unitarian 
creed. 

7.  Eusebius  (265-340).     Eusebius,  a  friend  of  Constan- 
tine,  and  a  writer  of  Ecclesiastic  History,  befriended  Arius  in 
his  controversies  with  Alexander  and  Athanasius.     He  was 
neither  an  Arian  nor  an  Athanasian,  but  occupied  an  inter- 
mediate position  in  the  Arian  controversy.     He  did   not 
hold  with  Arius,  that  there  was  a  time  when  the  Son  was 
not,  neither  did  he  say  that  he  was  co-eternal  with  the  Father. 
The  relation  of  the  Father  to  the  Son  he  likened  to  that  of  a 
flower  to  its  perfume. 

8.  Athanasius  (298-373).     Athanasius  became  Bishop  of 
Alexandria  when  thirty  years  of  age.     He  was  five  times  sent 
into  exile,  and  altogether,  was  separated  twenty  years  from 
his  diocese.     He  labored  with  zeal  and  success  both  as  a 
Bishop  and  as  an  author.     He  formulated  the  Trinitarian 
creed. 

In  opposition  to  Arius,  Athanasius  formulated  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Trinity  which  has  been  practically  accepted  by 
the  various  branches  of  orthodox  Christianity.  The  doctrine 
of  the  Trinity,  as  a  part  of  the  Nicene  creed,  was  formally 
adopted  by  the  Council  of  Nice,  A.  D.  325. 

Athanasius  refuted  the  doctrine  that  an  intermediate 
must  be  assumed  between  the  eternal  God  and  temporal 


PATRISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  113 

things,  by  the  following  argument : '  'If  this  intermediate  were 
temporal,  another  intermediate  being  would  be  needed  be- 
tween him  and  God;  if  eternal,  another  between  him  and 
finite  things,  and  so  on." 

9.  Hilarius   ( — -368).     Hilarius,    Bishop     of     Poitiers, 
sometimes  called  Malleus  Arianorum,  and  the  Athanasius  of 
the  west,   defended,   by  means  of  speculative   philosophy, 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  against  that  of  the  Arians.     He 
was  banished  to  Phrygia  by  the  Emperor  Constantius,  but 
was  restored  to  his  diocese  after  four  years  of  exile.     In  his 
discussions  he  used  the  Latin  language  instead  of  the  more 
flexible  Greek. 

10.  Pelagius,  supposed  to  be  of  British  birth,  came  to 
Rome  about  400  A.  D.     He  was  struck  with  the  low  tone  of 
morals  prevalent  in  the  Church,  the  members  seeming  to 
rely  on  a  profession  of  Christianity  and  the  efficacy  of  the 
sacraments. 

As  his  remonstrances  were  met  by  the  plea  of  human 
weakness,  he  replied:  "If  I  ought,  I  can."  Obligation  implies 
the  power  to  meet  that  obligation.  He  stoutly  maintained 
the  freedom  of  the  will,  and  the  possibility  of  living  without 
sin.  His  doctrines,  though  meeting  with  some  encourage- 
ment, were  finally  condemned  as  heretical. 

11.  Jerome  (341-420).     St.  Jerome,  a  man  of  great  learn- 
ing, made  a  critical  revision  of  the  old  Latin  translation  of 
the   Scriptures.     This   translation  is    known  as   the  Latin 
Vulgate.     Jerome,  however,  was  not  noted  for  his  speculative 
ability. 

12.  Ambrose  (340-397).     St.  Ambrose,  Bishop  of  Milan, 
a  princely  ecclesiastical  statesman,  endeavored  to  advance 
religious  life  and  worship  in  congregations.     To  this  end  he 
composed  hymns  and  prepared  a  ritual  for  the  clergy.     To 
him  directly  Augustine  owes  his  conversion. 

13.  Augustine  (354-440).     Augustine,  Bishop  of  Hippo, 
had  a  heathen  father  and  a  Christian  mother.     He  was 
brought  up  in  the  Christian  faith,  but  became  skeptical  and 
dissolute.     He  was  won  back  to  the  Christian  faith,  chiefly 
through  the  influence  of  Ambrose.     He  was  well  educated, 
and  had  prepared  himself  as  a  teacher  of  rhetoric;  but  after 
his  conversion,  he  devoted  himself  to  the  interests  of  the 
church,  and  became  her  ablest  theologian  and  defender. 


114  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Augustine  was  a  philosopher  as  well  as  a  theologian,  and 
anticipated  certain  so-called  modern  discoveries  in  psycholo- 
gy. He  took,  as  the  immovable  foundation  of  all  knowledge, 
the  fact  of  the  consciousness  of  thoughts,  feelings,  arid 
volitions,  then  consciousness  is  real,  and  thoughts,  feelings, 
and  volitions  are  real.  To  be  conscious  of  sensation  or  of  any 
other  mental  fact,  is  proof  of  the  existence,  not  only  of  that 
fact,  but  of  the  one  who  is  conscious.  This  reminds  us  of 
Descartes'  Cogito,  ergo  sum.  The  fact  of  our  existence  is 
involved  in  the  fact  of  the  consciousness  of  phenomena,  and 
can  be  known  in  no  other  way.  Reality,  therefore,  is,  and 
truth  is,  since  we  know  reality,  and  God  is  who  is  truth  itself. 
Thorough-going  skepticism,  as  that  of  Pyrrho,  is  thus  refuted. 

Augustine  combatted  the  Manichaean  heresy,  a  system  of 
doctrine  which  explained  the  mysteries  of  the  world  by  means 
of  two  original  principles,  the  one  good  and  the  other  evil, 
ever  in  conflict.  He  was  the  better  prepared  to  do  this, 
because,  at  one  time,  he  had  been  enthralled  by  this  doctrine, 
and  understood  it  perfectly. 

Accepting  the  doctrine  of  total  depravity,  confirmed,  as 
he  believed  by  his  own  experience  in  his  vain  attempts  to 
reform,  Augustine  inferred  the  inability  of  man  to  save  him- 
self from  sin,  and  concluded  that  salvation  is  solely  by  the 
grace  of  God.  Since  only  a  part  of  the  human  race  are 
saved,  God  elects  those  who  are  saved  to  eternal  life,  and 
consequently  the  rest  are  reprobated;  but  Augustine  dwells 
lightly  on  this  feature,  though  it  logically  follows,  since  they 
cannot  by  any  possibility  save  themselves.  As  salvation  is 
solely  by  the  sovereign  grace  of  God,  and  as  he  is  able  to  save 
whom  he  will,  it  would  seem  that  benevolence  requires  that 
God  should  save  all.  This  would  glorify  him  in  the  light  of 
reason. 

If  it  is  said  that  the  reprobate  are  sinners  and  deserve 
their  fate,  it  may  be  replied  that  the  elect  are  also  sinners, 
and  why  should  they  be  saved  in  preference  to  the  others? 
The  answer  would  be  God  is  sovereign  and  can  do  as  he 
pleases,  and  does  no  injustice.  Let  us  see.  The  reprobate 
are  totally  depraved,  according  to  Augustine,  and  cannot  do 
right,  and  are,  therefore,  not  responsible  for  doing  wrong. 
To  punish  them  for  what  is  unavoidable  is  certainly  not 
justice;  and  will  not  the  judge  of  all  the  earth  do  right? 


PATRISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  115 

Ah,  it  is  replied,  they  sinned  in  Adam.  They  had  no  con- 
scious existence  in  Adam;  hence  their  sin  in  Adam  is  a  fiction, 
though  it  may  be  admitted  that  they  inherited  from  Adam 
a  tendency  to  sin. 

The  question  will  be  asked,  shall  we  then  go  back  to  Pela- 
gianism?  Not  altogether.  The  natural  man  is  assisted  by 
the  grace  of  God,  which  should  not  be  left  out,  in  this  discus- 
sion. "The  grace  of  God  which  bringeth  salvation  hath 
appeared  to  all  men,"  and  with  this  grace,  that  is,  by  God's 
help,  any  one  can  be  saved;  and  if  any  one  is  lost,  it  is  be- 
cause he  would  not  come  unto  God  that  he  might  have  life. 
But,  says  one,  is  not  the  will  determined  by  motives?  No; 
motives  are  not  causes,  but  reasons,  and  the  will  or  volition, 
is  determined  by  the  ego  itself,  in  view  of  reasons.  The 
determining  power  is  within  and  not  without;  it  is  the  man 
himself.  The  will,  as  volition,  is  produced,  is  an  effect,  and 
not  free;  it  is  the  ego  that  is  free;  the  freedom  is  not  in  the 
effect,  but  in  the  cause,  that  is  in  the  person.  Conscience 
testifies  to  the  same  thing.  The  sinner  has  a  sense  of  guilt 
and  condemnation,  which  he  could  not  have,  if  he  believed 
that  he  acted  under  necessity;  hence  he  does  not  believe 
that  he  acted  under  necessity,  but  that  he  acted  freely,  and 
therefore  conscience  condemns  him.  Conscience  is  no  anom- 
aly in  human  nature;  it  does  not  bear  false  witness,  telling 
the  man  that  he  is  guilty,  when  he  is  not  guilty;  it  is  the 
honest  truthful  witness,  bearing  testimony  of  guilt,  which 
could  not  be  guilt  unless  the  man  is  free.  The  sinner's 
deepest  convictions  condemn  him  as  guilty. 

Augustine  rejects  the 'theory  of  a  succession  of  worlds, 
which  have  been  created  and  destroyed;  he  held  that  the 
present  universe  is  the  only  one,  and  that  it  had  a  beginning, 
and  that  with  the  universe  time  began.  With  Plato  he  held 
that  time  does  not  exist  apart  from  movement,  and  that  it 
measures  motion,  reversing  the  true  relation  that  motion 
measures  time.  Duration  is  eternal,  and  movement  is  in 
duration. 

What  was  before  time?  Augustine  answers :  "Eternity  and 
God;"  and  since  there  was  no  movement  in  eternity  or  in 
God  before  the  act  of  creation,  there  was  no  time.  In  reply, 
we  ask:  Was  God  asleep  in  eternity?  Do  the  changes  that 
take  place  constitute  time?  If  so,  what  changes?  The  sum 


116  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

total  of  the  changes,  or  some  particular  change?  It  cannot 
be  some  particular  change;  for  if  that  particular  change 
did  not  take  place,  other  changes  might  occur,  but  these 
changes  require  time,  and  time  would  still  be.  Strike  out 
change  after  change,  till  but  one  change  is  left,  still  there 
would  be  time.  Does  that  change  constitute  time?  No,  for 
it  might  have  been  struck  out  before  some  other  change,  and 
still  there  would  be  time.  What  then  is  time?  It  is  the 
blank  possibility  of  events,  or  that  in  which  things  might 
persist  or  succession  take  place.  Eternity  is  infinite  time. 

Augustine  held  that  there  was  no  time  before  the  act  of 
creation.  Did  God  come  into  existence  with  the  act  of 
creation?  No;  for  non-entity  cannot  spring  into  existence. 
God  then  is  eternal;  he  was  neither  dead  nor  asleep  before 
the  creation  of  the  world.  The  Logos,  the  Word,  the  Rea- 
son, the  Wisdom  of  God  existed  with  God  before  the  founda- 
tion of  the  world.  God  was  not  idle  nor  asleep. 

Augustine  held  that  space  has  no  existence  apart  from 
bodies  and  their  relation;  but  space  is  the  room  for  bodies, 
the  blank  possibility  of  bodies  and  motion;  it  is  that  in  which 
bodies  may  exist  or  motion  take  place.  Space  is  eternal,  and 
the  present  time  omnipresent;  but  they  have  no  power,  and 
are  not  rivals  of  God.  But  does  not  time  work  change? 
No;  that  language  is  poetic,  not  philosophic.  Forces  work 
changes  in  time.  Philosophers  may  learn  of  mathematicians 
in  regard  to  space  and  time.  The  most  important  of  the 
works  of  Augustine  is:  On  the  Trinity,  in  which  he  regards 
the  Son  as  the  Word,  the  Reason,  the  Wisdom  of  God. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

Scholastic  Philosophy — First  Period 

Scholasticism  is  the  system  elaborated  by  the  theologians 
of  the  middle  ages. 

Seven  liberal  arts  and  sciences — the  trivium  and  the  quad- 
rimum  were  taught.  The  trivium  embraced  Grammar, 
Rhetoric,  and  Logic;  the  quadrivium,  Arithmetic,  Geometry, 
Astronomy  and  Music. 

What  is  the  relation  of  philosophy  to  theology?  The 
only  possible  answers  to  this  question  are  the  following: 

(1)  They  are  co-extensive,  like  two  equal  coincident  circles. 

(2)  They    are    mutually   exclusive  having    no    common 
subject-matter. 

(3)  Philosophy  is  subordinate  to  theology. 

(4)  Theology  is  subordinate  to  Philosophy. 

(5)  Philosophy  intersects  theology. 

The  (5)  is  the  true  relation;  for  they  have  common  matter, 
and  each  matter  peculiar  to  itself.  Both  agreement  and 
difference  relate  to  their  subject-matter. 

Have  Philosophy  and  Theology  any  common  subject- 
matter?  Yes;  for  both  consider  the  fundamental  problems 
relating  to  the  origin  of  nature,  the  destiny  of  the  universe 
and  of  man,  and  their  dependence  on  God,  the  ultimate  real- 
ity, represented  by  the  common  part  of  the  circles. 

Theology  is  the  theory  of  religion,  or  the  philosophy  of  the 
relations  of  man  to  God.  Its  doctrines  concerning  sin, 
repentance,  pardon,  regeneration,  justification,  and  final 
salvation,  are  peculiar  to  itself,  and  are  not  held  in  common 
with  philosophy.  Scholasticism  made  Philosophia  Ancilla 
Theologiae. 

Philosophy  is  the  theory  of  fundamental  truth,  which,  if 
relating  to  God,  may  be  represented  by  the  common  part  of 
two  intersecting  circles;  if  relating  to  the  necessary  truth  of 
the  sciences,  by  the  part  of  the  circle  Philosophy  without  the 
circle  Theology. 

Hence,  the  relation  of  intersection,  which  excludes  the 
others,  is  the  true  relation  of  Philosophy  to  Theology. 

117 


118  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Though  philosophy  is  willing  to  aid  the  church  in  the 
development  of  her  theology,  yet  philosophy  is  not  ancilla 
ecclesiae  the  hand-maid  of  the  church,  since  it  deals  with 
necessary  truth,  not  only  that  relating  to  theology,  but  that 
not  so  related.  When  theology  strives  to  show  that  certain 
doctrines  are  rational,  or  at  least  not  irrational,  she  calls  for 
the  aid  of  philosophy,  which  is  cheerfully  rendered;  but 
Theology  accepts  certain  dogmas  by  faith,  which  philosophy 
investigates  by  reason;  their  methods  are  different. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  work  of  the  scholastic  theologians : 

1.  Erigena  (cir.  805-877).  Johannes  Scotus  Erigena,  prob- 
ably a  native  of  Ireland,  was  a  fine  scholar,  familiar  with  the 
writings  of  Aristotle,  the  Neo-Platonists,  and  the  early  church 
fathers.  He  was  invited  to  France  by  Charles,  the  Bald,  and 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  court  school. 

Erigena  is  the  transition  to  scholastic  philosophy  rather 
than  its  accepted  exponent.  He  was  perhaps  more  of  a 
Neo-Platonist  than  a  scholastic.  With  him  reason  was  the 
supreme  arbiter,  and  not  the  authority  of  Plato,  or  of  Aristotle 
or  of  the  Scriptures  or  of  the  church;  but  he  held  that  reason 
by  its  own  insight,  evolves  a  system  in  harmony  with  revela- 
tion. 

Erigena  considered  the  eucharist  symbolical  and  com- 
memorative. He  defended  the  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of 
the  will  against  the  extreme  predestinationism  of  Gottschalk. 

In  his  treatise  on  Divine  predestination,  Erigena  argues 
entirely  from  the  speculative  point  of  view.  He  asserts 
that  true  religion  and  true  philosophy  are  fundamentally 
the  same.  They  are,  however,  not  the  same,  as  true  religion 
is  practical — a  life  of  faith  in  God,  reverence  for  his  character, 
and  obedience  to  his  laws;  philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
speculative  and  takes  reason  for  its  instrument  and  its  author- 
ity. If  Scotus  had  said  that  theology  and  philosophy  occupy 
the  same  ground,  it  would  have  been  nearer  the  truth,  yet  not 
exactly  the  truth;  for  we  have  showed  above  that  they  hold 
in  part  common  ground,  and  each  ground  not  held  by  the 
other. 

At  the  request  of  the  King,  Erigena  translated  Dionysius, 
the  Areopagite,  and  published  it  without  submitting  it  to 
the  church  for  approval,  for  which  he  incurred  the  displeasure 
of  Pope  Nicholas  I. 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— FIRST  PERIOD  119 

The  great  work  of  Erigena,  entitled  De  Divisione  Naturae, 
is  a  reasoned  out  dialogue  after  the  manner  of  Plato.  Na- 
ture, the  universe,  containing  both  being  and  non-being, 
consists  of  four  divisions:  (1)  That  which  creates  but  is  not 
created.  (2)  That  which  is  created  and  creates.  (3)  That 
which  is  created  but  does  not  create.  (4)  That  which 
neither  is  created  nor  creates. 

The  first  is  God  the  origin  of  all  things;  the  last  is  God 
the  goal  of  all  things.  The  second  and  third  constitute  the 
universe,  the  manifestation  of  God  in  time.  God  alone,  the 
uncreated  Creator,  has  true  being,  and  is  a  trinity,  the  Father 
as  Being,  the  Son  as  Wisdom,  the  Spirit  as  Life.  Wisdom 
the  first  emanation  the  Son  of  the  Father,  corresponds  to  the 
Platonic  realm  of  ideas.  Goodness,  the  highest  idea,  partici- 
pates in  being.  Essence  participates  in  goodness,  and  hence 
in  being,  and  life  is  a  species  of  essence,  and  wisdom  a  species 
of  Me.  God  is,  therefore,  the  trinity,  Being,  Wisdom,  Life. 
Man  created  in  the  image  of  God  is  also  a  trinity,  Will,  Intel- 
lect, Sensibility. 

As  God  was  never  without  W7isdom,  or  eternal  ideas  mov- 
ing under  the  influence  of  the  living  Spirit,  so  God  has  eter- 
nally manifested  his  creative  power,  and  creation  is,  there- 
fore, eternal.  This  seems  to  conflict  with  the  (4)  that  which 
neither  is  created  nor  creates,  and  rules  it  out  as  actual,  and 
leaves  it  only  as  a  possible  conception;  for  if  all  things  return 
to  God,  who,  though  uncreated,  does  no  longer  create,  his 
Wisdom  and  Life,  having  no  sphere  of  activity,  would  virtual- 
ly cease  to  be,  and  we  should  have  left  simply  being  without 
Wisdom  or  life;  that  is,  God  would  become  non-being.  As 
God  is  eternal,  so  the  universe,  the  manifestation  of  Being, 
Wisdom,  and  Life,  or  of  the  triune  God,  is  also  eternal;  it 
never  had  a  beginning,  and  it  will  never  have  an  end;  there- 
fore, time  is  eternal,  and  is  identical  with  eternity.  Move- 
ment never  ceases;  for  creation  never  began,  nor  will  it  ever 
end. 

Sin  results  from  the  will  of  the  individual  who  falsely 
represents  evil  as  good  and  pursues  it;  wickedness  is  hell, 
which  is  not  a  local  place,  but  is  simply  in  the  soul  of  the 
sinner.  The  result  of  punishment  is  the  final  purification 
and  salvation  of  the  sinner;  even  the  devils  are  to  be  purified 
and  saved. 


120  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Erigena  is  a  remarkably  interesting  philosopher;  he  was 
not  held  by  theological  shackles.  With  him  reason  was 
ultimate  authority,  and  philosophy  superior  to  theology. 
He  did  not  accept  the  dogmas  of  the  church  as  ultimate  and 
complete,  and  then  endeavor  only  to  elucidate  them  by 
logical  exposition  and  defend  them  by  argument,  but  he 
philosophized  to  discover  the  truth  by  his  own  reason,  and 
thorough  original  investigation,  and  the  result  was  a  system 
of  rational  Theology,  which  is  philosophically  better  than 
dogmatic  Theology. 

(2.)  Roscellinus,  who  flourished  the  latter  half  of  the 
eleventh  century,  was  the  first  to  give  definite  expression 
to  the  doctrines  of  Nominalism  in  opposition  to  those  of 
Realism.  Conceptualism,  a  later  theory,  was  devised  as  a 
compromise  between  the  two  older  theories.  It  is  important 
to  have  a  clear  view  of  these  theories. 

Realism,  is  the  doctrine  that  the  universal,  a  genus  or  a 
species,  has  a  real  objective  existence,  independent  both  of 
the  individual  objects  of  a  class,  and  of  the  act  of  conception; 
and  that  it  is  the  perfect  pattern  according  to  which  the 
individuals  are  fashioned,  and  in  comparison  with  which 
they  must  forever  remain  imperfect  and  inferior.  This  is 
the  doctrine  of  ideas  as  taught  by  Plato.  The  formula  for 
realism  is:  Universalia  ante  rem.  Universals,  however,  may  be 
regarded  as  God's  ideas,  and  not  as  absolutely  independent. 

Nominalism  is  the  doctrine  that  only  individuals  have  a 
real  existence;  that  all  our  ideas  are  particular;  and  that 
universals  are  only  names  of  resembling  individuals.  The 
formula  for  nominalism  is :  Universalia  post  rem. 

Conceptualism  is  the  theory  that  a  universal  has  an  existence 
in  the  mind  of  the  thinking  subject,  as  a  pure  concept  em- 
bracing those  elements  only  which  correspond  to  the  qualities 
found  in  all  the  individuals  of  the  class;  that  it  is  found  by 
comparing  resembling  individuals,  disregarding  their  peculi- 
arities, noting,  abstracting  and  combining  their  common 
qualities;  and  that,  in  passing  from  individual  to  individual 
of  the  same  class,  the  peculiarities  of  the  individuals  are 
dropped,  while  the  common  qualities  are  retained,  the  notion 
corresponding  to  these  common  qualities  constitutes  the 
concept. 

The  formula  for  Conceptualism  is :  Universalia  in  re. 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— FIRST  PERIOD     121 

The  following  considerations  will  throw  light  on  these 
theories : 

The  individual  is  perceived;  the  universal  is  conceived. 
The  universal  is  not  an  independent  substantial  existence 
but  is  simply  what  Aristotle  calls  a  formal  cause,  or  that 
combination  of  qualities  found  in  every  individual  of  a  class, 
and  which  entitles  it  to  be  ranked  as  a  member  of  that  class; 
it  cannot  be  cognized  by  the  senses,  nor  represented  by  the 
imagination  purely  as  a  picture;  but  it  is  understood  by  the 
intellect  as  belonging  to  each  individual  of  the  class,  and 
corresponds  to  the  mental  product  called  a  concept.  In- 
dividual peculiarities  are  real,  and  distinguish  one  individual 
from  another. 

Individuals  are  real,  and  so  are  peculiarities;  classes  are 
real,  and  so  are  common  qualities;  but  neither  peculiarities 
nor  common  qualities  exist  apart  from  the  individuals,  yet 
they  can  be  understood  as  abstracts,  though  not  imagined. 

Individuals  can  be  represented  by  the  imagination,  so  can 
classes  as  collections  of  individuals;  but  neither  common 
qualities  alone,  nor  peculiar  qualities  alone  can  be  imagined, 
but  only  together  with  their  objects,  yet  as  abstracts  they 
can  be  understood. 

The  name  is  not  the  only  universal,  and  extreme  nominal- 
ism is  not  true,  for  the  common  qualities  are  universal.  The 
universal,  as  a  combination  of  the  common  qualities  of  a 
class,  has  no  substantial  existence  out  of  the  individuals  Of 
the  class,  and  extreme  realism  is  false.  The  concept  has 
mental  existence  as  the  counterpart  of  the  universal;  it  a 
real  to  thought,  though  not  an  image  constructed  by  this 
imagination.  It  is  only  when  the  universal  and  the  particulae 
are  combined  that  an  object  can  be  represent ed  by  thr 
imagination  so  as  to  be  understood.  By  the  universal  we 
form  the  class;  by  the  particular  we  identify  the  individual 

To  return  to  Roscellinus :  he  applied  the  nominalistic  doc- 
trine, that  there  is  nothing  real  but  individuals,  to  the  Trinity, 
and  denied  that  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit  constituted 
one  God,  in  which  case,  said  he,  the  Father  and  the  Holy 
Spirit  must  have  been  incarnate  with  the  Son;  but,  did  usage 
permit,  we  ought  to  speak  of  three  Gods.  This  statement, 
of  course,  gave  great  offence  to  the  orthodox  party. 


122  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

3.  Anselm  (1033-1108).  Anselm,  the  Archbishop  of 
Canterbury,  so  far  from  endorsing  the  tritheistic  theory,  as 
Roscellinus  supposed,  composed  his  treatise,  De  Fide  Trinitatis, 
in  refutation.  He  accepted  the  sacred  dogmas,  as  they  were 
given  by  the  authority  of  the  church,  and  by  philosophy 
endeavored  to  make  them  appear  reasonable,  and  this  is  the 
keynote  of  Scholasticism.  His  motto  was:  Credo  ut  intelli- 
gam.  He  endeavored  to  give  philosophic  demonstration, 
not  only  of  the  existence  of  God,  but  also  of  the  trinity  and 
the  incarnation. 

His  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God  was  both  a 
posteriori  and  a  priori.  The  a  posteriori  proof  is  found  in 
the  Monologium.  From  truth  in  knowing  and  in  willing,  and 
in  things,  he  rises  to  God,  the  absolute  truth,  the  ultimate 
principle  of  things  and  thought.  The  a  priori  proof,  found  in 
the  proslogium,  is  ontological.  God  is  the  greatest  being  con- 
ceivable. Now  if  God  has  no  objective  existence,  but  is 
only  a  conception  of  the  human  mind,  he  would  not  be  abso- 
lutely the  greatest,  for  real  objective  existence  would  render 
him  greater;  hence  God,  the  greatest  being  has  objective 
existence.  Descartes'  demonstration  of  the  existence  of 
God  the  most  perfect  being  is  similar;  but  conception  does  not 
involve  objective  existence. 

From  the  existence  of  God,  the  greatest  being,  Anselm 
proceeds  to  adduce  the  rational  grounds  for  the  Christian 
doctrines  of  Creation  and  the  Trinity. 

In  his  great  work :  Cur  Deus  homo,  he  undertakes  to  demon- 
strate the  necessity  of  the  atonement.  Sin,  the  transgression 
of  God's  law,  wounds  the  infinite  honor  of  God,  and  requires 
infinite  satisfaction,  which  man,  a  finite  being,  cannot  render. 
Assuming  the  form  of  man,  the  sinless  son,  as  God-Man, 
rendered  this  satisfaction,  by  paying  the  penalty,  so  that 
mercy  can  be  extended  to  man,  while  the  law  is  vindicated. 
The  wages  of  sin  is^  death.  The  death  of  Christ  showed  the 
claims  of  justice,  though  it  did  not  satisfy  them.  The  con- 
test between  goodness  and  justice  is  thus  settled  in  a  legal 
rather  than  in  an  ethical  way.  With  it  should  be  considered 
the  free  will  of  man,  his  duty  of  repentance  and  life  of  obedi- 
ence. 

4  William  of  Champeaux  (1070-1121).  William  held  in 
succession  two  different  opinions  in  regard  to  realism.  From 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— FIRST  PERIOD  123 

his  first  or  extreme  opinion,  he  was  dislodged  by  Abelard,  his 
former  pupil.  The  extreme  opinion  was  to  this  effect: 
All  the  individuals  of  the  same  class  were  essentially  the  same, 
differing  only  in  accidents;  or  more  definitely  he  taught  that 
the  substance  of  a  class  existed,  in  its  entirety,  in  each  in- 
dividual of  that  class.  The  criticism  of  Abelard  forced  him 
to  modify  this  position:  If  the  essence  homo  is  wholly  and 
essentially  present  in  Socrates,  that  is,  wholly  absorbed  in 
Socrates,  it  cannot  be  where  Socrates  is  not,  and  hence  is  not 
in  Plato. 

In  his  modification  of  his  realism,  William  retracted  the 
view  that  the  universal  is  numerically  the  same,  that  is, 
identical,  in  all  the  individuals  of  the  class,  and  asserted  its 
essential  sameness,  that  is,  its  similarity.  To  this  view 
there  is  no  reasonable  objection,  since  there  is  something 
similar  in  all  the  individuals  of  the  class,  otherwise  there 
would  be  nothing  which  would  entitle  them  to  be  classed 
together.  William  held  that  the  humanity  of  Peter  is  similar 
to  that  in  Paul,  yet  not  identical;  but  the  Divinity  in  the 
Father,  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  is  one  and  identical.  They  are 
distinguished  by  their  manifestations. 

This  combination  of  common  or  similar  qualities  is  the 
characteristic  of  the  class,  and  the  notion  of  this  combination 
of  qualities  is  the  concept  of  the  tlass,  and  has  only  a  mental 
existence,  not  in  the  imagination,  but  in  the  understanding 
of  the  subject  who  thinks  of  the  class.  The  characteristic  of  a 
species  is  that  which  distinguishes  the  species  from  other 
species  of  a  genus,  and  is  used  in  the  definition  of  the  species. 
When  we  say  Plato  is  a  man,  we  mean  that  Plato  is  an  in- 
dividual of  the  class  man,  having  the  combination  of  attri- 
butes similar  to  that  found  in  every  man;  he  also  has  individual 
attributes  peculiar  to  himself  which  distinguish  him  from 
other  men,  as  from  Ari  totle,  who  also  has  his  peculiarities. 

The  theory  of  indifference  naturally  followed  the  modifica- 
tion of  that  of  William's;  it  may  be  thus  stated :  The  universal 
consists  of  the  attributes  in  any  individual  of  the  class  similar 
to  those  in  the  other  individuals  of  the  same  class,  the  in- 
dividuals alone  having  a  substantial  existence.  Restricting 
attention  to  these  similar  attributes,  throwing  the  elements 
peculiar  to  the  individual  out  of  account,  the  individual 
becomes  the  genus  or  the  species.  This  became  a  favorite 


124  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

theory  of  the  Realistic  camp,  after  the  criticism  of  Abelard; 
but  this  gives  up  the  substantial  existence  of  the  universal, 
which  is  the  core  of  Realism,  and  reduces  it  to  a  bundle  of 
similar  attributes  in  all  the  individuals  of  the  class.  This  is  a 
correct  view  except  in  this :  This  bundle  of  attributes  is  not  the 
genus  or  the  species,  though  it  was  so  regarded,  but  is  the 
characteristic  of  the  class,  and  its  mental  counterpart  is  the 
concept.  The  genus  or  species  is  the  class  itself,  which  is  a 
better  view. 

5.  Gilbert  de  la  Porr'ee  (1075-1154).     Gilbert  distinguishes 
between  the  manner  of  existence  of  individuals  and  of  genera 
or  species.     By  genera  or  species,  he  did  not  mean  the  class 
but  the  combination  of  attributes,  essentially  though  not 
numerically,  the  same  in  all  of  the  individuals  of  the  class. 
The  universal  is  thus  a  native  form,  essentially  the  same, 
inherent  in  every  individual  of  a  class.     The  particular  is 
what  is  peculiar  to  the  individual  and  distinguishes  him 
from  the  other  individuals  and  gives  him  his  special  value. 
The  individual  is  the  universal  plus  the  particular. 

Gilbert  held  that  universals  exist  in  God  as  the  perfect 
archetypes  or  patterns  after  which  they  exist  as  more  or 
less  imperfect  copies,  in  the  individuals  of  a  class.  Gilbert 
was  thus  at  once  both  a  Platonist  and  Aristotelian. 

The  categories  of  Aristotle  were  divided  by  Gilbert  into 
two  classes— /ormae  inhaerentes,  as  substance,  quantity,  qual- 
ity, and  potential  relation,  and  formae  assistantes,  as  action, 
passion,  place,  time,  position,  belonging  to  objects  only  in 
relation  to  other  objects.  This  distinction  was  adopted  by 
all  the  schools,  and  held  its  place  about  four  hundred  years. 

6.  Abelard    (1079-1142).     We   have   seen   how   Abelard 
refuted  extreme  realism,  but  he  did  not  go  over  to  extreme 
nominalism.     Laying   down   the   principle:    Res  de  re  non 
predicatur,  he  inferred  that  genera  and  species,    which  are 
admitted  to  be  pr  dicated,  cannot  be  things  or  substances. 
He  also  saw,  that  by  separating  the  universal  substance  from 
the  form  which  makes  it  individual,  renders  it  indifferent  to 
these  forms,  and  identifies  all  beings  in  one  universal  sub- 
stance.    The  theory  of  indifference,  which  recognizes  a  generic 
substance  as  the  core  of  the  individual,  is  condemned  by  the 
view  that  only  the  individual  exists  by  its  own  right      The 
universal,  however,  is  not  a  substantial  core  of  the  individual; 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— FIRST  PERIOD  125 

it  is  that  combination  of  qualities  similar  in  one  individual 
of  a  class  to  that  found  in  any  other  individual  of  the  same 
class.  The  notion  of  this  combination  of  qualities  is  the 
concept. 

What  then  are  genera  and  species?  They  are  classes,  not 
universals.  When  we  say  Plato  is  a  man,  we  do  not  mean 
Plato  is  man,  or  Plato  is  humanity,  though  we  can  say  Plato 
is  human.  When  we  say  Plato  is  a  man,  we  mean  that 
Plato  is  a  certain  individual  of  the  class  man.  The  subject 
and  predicate  are  identical;  for  a  certain  man  is  Plato.  Say- 
ing Plato  is  a  man,  puts  him  in  the  class  man  without  fully 
identifying  him  or  discriminating  him  from  other  individuals 
of  the  class.  Here  we  predicate  Plato  of  himself,  since  a  cer- 
tain one  of  the  class  man  is  Plato;  but  the  proposition  Plato 
is  a  man  means  more  than  Plato  is  Plato;  it  also  classifies 
him  as  a  man. 

In  the  definition,  Plato  is  the  man  who  founded  the  Academ- 
ic School  of  Philosophy,  we  have  not  only  classed  Plato,  but 
identified  him  and  distinguished  him  from  other  individuals 
of  the  class  man.  It  is  the  particular  in  Plato  that  identifies 
him  and  gives  him  importance. 

The  subject  and  predicate  are  identical,  not  in  form,  but 
in  fact,  only  what  is  implicit  in  the  subject  is  explicit  in  the 
predicate.  The  peculiar  qualities  not  only  define  the  man 
but  give  him  his  value. 

Abelard  employed  reason  in  testing  dogma.  He  said: 
"A  doctrine  is  believed  not  because  God  has  said  it,  but 
because  we  are  convinced  by  reason  that  it  is  so." 

Though  he  combatted  the  Tritheism  of  Roscellinus,  his 
own  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  was  condemned  by  the  councils 
at  Soissons  and  at  Sens. 

Abelard  is  regarded  as  the  originator  of  the  theory  called 
Conceptualism. 

7.  Hugo  of  St.  Victor  (1097-1141).     Hugo  declared  that 
uncorrupted  truth  cannot  be  discovered  by  reasoning;  yet 
he  attempted  to  give,  in  his  Snmma  Sententiarum,  a  rational 
presentation  of  the  Christian  doctrines.     He  was  the  first 
of  the  Summists,  or  those  giving  abridged  views  of  theology. 

8.  John  of  Salisbury  ( 1180).     John  in  his  Metalogicus 

defends  logic  against  those  who  despised  scholastic  training; 
yet  he  adds  that  dialectic  is  like  the  sword  of  Hercules  in  a 


126  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

pigmy's  hand,  unless  there  be  added  a  knowledge  of  the 
Sciences;  and  that  love,  not  logic,  is  the  fulfillment  of  the 
law.  In  his  Polycraticus,  he  gave  an  inventory  of  what  the 
scholastics  had  accomplished  up  to  his  own  time.  His  works 
are  valuable,  giving,  as  they  do,  an  account  of  the  schools, 
and  the  logical  discussions  of  the  period.  He  wrote  elegant 
Latin,  was  a  great  admirer  of  Cicero,  and  considered  himself 
an  Academician;  but  with  him  the  first  period  of  Scholasticism 
or  the  supremacy  of  Plato,  comes  to  an  end. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

Scholastic  Philosophy — Second  Period 

1.  Arabic  Philosophy.  In  order  to  understand  the  second 
period  of  Scholastic  philosophy,  it  is  necessary  to  consider 
Arabic  philosophy,  and  the  revival  of  Aristotle. 

Arabic  philosophy  is  Greek  thought,  with  modifications  and 
additions,  expressed  in  the  Arabic  language,  and  shaped  by 
oriental  speculation.  The  Mahometan  theologians  inquired 
how  the  absolute  unity  of  God  is  consistent  with  his  mani- 
fold attributes,  and  how  the  sovereignty  of  God  consists  with 
free  will  in  man.  They  regarded  space  as  pervaded  by 
inextended  atoms,  and  time  as  divided  into  infinitesimal 
instants.  Each  change  in  the  atoms  is,  according  to  them, 
owing  to  the  direct  act  of  God,  and  the  same  is  true  of  human 
conduct.  God  is  the  sole  cause  in  the  universe,  if  the  Arabic 
theory  is  true. 

(1)  Alkendi,    a  native  of   Bosra,   who  flourished  in  the 
ninth  century,  and  variously  styled,  the  excellent  one  of  his 
century,  the  only  one  of  his  age,  the  philosopher  of  the  Ara- 
bians, was  the  author  of  more  than  two  hundred  books  of 
which  about  thirty  are    on  philosophy.     He  gave  great   at- 
tention to  logic,  and  regarded  mathematics  as  the  foundation 
of  all  science.     His  works  were  highly  esteemed  by  Roger 
Bacon.     Alkendi  was  also  an  astrologer. 

(2)  Alfarabi  ( 950).       Alfarabi    wrote  on    logic,    in 

which  he  followed  Alkendi;  he  wrote  on  many  other  sub- 
jects, part  of  the  books  were  commentaries  on  Aristotle. 
The  Christian  Aristotelians   often  quote  him  and  referred 
to  his  commentaries  on  Aristotle  as  De  demonstration;  the 
influence  exerted  by  them  was  very  great. 

(3)  Avicenna  (980-1037).     Avicenna,  a  native  of  Bokhara, 
was  regarded  as  the  greatest  of  the  Oriental  philosophers. 
His  treatise  on  Oriental  philosophy  was  known  to  Roger 
Bacon,  and  was  highly  prized  by  him.     Avicenna  was  con- 
sidered  as   somewhat   pantheistic   by   the   more   orthodox 
Averroes. 

127 


128  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Only  a  portion  of  his  works  is  extant — that  treating  of 
the  five  universals  of  Porphyry;  it  seems  to  settle  the  dispute 
about  universals,  thus:  Universalia  ante  multitudinem,  as 
in  the  divine  understanding;  this  is  realism.  Universalia 
in  multitudine;  the  name  is  common  to  the  individuals;  this 
is  nominalism,  Universalia  post  multitudinem,  as  concepts; 
this  is  conceptualism.  Thus  in  a  certain  sense,  all  parties 
to  the  dispute  are  right;  they  are  wrong  only  in  their  extreme 
views. 

(4)  Algazel  ( 1111).     Algazel  drew  crowds,  as  a  popu- 
lar lecturer  on  philosophy,  at  Bagdad,  Jerusalem,  Damascus 
and  Alexandria;  but  believing  that  philosophy  resulted  in  an 
indifference  to  religion,  he  wrote  two  works:  Tendencies  of  the 
philosophers,   and  Destruction  of  the  philosophers.      In  the 
first  he  gave  the  state  of  the  speculative  sciences,  and  in  the 
second  he  pointed  out  their  errors  and  contradictions,  and 
their  divergencies  from  the  Moslem  faith.     He  had  strong 
tendencies  towards  Mysticism;  he  died  in  seclusion  as  a 
monk. 

(5)  Averroes  (1126-1198).     Averroes  was  born  at  Cordova 
in  Spain.     His  early  life  was  spent  in  study,  under  the  best 
teachers  of  the  age.     He  made  great  progress  in  mathematics, 
astronomy,  theology,  medicine  and  jurisprudence. 

The  times  were  stormy;  the  Saracens  in  Spain  were  some- 
what divided,  and  were  closely  pressed  by  the  Christian 
armies  on  the  north,  but  with  the  influx  of  fresh  tribes  from 
the  desert,  they  rallied  and  defeated  the  forces  of  their  ene- 
mies, and  established  the  sway  of  Moslem  in  greater  splendor. 
Schools  and  colleges  abounded  under  the  patronage  of  liberal 
rulers. 

Averroes  was  made  Kadi  of  Seville,  and  held  a  like  office 
at  Cordova,  but  through  court  intrigues,  he  was  banished, 
and  suffered  insults  from  the  ignorant  multitude  who  imag- 
ined that  philosophy  was  dangerous  to  the  true  faith.  He 
was,  however,  restored  to  honor,  which  he  enjoyed  the  rest 
of  his  life. 

The  historic  fame  of  Averroes  has  come  chiefly  through 
the  Christian  schoolmen,  who  from  his  writings,  acquired 
a  more  complete  knowledge  of  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle, 
who  at  that  time  was  held  in  the  highest  honor. 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— SECOND  PERIOD  129 

Averroes  interpreted  Aristotle  as  a  truth-seeker,  and  not 
in  the  interests  of  theology;  he  also  objected  to  the  allegorical 
interpretations  of  the  Koran,  and  maintained  that  a  return 
should  be  made  to  the  plain  teachings  of  the  prophet.  In 
matters  of  this  world,  Averroes  held  to  the  point  of  view  of 
science,  but  in  religion,  he  accepted  a  personal  power  distinct 
from  the  truth  of  science,  though  not  in  conflict  with  it.  In 
other  words,  science,  which  can  be  understood  only  by  the 
intelligent  few,  he  cultivated  like  a  Greek  philosopher;  but 
religion,  which  is  a  common  life  for  all,  he  enjoyed  as 
a  personal  experience.  The  mixture  of  science  and  religion, 
or  of  philosophy  and  theology,  awakened  popular  hostility 
to  philosophy,  and  was  a  source  of  corruption  to  theology; 
but  this  position  was  the  reverse  of  that  of  the  Christian 
schoolmen,  who  employed  philosophy  to  make  clear  the 
doctrines  of  theology  to  the  eye  of  reason. 

Rejected  by  his  Mahometan  co-religionists,  Averroes 
found  a  hearing  from  the  Jews,  and  his  writings  became  text- 
books in  their  schools. 

The  theory  of  Averroes,  that  the  intellect  is  one  and  con- 
tinuous in  all  individuals,  and  is  their  life  and  joy  according 
to  their  degree  of  illumination,  was  interpreted  as  one  soul 
common  to  all  mankind,  and  thus  conflicted  with  personal 
immortality.  This  theory  of  the  unity  of  intellect  in  all 
men  was  made  a  matter  of  special  investigation  by  both 
Albert  us  Magnus  and  Thomas  Aquinas. 

At  Paris  Averroes  came  to  be  regarded  as  standing  for 
science  against  theology,  and  found  eager  followers  in  the 
members  of  a  skeptical  society;  but  at  Oxford  he  had  become 
an  authority  as  an  expounder  of  the  works  of  Aristotle. 
Roger  Bacon  recommended  the  study  of  Arabic  as  the  only 
means  of  acquiring  a  correct  knowledge  of  Aristotle,  the  great 
philosopher. 

At  the  university  of  Padua,  Aristotle  was  studied  in 
Greek  which  led  to  a  neglect  of  the  works  of  Averroes. 
Thus  is  illustrated  the  fact  that  in  order  to  maintain  itself 
with  the  course  of  time,  philosophy  must  keep  pace  with 
the  continual  advancement  of  science,  and  the  general 
progress  of  the  human  race. 

2.  Let  us  now  return  to  the  Christian  Scholastics  of 
which  we  shall  treat  of  only  the  principal : 


130  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

(1)  Albertus  Magnus  (1193-1280).  Albert  was  called  the 
Great,  on  account  of  his  extensive  learning  and  his  great 
ability  as  a  teacher.  He  was  a  native  of  Lauingen  in  Swabia, 
and  was  educated  at  Padua  and  Paris. 

He  reproduced,  in  Systematic  order,  the  whole  of  the 
philosophy  of  Aristotle,  and  adapted  it  to  the  requirements 
of  ecclesiastical  dogmas.  The  Latin  translations  of  Aristotle 
from  the  Arabic,  as  well  as  some  translations  from  the  Greek, 
were  accessible  to  him.  Platonism  and  Neo-Platonism  were 
not  without  influence,  but  Aristotle  was  his  great  authority. 

To  Albert  as  to  Avicenna,  the  universal  existed  hi  a 
threefold  form:  as  universale  ante  rem,  in  the  mind  of  God, 
according  to  Plato  and  Plotinus;  as  universale  in  re,  the 
collection  of  common  qualities  found  in  every  individual  of 
a  class,  according  to  Aristotle;  as  universale  post  rent,  in  the 
mind  of  man  as  a  concept,  having  its  counterpart,  or  com- 
bination of  qualities,  in  every  individual  of  the  class,  accord- 
ing to  Abelard  and  the  conceptualists  generally.  Hence  and 
finally,  the  universale  post  rem  is  a  subjective  concept  formed 
a  posteriori,  corresponding  to  the  universale  in  re,  the  collec- 
tion of  the  common  qualities  of  all  the  individuals  of  the 
class,  and  an  imperfect  copy  of  the  universale  ante  rem, 
formed  a  priori  in  the  mind  of  God,  as  the  divine  pattern 
after  which  the  individuals  of  the  class  were  created. 

Albert  defines  logic  as  the  science  which  teaches  how  to 
deduce  the  unknown  from  the  known;  and  in  his  interpreta- 
tion of  Aristotle  he  follows  Avicenna  rather  than  Averroes 
whom  he  frequently  combats,  though  occasionally  quotes 
with  approval. 

The  ethics  of  Albert  rests,  very  properly,  on  the  freedom 
of  the  will,  and  the  virtues  he  enjoins  consist  of  the  cardinal 
virtues  of  the  ancients  combined  with  the  Christian  virtues 
of  equal  rank. 

In  psychology,  he  taught  that  the  lower  faculties  were 
united  with  the  spirit,  the  bodily  organs  being  necessary 
only  in  the  present  life. 

In  theology,  Albert  separated  the  dogmas  of  the  church 
from  philosophical  speculations.  The  doctrines  of  creation, 
incarnation,  redemption,  forgiveness  of  sin,  and  immortality 
he  accepted  on  the  authority  of  revelation  apart  from  philoso- 
phy, though  he  sought  for  rational  arguments  in  support  oi 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— SECOND  PERIOD  131 

these  doctrines,  for  the  confirmation  of  believers,  the  in- 
struction of  the  ignorant,  and  the  refutation  of  unbelievers, 
holding  that  these  articles  of  faith  are  illustrated,  but  not 
discovered  by  the  light  of  reason.  Albert  was  perhaps  the 
most  learned  man  of  his  time  as  well  as  the  most  widely 
read.  Almost  the  last  act  of  his  life  was  the  defence  of  the 
orthodoxy  of  his  friend  and  former  pupil,  Thomas  Aquinas. 

(2)  St.  Thomas  of  Aquino  (1225-1274).  Thomas  Aquinas 
was  of  a  noble  family  and  allied  to  several  of  the  monarchs 
of  Europe.  He  was  the  Son  of  Landulf,  Count  of  Aquino, 
in  the  territory  of  Naples. 

He  received  his  elementary  education  at  the  monastery  of 
Monte  Cassino,  after  which  he  spent  six  years  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Naples.  He  joined  the  order  of  the  Dominicans, 
against  the  will  of  his  family.  He  then  studied  under  Alber- 
tus  Magnus  at  Cologne  and  at  Paris.  Receiving  his  degree, 
he  engaged  in  the  controversy  between  the  Begging  Friars  and 
the  University,  concerning  the  liberty  of  teaching,  and  taking 
sides  against  the  University,  he  won  his  case. 

He  did  active  service  for  his  order  and  for  the  church, 
writing,  lecturing,  and  frequently  taking  long  journeys.  He 
was  appointed  to  the  Chair  of  Theology,  in  the  University 
of  Naples,  where  he  was  actively  engaged  in  writing  and  in 
giving  instruction.  He  refused  the  archbishopric  of  Naples, 
and  the  Abbacy  Monte  Casnino. 

He  was  summoned  by  Pope  Gregory  X  to  attend  the 
Council  at  Lyons,  to  aid  in  adjusting  the  controversies  be- 
tween the  Greek  and  Latin  Churches. 

Though  suffering  from  illness,  he  at  once  set  out  for  the 
Council,  but  his  strength  failing  him  on  the  way,  he  was 
carried  to  the  Cistercian  monastery  of  Fossa  Nuova,  where 
he  died,  after  a  lingering  sickness. 

Thomas  wrote  many  books,  the  greatest  of  which  is  the 
Summa  Theologiae.  His  other  books  were  preparatory 
to  this  which  was  intended  to  give  a  summary  of  all  knowl- 
edge, especially  the  doctrines  of  the  church,  arranged  in  a 
systematic  form,  and  explained  according  to  the  logic  of 
Aristotle. 

According  to  Thomas,  there  are  two  distinct  sources  of 
knowledge,  Revelation  and  Reason,  of  which  Revelation  is 
the  superior.  Revelation,  the  divine  source  of  knowledge, 


132  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

has  two  channels — Scripture  and  the  Church.  Reason,  the 
fountain  of  natural  knowledge,  has  for  its  channels  the 
various  systems  of  philosophy,  especially  those  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle — Plato  for  thought,  Aristotle  for  method.  Modern 
natural  science  makes  observation  the  chief  if  not  the  sole 
foundation  for  knowledge. 

Thomas  divided  the  virtues  into  natural  and  theological; 
the  natural  into  intellectual  and  moral;  the  intellectual  or 
speculative,  dealing  with  the  right  use  of  reason;  and  the 
practical,  moral  or  ethical,  dealing  with  others,  as  justice, 
or  with  ourselves,  as  prudence,  temperance,  and  fortitude. 
The  theological  virtues  are  faith,  hope  and  love.  Free  will, 
the  condition  of  duty,  is  supplemented  by  Divine  Grace. 
As  to  universals  Thomas  was  in  agreement  with  Albert. 

The  Summa  Theologiae  is  divided  into  three  parts,  treat- 
ing, respectively  of  God,  of  Man,  and  of  the  God-Man;  the 
first  and  second  parts  were  the  work  of  Thomas  himself,  the 
last  was  finished  by  other  hands,  according  to  his  plan,  as 
he  died  before  it  was  completed.  It  is  not  possible  to  follow 
this  work  in  all  its  details,  suffice  it  to  say  that  it  was  elabor- 
ated with  great  logical  skill,  and  pains-taking  thoroughness. 
Let  those  who  sneer  at  the  ignorance  of  the  schoolmen  read 
this  great  work  of  St.  Thomas. 

With  Thomas,  Scholasticism  culminated. 

(3)  Duns  Scotus  (  -1308).  The  place  and  date  of  the 
birth  of  Duns  Scotus  are  both  uncertain.  He  showed  marked 
ability  as  a  boy,  and  in  early  life  joined  the  Francis- 
can Order.  He  studied  at  Merton  College,  Oxford,  of  which 
he  was  made  a  fellow.  In  mathematics  and  philosophy,  he 
was  especially  proficient,  and  when  Varron  vacated  the 
chair  of  philosophy,  he  was  appointed  his  successor.  His 
lectures  on  philosophy  attracted  crowds  of  students.  He 
went  to  the  University  of  Paris  from  which  he  received  his 
doctor's  degree,  and  was  shortly  after  appointed  regent  of 
the  Theological  School.  He  gained  great  reputation,  as  a 
controversialist,  by  his  able  defence  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
Immaculate  Conception,  refuting  two  hundred  objections 
against  the  doctrine  by  the  Dominicans,  and  establishing 
it  by  a  cloud  of  arguments;  and  such  was  his  dialectical 
skill  that  he  won  the  title  of  Doctor  Subtilis. 

Scotus  was  sent  by  the  general  of  his  order  to  Cologne  to 
assist  in  founding  a  University,  and  to  engage  in  a  contro- 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— SECOND  PERIOD  133 

versy  with  the  Beghards  and  Beguines,  companies  of  men 
and  women  who  devoted  themselves  to  a  religious  life  and 
the  care  of  the  sick,  without  binding  themselves  by  strict 
vows  not  to  return  to  secular  life.  He  was  received  with 
great  ceremony  by  the  city  officials,  but  after  a  short  residence 
died  of  apoplexy. 

The  opinions  of  Scotus  were  influenced  by  the  fact  that 
he  was  a  Franciscan  and  Thomas  a  Dominican,  and  that 
antagonism  existed  between  the  Franciscans  and  the  Dom- 
inicans; hence  his  system  is  an  elaborate  criticism  of  that  of 
Thomas,  and  hence  also  of  his  partisans. 

Thomas  and  Scotus  differed  in  their  views  regarding  the 
relation  of  philosophy  to  theology.  With  Thomas  philosophy 
must  ever  be  found  in  agreement  with  theology,  when  both 
are  understood,  as  both  are  expressions  of  the  same  truths, 
while  with  Scotus  the  dogmas  of  the  church  were  absolute 
truths  from  which  philosophy  sometimes  diverged,  theology 
also  revealing  truth  not  accessible  to  philosophy,  as  the 
creation  of  the  world,  the  immortality  of  the  human  soul,  and 
the  existence  of  God,  the  Almighty,  the  Divine  cause  of  the 
universe.  He  admits  that  philosophy  can  demonstrate  the 
existence  of  an  ultimate  cause  of  the  universe,  but  not  that 
this  cause  is  almighty  and  Divine,  which  attributes  are 
revealed  by  theology.  He  based  the  doctrines  of  Christianity 
and  the  rules  of  morality  on  the  arbitrary  will  of  God.  It 
is,  however,  more  reasonable  to  believe  that  the  laws  of  God 
accord  with  infinite  wisdom,  and  that  they  were  established 
for  the  highest  welfare  of  the  universe,  though  the  specific 
design  cannot  always  be  discovered  by  human  reason. 

Scotus  agreed  with  Albert  and  Thomas  in  regard  to  the 
three-fold  existence  of  universals,  though  he  differed  from 
them  with  reference  to  individuation,  holding  that  the  uni- 
versal essence  and  the  individualizing  determinations  do  not 
correspond  to  form  and  matter,  but  that  individual  charac- 
teristics are  form  as  well  as  the  universal  essence.  The  truth 
is,  the  genus  has  attributes  universal  for  the  genus;  the 
species  adds  to  the  universal  of  the  genus,  the  peculiar 
characteristic  of  the  species,  which  is  universal  for  the  species 
but  not  for  the  genus,  so  that  the  content,  or  common  quali- 
ties of  the  species  =  the  content  of  the  genus  -f  the  charac- 
teristic of  the  species;  the  individual  adds  to  the  contents  of 


134  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

the  species  its  own  peculiarities,  so  that  the  content  of  the 
individual  =  the  content  of  the  genus  +  the  characteristic 
of  the  species  +  the  peculiarities  of  the  individual.  Dis- 
tinction, however,  should  be  made  between  the  permanent 
peculiarities  of  the  individual,  and  the  accidents,  as  a  wart 
on  the  hand,  which  may  come  and  go. 

In  regard  to  the  will,  Scotus  held  to  its  freedom  in  a  more 
absolute  sense  than  did  Thomas. 

Scotus  was  the  author  of  numerous  works,  among  the  most 
important  of  which  are  those  commenting  on  the  writings  of 
Aristotle. 

In  showing  the  divergence  between  philosophy  and  theolo- 
gy, Scotus  took  the  first  step  in  causing  opposition  between 
them,  which  led  to  the  decline  of  Scholasticism. 

(4)  William  of  Occam  ( 1347).  William  was  born  in 

the  village  of  Ockham  in  the  county  of  Surrey,  and  educated 
at  the  Merton  College,  Oxford,  and  at  Paris  where  he  was 
first  the  pupil,  then  the  rival  of  Duns  Scotus.  He  was  the 
provincial  of  England  at  the  assembly  of  the  Franciscan 
Order  at  Perugia,  and  headed  the  revolt  of  that  order  against 
Pope  John  XXII.  He  was  tried  for  heresy  before  the 
bishops  of  Ferrara  and  Bologna,  and  imprisoned  four  months 
in  the  dungeon  of  the  papal  palace  at  Avignon.  Managing  to 
escape  with  his  companions,  Michael  of  Cesena,  general  of  the 
order,  and  Bonogratia,  they  found  their  way  to  Munich  to 
the  Court  of  Louis,  who  had  been  legally  elected  Emperor 
of  Germany,  and  whose  election,  the  Pope  refused  to  ratify. 
The  proposal  he  made  to  Louis  was:  "Defend  me  with  the 
sword,  and  I  will  defend  you  with  the  pen."  The  proposal 
accepted,  he  sent  forth  pamphlets  in  refutation  of  the 
extravagant  claims  of  the  Pope,  showing  that  the  office  of 
King  was  independent  of  that  of  the  Pope,  and  no  less  of 
divine  authority. 

From  his  logical  ability,  William  was  called  the  Invincible 
Doctor.  In  regard  to  universals,  he  strongly  objected  to 
the  hypostetizing  of  abstractions.  He  took  the  extreme 
view  of  Nominalism,  that  the  name  is  the  only  universal, 
and  though  he  added  nothing  new  to  the  doctrine,  he  made 
it  more  intelligible  by  showing  that  words  in  speech  were 
used  like  figures  in  Arithmetic  or  letters  in  Algebra,  as  when 
we  let  x  stand  for  the  unknown  quantity  required,  or  when 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— SECOND  PERIOD  135 

we  use  the  word  triangle  for  the  thought  of  any  one  of  the 
infinite  number  of  individual  objects  to  which  it  may  be 
applied.  As  words  stand  for  thoughts,  and  thoughts  for 
things,  each  being  inadequate,  there  is  a  double  inadequacy, 
and  the  outcome  is  skepticism. 

He  contended  that  everything  that  really  exists  is  individ- 
ual, that  to  seek  the  cause  of  individuality  is  to  seek  the 
cause  of  the  individual,  and  that  it  is  not  the  individual  that 
needs  explanation,  but  the  universal.  For  his  extreme 
nominalism,  he  claimed  the  authority  of  Aristotle,  though 
strictly  not  justly.  Thus  he  held  that  the  universal  is  not 
any  really  existing  thing,  but  is  merely  a  term  or  predicable 
made  universal  by  its'  application  to  any  individual  of  the 
class,  and  hence  a  common  noun. 

It  is  of  course  true  that  the  universal  is  no  real  thing 
existing  by  itself  apart  from  the  class ;  apart  from  the  pattern 
in  the  Divine  mind,  after  which  the  objects  of  the  class  were 
formed;  apart  also  from  the  concept  of  the  class  in  the  human 
mind,  which  are  the  errors  of  Realism;  but  the  universal 
does  really  exist,  as  a  combination  of  qualities  in  any  in- 
dividual of  a  class,  similar  to  that  in  any  other  individual 
of  the  class.  The  name  is  of  course  universal,  as  the  name 
elephant  is  applicable  to  every  elephant,  and  why?  because 
they  all  have  certain  qualities  which  entitle  them  to  be 
classed  together  and  called  by  the  common  name  elephant. 
We  call  a  certain  class  of  animals  vertebrate,  not  because  one 
identical  skeleton  will  do  for  all,  but  that  the  skeleton  of 
one,  in  its  essential  features,  is  similar  to  that  of  any  other 
animal  of  the  class. 

William  more  completely  severed  philosophy  from  theology 
than  did  Scotus,  and  this  meant  the  dissolution  of  Scholastic- 
ism, which  consisted  in  their  union.  With  Occam,  theology  is 
related  to  practical  religion,  philosophy  to  speculative 
thought;  theology  is  based  on  revelation  and  accepted  by 
faith,  philosophy  deals  with  universal  truth  apprehended  by 
reason.  The  rules  of  morality  are  expressions  of  the  arbi- 
trary will  of  God,  according  to  Occam  and  are  not  based  on 
rational  principles.  God's  commands  we  may,  however, 
believe  to  be  reasonable,  though  the  human  mind  may  some- 
times fail  to  discover  their  reasons,  or  God's  design  in  re- 
quiring obedience. 


136  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

3.  Mysticism  is  a  compound  of  thought  and  feeling,  of 
philosophy  and  religion.  On  its  philosophic  side,  it  is  an 
attempt  to  apprehend  the  ultimate  reality  of  things  by 
immediate  intuition,  and  on  its  religious  side,  it  is  an  effort 
to  grasp  the  Divine  essence,  and  to  enjoy  the  blessedness  of 
actual  communion  with  the  most  high  God.  Its  seed  may 
be  found  in  Plato's  doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  which  ger- 
minated in  Philo,  developed  in  Gnosticism,  expanded  in  full 
bloom  in  Neo-Platonism,  and  bore  fruit  in  the  period  of 
Scholasticism.  It  is  rather  a  phase  of  religious  philosophy, 
than  a  system,  and  finds  a  possibility  of  development  along 
with  various  schools. 

Mysticism  is  based  on  feeling  rather  than  on  intellectual 
intuition  and  as  a  movement,  both  in  the  philosophic  and 
in  the  religious  direction,  is  not  altogether  without  justifica- 
tion. The  human  mind  has  the  faculty  of  rational  intuition 
which  immediately  apprehends  the  necessity  of  the  conditions 
of  phenomena;  and  the  system  of  philosophy  which  ignores 
this  fact  is  without  a  rational  basis.  For  example,  it  is 
intuitively  certain  that  there  is  a  cause  for  every  event,  that 
succession  implies  time,  that  body  and  motion  imply  space, 
as  the  conditions  of  their  possibility,  that  the  universe  im- 
plies an  ultimate  reality,  without  beginning,  and  hence 
eternal.  But  rational  intuition  must  be  kept  within  its 
proper  bounds;  while  it  declares  a  priori  that  every  event 
must  have  a  cause,  it  does  not  tell  us  the  cause  of  any  particu- 
lar event;  that  must  be  determined,  if  determined  at  all 
a  posteriori,  by  investigation  guided  by  experience.  While, 
rational  intuition  apprehends  the  necessity  of  an  ultimate 
reality,  the  eternal  cause  of  the  universe,  the  character  of 
that  cause,  must  be  determined,  if  ever  known,  by  the 
nature  of  the  universe,  or  be  made  known  by  revelation. 

On  its  religious  side,  Mysticism  is  justified  by  the  fact  of 
Christian  experience.  The  Spirit  itself,  through  the  feeling 
of  love,  beareth  witness  with  our  spirits  that  we  are  the 
children  of  God;  and  this  is  done  by  the  love  of  God  shed 
abroad  in  our  hearts  by  the  Holy  Spirit  which  is  given  unto 
us.  Mysticism  rightly  held  to  this  religious  experience. 

Mysticism  does  not  hold  with  Pantheism  that  we  are 
naturally  at  one  with  God,  but  that  we  are  in  a  state  of 
alienation,  and  must  be  brought  back,  by  the  new  birth,  to 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— SECOND  PERIOD  137 

a  state  of  union  with  the  Divine  Being,  as  the  goal  of  religious 
attainment.  This  sufficiently  differentiates  Mysticism  from 
formal  or  ritualistic  Christianity.  It  is  distinguished  from  the 
evangelical  systems  by  the  intensity  with  which  it  claims  to 
realize,  by  the  feeling  of  love,  the  divine  presence.  So  vivid 
is  the  realization  that  the  tendency  of  the  Mystic  is  to  lose 
himself  in  the  excess  of  feeling.  His  personality  becomes 
weakened,  and  all  other  realities  seem  unreal.  Reason 
should  be  cultivated  while  love  is  enjoyed. 

The  Mystic's  ideal  of  life  is  not  that  of  ethical  energy  doing 
good  by  promoting  the  welfare  of  the  human  race,  nor  that 
of  dialectical  disputation,  but  in  meditation,  and  in  the 
enjoyment  of  love  by  devout  communion  with  God. 

The  error  of  Mysticism  consists  in  exaggerating  feeling  an 
essential  element,  by  making  it  overshadow  rational  theory 
and  practical  duties.  Its  opponents,  by  their  opposition, 
have  drifted  farther  into  formal  religion,  and  ritualistic 
observance,  having  the  form,  but  denying  the  power  of 
Godliness.  Evangelical  Christians  are  benefitted  by  en- 
deavoring to  observe  a  happy  mean  between  these  extremes, 
by  enjoying  a  religious  experience,  while  understanding  its 
theory  and  in  discharging  the  duties  of  life.  It  is  the  spiritual 
birth-right  of  every  Christian  to  enjoy  the  love  of  God  in  the 
heart;  and  at  the  same  time,  it  is  his  duty,  as  far  as  he  is  able, 
to  understand  his  religion,  to  assist  his  neighbor,  and  to  labor 
for  the  well-being  of  the  human  race. 

We  have  said  that  the  Mystics  have  some  grounds  for 
their  belief;  they  claim  to  know  the  absolute  cause;  it  is  not 
so  much  the  knowledge  that  is  at  fault,  but  the  way  they 
reach  that  knowledge;  they  claim  to  reach  it  by  immediate 
intuition  in  the  form  of  feeling,  irrespective  of  the  universe, 
the  effect  of  that  cause.  The  absolute  cannot  be  reached  in 
that  way.  Rational  intuition  does  not  begin,  a  priori 
with  the  absolute,  with  cause,  with  time,  with  space,  and 
then  deduce  the  universe,  events,  succession,  body,  and 
motion;  it  reverses  this  order,  and  begins,  a  posteriori, 
with  the  known  facts  of  experience,  as  it  has  a  right,  and  by 
its  innate  power,  not  innate  knowledge,  it  apprehends  the 
absolute,  cause,  time  and  space,  as  the  necessary  conditions 
of  the  facts  known  by  experience — a  procedure  at  once 
logically  sound  and  fruitful  of  consequences.  To  begin  with 


138  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

conditions  instead  of  the  conditioned,  and  to  hold  that 
conditions  can  be  known  apart  from  the  condition,  leads,  on 
the  one  hand,  to  the  wild  hypotheses  of  a  pre-existing  state,  or 
to  the  present  empirical  intuition  of  the  absolute  and  of  cause 
in  general,  which  opens  the  way  for  extravagant  claims  and 
wild  fanaticism.  Ideas,  as  universals,  are  not  apprehended 
a  priori,  apart  from  objects,  as  Plato  taught.  Aristotle's 
doctrine  of  form  is  much  more  correct.  Certain  qualities, 
essentially  similar,  are  found  in  every  object  of  a  class;  but 
this  combination  does  not  exist  by  itself  apart  from  the 
objects,  but  the  idea  or  notion  of  this  combination  has  a 
mental  existence  in  the  human  mind,  but  formed  a  posteriori, 
by  examination,  generalization,  and  induction.  There  is, 
however,  no  objection  to  the  view  that  the  pattern  of  the 
universal  existed  in  the  Divine  mind  before  the  existence 
of  the  objects  of  the  class,  and  that  the  objects  of  the  class 
were  formed  according  to  this  pattern. 

It  is  easy  to  show  how  we  reach  the  condition  from  the 
conditioned:  Since  body  and  motion  are  facts  of  experience, 
there  must  be  space  in  which  bodies  exist  and  move;  since 
there  is  succession  of  phenomena,  there  must  be  time  or 
duration  in  which  succession  takes  place;  since  there  are 
events  there  must  be  cause,  for  non-entity  cannot  jump 
into  being;  since  the  universe  is,  there  must  be  the  eternal 
reality  we  call  God,  as  the  condition  on  which  the  universe 
depends. 

We  shall  best  understand  Mysticism  by  knowing  what  the 
Mystics  actually  taught  which  we  shall  find  in  a  review  of 
their  doctrines. 

(1)  Erigena  laid  down  what  may  be  called  the  principle 
of  Mysticism:  Out  of  the  eternal  incomprehensible  essence, 
the  world  of  ideas  is  eternally  created,  constituting  the 
Word  or  Son  of  God,  in  whom  all  things  exist.  All  existence 
is  a  Theophany.  God  is  the  beginning  of  all  things,  and  all 
things  return  to  God,  and  in  Oneness  with  God,  we  realize 
our  highest  blessedness.  The  Mystic  assumed  to  have  such 
an  intimate  union  with  the  Divine  Being,  both  in  thought 
and  in  affection,  that  he  can  apprehend  God  by  reason,  or 
realize  Him  by  the  deeper  intuitions  of  love.  In  this  is 
found  the  first  principle  of  Mysticism,  whatever  may  be  its 
special  outward  form  or  manifestation. 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— SECOND  PERIOD  139 

(2)  Bernard  of  Clariveaux  (1091-1153).    Bernard  was  an 
eloquent  divine,  and  exerted  great  influence  in  the  church. 
He  condemned  Abelard's  distinctions  as  externalizing  the 
doctrines  of  the  faith,  maintaining  that  religion  related  to 
the  inner  experiences  of  the  soul. 

He  held  that  reason  has  three  stages,  and  through  these 
the  mind  rises  to  the  contemplation  of  the  Divine  Being. 
Still  more  exalted  is  the  ecstatic  vision  sometimes  granted  to 
those  who  are  dead  to  the  world  and  alive  unto  God,  such  as 
St.  Paul  had  when  he  was  caught  up  to  the  third  heavens. 
This  state  can  be  reached  only  by  those  who  practice  ex- 
treme self-denial,  and  who  merge  their  love  of  self  in  the  love 
of  God;  for  God  can  be  all  in  all  only  when  all  selfishness  is 
extirpated  from  the  soul. 

(3)  The   Victorines,  Hugo,   Richard   and  Walter,  of   the 
monastery  of  St.  Victor,  near  Paris,  further  developed  Mys- 
ticism by  publishing  popular  books  calculated  to  awaken 
piety  and  to  inspire  devotion.      These  books  explained  the 
conditions  necessary  to  be  observed  in  order  to  reach  a  state 
of  ecstacy  in  communion  with  God. 

(4)  Bonaventura     (1221-1274).      John    of    Fidanza   was 
born  at  Bagnarea  in  the  Papal  states,  and  was  destined  by 
his  mother  for  the  church.     He  received  the  cognomen  of 
Bonaventura  from  St.  Francis  of  Assisi,  who  is  said  to  have 
performed  on  him  a  miraculous  cure.     Distinguished  for  the 
brilliancy  of  his  intellect  and  the  purity  of  his  character  he 
was  elected  general  of  the  Franciscan  Order.     He  introduced 
stricter  discipline  into  his  Society,  and  advocated  asceticism 
as  a  means  of  Grace.     By  his  order,  Roger  Bacon  was  inter- 
dicted from  lecturing  at  Oxford.     He  threw  the  weight  of  his 
influence  in  favor  of  the  election  of  Gregory  X  to  the  Papal 
chair.     For  this  he  was  rewarded  by  the  Pope,  who  con- 
ferred on  him  the  titles  of  Cardinal  and  Bishop  of  Abano. 
He  received  the  degree  of  Doctor  in  1255,  and  on  account  of 
the  purity  of  his  life,  he  was  styled  Doctor  Seraphicus.     He 
died  at  the  great  council  of  Lyons  of  which  he  was  a  member. 

In  cultivating  mystical  piety,  Bonaventura  differed  widely 
from  Roger  Bacon,  who  was  a  pioneer  in  Natural  Science,  and 
from  St.  Thomas,  who  brought  the  Aristotelian  Scholasticism 
to  the  height  of  perfection. 

Bonaventura  accepted  realism,  the  theory  that  universal 
ideas  do  not  exist  in  the  objects  of  a  class,  but  in  the  Divine 


140  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

mind  as  the  patterns  after  which  these  objects  were  formed, 
which  may  be  accepted  as  true;  but  if  universals  do  not  exist 
in  the  objects  of  a  class,  as  ideas,  they  do  exist  in  these 
objects  as  combinations  of  similar  attributes;  and  a  nation 
of  this  combination  of  attributes  is  a  concept  in  the  human 
mind. 

Bonaventura  held  to  three  steps  in  knowledge — the  senses 
giving  empirical  knowledge,  reason  which  examines  the 
soul  itself  the  image  of  God,  and  that  transcendent  mystic  act 
which  grasps  the  Divine  Being  and  enjoys  his  love. 

Reason  can  discover  certain  moral  truths  as  basal  principles ; 
but  other  truths,  as  the  attributes  of  God,  it  can  apprehend 
only  by  divine  illumination,  for  which  the  proper  means  must 
be  employed,  as  fasting,  prayer,  meditation,  and  the  strict 
practice  of  every  virtue.  By  these  means,  the  soul  can 
rise  to  an  ecstatic  union  with  God.  There  is  a  great  truth 
here  which  may  be  accepted,  if  the  depth  of  feeling  is  guarded 
from  excess,  and  the  danger  of  running  into  extravagance 
be  avoided  by  sobriety  of  judgment. 

(5)  Meister  Eckhart   (1260-1329).     Eckhart's   mysticism 
was  more  of  a  theoretical  character  than  that  of  the  Scholas- 
tic mystics  in  general.     He  evolved  a  philosophy  of  mystic- 
ism freely  from  pure  reason,  without  basing  it  upon  the 
dogmas  of  the  church;  but  through  his  system,  these  dogmas 
often  acquired  a  new  meaning. 

In  the  fusion  of  feeling  and  knowing,  the  mystics  generally 
left  the  control  with  the  feeling.  Not  so  with  Eckhart;  for 
with  him  reason  was  the  controlling  element,  and  the  specula- 
tive view,  the  matter  of  peculiar  interest. 

Eckhart  considered  the  Absolute  to  be  the  primal  indeter- 
minate essence,  the  potentiality  of  all  things,  the  Godhead, 
whose  nature  is  to  come,  by  a  triadic  process,  to  consciousness, 
as  the  triune  God,  the  Father,  the  Son  and  the  Holy  Spirit. 
How  can  man  know  God?  To  be  dead  to  self  is  to  be  alive 
to  God.  The  renunciation  of  selfhood,  Eckhart  called 
decease,  and  when  that  is  completely  effected,  God  reveals 
his  Son  in  us,  and  we  become  one  with  God,  which  is  recog- 
nized by  a  rational  act  called  Funklein  or  flash  of  light. 

(6)  Other    distinguished    mystics    may    be    mentioned: 
Heinrich  Suso  (1295-1266)  was  distinguished  for  his  austerity, 
poetic  fancy,  and  fervency  of  feeling.    John  Tauler  of  Stras- 


SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY— SECOND  PERIOD  141 

burg  {1300-61)  was  more  practical  than  Eckhart,  and  less 
emotional  than  Suso.  He  was  a  distinguished  preacher,  and 
withal  a  benevolent  man.  When  the  plague  visited  Strasburg 
he  remained  at  his  post,  and  encouraged  his  terror-stricken 
people.  His  theology  is  the  purest  type  of  mysticism,  in- 
sisting on  purity  of  morals,  personal  relationship  to  God, 
and  freedom  from  bondage  to  ecclesiastical  shackles.  John 
Ruysbroeck  (1293-1381)  was  the  leading  mystic  in  the  Nether- 
lands. He  discriminated  between  truth  and  error,  and 
dwelt  on  the  means  by  which  the  mystical  union  with  God  is 
to  be  attained. 

John  Boehme  (1575-1624)  claimed  to  have  a  direct  illumi- 
nation, so  that  he  could  see  the  root  of  all  things,  the  Un- 
grund  of  events,  the  origin  of  all  things,  the  being  of  God 
By  looking  into  the  heart  of  things,  nature  became  unveiled 
to  reason,  to  mystic  feeling,  and  all  mysteries  became  clear. 
Of  course,  such  extravagant  claims  can  not  be  justified. 

Other  pious  writers  of  mystic  tendencies  may  be  noted: 
Thomas  a  Kempis,  Madam  Guyon,  Henry  More,  George 
Fox,  William  Law,  St.  Martin. 


CHAPTER  XV 

Transition  to  Modern  Philosophy 

1.  Cardanus  (1501-76).     Cardanus  explained  nature  by 
two  principles:  matter,  the  passive  principle,  and  the  world 
soul,  the  active  principle    which  by  pervading  matter,  and 
bringing  it  into  order  causes  light  and  heat.     Attraction  and 
repulsion,  the  causes  of  motion,  become  in   higher  beings, 
love  and  hatred.     The  masses,  it  is  true,  should  accept  the 
teaching  of  the  church,  but  the  thinker  should  engage  in  the 
pursuit  of  truth.     Cardanus  was  a  good  mathematician;  he 
discovered  a  formula,  known  as  Cardanus'  formula  for   the 
solution  of  cubic  equations.     He  was  the  author  of  interesting 
works  on  mathematics,  physics,  astrology;  and  he  wrote  an 
autobiography.     His  independence,  as  a  thinker,  is  to  be 
noted,  as  indicating  the  current  of  thought. 

2.  Telesius(  15  08-88).     Telesius  explained  nature  in  much 
the  same  way  as  Cardanus — passive  matter,  heat  of  which 
the  sun  is  the  source,  the  cause  of  repulsion,  and  cold  from 
the  earth,  the  cause  of  attraction,  and  on  these  all  change 
and  life  depend.     He  maintained  that  Aristotle's  doctrines 
must  be  replaced  by  facts  derived  from  an  empirical  examina- 
tion of  nature  itself,  and  that  all  knowledge  begins  with 
sensuous  experience.     He  admits,  however,  the  spirituality 
and  immortality  of  the  soul.     The  different  virtues  he  re- 
garded as  the  manifestation  of  the  instinct  of  self-preservation. 
He  revived  the  doctrine  taught  by  Democritus,  that  all  the 
senses  are  modifications  of  the  sense  of  touch.     It  is  true, 
that  they  all  involve  contact — in  case  of  sight,  light  from  an 
object  in  contact  with  the  eye,  and  in  case  of  hearing,  waves 
of  air  in  contact  with  the  ear. 

3.  Bruno  (1548-1600).     Giordano   Bruno    was   born   at 
Nola,  a  village  in  Italy  near  Naples,  where  he  was  educated. 
While  yet  a  young  man  he  became  a  member  of  the  Domini  - 
can  Order,  but  he  shortly  withdrew  from  the  society,  as 
intolerable  to  his  headstrong  disposition.     Accused  of  im- 

142 


TRANSITION  TO   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY    143 

piety,  he  wandered  to  different  cities,  intent  on  knowing  for 
himself  the  mysteries  of  the  universe,  free  from  the  shackles 
of  authority.  He  was  greatly  influenced  by  the  scientific 
movement  of  his  time,  and  accepted  the  heliocentric  theory 
of  Copernicus,  regarding  the  earth  as  one  of  the  planets  of 
the  solar  system,  and  the  universe  as  a  greater  system  of 
solar  systems. 

The  eternal  God  he  believed  to  be  immanent  in  the  uni- 
verse, as  its  infinite  cause,  its  substance  and  soul,  its  up- 
holder and  life.  He  distinguished  between  the  universe 
and  the  world.  The  universe  is  the  manifestation  of  God, 
the  eternal  being,  without  beginning  or  end,  omnipotent  and 
omnipresent;  the  world  of  beings,  the  creation,  had  a  be- 
ginning, and  will  have  an  end.  The  human  soul,  the  highest 
form  of  cosmic  life,  has  its  origin  in  the  infinite  soul  of  the 
universe. 

Bruno  was  well  received  in  Paris,  where  he  delivered 
lectures.  He  spent  two  years  in  England,  and  though  de- 
lighted with  Queen  Elizabeth,  he  was  disgusted  with  the 
brutality  of  the  English  masses.  He  engaged  as  a  disputant 
at  Oxford  on  the  comparative  merits  of  the  Copernican  and 
the  Aristotelian  theories  of  the  heavens,  and  gained  an  easy 
victory. 

Bruno  regarded  Aristotle  with  antipathy,  much  preferring 
the  older  philosophers,  as  Heraclitus  and  Democritus,  and 
in  this  respect  he  was  like  Telesius  and  Bacon. 

Bruno  was  the  author  of  several  important  works:  On 
the  Copernican  theory,  on  metaphysics,  and  a  dialogue  on 
morals.  He  attacked  the  established  religion,  jeered  at  the 
monks  as  pedants,  and  placed  the  Jewish  records  on  the 
same  level  as  the  myths  of  Greece.  He  sought  for  unity, 
and  found  it  in  God,  the  eternal  source  and  substance  of  the 
universe. 

He  accepted  an  invitation  to  visit  Venice.  He  was  arrested 
and  brought  to  Rome  and  thrown  into  prison.  After  a  con- 
finement of  seven  years,  he  was  excommunicated  and  burnt 
at  the  stake. 

4-  Campanella  (1568-1639).  Tommaso  Campanella  was 
born  in  Calabria  and  died  at  Paris.  He  held  to  two  sources 
of  knowledge — perception  and  reasoning.  Perception  is 
through  the  senses;  but  what  is  it  that  we  immediately  know? 


144  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

It  is  the  sensation,  a  mere  modification  of  self,  that  we  per- 
ceive or  better  say,  we  are  conscious  of.  How  then  can  I 
prove  that  objects  exist  apart  from  myself?  Campanella 
replies,  by  reason.  The  inner  sense  reveals  to  me  both  my 
existence  and  my  limitations;  and  since  I  am  limited,  there 
is  an  objective  world  that  limits  me.  Something  is  gained 
by  establishing  the  fact  of  a  non-ego,  the  existence  of  exter- 
nal things;  but  do  the  senses  report  them  correctly?  They 
report  relative  truth.  The  objects  are  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  affect  us  in  a  certain  manner,  and  this  answers  the  purpose 
of  human  knowledge;  if  not  complete,  it  is  at  least  relatively 
true.  We  judge  from  the  sensations  what  the  objects  are, 
then  picture  them. 

Let  us  look  at  the  fact  of  knowledge  in  a  somewhat  differ- 
ent light:  Strictly  we  do  not  perceive  sensation;  for  to  perceive 
means  to  take  through.  We  do  not  take  sensation  through 
anything,  but  are  immediately  conscious  of  it;  but  we  do 
perceive  the  external  objects  through  the  senses  by  means  of 
the  sensations  they  cause  in  us.  We  judge  what  kind  of  an 
object  it  is  which  gives  us  certain  sensations,  and  ideate  the 
judgment,  that  is,  picture  the  object  by  the  imagination,  in 
conformity  with  the  judgment. 

The  questions  again  arise,  how  do  we  know  that  there  is 
an  external  object,  and  that  it  corresponds  to  our  mental 
picture?  If  the  object  is  wholly  internal,  it  is  incredible 
that  several  persons  should  perceive  the  same  thing.  The 
common  perception  can  be  explained  only  by  a  common 
external  object,  giving  the  spectators  like  sensations  leading 
to  the  perception  of  the  same  object.  But  do  we  perceive 
the  object  as  it  is?  It  is  more  likely  that  we  perceive  it 
approximately  as  it  is,  than  that  we  perceive  it  as  it  is  not. 
Our  perceptions  are  tested  by  the  several  senses  converging  on 
the  same  object,  and  by  long  experience,  so  that,  except  in 
rare  cases,  we  can  rely  on  them  as  giving  us,  if  not  complete 
truth,  at  least  reliable  relative  truth.  We  call  our  friends  by 
name,  and  they  respond,  signifying  that  our  perceptions  were 
correct;  but  it  is  well  to  remember  that  our  judgments  from 
sensation  may  sometimes  be  incorrect,  and  lead  us  into 
error. 

5.  Bacon  (1561-1626).  Francis  Bacon  was  the  youngest 
son  of  Sir  Nicholas  Bacon,  a  celebrated  lawyer  who  for 


TRANSITION  TO  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY    145 

twenty  yeart  was  Lord  Keeper  of  the  Seals  in  Queen  Eliza- 
beth's reign.  His  mother,  a  cultured  woman,  was  a  daughter 
of  Sir  Anthony  Cooke,  tutor  of  Edward  VI. 

Of  Bacon's  eventful  life,  only  the  leading  points  can  here 
be  given.  As  a  boy,  he  showed  an  acute  intellect,  and  the 
Queen,  pleased  with  his  ready  answers  to  her  questions,  called 
him  her  young  Lord  Keeper  and  Lord  Keeper  he  afterwards, 
in  reality,  became.  When  twelve  years  of  age,  he  entered 
Trinity  College,  Cambridge,  and  graduated  in  three  years. 
He  was  not  satisfied  with  the  state  of  the  sciences,  and  de- 
spised the  Aristotelian  philosophy,  though  he  professed  a 
veneration  for  Aristotle. 

In  company  with  the  English  embassadpr,  he  visited  France 
where  he  remained  two  years,  either  in  Paris  or  in  traveling 
through  the  provinces.  At  the  death  of  his  father,  he  was 
obliged  to  return  to  England,  and  found  that  he  had  not  been 
provided  for,  as  his  father  had  intended. 

To  provide  for  his  own  support,  he  entered  upon  the 
study  of  law;  but  having  been  brought  up  in  affluence,  and 
not  having  learned  the  lesson  of  economy,  he  acquired  the 
habit  of  borrowing  money,  and  was  ever  afterwards  embar- 
rassed with  debt. 

He  rose  rapidly  in  his  profession,  as  a  lawyer,  and  was 
shortly  elected  a  member  of  Parliament  for  Middlesex,  and 
finally  became  counsellor  to  the  Queen,  though  he  was  dis- 
appointed in  not  obtaining  a  salaried  office,  which  he  hoped 
to  secure  through  the  influence  of  his  uncle,  Lord  Burghley, 
the  Prime  Minister. 

Under  King  James,  he  first  obtained  the  appointment  to 
the  office  of  solicitor,  afterwards  that  of  Lord  Keeper  of  the 
Seals,  then  he  attained  to  a  seat  in  the  Chancery  Court,  and 
finally  became  Lord  Chancellor,  and  was  created  Baron 
Verulam,  and  Viscount  of  St.  Alban.  He  was  now  the  first 
officer  of  the  Crown,  and  the  ablest  man  in  the  State.  But 
his  downfall  was  near  at  hand.  Accused  of  taking  bribes, 
he  was  convicted,  deprived  of  his  office,  fined  and  imprisoned ; 
and  though  his  fine  was  remitted,  and  he  was  released  from 
prison  by  order  of  the  King,  he  never  returned  to  public 
life,  but  spent  his  time  in  literary  and  scientific  labors,  in 
which  he  delighted,  and  which  had  occupied  his  time  and 
thoughts,  more  or  less,  for  many  years  of  his  life. 


146  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Bacon  planned  to  cover,  in  his  works,  the  \\hole  range  of 
science  and  philosophy.  He  made  an  outline  sketch  of  the 
entire  field,  but  completed  only  a  small  portion  of  his  pro- 
jected work.  His  Essays  are  his  most  popular  productions; 
they  have  been  very  generally  read  and  greatly  admired, 
and  are  well  worthy  of  the  perusal  of  every  thoughtful  mind. 
Take  this  sentence  from  his  essays:  "Reading  maketh  a 
full  man;  conference,  a  ready  man;  writing,  an  exact  man." 
We  see,  at  once,  how  concise  is  his  style. 

The  Novum  Organum,  the  New  Organ,  as  the  name  signifies, 
was  an  attempt  to  unfold  a  new  method  of  discovering  truth, 
especially  in  science,  by  the  process  of  induction,  and  thus 
it  stands  opposed  to  the  Organon  of  Aristotle,  which  in  the 
hands  of  the  schoolmen,  had  become  chiefly  a  deductive 
method  of  reaching  conclusions  and  as  Bacon  averred,  from 
barren  general  principles,  not  sufficiently  established.  In- 
stauratio  magna,  the  great  renovation,  was  the  name  given  by 
Bacon  to  his  entire  system. 

In  his  theory  of  induction,  Bacon  distinguished  between 
anticipation  and  interpretation.  By  anticipation,  he  meant 
hasty  induction,  such  as  passing  from  an  examination  of  a 
few  individuals  of  a  species  to  a  general  principle  applied  to 
the  genus  embracing  that  species  together  with  other  species; 
whereas  we  should  first,  by  interpretation  of  prerogative 
instances,  carefully  establish  the  principle  for  the  species  in 
question,  then  for  another  species  of  the  genus,  and  so  on  for 
all  the  species  of  the  genus,  or  at  least  for  a  considerable 
number  of  them,  and  thus  legitimately  establish  the  principle 
for  the  genus.  Anticipation,  however,  jumps,  from  the  few 
individuals  of  one  species,  over  the  other  species  to  the 
genus,  instead  of  ascending  legitimately  through  the  other 
species;  it  then  by  deduction  reasons  illegitimately  down 
to  other  species  of  the  genus.  To  illustrate:  Having  before 
us  several  rectangles,  we  find  that  the  area  of  each  is  equal 
to  the  product  of  two  adjacent  sides.  Now  suppose  we  pass 
to  the  parallelogram,  the  genus  of  which  the  rectangle  is  a 
species,  and  say  the  area  of  every  parallelogram  is  the  pro- 
duct of  two  adjacent  sides;  but  this  is  a  hasty,  and  in  fact, 
an  incorrect  induction  by  anticipation.  Suppose  then  we 
descend  to  the  rhombus,  a  species  of  parallelogram,  by  the 
deductive  syllogism,  and  say:  The  area  of  every  parallelo- 


TRANSITION  TO  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY    147 

gram  is  the  product  of  two  adjacent  sides;  but  the  rhombus 
is  a  parallelogram;  therefore,  the  area  of  the  rhombus  is  the 
product  of  two  adjacent  sides.  The  major  premise  is  an 
unwarranted  induction,  and  is,  in  fact,  false;  the  conclusion 
is  not  only  unwarranted,  but  false. 

Bacon  calls  the  chief  sources  of  error  idola,  idols,  cherished 
false  opinions:  idola  tribus,  idola  specus,  idola  fori,  idola 
theatri. 

(1)  Idola  tribus,  idols  of  the  tribe,  tendencies  to  error 
inherent  in  human  nature,  as  the  assumption  that  nature 
corresponds  to  our  ideas  of  order  or  perfection.     Thus,  as  the 
circle  is  the  most  perfect  curve,  it  was  assumed  that  the 
planets  moved  in  circles.  There  is  tendency  to  hasty  general- 
ization, to  believe  in  myths,  omens,  signs,  and  charms,  to 
note  the  agreement  of  facts  with  proverbs,  and  overlook 
exceptions.     Thus,  you  will  have  good  or  bad  luck  in  a  month 
according  as  you  see  the  new  moon  first  over  your  right 
or  left  shoulder,  which  seems  to  be  always  verified,  as  we 
have  both  good  and  bad  luck  every  month.     We  notice  the 
fulfillment  and  overlook  the  exceptions. 

(2)  Idola  specus,  idols  of  the  den,  the  peculiar  nature  of 
ourselves,  our  companions,  or  our  environment.     The  special 
bent  of  a  mind,  inherited  or  acquired,  affects  its  opinions, 
and  may  disqualify  it  from  passing  sound   judgments    on 
matters  concerning  which  it  has  received  a  bias.     Some  minds 
readily  perceive  resemblances;  others  quickly  detect  differ- 
ences.    The  first  are  likely  to  make  hasty  generalizations; 
the  others  are  apt  to  make  needless  distinctions.     Some 
people  are  conservative,  and  cling  to  the  past;  others  are 
progressive,  and  seek  for  radical  changes,  as  they  see  little 
or  no  good  in  the  present.     Some  delight  in  abstract  specula- 
tions, or  great  generalizations;  others  are  interested  in  con- 
crete facts,  and  take  no  satisfaction  in  comprehensive  theories. 

(3)  Idola  fori,  idols  of  the  forum,  the  errors  incident  to 
the  use  of  language,  or  to  the  meaning  attributed  to  certain 
words,  epithets,  shiboleths,  mottoes,  party  catch-words,  and 
the  like.     People  often  wrangle  because  they  attach  different 
shades  of  meaning  to  the  same  word.     Thus,  to  the  word 
will,  one  attaches  the  meaning  of  volition,  or  decision;  an- 
other the  meaning  of  the  power  of  choice.     One  uses  the 
word  mind  in  the  sense  of  intellect;  another  in  the  sense  of 
soul  or  spirit,  including  intellect,  sensibility,  and  will. 


148  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

(4)  Idola  theatri,  idols  of  the  theater,  or  errors  springing 
from  current  opinion,  or  imperfect  philosophical  theories. 
Thus,  various  philosophers,  especially  the  ancient,  have 
found  the  principle  of  things  in  water,  or  air,  or  fire,  in  being 
or  becoming,  in  number  or  in  the  vovs.  Some  philosophers 
held  to  the  certainty  of  knowledge;  others  to  the  impossibility 
of  knowing  anything  whatever.  Some  hold  that  the  senses 
are  wholly  unreliable;  others  that  they  are  the  only  sources 
of  knowledge.  Some  hold  that  universals  exist  only  in  the 
mind  of  God;  others  that  they  exist  only  in  the  human  mind; 
some  that  they  exist  apart  from  any  mind  or  from  any  object; 
others  that  they  exist  only  in  objects;  and  still  others  that 
they  are  merely  names.  Some  hold  deduction  to  be  the 
true  type  of  reasoning;  others  discount  deduction,  and 
assign  the  chief  value  to  induction.  ^ 

Bacon  laid  down  the  following  rules  for  induction : 

(1)  Study  the  phenomena  to  be  explained,  in  all  their 
varieties  and  combinations,  not  only  by  simple  observation, 
but  also  by  experiment,  when  practicable.     This  gives  the 
natural  history  of  the  facts. 

(2)  Seek  for  the  conditions  of  the  phenomena,  whether 
mere  antecedents,  or  causes  producing  changes,  or  forms 
giving    permanent    qualities.     The    forms    include    latent 
processes,  resulting  in  slow  changes  of  structure,  or  latent 
properties,  supporting  the  permanent  structure. 

(3)  Exclude  things  not  found  to  be  conditions  of  the 
phenomena. 

(4)  Negative  instances,  or  the  absence  of  the  property 
to  be  explained,  from  certain  objects  of  the  class,  are  to  be 
noted,  and,  if  possible,  accounted  for. 

Bacon  called  attention  to  the  importance  of  examining 
solitary  instances,  as  when  the  same  feature  exists  in  two 
objects  otherwise  different,  or  when  a  certain  feature  differs 
in  two  objects  otherwise  the  same;  also  to  the  case  of  a  vary- 
ing property,  either  increasing  or  decreasing;  to  the  condi- 
tions of  the  highest  perfection  of  an  organ  or  faculty;  to 
parallel  or  analogous  instances  in  different  objects;  to  qualities 
accompanying  and  varying  directly  or  inversely  with  one 
another;  to  the  search  for  crucial  instances  in  deciding  be- 
tween competing  explanations  of  the  same  phenomenon. 


TRANSITION  TO   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY    149 

Bacon  placed  a  light  estimate  upon  all  that  had  hitherto 
been  done  in  Philosophy  or  Science,  whether  by  Empirics 
or  Dogmatists.  He  said:  "The  Empirics  are  like  the  ant, 
they  only  bring  together  and  use;  the  Rationalists  are  like 
spiders,  which  spin  webs  out  of  their  own  bowels;  but  the 
bee  (the  true  philosopher  like  Bacon)  follows  a  middle  course, 
for  she  draws  her  materials  from  the  flowers  of  the  garden 
and  field,  and  yet  changes  and  digests  them  by  a  power  of  her 
own. " 

Macaulay  says:  "Two  words  form  the  key  of  the  Baconian 
doctrine,  Utility  and  Progress.  ...  It  was  not  by  fur- 
nishing philsophers  with  rules  for  performing  the  inductive 
process  well,  but  by  furnishing  them  with  a  motive  for  per- 
forming it  well,  that  he  conferred  so  vast  a  benefit  on  society. " 

In  Ethics,  Bacon  insisted  on  four  things;  the  secularization 
of  Ethics,  or  the  separation  of  morals  from  religion;  the 
disuse  of  metaphysical  presuppositions,  and  the  search  for 
the  motives  of  conduct;  the  exaltation  of  the  welfare  of 
society,  over  that  of  the  individual;  and  the  identification 
of  the  good  with  the  useful,  the  moral  with  the  beneficial. 

Bacon  attached  only  a  slight  value,  entirely  too  slight,  to 
the  ethical  speculations  of  the  ancient  philosophers.  It 
would  have  been  well  had  he  given  more  attention  to  his  own 
ethical  practice. 

In  logic,  he  habitually  exalts  induction  and  disparages 
deduction,  the  two  branches  of  logic  now  regarded  as  co- 
ordinate and  of  equal  importance. 

He  attempts  to  belittle  Aristotle  especially,  and  to  some 
extent  Plato,  the  most  illustrious  of  the  Greek  philosophers, 
who  in  powers  of  mind,  and  in  intellectual  achievement, 
were  not  inferior  to  Bacon  himself. 

Bacon  did  a  good  work  in  exposing  the  barrenness  of  deduc- 
tion when  separated  from  the  complementary  method  of 
induction,  and  by  insisting  on  the  importance  of  interrogat- 
ing nature,  and  rising,  by  cautious  inductions,  step  by  step, 
through  intermediate  principles,  to  the  highest  and  broadest 
generalizations,  thus  supplying  principles  for  safe  and  innum- 
erable deductions.  His  oft  repeated  advice,  "Interrogate 
nature,"  has  been  fruitful  in  good  results.  The  rapid 
advance  in  science,  since  Bacon's  time,  is  the  result  very 
largely,  of  the  incentive  he  gave  to  thorough  research. 


150  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  value  of  Bacon's  doctrine  does  not  consist  in  the 
details  of  his  method,  which  were  somewhat  cumbrous, 
but  in  its  aim  and  tendency;  yet  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that 
the  explanation  he  gave  of  heat  is  the  one  accepted  at  the 
present  day.  For  many  years  after  Bacon's  time,  heat  was 
attributed  to  a  special  substance  called  phlogiston;  but  two 
and  one-half  centuries  after  Bacon's  time,  Prof.  Tyndall, 
by  a  series  of  brilliant  experiments,  proved  Bacon's  theory 
to  be  correct  that  "heat  is  a  mode  of  motion." 

Bacon  did  scant  justice  to  the  Greek  sages,  whether  called' 
philosophers  or  sophists.  He  says  "the  sophists  were  va- 
grant and  mercenary,  perambulating  the  different  states, 
parading  their  wisdom,  and  exacting  a  price  for  it,  while  the 
philosophers  were  more  staid  and  liberal,  in  that  they  had 
fixed  residences,  and  opened  schools  and  taught  philosophy 
for  nothing." 

Bacon  quotes  from  Dionysius,  an  obscure  writer:  "The 
dialogues  of  Plato  are  words  of  idle  old  men  to  inexperienced 
youth."  Does  that  do  justice  to  Plato?  He  quotes  from 
an  Egyptian  priest:  "The  Greeks  were  always  children,  and 
possessed  neither  antiquity  of  knowledge  nor  knowledge  of 
antiquity."  The  fact  is,  however,  the  world  has  not  pro- 
duced a  poet  superior  to  Homer,  an  orator  superior  to  Demos- 
thenes, a  sculptor  superior  to  Phidias,  a  prose  writer  superior 
to  Plato,  a  thinker  superior  to  Aristotle,  an  architect  superior 
to  the  builder  of  the  Parthenon.  What  has  Egypt  to  show 
against  these?  The  ruins  of  temples,  gloomy  even  in  their 
best  days;  pyramids  massive  in  magnitude,  but  rude  and 
clumsy  in  structure;  mummies  of  old  pharaohs;  a  succession  of 
dynasties  of  despotic  sovereigns;  but  nothing  that  will  re- 
deem Egypt  from  the  opprobrium  of  being  "the  basest  of 
Kingdoms. " 

Bacon  pretended  to  honor  Aristotle,  while  he  never  lost 
an  opportunity  of  giving  him  a  thrust.  Yet  Bacon  did  the 
world  a  very  great  service;  he  incited  the  best  minds  to  study 
nature,  to  investigate  facts;  he  turned  the  attention  of  ingen- 
ious men  to  the  investigation  of  machines  for  the  alleviation 
of  human  labor;  and  if  he  could  witness  the  vast  results  that 
have  followed,  especially  in  the  nineteenth  century,  no  one 
would  be  more  astonished  than  himself. 


TRANSITION  TO  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY   151 

Bacon  stands  as  the  pioneer  in  modern  science.  To  show 
the  difference  between  mediaeval  and  modern  thought,  take, 
for  example,  the  pumping  of  water:  The  schoolmen  would 
say,  Nature  abhors  a  vacuum,  therefore  when  the  air  is 
exhausted  in  the  pump-stock,  above  the  surface  of  the  water, 
the  water  rushes  up  to  fill  the  vacuum  which  nature  abhors; 
but  modern  science  declares,  the  pressure  of  the  atmosphere 
on  the  water  outside  of  the  pump  forces  the  water  up  within 
the  pump,  where  the  pressure  is  removed. 

Bacon  said,  first  study  the  natural  history  of  objects,  then 
their  natural  philosophy,  or  physics,  and  after  that  their 
metaphysics;  he  taught  that  physics  deals  with  their  material 
and  efficient  causes,  and  metaphysics  with  their  formal  and 
final  causes;  but  the  distinction  of  these  four  causes,  Bacon 
borrowed  from  Aristotle. 

Bacon's  theories  are  more  directly  related  to  science  than 
to  philosophy,  and  on  science  they  have  produced  the  greater 
effect;  yet  they  have  not  been  without  effect  on  philosophy, 
as  can  be  seen  in  Hobbes,  Locke,  Hume,  Hartley  and  Mill. 

Science  begins  with  facts,  which  it  carefully  observes, 
analyzes,  classifies,  and  determines  their  conditions,  causes, 
laws  and  consequences.  Within  its  own  sphere,  science  is 
supreme;  but  science  is  not  all  of  knowledge;  it  leaves  many 
things  unexplained.  Philosophy  is  deeper  than  science. 
It  seeks  for  the  root  of  the  matter,  and  though  sometimes 
baffled,  yet  it  often  succeeds  in  finding  fundamental  truths, 
far  reaching  in  their  consequences,  that  give  unity  and  har- 
mony to  knowledge. 

(6)  Hobbes  (1588-1679).  Thomas  Hobbes  was  the  son  of 
the  vicar  of  Charlton  and  Westport.  He  had  good  prepara- 
tory training,  and  was  sent  to  Oxford  at  the  age  of  fifteen. 
He  remained  five  years  at  the  University,  but  pursued  his 
studies  in  pretty  much  his  own  way,  taking  more  interest 
in  the  discoveries  of  Drake,  and  in  the  wonders  of  the  heavens 
than  in  the  logic  and  metaphysics  of  the  schools. 

After  leaving  the  University,  he  became  tutor  to  the  son 
of  William  Cavendish,  Baron  of  Hardwick.  The  tutor  and 
pupil  soon  became  very  much  attached  to  each  other,  and 
were  sent  abroad  together  in  a  tour  through  France,  Ger- 
many and  Italy.  Wherever  he  went,  he  heard  the  scholastic 
philosophy  spoken  of  with  scorn,  and  found  that  the  little 


152  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

learning  he  had  acquired  at  the  University  was  of  no  avail 
to  give  him  standing  in  comparison  with  such  men  of  science 
as  Bruno  and  Galileo,  or  with  a  man  of  the  world  like  Mon- 
taigne. He  fell  back  on  the  Latin  and  Greek,  upon  which 
he  bestowed  years  of  labor.  He  wrote  a  translation  of  the 
Greek  Historian  Thucydides,  which  he  afterwards  published. 
He  wrote  in  Latin  and  read  the  best  Latin  authors,  till  he 
acquired  a  good  Latin  style. 

Through  his  relation  with  Young  Cavendish,  an  important 
social  and  political  figure,  he  became  acquainted  with  the 
noted  literary  men  of  the  day,  as  Bacon,  Lord  Herbert,  and 
Ben  Jonson.  He  did  not  accept  Herbert's  intuitional  prin- 
ciples in  philosophy,  but  like  him,  he  was  an  independent, 
original  thinker.  He  was  somewhat  intimate  with  Bacon. 
They  frequently  walked  together,  and  he  made  notes  of 
some  of  Bacon's  apt  sayings.  Bacon  employed  him  to  make 
Latin  translations  of  some  of  his  essays.  From  these  facts, 
he  has  been  called  a  disciple  of  the  great  philosopher;  but  the 
fact  is,  Hobbs  was  an  independent  thinker.  He  disagreed 
with  Bacon  in  assigning  a  greater  value  to  deduction  from 
general  propositions  and  in  his  estimate  of  the  value  of 
Mathematics;  and  in  both  these  respects,  Hobbes  was  Right, 
while  Bacon  was  wrong. 

His  friend  and  patron,  the  Earl  of  Devonshire,  suddenly 
dying,  Hobbes  became  tutor  to  the  son  of  Sir  Gervase  Clif- 
ton, and  took  with  him  a  journey  to  the  continent,  but  spent 
the  time  chiefly  at  Paris,  where  he  directed  his  attention 
principally  to  mathematics,  which  he  had  neglected  in  his 
University  course. 

In  1631,  he  was  recalled  to  England  to  take  charge  of  the 
education  of  the  young  Earl  of  Devonshire,  and  in  1634,  he 
went  abroad  with  his  pupil  for  a  companion.  He  was  now 
much  interested  in  searching  out  the  secrets  of  the  physical 
world.  He  visited  Galileo,  then  quite  aged,  and  conversed 
with  the  members  of  the  scientific  circle  in  Paris,  and  was 
accounted  one  of  the  philosophers. 

Hobbes  held  that  all  philosophical  truth  could  be  treated 
under  three  heads — Body,  Man  and  State,  which  he  proposed 
to  work  out  in  three  separate  treatises,  entitled,  respectively, 
De  Corpore,  De  Homine,  De  Cive.  The  interactions  of  body 
were  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  motion,  by  means  of  mathe- 


TRANSITION  TO  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY    153 

matics,  giving  rise  to  the  science  of  mechanics.  Change  in 
motion,  however,  requires  cause;  therefore,  cause  not  motion 
is  original.  The  principles  of  mechanics  were  to  be  applied 
to  the  phenomena,  in  the  individual  man,  of  sensation  and 
knowledge,  and  to  the  affections,  the  desires  and  the  pas- 
sions, and  thence  extended  to  embrace  political  action  and 
to  the  phenomena  of  society,  by  showing  on  what  principles 
these  were  to  be  regulated,  in  order  to  preserve  the  existence, 
and  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  human  race. 

On  account  of  the  disturbed  political  condition  of  England, 
Hobbes  again  left  for  the  continent,  spending  most  of  his 
time  at  Paris.  He  did  not  return  to  England  for  eleven 
years.  In  the  meantime,  he  finished  his  work  De  Give.  It 
was  immediately  printed,  but  was,  for  a  time,  withheld  from 
publication,  and  only  a  few  copies  were  circulated  among  his 
friends,  who  received  it  with  applause;  and  it  was  even 
praised  by  Descartes  with  whom  he  before  had  a  controversy 
on  certain  points  in  the  "Meditations." 

The  civil  war  in  England  turning  against  the  royalists, 
many  of  them  fled  to  Paris,  among  them  the  young  Charles, 
the  Prince  of  Wales,  to  whom  Hobbes  became  mathematical 
tutor.  These  events  induced  Hobbes  to  write  a  book  on 
Civil  Government  that  might  prove  a  check  on  what  he 
regarded  the  tendency  of  the  people,  urged  by  their  anti- 
social passions,  to  relapse  into  the  original  state  of  anarchy 
in  which  every  man's  hand  was  against  the  hand  of  every 
other  man,  rendering  both  property  and  life  unsafe.  He 
conceived  the  state  as  a  great  monster,  a  Leviathan,  created 
by  a  compact  of  the  people  to  secure  themselves  against  the 
hazard  to  life  and  property,  and  in  fact  against  their  exter- 
mination. The  government  thus  constituted,  by  the  agree- 
ment of  the  people,  had  the  rightful  power  of  control,  and 
as  the  legitimate  authority,  established  the  standard  in  all 
matters  of  conduct,  whether  civil,  social,  moral,  or  religious. 
Hobbes  called  his  book  The  Leviathan,  in  agreement  with  his 
conception  of  the  state.  If  a  law  seemed  unjust  to  an  indi- 
vidual, he  was  yet  bound  to  obey  it,  and  was  not  responsible 
for  the  injustice. 

Hobbes  was  drawn  into  controversy  with  Bishop  Bramhall 
of  Londonderry  on  the  subject  of  Liberty  and  Necessity.  The 
Bishop  was  a  stanch  Arminian,  and  Hobbes  was  a  powerful 


154  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

advocate  of  determinism,  or  philosophical  necessity.  Hobbes 
answered  the  objection  to  punishment,  that  if  free  will  be 
not  a  fact,  then  punishment  is  unjust  to  the  criminal,  by 
saying  that  punishment  is  justified  by  its  good  consequences 
in  preventing  the  criminal  from  repeating  his  crime,  and  in 
the  wholesome  restraint  it  lays  upon  those  who  might  be 
inclined  to  lawless  conduct.  This  answer  has  weight  in 
regard  to  the  utility  of  punishment  in  checking  crime,  but 
it  does  not  answer  the  charge  of  injustice  to  the  criminal,  if 
he  acted  under  necessity.  It  is  true,  as  Hobbes  showed,  that 
neither  desires  nor  aversions  are  free,  since  they  are  caused 
by  motives,  nor  is  volition,  choice  or  decision  free,  as  an  act 
or  product,  since  it  is  caused  by  the  ego,  which  alone  is  free; 
and  though  it  acts  in  view  of  motives  as  reasons,  it  is  not 
compelled  thus  to  act  by  motives,  which  though  causes  of 
desires  and  aversions  are  not  causes  coercing  the  ego  to 
decide.  All  events  have  causes;  but  the  ego  is  a  person, 
not  an  event,  and  as  a  person,  it  is  free.  The  energy  that 
makes  the  choice  is  the  ego  itself  which,  though  causing  the 
volition,  is  not  caused  to  cause  it.  The  ego  is  an  original 
source  of  a  train  of  consequences. 

It  is  sometimes  asserted  that  if  determinism  be  not  true, 
ethics  cannot  be  a  science;  for  if  the  will  is  lawless,  it  is  im- 
possible to  predict  what  course  a  person  will  take.  Can  a 
determinist  predict  infallibly  what  course  a  person  will  take? 
Let  him  try  it,  and  he  will  find  that  he  will  fail  as  often  as 
one  who  holds  to  the  fact  of  freedom.  The  power  of  pre- 
vision is  not  destroyed  by  freedom.  A  person  is  not  neces- 
sarily lawless  because  free.  Knowing  the  character  of  a 
person,  the  relative  strength  of  his  reason  and  passions,  and 
his  environment,  a  prediction,  that  will  probably  hold  good, 
can  be  made  in  regard  to  his  course  of  action  in  given  circum- 
stances. A  thief  will  steal  if  he  has  opportunity,  and  if  he 
believes  that  he  can  escape  detection;  an  honest  man  will 
not  steal.  Again,  though  we  may  not  always  be  able  to 
predict  what  course  a  given  individual  will  take  yet  we  can 
predict,  with  approximate  certainty,  what  will  be  the  con- 
sequences of  a  right  or  a  wrong  course  of  conduct.  It 
therefore,  does  not  follow  that  freedom  excludes  the  power  of 
prevision  and  subverts  ethical  science,  it  is  necessity  that 
subverts  ethical  science,  since  it  renders  merit  or  demerit 
impossible. 


TRANSITION  TO   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY    155 

Hobbes  contended  that  true  freedom  consisted  in  the 
liberty  to  carry  out  one's  decisions;  but  this  is  evidently  the 
liberty  of  execution;  that  is,  it  is  freedom  from  restraint  or 
constraint  in  doing  as  one  has  decided  to  do,  and  not  freedom 
to  decide.  Freedom  to  carry  out  the  decision  of  the  will,  in 
external  or  executive  act,  is  not  freedom  to  will  but  freedom 
to  do.  It  is  not  best  to  say  the  will  is  free;  for  the  word  will 
is  ambiguous,  and  may  mean  the  choice  itself  or  the  power  of 
choice;  the  choice  is  an  act  or  product,  and  is  caused,  and 
therefore  not  free;  the  will,  as  a  power,  is  employed  by  the 
ego  in  choosing,  and  is,  therefore,  not  free,  but  is  the  servant 
of  the  ego  as  much  as  is  the  hand;  but  the  ego  itself,  and  that 
alone  is  free,  since  though  it  may  act,  as  it  usually  does,  in 
view  of  motives,  as  reasons,  it  is  not  forced  to  act  as  it  does 
by  compelling  causes.  In  fact,  to  act  from  compelling 
causes  is  not  to  act  at  all,  but  to  be  moved,  to  be  passive  as 
a  foot-ball,  making  the  ego  altogether  inert,  which  is  wide 
of  the  mark.  The  energy,  the  dynamic  of  the  act,  is  in  the 
ego  itself. 

The  view  that  freedom  consists  in  liberty  to  do  as  one 
pleases,  in  realizing  the  choice  in  external  action,  was  advo- 
cated afterwards  by  Edwards,  who  also  undertook  to  show 
that  the  person  does  not  cause  his  own  volitions;  for  to  cause 
his  own  volitions,  says  Edwards,  he  must  act  in  order  to 
cause  them,  and  act  in  order  to  cause  that  act,  and  again 
act  in  order  to  cause  that  previous  act,  and  so  on,  which 
involves  an  infinite  series  of  acts,  an  impossibility  in  finite 
time;  therefore,  a  person  does  not  cause  his  volitions.  The 
same  reasoning  will  show  that  a  person  must  act  in  order  to 
perform  any  act  whatever,  even  an  external  act,  and  act  to 
perform  that  previous  act,  and  so  on,  which  involves  an 
infinite  series  of  acts,  an  impossibility  in  finite  time;  there- 
fore, a  person  can  not  act  at  all,  even  in  an  external  way  in 
executing  his  volitions,  which  both  Hobbes  and  Edwards 
allow,  in  the  liberty  he  has  of  doing  as  he  pleases.  Edward's 
argument,  in  proving  too  much,  proves  nothing  at  all.  The 
fact  is,  a  person  does  not  have  first  to  act  in  order  to  decide, 
he  simply  decides;  and  having  decided  to  act,  he  does  not  have 
to  act  in  order  to  act,  he  simply  acts. 

Hobbes  was  much  interested  in  mathematical  studies.  He 
attempted  to  square  the  circle,  and  actually  boasted  that  he 


1 56  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

had  performed  that  extraordinary  feat.  This  drew  him  into 
a  controversy  with  Ward,  the  astronomer,  and  Wallis,  the 
celebrated  mathematician,  in  which  contest,  Hobbes  got 
the  worst  of  it,  though  he  displayed  originality  and  vigor  of 
thought.  This  ought  to  be  a  warning  to  all  circle  squarers, 
a  tribe  which  seems  not  likely  to  become  extinct. 
^»-  From  the  phenomena  of  perception,  Hobbes  inferred  that 
change  of  motion  is~the  cause  of  all  things.  Though  motion 
is  just  as  natural  to  body  as  rest,  yet  change  of  motion  is  an 
event  that  requires  a  cause,  which,  though  not  visible,  is 
apprehended  by  rational  intuition  as  force  or  energy. 

Hobbes  adopted  the  narrow  view  in  philosophy,  tjiat  all 
our  knowledge  is  derived  from  sensation  and  reasoning;  but 
reason,  or  rational  intuition,  not  reasoning,  adds  original 
elements  of  its  own;  it  apprehends,  for  example,  that  every 
event  must  have  a  cause,  since  non-entity  cannot  spring  into 
being. 

The  natural  state  of  man,  according  to  Hobbes,  is  that  of 
war,  which  on  account  of  the  selfishness  of  men,  if  not  re- 
strained, would  result  in  extermination.  To  prevent  this 
catastrophe,  men  entered  into  a  compact,  and  formed  a 
government,,  which  checked  violence  and  preserved  life. 
In  the  present  moral  condition  of  mankind,  anarchy,  the 
absence  of  government,  would  result  in  violence,  disorder, 
robbery  and  murder;  it  would  be  permissible  only  if  mankind 
were  morally  perfect. 

As  government  is  preferable  to  anarchy,  so  is  a  strong 
government  preferable  to  a  weak  one;  hence  according  to 
Hobbes,  monarchy  is  the  best  form  of  government,  and 
absolute  monarchy  the  best  form  of  monarchy.  The  state, 
therefore,  as  represented  by  the  sovereign,  is  absolute  in  all 
matters  pertaining  to  law,  morals,  or  religion;  yet  Hobbes 
accepted  the  golden  rule  as  the  immutable  law  of  nature, 
which  he  stated  in  the  negative  form:  do  not  to  others  as  you 
would  not  have  them  do  to  you;  but  this  conflicts  with  the  view 
that  the  will  of  the  monarch  is  the  standard  of  right  and 
wrong,  as  the  arbitrary  will  of  the  monarch  might  conflict 
with  the  golden  rule,  as  in  fact,  it  often  has  done,  still  it  is 
duty  to  obey,  and  the  responsibility  does  not  rest  upon  the 
individual. 


TRANSITION  TO  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY    157 

Every  idea  we  can  form  is,  according  to  Hobbes,  limited 
and  relates  to  the  finite,  and  knowledge  of  the  infinite  is, 
therefore  excluded.  We  may  expect  absurdities,  he  declares, 
whenever  we  hear  the  words  eternal  and  infinite;  yet  he 
holds  that  if  we  go  back  far  enough,  along  the  line  of  cause 
and  effect,  we  shall  reach  an  eternal  cause  that  in  turn  did 
not  have  a  cause.  Does  the  word  eternal  here  imply  an 
absurdity? 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  his  doctrine,  Hobbes  was  a  clear, 
strong  writer,  and  a  master  of  English  style.  His  great  work, 
the  Leviathan,  is  well  worth  the  reading. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Modern  Philosophy — Cartesian 

1.  Descartes  (1596-1650).  Rene  Descartes  was  born  at 
La  Haye  in  Touraine,  France,  and  died  at  Stockholm,  Sweden. 

Rene  having  an  inquiring  mind,  his  father  called  him  his 
* 'little  philosopher."  At  the  age  of  eight,  he  was  sent  to  the 
Jesuit  College  at  La  Fleche  in  Angou,  where  he  remained 
eight  years. 

His  feeble  health,  while  in  college,  excused  him  from  the 
morning  duties,  and  he  thus  acquired  the  habit  of  late  rising, 
and  of  thinking  while  in  bed,  and  this  he  kept  up  till  he  was 
called  to  Sweden,  when  he  was  summoned  at  five  in  the 
morning  to  give  lessons  to  the  Queen.v 

Even  while  in  College,  he  began  to  "distrust  the  scholastic 
philosophy,  and  finally  he  was  led  to  begin  his  investigations, 
by  not  accepting  anything  in  philosophy,  as  true,  which  it 
was  possible  for  him  to  doubt. 

The  year  after  his  graduation,  he  spent  in  Paris,  and 
enjoyed  the  pleasures  of  the  Capital  with  gay  companions, 
and  acquired  a  passion  for  gaming.  He  renewed  his  ac- 
quaintance with  Mersenne,  a  former  fellow  student,  who 
proved  a  faithful  friend  through  life.  He  also  formed  the 
acquaintance  of  Mydorge,  one  of  the  ablest  mathematicians 
of  France. 

Descartes  now  thought  it  best  to  abandon  his  frivolous 
life  and  devote  himself  to  serious  study.  Accordingly  he 
withdrew  to  a  secluded  part  of  the  city,  and  for  two  years 
devoted  himself  to  a  profound  study  of  Geometry,  by  which 
he  developed  a  method  which  finally  led  to  the  fruitful 
science  of  Analytic  Geometry. 

His  retreat  being  discovered,  he  was  drawn  out  again  into 
society.  He  escaped  from  these  frivolities  by  taking  service 
in  the  army  of  Prince  Maurice  of  Orange,  a  general  of  great 
ability. 

Walking  through  a  street  of  Breda,  his  attention  was 
drawn  to  a  placard  in  the  Dutch  language,  which  he  did  n< 

158 


MODERN   PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN        159 

understand.  The  writing  was  a  difficult  problem  posted,  as 
a  challenge  to  any  one  to  solve,  if  he  was  able.  Descartes 
asked  a  stranger  standing  by  to  translate  it  for  him  either 
into  French  or  Latin.  The  stranger,  who  happened  to  be 
Isaac  Beekman,  the  head  of  the  College  of  Dort,  offered  to 
turn  it  into  Latin  if  Descartes  would  bring  him  a  solution 
the  next  day.  Descartes  promised  to  do  so,  and  fulfilled 
his  promise.  A  friendship  sprang  up  between  them,  which 
was  afterwards  broken,  because  Beekman  published,  as  his 
own,  an  original  essay  on  Music  which  Descartes  had  en- 
trusted to  him. 

After  spending  two  years  in  Holland,  Descartes  enlisted 
as  a  soldier  in  the  Bohemian  army,  and  went  to  upper  Ger- 
many. The  winter  of  1619  he  spent  in  comfortable  quarters, 
and  began  his  meditations,  which  led  to  his  discourse  on 
Method.  He  concluded  that  a  system  formed  by  one  thinker 
would  be  more  consistent  than  that  formed  by  many.  In- 
stead, therefore,  of  studying  truth  found  in  many  books,  and 
combining  the  results  into  a  conglomerate  system,  he  resolved 
to  form  a  system  of  his  own,  original  and  self -consistent, 
evolved  from  his  own  thoughts;  but  he  saw  the  importance 
of  getting  rid  of  all  prejudices  and  of  admitting  nothing 
doubtful,  and  beginning  anew,  on  a  sure  foundation.  He 
did  not,  however,  apply  the  principle  of  doubt  to  religion 
or  to  politics,  but  separated  them  entirely  from  science  and 
philosophy.  While,  therefore,  he  was  a  strict  conservative 
in  religion  and  politics,  yet  in  science  and  philosophy,  he 
was  a  radical  reformer. 

Hearing  of  a  secret  order  called  Rosicrucians,  self-styled 
invisibles,  who  were  supposed  to  be  possessed  of  certain 
secrets  in  science,  Descartes  sought  for  them,  but  in  vain, 
though  he  was  afterwards  suspected  of  being  one  of  their 
number. 

Descartes  found  that  logic,  though  useful  in  proving  propo- 
sitions, and  in  communicating  knowledge,  was  of  little 
account  in  the  discovery  of  truth.  He  laid  down  four  logical 
rules:  To  admit  as  true  only  what  is  so  perfectly  clear  and 
distinct  as  to  admit  of  no  doubt;  to  divide  complex  difficul- 
ties into  simpler  parts;  to  pass  from  the  easy  to  the  difficult; 
to  omit  nothing  essential. 

He  returned  to  Paris,  and  with  his  old  friends,  Mersenne  and 


160  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Mydorge,  engaged  deeply  in  the  study  of  Optics,  especially 
the  theory  of  lenses,  and  their  proper  preparation,  though  he 
did  not  lose  sight  of  his  ultimate  object,  the  renovation  of  phi- 
losophy. 

He  was  discovered  by  one  of  his  old  comrades,  and  to  avoid 
them,  he  returned  forthwith  to  Holland,  where  he  lived  the 
greater  part  of  the  time,  till  he  was  fifty  years  of  age.  He 
made  a  brief  visit  to  England,  and  again  visited  France 
twice  on  business.  The  second  time,  he  was  awarded  a 
pension  from  the  royal  bounty,  which  was  obtained  by  the 
Cardinal  de  Berulle,  in  consideration  of  his  services  to  man- 
kind. 

A  royal  order  summoned  him  again  to  Paris  for  new 
honors  and  an  additional  pension.  Arrived  at  Paris,  he 
found  the  country  distracted  by  civil  war.  He  paid  for  his 
royal  parchment,  but  receiving  no  additional  pension,  he 
left  immediately  for  his  home  in  Holland.  He  changed  his 
abode  twenty-four  times,  while  in  Holland,  chiefly  to  avoid 
the  intrusion  of  visitors,  or  for  the  sake  of  pleasant  surround- 
ings, or  to  be  in  the  neighborhood  of  some  University. 

Descartes  kept  up  a  correspondence,  for  many  years,  with 
the  Princess  Elizabeth,  daughter  of  the  ejected  Elector 
Palatine,  and  to  her  he  dedicated  his  "Principles  of  Philoso- 
phy." 

His  favorite  science  was  physics  in  all  its  branches,  especi- 
ally in  its  relation  to  physiology,  in  which  he  made  original 
investigations.  A  friend  asking  to  see  his  library,  Descartes 
opened  the  door  into  his  dissecting  room  and  pointing  to 
animal  bodies  partly  dissected,  said:  "These  are  my  books." 
He  supposed  he  had  found  the  secret  of  a  long  life,  and 
boasted  that  he  expected  to  live  to  be  a  hundred  years  of 
age. 

Descartes  compared  science  to  a  tree  of  which  physics  is 
the  trunk,  metaphysics  the  root,  and  mechanics,  medicine 
and  morals,  the  chief  branches;  but  he  made  mathematics 
the  basis  of  mechanics.  In  fact,  one  of  the  greatest  services 
rendered  by  Descartes  to  mankind  was  the  invention  of 
Analytic  Geometry,  the  application  of  Algebra,  especially 
the  indeterminate  equation,  in  which  the  unknown  quantities 
are  variable,  to  Geometrical  investigations.  This  fruitful 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN      161 

invention  prepared  the  way  for  that  most  powerful  method 
of  investigation,  the  Differential  and  Integral  Calculus  dis- 
covered by  Leibniz  and  Newton.  \ 

When  about  to  publish  a  Hew  treatise,  Descartes  was 
accustomed  to  send  through  his  friend  Mersenne,  advanced 
sheets  to  the  best  thinkers,  and  thus  obtain  their  criticisms, 
which  he  answered,  and  had  printed  in  the  appendix  of  his 
book.  This  led  to  some  lively  discussions,  and  caused  his 
doctrines  to  be  well  known  throughout  Europe.  In  fact, 
Descartes'  greatest  service  to  mankind  was  in  stirring  up 
thought. 

Descartes  held  that  animals  were  mere  automata,  moved 
by  impulse,  and  hence  without  feeling,  thought  or  will;  and 
on  this  account,  he  believed  he  could  practise  vivisection 
without  cruelty,  and  in  this  way  increase  his  knowledge  of 
physiology.  The  cry  of  the  animal  undergoing  the  operation, 
he  thought,  did  not  indicate  a  feeling  of  pain. 

Through  the  zeal  of  two  of  his  disciples,  Renery  and  Regius, 
who  were  professors  in  the  University,  Descartes  was  drawn 
into  controversy  with  Voe't,  a  distinguished  theologian,  who 
issued,  in  the  name  of  Schoeck,  one  of  his  pupils,  a  pamphlet 
charging  the  doctrines  of  Descartes  with  Atheism.  Des- 
cartes replied  in  a  vigorous  letter,  yet  he  was  summoned 
before  the  magistrates  of  Utrech  to  answer  to  the  charge. 
Descartes  appealed  to  the  French  embassador  and  to  the 
Prince  of  Orange,  who  afforded  him  ample  protection. 

Receiving  an  urgent  invitation,  Descartes  went  to  Stock- 
holm in  1649,  to  be  tutor  to  Queen  Christina,  who  took  an 
ardent  interest  in  his  doctrines,  and  desired  him  to  be  her 
personal  instructor.  He  was  summoned  at  five  o'clock  in  the 
morning  to  give  his  lessons,  which  from  the  severity  of  the 
climate,  and  the  unusual  hour,  and  his  watching  with  his 
sick  friend,  Chanut,  proved  too  much  for  his  strength.  He 
died  of  an  inflammation  of  the  lungs,  February  11,  1650. 

The  four  great  works  of  Descartes  were  Discourse  of  Method, 
Meditations  on  the  First  Philosophy,  Principia  Philosophiae, 
and  Analytic  Geometry.  In  addition  to  these  great  works, 
he  wrote  many  minor  books  and  innumerable  letters. 

Descartes  held  that  knowledge  implies  clearness  and 
distinctness,  excluding  all  doubt;  that  objects  of  knowledge 
fall  into  groups  having  a  central  element  with  which  the 


162  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

investigation  should  begin;  that  investigation  should  pass 
from  the  simple  to  the  complex;  and  that  all  the  objects  of  a 
group  should  be  known  in  their  interconnections. 

It  follows,  therefore,  that  whatever  it  is  possible  to  doubt 
cannot  be  called  knowledge.  Descartes,  consequently,  began 
by  doubting  every  thing  it  was  possible  for  him  to  doubt;  but 
he  did  not  doubt  for  the  sake  of  doubting.  He  was  not 
essentially  a  skeptic,  but  an  investigator.  His  object  was  to 
remove  everything  doubtful,  in  order  to  find  a  firm  founda- 
tion of  truth;  but  he  found  one  thing  he  could  not  doubt — 
the  fact  that  he  doubted;  but  to  doubt  is  to  think,  and  to 
think  is  to  be,  which  fact  he  thus  expressed :  Cogito,  ergo  sum, 
I  think,  therefore  I  am.  Descartes  did  not  mean,  as  he 
explained,  that  sum,  I  am,  is  to  be  understood  as  a  deduction 
from  cogito,  I  think,  as  the  word  ergo,  therefore,  would  seem 
to  imply.  Since  ego  understood,  the  subject  of  sum,  or  I, 
the  subject  of  am,  is  already  assumed  as  the  subject  under- 
stood of  cogito,  or  as  I,  the  subject  of  think.  What  Descartes 
meant  was  that  the  fact  of  his  existence  was  revealed  to  himself, 
through  his  consciousness  of  thinking,  which  is  indubitable. 
He  might  just  as  well  have  said  Volo,  ergo  sum,  or  sentio,  ergo 
sum;  but  with  Descartes,  all  mental  action  was  thought. 
^_Qescartes  was,  therefcj^jC£xt^jxjQf.jjne .thing — the  fact  of 
his  own  existence '.  The  next  step  was  to  find  a  warrant  for 
passing  from  the  knowledge  of  his  own  existence  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  a  world  without,  and  this  warrant  he  found  in  the 
existence  of  God.  He  says:  "When  the  mind  reviews  the 
different  ideas  that  are  in  it,  it  discovers  what  is  by  far  the 
chief  among  them — that  of  a  Being  omniscient,  all  powerful, 
and  absolutely  perfect;  and  it  observes  that,  in  this  idea, 
there  is  contained  not  only  possible  and  contingent  existence, 
as  in  the  ideas  of  all  other  things  it  clearly  perceives,  but 
existence  absolutely  necessary  and  external.  .  .  So  from 
its  perceiving  necessary  and  external  existence  to  be  com- 
prised in  the  idea  it  has  of  an  all  perfect  Being,  it  ought 
manifestly  to  conclude  that  this  all  perfect  Being  exists." 

Of  course  existence  is  necessary  to  an  all  perfect  being, 
as  there  can  be  no  all  perfect  being  without  existence;  but  is 
it  true  that  whatever  we  imagine,  has  an  objective  existence? 
Because  we  have  an  idea  of  an  all  perfect  being,  does  it  follow 
that  an  all  perfect  being  exists? 


MODEEN  PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN      163 

Descartes  met  this  objection  by  saying  that  the  idea  of 
an  all  perfect  being  is  too  great  for  us  to  form,  and  therefore 
it  must  have  been  formed  in  us  by  the  all  perfect  being  him- 
self; and  hence  that  God,  the  all  perfect  being  exists.  This 
helped  the  matter  somewhat. 

Can  we  not,  however,  form  the  idea  of  a  more  perfect  being 
than  ourselves?  Is  there  any  limit  to  the  perfection  of  the 
idea  we  can  form?  Descartes'  proof  of  the  existence  of  God 
is  scarcely  satisfactory.  A  satisfactory  proof  of  the  existence 
of  God  follows  from  the  truth,  that  something  is  eternal;  for  if 
ever  there  was  a  time  when  there  was  absolutely  nothing, 
there  never  would  have  been  anything,  since  ex  nihil  nihilfit, 
from  nothing  nothing  comes,  a  principle  to  which  Descartes 
himself  assented.  The  eternal  existence,  the  adequate  cause 
of  everything  else,  must  contain  within  himself  all  actual 
perfections. 

The  fact  being  established  of  the  existence  of  God,  the 
Infinite  and  Perfect,  Descartes  would  be  authorized  to  say, 
as  he  did : 

"God  would,  without  question,  deserve  to  be  regarded  as" 
a  deceiver,  if  He  directly  and  of  Himself  presented  to  our 
mind  the  idea  of  this  extended  matter,  or  merely  caused  it 
to  be  presented  to  us  by  some  object  which  possessed  neither 
extension,  figure  nor  motion.  .  .  But  since  God  cannot 
deceive  us, — for  this  is  repugnant  to  his  nature,  as  has  al- 
ready been  remarked,  we  must  unhesitatingly  conclude  that 
there  exist  certain  objects,  extended  in  length,  breadth,  and 
thickness,  and  possessing  all  those  properties  which  are 
clearly  apprehended  to  belong  to  what  is  extended,  and  this 
extended  substance  we  call  matter  or  body." 

""  at  did  Descartes  mean  by  matter  or  body?     He  main- 


tained that  the  sole  essential  property  of  body  is  extension, 
involving  form,  divisibility,  and  motion;  but  the  extent  of  a 
body,  as  Descartes  conceived  it,  is  not  a  void;  for  he  held  that 
a  vacuum  is  impossible;  hence  if  the  extent  of  a  body  is  not  a 
void,  it  must  be  filled  with  something  extended  which  is  not 
extension  itself,  extension,  and  that  which  fills  the  extent  is 
called  matter  or  body.  It  is  better  to  say  that  body  has. 
What  then  is  matter?  Whether  it  is  continuous,  as  Descartes 
seemed  to  hold,  or  composed  of  atoms,  with  void  spaces  be- 
tween them,  as  maintained  by  Democritus,  it  is  certainly  more 


164  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

than  the  extension  itself;  it  is,  at  least,  energy  which  manifests 
certain  attributes.  Descartes  objected  to  atoms,  as  a  body, 
however  small,  is  divisible  in  thought,  in  infinitum;  but  an 
atom  may  be  simply  energy  located  at  a  mathematical  point. 

Descartes  speaks  of  the  reciprocal  action  between  the  soul 
and  body;  but  how  is  such  action  possible,  if  body  is  simply 
extension  without  dynamic  powers,  and  mind  is  simply 
thought?  The  idea  of  cause  finds  no  place  in  such  a  system. 

The  place  of  meeting  for  the  soul  and  body,  in  the  pineal 
gland,  as  Descartes  held,  does  not  explain  their  reciprocal 
action.  If  sensation  is  really  caused  by  the  action  of  the 
body  upon  the  soul,  and  voluntary  motion  by  the  action  of 
the  soul  upon  the  body,  then  the  body  can  both  exert  and 
receive  energy,  in  which  case,  it  has  dynamic  powers,  and 
is  something  more  than  mere  extension;  it  is  extended  sub- 
stance, but  if  it  be  true,  as  Descartes  believed,  that  the 
apparent  action  of  the  body  upon  the  soul,  in  sensation,  is 
not  real,  nor  the  apparent  action  of  the  soul  upon  the  body, 
in  voluntary  motion,  then  it  was  not  proper  for  him  to  speak 
of  the  reciprocal  action  between  the  soul  and  body. 

Hearing  that  Galileo,  who  had  asserted  the  motion  of  the 
earth,  was  compelled  to  retract,  Descartes,  desirous  of 
keeping  on  good  terms  with  the  church  of  which  he  was  a 
loyal  member,  though  accepting  the  Copernican  hypothesis, 
maintained  that  the  earth  is  at  rest  with  respect  to  the 
vortex  of  ether  that  sweeps  round  the  sun,  just  as  a  passenger, 
sitting  on  the  deck  of  a  ship,  is  at  rest  with  respect  to  that 
ship,  as  it  sails  over  the  sea.  This,  however,  does  not  prove 
that  the  earth  is  at  rest;  for  just  as  the  passenger  moves 
with  the  ship,  so  the  earth  moves  with  the  whirling  ether. 
Descartes'  theory  of  vortices  was  superseded  by  Newton's 
law  of  gravitation;  but  Newton's  law  does  not  account  for 
the  force  of  gravity,  it  only  gives  the  law  of  its  action,  while 
Descartes'  vortex  may  lead  to  an  explanation  of  the  force 
itself. 

The  three  realities,  then,  whose  existence  Descartes  con- 
sidered certain,  are  God,  the  infinite  substance,  self-dependent 
and  on  which  everything  else  depends,  the  soul  the  subject 
of  psychical  phenomena  of  which  we  are  conscious,  and 
the  external  world.  The  soul  not  only  feels  sensations,  but 
thinks,  is  active  and  free.  Body  is  more  than  extension;  it 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN        165 

is  something  extended;  it  is  not  a  vacuum,  as  Descartes 
admitted  it  is  not,  in  denying  the  possibility  of  a  vacuum, 
and  in  allowing  motion. 

Cjn  what  respect  is  Descartes  the  founder  of  Modern 
Philosophy?/  In  taking  for  its  foundation  the  facts  of  con- 
sciousness. By  the  facts  of  consciousness,  we  are  assured 
of  our  thinking  and  hence  of  our  own  existence.  Though 
Descartes'  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God  is  not 
beyond  question,  yet  the  existence  of  God,  as  the  ultimate 
reality,  the  first  cause,  is  certainly  known.  Admitting  the 
being  of  God,  and  the  fact  that  he  gave  us  our  faculties,  yet 
if  this  does  not  guarantee  the  truth  of  all  we  think  we  know, 
it  gives  us  confidence  to  believe  that,  under  proper  conditions, 
by  the  due  observance  of  logical  laws,  and  especially  by 
verifying  our  conclusions,  we  may  arrive  al  valid  certainty, 
or  actual  knowledge. 

Bacon  did  a  good  work  for  science  in  insisting  on  the 
importance  of  the  discovery  of  facts  by  interrogating  nature. 
Descartes  found  the  true  foundation  for  philosophy  in  the 
facts  of  consciousness.  Bacon's  method  was  too  cumbrous 
to  follow,  though  he  was  right  in  searching  for  facts.  Des- 
cartes was  right  in  the  value  he  placed  upon  deduction,  and 
in  the  importance  he  attached  to  mathematical  investigation. 

Both  Bacon  and  Descartes  were  great  men,  and  did  inesti- 
mable service  to  mankind  by  exciting  thought  in  the  great 
minds  of  the  world.  Bacon's  literary  style  is  masterful,  as 
seen  in  his  essays;  and  Descartes  was  matchless  in  the  trans- 
parent clearness  of  his  style,  as  revealed  in  his  meditations. 

The  philosophy  of  Descartes  asserted  the  rights  of  reason, 
and  maintained  its  authority;  but  in  carrying  out  its  views, 
it  ^  encountered  great  difficulties.  What  is  the  relation  of 
mind  to  matter,  of  the  soul  to  the  body,  and  of  the  soul  to 
God?  It  seems  evident,  from  experience,  that  sensation  is 
the  effect  of  the  action  of  the  body  upon  the  soul,  and  volun- 
tary motion  the  effect  of  the  action  of  the  soul  upon  the 
body;  but  if  the  mind  is  nothing  but  thought,  and  the  body 
nothing  but  extension,  how  can  there  be  any  interaction 
between  them? 

The  difficulty  can  be  avoided  by  admitting  that  the  mind 
is  more  than  thought,  and  matter  more  than  extension. 
Mind  is  a  thinking  substance;  it  is  that  which  thinks  and 


166  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

feels  and  wills.  Thinking  may  be  inextended;  hut  it  is  not 
self-supporting;  thinking  doesn't  think  any  more  than  running 
runs.  The  mind  thinks,  the  boy  runs;  and  though  thinking 
may  be  inextended,  the  mind  or  soul,  for  all  we  know,  may  be 
extended;  at  all  events,  it  has  energy,  or  is  dynamic.  Matter 
is  more  than  extension,  it  is  an  extended  substance.  There 
is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  interaction  between  mind,  a 
thinking  substance,  and  matter  an  extended  substance;  both 
have  dynamic  powers.  But  we  shall  see  how  the  successors 
of  Descartes  met  the  difficulties  of  his  system. 

2.  Geulincx    (1623-1669).      Geulincx   was   a   student   at 
Lyons  where  he  was  afterwards  a  professor.     Being  aCarte- 
sian,  he  was  lightly  regarded,  and  finally  was  driven  from  his 
position.     He   went  to   Ley  den  and  became  a   Protestant. 
His  life  was  not  prosperous,  though  he  continued  zealously 
to   teach   philosophy    when    he  had  opportunity.     He  was 
finally  appointed  a  professor  in  the  University  at  Pesth,  but 
he  died  shortly  after  his  appointment. 

Geulincx  held  that  self-examination  taught  him,  that  only 
his  thoughts  and  his  will  were  his  own,  but  not  his  body, 
which  is  a  part  of  the  material  world.  The  mind,  he  thought, 
cannot  act  on  the  body.  A  person  might  just  as  well  believe 
that  he  wrote  the  Illiad,  or  placed  the  sun  in  the  heavens, 
as  that  he  could  raise  his  own  hand;  but  on  the  occasion,  when 
he  wills  to  raise  his  hand,  God  intervenes  and  raises  his  hand 
for  him.  Neither  can  the  body,  nor  any  material  object, 
act  on  the  mind;  but  on  the  occasion,  when  an  object  is 
present,  God  gives  him  a  sensation,  to  attract  his  attention, 
and  presents  the  idea  of  the  object.  This  doctrine  is  called 
Occasionalism. 

3.  Malebranche  (1638-1715).     Malebraiiche,  who  was  the 
son  of  a  high  official  at  Paris,  entered  the  Oratory  at  the  age 
of  twenty -two.     He  was  so  charmed  with  the  writings  of 
Descartes  that  he  resolved  to  devote  his  life  to  philosophy. 
He  accepted  Geulincx's  theory  of  Occasionalism,  which  he 
further  developed. 

The  following  is  Malebranche's  theory  of  perception:  A 
material  object  acts  on  some  organ  of  sense;  this  is  followed 
b$r  the  excitement,  reaction  or  response  of  the  organ;  sensa- 
tion accompanies  the  excitement;  the  judgment  concerning 
the  object  follows  the  sensation.  This  is  the  most  complete 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN        167 

analysis  of  perception  we  have  so  far  found;  but  Malebranche 
omitted  the  rational  intuition  of  the  necessity  of  the  object, 
or  cause  of  the  sensation,  also  of  the  necessity  of  the  ego,  as 
the  subject  of  the  sensation,  and  he  also  omitted  the  ideation, 
or  the  construction  of  the  mental  picture  of  the  object  by  the 
human  mind.  He  called  the  object  an  idea  presented  by  the  act 
of  God.  But  a  complete  analysis  of  perception  will  reveal  the 
following  elements:  In  general,  an  object  to  be  perceived,  a 
subject,  or  ego,  to  perceive;  the  synthesis  of  subject  and 
object  more  specifically,  the  object  or  physical  cause  of 
the  sensation;  the  subject  with  its  physiological  organs  and 
powers  of  perception;  the  mechanical  action  of  the  object 
on  the  organs;  the  excitement  of  the  organs;  the  sensation 
accompanying  the  excitement;  the  rational  intuition  of  the 
necessity  of  the  object  and  subject;  the  inferential  judgment 
as  to  the  cause  of  the  sensation;  the  ideation  of  the  judgment, 
or  the  picturing  of  the  cause. 

In  allowing  the  action  of  the  object  on  the  organ,  and  the 
reaction  of  the  organ,  Malebranche  could  not  deny  that  matter 
was  dynamic;  but  he  did  not  admit  that  matter  could  act  on 
mind,  and  so  he  held  that  when  the  object  excited  the  organ, 
God  intervened  and  caused  a  sensation  and  p  esented  his 
idea  of  the  object  which  was  what  the  mind  perceived,  so 
that  our  spirits  perceive  all  things  in  God,  who  is  the  place 
of  spirits.  The  fact  is,  the  ideas  are  not  God's  ideas  which 
we  perceive,  but  our  own  ideas  which  we  construct.  Do  our 
ideas  correctly  represent  the  objects?  Not  always.  Our 
ideas  are  formed  according  to  the  judgment,  and  are  correct 
or  incorrect,  according  as  our  judgments  concerning  the 
objects  are  true  or  false;  they  embody,  as  images,  or  pictures, 
our  knowledge,  or  beliefs,  or  our  mistakes,  in  regard  to  the 
objects.  The  liability  to  error  is  found  in  the  element  of  the 
judgment,  or  inference.  In  ordinary  cases,  the  perceptions 
are  reliable,  as  is  verified  when  we  address  a  person  by  name, 
and  he  confirms  the  correctness  of  our  perception;  but  in 
unusual  cases,  we  are  liable  to  mistakes  in  our  perceptions, 
which  indicates  that  Malebranche's  theory,  that  the  ideas 
are  God's  ideas,  is  false;  for  God's  ideas  would  be  correct, 
yet  the  mistake  may  possibly  be  in  our  perception  of  God's 
ideas. 

4.  Glanvill  (1636-1680).  Joseph  Glanvill  was  educated 
at  Oxford;  and  discarding  the  scholastic  philosophy,  he  was 


168  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

greatly  influenced  by  the  systems  of  Bacon  and  Descartes. 
He  wrote  a  treatise  which  he  called  Scepsis  Scientifica,  scientific 
doubt,  or  as  he  meant  it  to  be  understood,  Scientific  inquiry, 
and  dedicated  it  to  the  Royal  Society.  He  maintained  the 
right  of  unrestricted  freedom  in  thought. 

Nature  was  to  him  a  great  automaton,  operated  by  mechan- 
ical action.  Holding  that  out  knowledge  must  always  re- 
main imperfect,  he  maintained  that  our  hypotheses  should  be 
held  subject  to  modification  as  we  obtain  new  light  from 
experience  and  research. 

His  views  in  regard  to  causation  are  worthy  of  considera- 
tion. He  says  We  know  causes,  not  by  immediate  intuition, 
but  by  their  effects  only.  If  we  infer  that  one  thing  is  the 
cause  of  another,  we  are  only  depending  on  the  fact  that  the 
former  always  accompanies  the  latter;  for  causality  itself  is 
unsensible;  but  the  inference  from  accompaniment  to  a  causal 
relation  is  not  necessary." 

In  saying  that  causality  itself  is  "unsensible, "  and  that  the 
inference  from  accompaniment  o  a  causal  relation  is  not 
necessary,  Glanvill  meant  that  cause  is  not  perceptible  through 
the  senses ;  that  it  is  something  more  than  an  accompaniment 
or  an  antecedent,  though  immediate  or  invariable;  and  that 
an  event  is  an  effect,  or  more  than  an  accompaniment  or  a 
consequent.  To  illustrate,  suppose  a  stone  supported  at  an 
elevation  of  fifty  feet  above  the  ground.  Removing  the 
support,  the  stone  falls;  but  we  do  not  regard  the  removal 
of  the  support  the  cause  of  the  fall  of  the  stone,  but  only  as 
the  non-dynamic  condition;  the  real  cause  is  gravitation, 
whatever  that  may  be.  Day  follows  night,  but  we  do  not 
regard  night  as  the  cause  of  day,  but  day  follows  the  rising 
of  the  sun,  and  here  we  recognize  a  causal  connection.  A 
hunter  takes  his  boy  with  him  and  goes  out  in  quest  of  game. 
Whatever  be  the  windings  of  the  father,  his  son  follows  him; 
but  the  course  taken  by  the  father  is  the  reason,  not  the 
cause,  of  the  course  taken  by  the  son.  The  law  of  accom- 
paniment here  is  that  of  reason  and  consequent,  not  that  of 
cause  and  effect.  When  we  lift  a  heavy  weight,  we  discover 
that  cause  is  energy,  or  something  more  than  a  mere  antece- 
dent. Cause  then  is  energy,  or  active  power,  that  is  it  is 
force. 

5.  Pascal  (1623-1662).  Blaise  Pascal  was  the  son  of 
Etienne  Pa  cal,  president  of  the  Court  of  Aids  at  Clermont. 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN        169 

The  family  had,  for  several  generations,  held  posts  of  honor 
in  the  civil  service,  and  had  been  ennobled  by  Louis  XI 

When  Blaise  was  seven  years  old,  his  father  removed  to 
Paris  for  the  better  education  of  his  children,  and  for  the 
opportunity  of  enjoying  scientific  society. 

Blaise  was  early  taught  Latin  and  Greek,  but  was  kept 
from  mathematical  studies;  but  being  present  when  certain 
scientific  friends  were  visiting  his  father,  and  hearing  some 
remarks  about  Geometry,  he  took  up  the  study  by  himself, 
without  books,  and  made  considerable  progress  before  his 
father  discovered  what  he  was  about.  He  was  then  per- 
mitted to  have  access  to  mathematical  books,  and  encouraged 
in  their  study.  He  became  famous  as  a  mathematician,  and 
especially  noted  for  his  originality  and  depth  of  thought. 

He  was  also  distinguished  for  his  scientific  attainments. 
He  proved  that  a  barometric  column  was  sustained  to  the 
height  of  thirty  inches,  not  as  it  was  said,  by  nature's  abhor- 
rence of  a  vacuum,  but  by  the  pressure  of  the  air,  by  showing 
that  the  column  of  mercury  would  gradually  fall  as  the 
instrument  was  carried  up  to  the  summit  of  a  mountain. 

Pascal  turned  his  attention  to  religion  which  he  valued 
chiefly  for  the  heart  experiences  it  confers,  and  in  this  respect 
he  was  a  mystic,  though  he  kept  the  power  of  clear  thought. 
He  supported  the  Jansenists  in  their  controversy  with  the 
Jesuits.  His  eighteen  Provincial  Letters,  so-called,  are  re- 
markable for  their  penetrating  thought,  and  for  the  clearness 
and  beauty  of  their  style. 

His  Pensees,  which  are  scattered  fragments  of  Theological 
and  philosophical  speculations,  never  completed,  show  by 
their  remarkable  depth,  what  he  could  have  done  had  his 
life  and  health  been  spared  a  few  years  longer. 

The  value  of  Pascal  to  philosophy  is  not  to  be  estimated  by 
any  finished  work,  but  by  the  stimulus  he  gave  to  philosophi- 
cal speculation.  His  influence  was  widely  felt,  and  powerful 
in  its  effect. 

The  Port  Royal  Logic,  a  popular  work  of  great  merit,  pre- 
pared jointly  by  Arnauld  and  Nicole,  was  based  on  specula- 
tions found  in  the  writings  of  Pascal. 

6.  Gassendi  (1592-1655) .  Pierre  Gassendi  showed  remark- 
able intellectual  powers  at  an  early  age.  He  was  sent  to 
College  at  Digne,  and  made  rapid  progress  in  his  studies, 


170  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

especially  in  mathematics  and  languages.  He  studied 
philosophy  at  Aix,  under  Fesaye.  Four  years  later,  he 
received  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Theology  at  Avignon,  and 
took  orders  as  a  priest.  In  the  same  year,  1617,  he  was 
called  to  the  chair  of  philosophy  at  Aix,  where  he  lectured  on 
the  philosophy  of  Aristotle. 

While  occupying  the  chair  of  philosophy  at  Aix,  he  con- 
tinued his  favorite  studies  of  physics  and  astronomy,  by 
which  he  became  dissatisfied,  more  and  more,  with  Aristotle's 
philosophy,  against  which  he  published  the  first  book  and  a 
part  of  the  second  of  a  treatise  designed  to  be  complete  in 
seven  books,  but  the  remaining  part  of  the  treatise  he  never 
completed.  The  first  book  against  Aristotle  is  in  essential 
agreement  with  Vives,  Ramus,  and  Bruno,  but  it  contained 
little  or  nothing  new.  The  second  book,  a  review  of  Aris- 
totle's logic,  does  not  materially  differ  from  the  work  of 
Ramus. 

He  visited  Holland  where  he  wrote  an  examination  of  the 
mystical  philosophy  of  Robert  Fleed,  also  an  essay  on  the 
transit  of  Mercury.  He  published  his  objections  to  the 
fundamental  propositions  of  Descartes,  in  which  he  shows 
his  acceptance  of  the  empirical  philosophy,  the  principle  of 
which  is:  "There  is  nothing  in  the  intellect  which  has  not 
been  in  the  senses. " 

He  was  more  in  harmony  with  Epicurus  than  with  any 
other  ancient  philosopher,  and  published  a  work  on  the 
system  of  Epicurus  styled  Syntagma  Philosophiae  Epicuri, 
which  had  considerable  influence  on  the  thinking  of  the  time. 

The  most  important  of  Gassendi's  works,  the  Syntagma 
Philosophicum,  is  an  eclectic  conglomerate  of  irreconcilable 
dogmas  from  the  empirical  and  rational  schools  of  thought. 
It  is  divided  into  logic,  physics,  and  ethics. 

The  logic,  besides  a  brief  history  of  the  science,  contains 
the  theory  of  right  apprehension,  the  theory  of  right  judgment, 
the  theory  of  right  inference,  and  the  theory  of  right  method. 
While  holding  that  the  evidence  of  the  senses  is  the  only 
convincing  evidence,  yet  he  inconsistently  maintains  that 
the  evidence  of  reason  is  absolutely  satisfactory.  The  senses 
give  us  knowledge  of  individual  things,  and  yet  only  the 
qualities  of  things;  that  we  reach  the  idea  of  thing  or  substance 
by  induction;  and  that  induction  rests  on  a  general  proposi- 
tion not  proved  by  induction. 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— CARTESIAN        171 

The  second  part  of  the  syntagma,  the  physics,  though  a  work 
of  merit,  is  not  altogether  self -consistent.  He  approves  the 
Epicurean  physics,  yet  holds  that  the  soul  is  immaterial,  free 
and  immortal. 

In  the  third  part,  the  ethics,  he  maintains  that  happiness, 
which  he  considers  to  be  the  harmony  of  the  soul  and  body, 
is  the  aim  of  life,  and  that  if  it  is  not  attainable  in  this  life, 
it  may  be  in  the  life  to  come. 

Gassendi,  though  possessing  great  critical  ability,  had  not 
the  constructive  talent  of  a  system  maker.  As  an  empirical 
philosopher,  he  is  to  be  classed  with  Hobbes. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

Modern  Philosophy — Metaphysical 

1.  Spinoza  (1632-1677).  Baruch  Spinoza,  as  he  was 
named  by  his  parents,  or  Benedictus  Spinoza,  as  he  called 
himself,  was  born  at  Amsterdam,  of  Jewish  parents,  who 
had  fled  from  Portugal  to  escape  persecution. 

Being  a  bright  boy,  his  education  was  entrusted  to  the 
chief  Rabbi,  Saul  Levi  Morteira,  who  was  requested  to 
train  him  for  the  Synagogue  service.  He  made  great  progress 
in  his  studies,  and  soon  began  to  ask  questions  which  troubled 
his  teacher  to  answer.  He  was  expected  to  accept,  on  author- 
ity, the  doctrines  taught  him;  but  this  he  refused  to  do,  and 
demanded  the  reasons  for  the  faith  required  of  him. 

Knowing  his  talents  and  dreading  his  influence,  the  rulers 
of  the  Synagogue  offered  him  a  pension  of  a  thousand  florins, 
if  he  would  conform  to  their  order  and  assist  in  their  cere- 
monies; but  this  he  indignantly  refused  to  do,  regarding  the 
offered  pension  as  a  bribe.  He  was  accordingly  excom- 
municated, and  an  attempt  was  even  made  against  his  life 
by  an  assassin,  who  aimed  at  him  a  deadly  blow  with  a 
gleaming  dagger,  as  he  was  returning  home  from  the  theater. 

Spinoza  learned  Latin  and  acquired  a  taste  for  Natural 
Science  from  a  free-thinking  physician,  Dr.  Van  den  Ende. 
His  philosophy  he  learned  chiefly  from  Descartes,  but  he 
was  also  influencd  by  Maimonides,  Hobbes  and  Bruno, 
and  was  affected,  to  some  extent,  by  the  scholastic  philosophy, 
though  as  an  original  thinker,  he  cut  loose  from  all  predeces- 
sors. 

According  to  a  prudent  Jewish  custom,  he  had  learned  a 
trade,  in  his  case,  the  polishing  of  glasses  for  optical  instru- 
ments, and  this  gave  him  the  means  of  support,  with  the 
assistance  of  friends,  while  he  pursued  his  investigations. 

After  his  reputation,  as  a  thinker,  had  become  establish 
he  was  offered  the  chair  of  philosophy  at  Heidelberg  by  Kai 
Ludwig,  the  Elector  Palatine;  but  this  flattering  offer 

172 


MODERN    PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL    173 

declined,  though  the  position  was  a  lucrative  one;  for  he 
loved  to  be  independent,  and  feared  that  he  would  not  be 
free  in  his  teaching,  though  this  he  was  promised,  and  that  it 
would  not  interfere  with  his  own  studies. 

His  principal  works,  written  at  the  Hague,  between  the 
years  1660  and  1677,  were  entitled:  Renati  Descartes  princi- 
piorum  philosophiae,  Pars  I  et  II,  more  geometrico  demo- 
stratae;  Tractatus  theologico-politicus;  and  Ethica  more  geomet- 
rico demonstrate.  The  Ethica  is  his  chief  work,  and  on  it  his 
fame,  as  a  philosopher,  especially  depends.  He  wrote  several 
other  works  of  less  importance,  and  numerous  letters.  Some 
of  these  works  were  published  after  his  death,  under  the 
supervision  of  his  friend,  Ludwig  Meyer.  One  of  his  works, 
Tractatus  de  Deo,  homine,  ejusque  felicitate,  was  unknown  to 
the  world  until  the  year  1852. 

Descartes  ppstulated-lwQ  substances,  matter,  or  exten- 
sion, and  mind,  or  thought,  and  supposed  them  so  radically 
distinct  that  neither  could  act  on  the  other-.  —"Their  apparent 
interaction,  which  to  Descartes  was  inexplicable,  was  ac- 
counted for  by  Geulincx  and  Malebranehe~t>y  the  hypothesis 
of  occasionalism,  or  the  intervention  of  God,  who  on  the 
occasion  of  the  presence  of  an  object,  excited  a  sensation  to 
awaken  attention,  and  presented  the  idea  of  the  object. 

Spinoza  went  bacjk  of  the  two  substances,  extension-  and 
thought,  postulated  by~~Descartesplind  considered  them 
attributes  of  one.  substance,  the  sole  fundamental  reality, 
which  he  called  deus  sive  natura,  God  or  Nature,  infinite, 
absolute,  self -existing  by  the  necessity  of  its  own  nature. 
Extension  and  thought,  the  two  known  attributes  of  God, 
were  the  two  forms  expressive  of  his  essence.  Finite  objects 
with  their  movements  and  interactions,  also  special  thoughts, 
or  mental  acts,  he  called  modes,  respectively  of  extension  and 
thought. 

Causal  relations  apparently  exist  between  the  objects  of 
one~serres,  whetheFmailei1  or  mind, ,  vvjlli  UjAJgse^^b^^ber ; 
but  this  correspondence  between  the  two  series,  Spinoza 
explained  by  going  back  to  God,  as  the  sole  substance,  whose 
acts  have  two  phases,  extension  and  thought,  which  always 
accompany  each  other,  being,  in  fact,  the  same  thing  or  act 
of  God,  differing  only  phenomenally,  so  that  the  order  and 
connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection 
of  things. 


174  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

At  this  point,  an  interesting  question  arises :  Did  Spinoza 
regard  extension  and  thought,  as  having  to  the  human  mind, 
an  objective  existence  in  God,  or  did  he  regard  them  simply 
as  conceptions  the  human  mind  made  in  its  endeavor 
to  grasp  reality?  This  question  has  been  the  occasion  of 
some  dissension.  Kuno  Fischer,  and  some  others,  held 
that  Spinoza  meant  by  attributes  the  real  properties  or 
essences  which  the  one  substance,  God  or  Nature,  possesses, 
apart  from  the  observer.  On  the  other  hand,  Hegel  and 
Erdmann  understood  Spinoza  to  mean  that  these  attributes 
were  to  be  taken  in  the  subjective  sense,  as  the  way  in  which 
the  human  mind  conceives  God;  that  substance  itself  is 
neither  extended  nor  cognitive,  but  merely  appears  so  to  the 
understanding  as  the  modes  of  its  cognitions. 

No  doubt  Spinoza  held  that  the  human  mind  conceived 
the  infinite  sole  substance  under  the  forms  of  extension  and 
thought,  though  not  as  wholly  subjective.  He  says,  defini- 
tion IV:  "By  attribute  I  understand  that  which  the  intellect 
perceives  concerning  substance,  as  constituting  its  essence. " 
He  also  says,  Book  II,  proposition  7:  "The  order  and  con- 
nection of  ideas  are  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection  of 
things."  Hence  every  relation  of  true  subjective  thought 
corresponds  to  a  relation  in  objective  existence,  and  this 
correspondence  constitutes  its  truth. 

Finite  things  are  the  modes  of  the  attributes,  extension 
and  thought  of  the  infinite  substance;  that  is,  they  are  vari- 
able manifestations  of  God.  They  are  nothing  of  them- 
selves, since  nothing  exists  out  of  God,  and  if  God  should 
withdraw  from  them  his  support,  they  would  fall  into  non- 
existence. 

The  modes  of  extension  are  finite  bodies  with  their  magni- 
tude and  form,  motion  and  rest,  and  their  interactions. 
The  modes  of  consciousness  are  the  special  cognitions,  feel- 
ings, and  volitions,  with  all  their  relations.  These  modes, 
whether  of  extension  or  of  consciousness,  are  all  transitory. 

God,  or  the  infinite  substance,  Spinoza  called  natura 
naturans;  but  the  sum  of  the  manifested  modes,  he  called 
natura  naturata.  Natura  naturans  is  God  acting,  or  God 
manifesting  his  infinite  perfections  and  omnipotent  Jenergy ; 
natura  naturata  includes  all  the  variable  manifestations  ol 
God  in  nature  and  in  the  world  of  mankind,  Thf)  modes. 


MODERN    PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL    175 

whether  modifications  of  extension  or  of  consciousness,  run 
out  into  infinite  series  of  things  connected  by  the  law  of 
cause  and  effect. 

Spinoza  has  been  accused  of  Atheism,  but  this  accusation 
is  evidently  false.  He  was  no  atheist,  but  he  was  a  pantheist. 
Everything  phenomenal  is  the  manifestation  of  God,  the 
causa  causans.  Spinoza  defined  substance,  attribute,  mode, 
and  God,  thus:  Substance  is  that  which  is  in  itself,  and  is 
conceived  through  itself;  that  is,  the  conception  of  which  does 
not  need  the  conception  of  another  thing  from  which  it  must 
be  formed.  Attribute  is  that  which  the  intellect  perceives 
of  substance,  as  if  constituting  its  essence.  Mode  is  the 
affections  of  substance,  or  that  which  is  in  another  thing, 
through  which  also  it  is  conceived.  God  is  Being  absolutely 
infinite,  that  is  to  say,  substance  consisting  of  infinite  attri- 
butes, each  one  of  which  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essence. 

Let  us  examine  the  pantheism  of  Spinoza:  He  held  that  all 
finite  things  are  only  modes  of  the  two  attributes  of  God — 
extension  and  thought,  thus  giving  to  attributes  a  higher 
dignity  than  to  modes.  God  is  the  general  essence  of  all 
finite  things;  he  exists  in  them,  or  is  manifested  in  the  sum 
of  these  things;  and  conversely,  all  finite  things  exist  only  in 
God,  their  essence  and  source;  hence  the  significance  of 
Spinoza's  expression,  Deus  sive  Natura.  God  is  the  sum  of 
all  his  attributes,  that  is  Deus  =  omnia  ejus  attributa;  or  to  be 
more  explicit,  God  is  the  sum  of  all  his  attributes  with  all 
their  modes. 

Substance,  however,  is  to  be  distinguished  from  its  attri- 
butes. Is  body  extension?  It  has  extension;  a  body  is 
extended,  else  it  would  not  be  body.  But  is  the  body  the 
space  it  occupies?  Move  the  body,  the  space  it  occupied 
remains.  Is  the  ego  identical  with  its  thought?  It  may 
cease  to  think,  and  begin  to  feel.  Is  the  ego  identical  with 
its  feeling?  It  may  cease  to  feel  and  begin  to  will.  Is  the 
ego  identical  with  its  willing?  To  these  questions,  we  must 
answer  no.  But  may  not  the  ego  be  identical  with  the  sum 
of  these  phenomena?  It  may,  for  all  we  know  to  the  con- 
trary, be  sometimes  quiescent,  as  in  dreamless  sleep.  But 
again,  may  not  the  ego  =  intellect  -f  sensibility  4-  will? 
No.  The  ego  has  intellect,  and  sensibility  and  will,  and  as  a 
substance,  it  must  be  distinguished  from  these  attributes;  or 


176  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

to  employ  Spinoza's  terms,  as  an  attribute,  called  conscious- 
ness, it  is  to  be  distinguished  from  its  modes,  or  its  special 
thoughts,  feelings,  or  volitions.  The  ego  has  the  power  to 
think,  feel  or  will. 

The  application  to  God  is  evident.  He  is  not  to  be  identi- 
fied with  extension,1  though  he  can  manifest  his  energy  at 
any  point  in  infinite  space;  he  is  not  to  be  identified  with 
thought,  though  he  is  an  infinite  thinker.  If  God  is  not  to  be 
identified  with  the  attributes,  extension  and  thought,  much 
less  is  he  to  be  identified  with  what  is  inferior  to  these  attri- 
butes —  their  modes,  the  infinitely  various  forms  and  move- 
ments of  bodies  with  their  interactions,  or  with  the  countless 
number  and  innumerable  variety  of  thoughts,  feelings  and 
volitions,  with  all  their  possible  relations.  A  finite  body, 
or  a  single  state  of  consciousness,  is  a  finite  mode;  but  all 
bodies  and  minds,  with  their  infinitude  of  relations,  con- 
stitute an  infinite  mode. 

According  to  Descartes,  Geulincx  and  Malebranche,  God 
is  the  free  Creator  of  all  things;  according  to  Spinoza  he  is 
the  essence  which  necessarily  manifested  itself  as  the  sum 
of  the  facts  of  nature,  or  God  is  the  essence  and  manifesta- 
tion of  Nature,  and  every  fact  of  matter  or  spirit  is  a  mode 
of  one  of  his  attributes  —  extension  or  consciousness. 

Constructing  his  work,  more  geometrico,  Spinoza  begins 
with  definitions  and  axioms;  he  enunciates  theorems,  giving 
their  demonstrations;  he  then  deduces  corollaries,  and  ap- 
pends scholiums,  by  way  of  affording  additional  light,  or  of 
avoiding  misapprehension,  or  obviating  objections. 

Spinoza  says:  "Self  -cause  is  that  whose  nature  involves 
existence;  or  that  whose  nature  can  not  be  conceived  as  not 
existing."  Self-cause  either  existed  before  it  caused  itself 
or  it  did  not  exist.  If  it  existed  before  it  caused  itself,  it 
would  not  need  to  cause  itself;  if  it  had  no  existence  before 
it  caused  itself,  it  could  not  cause  itself.  Spinoza  probably 
meant  by  causa  sui,  or  cause  of  itself,  necessary  existence, 
which  implies  eternal  existence  which  is  not  caused  at  all, 
such  as  the  geometric  forms  in  space;  also  space  itself  and 
time  itself. 

Spinoza  calls  the  following  an  axiom:  "The  knowledge  of 
an  effect  depends  upon  and  involves  the  knowledge  of  its 
cause."  This  is  true  if  knowledge  signifies  complete  u 


d 


nder- 


MODERN   PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL    177 

standing;  but  we  know  many  effects,  as  facts,  without  know- 
ing their  causes;  we  know  that  any  effect  has  a  cause  without 
knowing  the  cause;  yet  it  is  true  that  the  knowledge  of  the 
relations  of  an  effect  involves  the  knowledge  of  its  cause. 

Spinoza  also  gives,  as  an  axiom:  "A  true  idea  must  agree 
with  that  of  which  it  is  an  idea."  This  is  an  axiom,  if  we 
first  give  the  definition:  A  true  idea  is  an  idea  which  agrees 
with  that  of  which  it  is  an  idea;  for  then  to  be  a  true  idea,  it 
must  agree  with  that  of  which  it  is  an  idea. 

Spinoza  says:  "Eternity  is  existence  itself,  so  far  as  it  is 
conceived  necessarily  to  follow  from  the  definition  of  an 
eternal  thing."  Eternity  is  the  infinite  duration  in  which 
an  eternal  thing  exists.  It  would  still  be  infinite  duration, 
or  infinite  time,  if  the  eternal  thing  did  not  exist. 

"Proposition  I.  Substance  is,  by  nature,  prior  to  its  affec- 
tions. This  follows  from  the  definitions  of  substance  and 
mode. "  In  the  logical  order  of  dependence  this  is  true;  that 
is,  substance  is  the  condition  of  its  attributes,  and  hence  of 
its  modes,  which  are  special  states,  or  modifications,  that  is, 
affections,  of  its  attributes;  but  in  the  order  of  knowledge,  we 
know  modes,  or  affections,  and  hence  attributes,  first,  and 
that  by  experience;  and  knowing  attributes,  reason  appre- 
hends substance  as  their  ground,  or  source,  as  that  without 
which  the  attributes  would  be  impossible.  In  the  order  of 
existence,  however,  neither  can  be  prior  to  the  other;  for 
a  substance  must  have  attributes  of  some  kind,  otherwise 
it  would  be  nothing;  if  it  exists,  it  must  exist  in  some  state 
or  condition,  that  is,  in  some  mode  or  modification  of  its 
attributes,  otherwise  it  could  not  exist  at  all. 

"Proposition  VII.  It  pertains  to  the  nature  of  substance 
to  exist.  There  is  nothing  by  which  a  substance  can  be 
produced.  It  will,  therefore,  be  the  cause  of  itself;  that  is  to 
say,  its  essence  necessarily  involves  existence,  or  in  other 
words,  it  pertains  to  its  nature  to  exist." 

The  essence,  if  it  be  given,  of  course,  involves  the  existence 
of  the  substance,  as  its  condition  or  logical  antecedent;  like- 
wise the  substance,  if  given,  involves  its  essence  as  its  logical 
consequent;  but  the  existence  of  essence,  by  itself,  as  attri- 
bute, is  not  known  rationally,  but  empirically,  as  a  fact  which 
might  not  have  been.  Grant  essence,  then  substance  is  its 
necessary  antecedent,  not  in  time,  but  as  its  logical  condition; 


178  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

grant  substance,  then  essence  is  its  logical  consequent;  but 
neither  substance  nor  essence  is  known  by  reason  as  absolutely 
necessary,  and  so  far  as  we  know,  neither  might  have  been. 
The  universe  being  given,  God  is  conditionally  necessary  as 
its  explanation;  he  may  be  absolutely  necessary,  for  all  we 
know  to  the  contrary;  but  of  the  absolute  necessity  of  God, 
reason  does  not  inform  us. 

"Proposition  XI.  God,  or  substance,  consisting  of  infinite 
attributes,  each  one  of  which  expresses  eternal  and  infinite 
essence,  necessarily  exists.  If  this  be  denied,  conceive,  if  it  be 
possible,  that  God  does  not  exist.  Then  it  follows  that  his 
essence  does  not  involve  existence;  but  this  is  absurd.  There- 
fore God  necessarily  exists. " 

If  God  did  not  exist,  he  would  have  no  essence;  that  is, 
there  would  be  no  essence  from  which  to  infer  his  existence, 
which  is  not  the  absurdity,  as  Spinoza  supposes  of  admitting 
essence  and  denying  substance.  We  do  not  even  know 
God's  essence  as  a  first  fact.  We  know  the  universe,  and 
hence  infer  the  First  Cause;  and  this  first  cause  must  be 
adequate  to  the  production  of  the  universe;  that  is,  the 
first  cause  must  be  endowed  with  power  and  wisdom  sufficient 
for  its  production. 

In  Part  II,  Propositions  I  and  II,  Spinoza  declares: 
"Thought  is  an  attribute  of  God,  or  God  is  a  thinking  being. 
Existence  is  an  attribute  of  God,  or  God  is  an  extended 
being/' 

Then  when  as  in  Proposition  XI,  Spinoza  speaks  of  the 
infinite  attributes  of  God,  he  means  his  thought  is  infinite 
and  his  extension  is  infinite.  Thought  and  extension  are  the 
known  attributes  of  God;  but  if  he  has  other  attributes,  and 
he  may  have,  for  all  we  know,  an  infinite  number  of  attributes, 
they  are  all  infinite. 

In  making  extension  an  attribute  of  God,  Spinoza  did  not 
mean  extension  itself,  abstractly  considered  as  pure  space, 
but  the  infinite  extension  of  the  substance  of  God.  Finite 
bodies  are  modes  of  the  infinitely  extended  substance.  In 
making  thought  an  attribute  of  God,  he  considered  individual 
thoughts,  as  those  of  men,  to  be  modes  of  the  thought  of 
God. 

By  the  power  of  God,  Spinoza  understands  the  energizing 
of  the  active  essence  of  God,  natura  naturans.  The  modes  or 
manifestations  of  God  are  natura  naturata. 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY—  METAPHYSICAL      179 


The  only  idea  of  space  found  in  Spinoza's  systeiii  is 
of  substance  infinitely  extended;  but  reason  apprehends  space 
as  infinite  extension  itself,  the  room,  without  limit,  for  body 
and  motion,  and  for  the  universe  itself,  but  which  would  exist 
were  there  no  body,  no  motion,  no  universe. 

The  universe  being  given,  God,  the  First  Cause,  must  be, 
whether  regarded  as  transient  or  immanent,  and  as  the 
first  cause,  he  must  be  eternal,  otherwise  there  never  would 
have  been  anything,  save  time  and  space. 

In  the  appendix  to  Part  I,  Spinoza  denies  all  purpose, 
ror  final  cause,  with  respect  to  God,  holding  that  men  believe 
that  God  acts  in  view  of  ends,  because  they  themselves  are 
conscious  of  thus  acting.  He  holds  that  the  thoughts  of 
God  are  totally  unlike  those  of  men  except  in  name.  Then 
why  call  them  thoughts,  and  what  meaning  can  we  attach 
to  the  expression,  the  thought  of  God? 

God,  therefore,  according  to  Spinoza,  is  a  necessary  sub- 
stance,  infinite  in  extent  and  eternal  in  duration,  free  from 
constraint  or  restraint,  by  anything  external,  as  there  is 
nothing  external,  as  the  things  called  external  are  the  modes 
of  his  own  being,  and  acting,  without  purpose,  according  to 
the  necessity  of  his  own  nature.  Such  a  being  might  excite 
admiration,  but  could  it  inspire  love?  An  infinite  machine 
running,  as  a  perpetual  motion,  by  the  necessity  of  its  own 
mechanism,  would  be  an  infinite  wonder,  but  is  as  impossible 
as  the  perpetual  motion  contrived  by  a  human  crank.  Not  a 
machine,  but  the  living  God,  is  running  the  universe. 

We  give,  as  a  specimen  of  Spinoza's  method  of  reasoning, 
"  Proposition  XL.  If  we  imagine  that  we  are  hated  by  another, 
without  having  given  him  a  cause  for  it,  we  shall  hate  him  in 
return. 

Demonstration.  If  we  imagine  that  another  person  is 
affected  with  hatred,  on  that  account  we  shall  also  be  affected 
with  it;  that  is  to  say,  we  shall  be  affected  with  sorrow, 
accompanied  with  the  idea  of  an  external  cause.  But,  by 
hypothesis,  we  imagine  no  cause  for  this  sorrow  excepting 
the  person  himself  who  hates  us,  and  therefore,  because  we 
imagine  ourselves  hated  by  another,  we  shall  be  affected  with 
sorrow,  accompanied  with  the  idea  of  him  who  hates  us; 
that  is  to  say,  we  shall  hate  him.  " 


180  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Suppose  one  had  reached  that  high  state  of  grace  of  loving 
his  enemies  would  he  hate  another,  who  he  imagined  hated 
him? 

A  critical  examination  of  Spinoza's  system  is  a  good  disc'p- 
line  for  the  mind,  and  Spinoza  has  displayed  a  constructive 
intellect  of  a  very  high  order.  Only  recently,  many  great 
thinkers  have  gone  back  to  Spinoza's  system,  as  the  only 
true  one. 

2.  Leibniz  (1646-1716).  Leibniz  was  born  at  Leipsic 
where  his  father  was  professor  of  Ethics  at  the  university. 
His  mother  was  the  daughter  of  a  distinguished  jurist,  and 
thus  the  young  Leibniz  was  favored  by  heredity.  His 
father  died  when  his  son  was  six  years  of  age,  and  so  his 
education  was  the  care  of  his  excellent  mother.  Leibniz 
enjoyed  the  aid  of  the  superior  library  left  by  his  father,  and 
all  the  advantages  of  a  University  education  of  which  he 
availed  himself  to  the  utmost.  He  studied  for  the  doctor's 
degree  which,  for  some  misunderstanding,  was  refused  him 
at  Leipsic,  but  was  conferred  on  him  by  the  University  at 
Altdorf .  He  was  an  adept  in  languages,  and  in  the  scholastic 
philosophy;  and  visiting  Paris,  he  studied  the  higher  mathe- 
matics with  the  celebrated  Huygens.  He  also  visited  Eng- 
land, and  became  acquainted  with  many  of  the  distinguished 
scholars  of  that  country. 

His  mind  was  wonderful  in  the  universality  of  its  grasp, 
exceeding,  in  this  respect,  that  of  any  other  mind  since 
Aristotle.  He  was,  at  once,  a  philologist,  a  historian,  a 
jurist,  a  physicist,  a  mathematician,  a  philosopher;  and  in 
all  these  respects  he  was  an  adept  and  made  important 
investigations,  and  adorned  whatever  he  touched.  Equally 
with  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  he  was  the  discoverer  of  the  Differ- 
ential Calculus,  and  devised  a  notation  more  flexible  than 
that  of  Newton's,  even  the  one  used  at  the  present  day. 

He  was  the  friend  and  counsellor  of  Kings,  and  was  honored 
by  the  great.  Financially  he  was  well  to  do,  so  that  his 
career  may  well  be  the  envy  of  many  a  poverty-stricken 
man  of  letters. 

So  numerous  were  the  subjects  that  engaged  his  attention, 
so  wide  the  field  of  his  investigations,  that  time  failed  him  for 
writing  many  exhaustive  treatises;  but  perhaps  the  work 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL    181 

nearest  his  heart  was  his  Theodicy,  or  the  vindication  of  the 
ways  of  God  to  man;  his  heart  also  was  set  on  uniting  the 
discordant  churches  of  divided  Christendom. 

The  philosophy  of  Leibniz,  though  influenced,  more  or 
less,  by  the  systems  of  the  past,  especially  by  those  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  Descartes  and  Spinoza,  was  strikingly  original 
and  profound.  The  ultimate  reality  is  God,  a  monad,  thex 
creation  of  an  infinitude  of  monads. 

The  created  monads  of  Leibniz  are  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  atoms  of  Democritus,  which  were  regarded  as 
infinitesimal  solids,  inert  and  without  qualitative  differences, 
while  the  essential  monads  were  conceived  to  be  metaphysical 
points,  infinite  in  number — little  worlds  of  activity  and  intelli- 
gence, each  thoroughly  individual,  differing  from  all  the 
others,  the  whole  varying  without  break,  according  to  the 
law  of  continuity,  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest,  each  pic- 
turing the  universe,  according  to  its  degree  of  intelligence, 
not  by  passive  impressions,  but  by  active  reflection  and 
representation.  Above  these  is  God,  the  creator  of  all,  the 
monad  of  monads,  purus  actus,  the  absolute  energy,  the 
infinite  intelligence. 

There  is  no  gap  in  the  continuity  of  the  intelligence  and 
activity  of  the  monads,  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  of  the 
created  monads,  and  though,  according  to  Leibniz's  principle 
of  the  identity  of  indiscernibles,  the  difference  between  those 
nearest  alike  may  be  indiscernible,  yet  each  one  forever 
maintains  its  identical  individuality.  The  only  break  in  the 
law  of  continuity  is  between  the  highest  created  monad  and 
God,  the  absolute  monad,  the  monad  of  monads,  the  infinite 
intelligence,  the  pure  activity. 

The  monads  of  Leibniz  differ  from  the  one  substance  of 
Spinoza  which,  as  pure  being,  excludes  all  positive  deter- 
minations save  extension  and  thought,  while  the  monads,  as 
active  energy,  constitute  the  essence  of  substance,  making 
all  reality  dynamic. 

Instead,  therefore,  of  the  one  substance,  there  is  an  infinite 
number  of  individual  monads,  graded  according  to  the  law 
of  continuity,  each  forever  maintaining  its  own  identity; 
and  the  sum  total  of  these  monads  constitutes  the  universe. 
Each  living  being  is  a  ruling  monad  environed  by  a  multitude 
of  subordinate  monads  acting  together  according  to  the 
law  of  pre-established-harmony. 


18£  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  world  of  matter  is  the  imperfect  conception  which 
individual  minds  have  of  the  universe  of  monads,  the  con- 
ceptions becoming  more  clear  and  ideal  as  the  minds  advance 
in  degree  of  intelligence. 

The  hypothesis  of  pre-established  harmony  naturally  fol- 
lowed from  that  of  monads.  In  the  hierarchy  of  monads, 
the  higher,  or  more  active,  give  law  to  the  lower  or  more 
passive  or  imperfectly  active,  as  in  the  soul  and  body  in 
their  corresponding  states.  The  lower  monads  representing 
the  universe  in  a  confused  way,  may  be  regarded  as  material, 
so  far  as  passive;  but  the  higher  monads,  actively  represent- 
ing the  universe  in  a  clear  way,  are  to  be  regarded  as  spirits. 

The  doctrine  of  pre-established  harmony  is,  therefore, 
opposed  to  that  of  Descartes  in  regard  to  matter  and  mind 
as  two  substances  so  unlike  that  neither  can  act  on  the  other, 
leading  to  the  theory  of  occasionalism,  or  miraculous  inter- 
vention, proposed  by  Geulincx  and  Malebranche. 

Leibniz  did  not  hold  that  there  was  a  world  of  matter 
distinct  from  the  universe  of  monads,  the  two  worlds  so 
arranged,  by  a  pre-established  law,  as  to  run  in  harmony, 
but  that  the  monads,  according  to  their  degree  of  perfection, 
represented  by  their  intelligence,  the  facts  of  the  other  mon- 
ads, the  law  governing  the  lower  corresponding  with  the 
representations  of  the  higher.  God,  by  his  continued  action, 
moved  the  lower  monads,  or  world  of  matter,  and  incited 
corresponding  activities  in  the  higher  monads,  or  world  of 
mind. 

Hence,  each  monad  represented  correctly,  yet  not  through 
sensations  caused  by  passive  impressions,  but  by  the  law 
of  its  own  activity,  the  facts  relating  to  the  lower  monads, 
but  only  imperfectly,  so  far  as  it  is  material  or  passive,  the 
facts  pertaining  to  the  higher.  God,  the  purus  actus,  repre- 
sents, in  perfection,  the  state  of  the  entire  universe  of  monads. 
The  monads  all  represent  the  same  universe,  but  with  differ- 
ent degrees  of  perfection,  according  to  their  activity,  the 
monads  of  the  inorganic  world  representing,  as  in  a  confused 
dream,  the  representations  rising  in  degree  of  distinctness, 
through  the  vegetable  and  animal  kingdoms,  through  man, 
and  higher  beings,  up  to  God  whose  representations  are  per- 
fect, for  he  alone,  as  the  absolute  monad,  as  purus  actus, 
gives  law  to  the  whole  infinite  series  of  activities. 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL      183 

The  combination  of  the  passive  and  the  active  principles 
of  the  material  and  spiritual  in  the  monads  is  somewhat 
analagous  to  the  one  substance,  Deus  sive  natura  of  Spinoza, 
with  its  two  properties  of  extension  and  thought;  but  with 
Leibniz,  the  passive  or  material  principle  is  wanting  in  God, 
the  absolute  monad,  who  is  wholly  spirit,  or  pure  activity, 
the  creator  of  nature.  Al]  the  lower  monads,  whose  sum 
Constitutes  nature,  combining  both  passive  and  active  ele- 
ments, the  passive  or  material  predominating  in  the  lower, 
tl  e  active  or  spiritual  in  the  higher,  are  the  creatures  of  God, 
subject  to  order,  and  mutually  adjusted  according  to  the 
law  of  pre-established  harmony. 

The  logic  of  Leibniz  is  based  on  two  fundamental  principles 
— the  principle  of  contradiction  and  that  of  sufficient  reason. 
The  principle  of  contradiction  may  be  thus  stated:  That 
which  is  self -contradictory  or  which  contradicts  an  established 
truth  is  false,  and  if  false  its  contradictory  is  true.  The 
principle  may  otherwise  be  stated  thus:  All  truths  exist  in 
harmony.  The  principle  is  employed  in  Geometry  in  the 
indirect  demonstrations,  called  also  the  reductio  ad  absiirdum. 
The  principle  or  sufficient  reason  may  be  thus  expressed: 
To  established  contingent  truths,  that  is,  the  truth  of  facts, 
a  sufficient  reason  must  be  found. 

The  Theodicy  of  Leibniz,  an  attempt  to  vindicate  the 
government  of  God,  was  perhaps  of  all  his  works  the  one 
nearest  his  heart.  The  question  how  can  God,  the  infinitely 
good  and  holy  Creator  and  governor  of  the  world,  permit 
evil  in  the  universe  which  he  has  created  and  governs?  What 
is  the  origin  of  sin,  and  what  is  its  signification?  These 
questions  have  perplexed  many  thoughtful  minds.  The 
solution  of  Leibniz  is  optimistic,  and  is  essentially  to  this 
effect.  That  the  existing  universe  is  the  best  possible;  for  God, 
infinite  in  power,  wisdom  and  goodness,  would  create  the 
best  possible  world.  But  what  then  can  be  said  of  the  evil 
so  abounding  in  the  world?  Leibniz  declares  that  the-  evil 
is  rather  apparent  than  real;  but  all  partial  evil  is  universal 
good,  and  whatever  is,  is  right.  All  things  are  of  necessity. 
Every  event  takes  place  according  to  pre-established  law. 
Even  events  apparently  contingent  are  the  necessary  result 
of  remote  and  intervening  causes,  and  could  not  be  different 
from  what  they  are  found  to  be.  This  view  is  virtually  the 


184  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

denial  of  sin,  or  moral  evil.  A  being  acting  under  necessity 
cannot  be  guilty  of  moral  wrong,  and  a  sense  of  guilt,  or 
remorse  of  conscience,  is  a  feeling  of  blame  where  blame  does 
not  exist.  This  is  certainly  not  existing  harmony.  The 
fact  is,  man  is  free;  and  though  a  person  causes  his  acts, 
which,  as  caused,  are  not  free,  yet  the  person  is  free  to  cause 
or  not  to  cause  certain  acts,  and  as  free,  it  is  possible  for  him 
to  do  wrong,  in  which  case,  conscience  rightly  asserts  his 
guilt;  he  is  guilty  for  doing  wrong,  when  he  was  free  to  do 
right.  The  fact  of  remorse  is  in  harmony  with  the  fact  of 
guilt  which  implies  freedom,  but  is  inconsistent  with  the 
doctrine  of  necessity.  Man  is  not  a  machine  run  by  forcus 
over  which  he  has  no  control,  according  to  pre-established 
laws,  but  he  is  a  free  moral  being.  A  universe  of  moral 
beings  is  more  worthy  of  God  than  a  universe  of  machines, 
however  perfectly  the  machines  work  by  necessity  i.nder 
the  control  of  forces  running  them  according  to  invariable 
law;  yet  in  a  moral  universe  sin  is  possible,  and  is  actual  in  the 
present  world  as  found  by  sad  experience.  Leibniz,  however, 
held  that  the  necessity  of  a  person's  conduct  was  subjective, 
due  to  his  nature  and  not  to  an  external  cause. 

The  Theodicy  of  Leibniz  was  a  polemic  directed  especially 
against  the  skepticism  of  Bayle,  who  maintained  that  reason 
and  theology  were  in  irreconcilable  conflict,  yet  as  he  ironi- 
cally declared,  both  are  to  be  accepted.  Bayle  held  that 
the  presence  of  evil  in  the  world  is  inconsistent  with  the 
existence  of  God  as  infinitely  powerful  and  holy.  Bayle's 
argument  is  essentially  the  following:  God  is  neither  able 
nor  willing  to  prevent  evil,  or  he  is  able  but  not  willing,  or 
he  is  willing  but  not  able,  or  is  both  able  and  willing.  The 
supposition  that  God  is  both  able  and  willing  to  prevent  evil 
is  the  only  one  consistent  with  the  being  of  God,  as  omni- 
potent and  holy;  but  evil  does  exist;  therefore  God  is  not 
both  able  and  willing  to  prevent  it,  otherwise  it  would  not 
exist.  If  he  is  willing  to  prevent  evil,  but  not  able,  though 
he  may  be  holy,  he  is  not  omnipotent;  if  he  is  able  but  not 
willing  though  he  may  be  omnipotent,  he  is  not  holy;  if  he 
is  neither  able  nor  willing,  he  is  neither  omnipotent  nor  holy. 
In  any  case,  the  fact  of  evil  conflicts  with  the  existence  of 
God  as  omnipotent  and  holy;  and  hence  the  affirmations  of 
reason  are  contrary  to  theological  conceptions;  that  is,  there 
is  no  God. 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL    185 

Leibniz's  Doctrine  of  optimism,  virtually  denying  the 
existence  of  evil,  or  making  it  only  apparent,  or  necessary  to 
the  good  of  the  universe,  is  not  a  satisfactory  reply  to  Bayle's 
argument.  If  man  acts  under  necessity,  he  is  not  morally 
blame- worthy;  but  his  conscience  convicts  him  of  sin,  and 
his  reason  justifies  his  conscience.  Sin  or  moral  evil  is, 
therefore,  a  fact  which  cannot  be  gainsaid,  and  of  this  fact, 
mendacity,  dishonesty,  cruelty,  and  every  species  of  crime 
and  immorality  are  crying  witnesses  whose  voices  cannot  be 
silenced. 

The  theory  of  monads  and  of  pre-established  harmony, 
together  with  his  desire  to  vindicate  the  character  of  God, 
compelled  Leibniz  to  minimize  evil,  or  virtually  to  deny  it  alto- 
gether, and  to  devise  the  theory  optimism,  that  the  present 
universe  is  the  best  possible.  Granting  the  existing  of 
evil,  the  hypothesis  of  a  universe  of  monads,  whose  activities, 
whether  thoughts,  feelings,  volitions,  or  external  conduct, 
are  all  necessitated  according  to  pre-established  law,  throws 
the  responsibility  of  evil  on  God  himself,  who  ordained  the 
law,  and  renders  the  vindication  of  his  character  altogether 
impossible.  But  a  universe  of  free  moral  agents  with  power 
to  do  right  and  not  under  compulsion  to  do  wrong,  so  superior 
to  a  universe  of  machines,  vindicates  the  character  of  God, 
in  the  eye  of  reason,  from  all  responsibility  for  the  actuality 
of  evil,  throwing  on  him  only  the  responsibility  for  its  pos- 
sibility. For  the  sake  of  the  multitudes  of  high  and  holy 
beings,  the  possibility  of  evil,  or  the  risk  of  its  actuality,  was 
admitted,  and  the  responsibility  of  sin  is  thrown,  where  it 
belongs,  upon  the  sinner,  who  had  power  to  do  right,  and  was 
not  compelled  to  do  wrong.  This  view  both  justifies  the 
ways  of  God,  and  accords  with  the  facts  of  human  nature. 

The  universe,  according  to  Leibniz,  was  created  and 
organized  so  as  to  embody  the  divine  plan,  all  the  monads 
acting  in  conformity  to  law,  accomplish  their  pre-ordained 
work  without  subsequent  intervention  on  the  part  of  God. 
Every  emergency  was  foreseen  and  provided  for  in  the  origi- 
nal plan,  the  foreknowledge  of  God  guiding  in  the  adjust- 
ment of  forces  working  according  to  law  pre-ordained  by 
infinite  wisdom,  rendered  further  intervention  of  providence 
entirely  unnecessary,  thus  displaying  in  the  highest  degree, 
the  perfect  wisdom  of  the  Divine  Creator.  This  view  may 


186  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

suffice  for  a  mechanical  universe;  but  it  is  not  unreasonable 
to  suppose  that  a  world  of  free  beings  would  better  accom- 
plish the  divine  purpose  by  the  kind  guidance  of  the  Moral 
Governor.  The  continual  moral  government  of  God  accords 
with  the  fact  of  moral  law  and  true  religion,  while  the  scheme 
of  necessity  conflicts  with  rational  views  of  morality,  religion 
and  responsibility. 

Leibniz  applied  his  own  philosophical  principles  to  a 
criticism  of  the  system  of  Locke,  especially  in  regard  to  the 
origin  of  knowledge,  and  to  his  polemic  against  the  theory  of 
innate  ideas. 

Locke  taught  that  all  our  knowledge  comes  through  sen- 
sation and  reflection,  and  consequently  that  we  have  no 
innate  ideas.  He  accepted  the  statement:  Nihil  est,  in 
intellectu  quod  non  fuerit  in  sensu.  This  statment  Leibniz 
also  accepted,  with  this  addition:  nisi  ipse  intellectus. 

Leibniz  held  that  there  are  ideas  innate,  or  originated  by 
the  mind  itself.  Locke  held  that  if  the  mind  has  innate 
ideas,  it  must  be  conscious  of  them;  for  to  deny  consciousness 
of  them  is  virtually  to  affirm  that  they  are  not  in  the  mind, 
and  hence  not  innate.  As  a -matter  of  fact,  however,  neither 
children  nor  savages  are  conscious  of  certain  principles  called 
innate.  What  do  they  know  about  axioms,  or  the  principle 
of  causality,  or  that  of  contradiction?  Locke  admits  that 
the  mind  is  capable  of  knowing  first  principles  when  pre- 
sented, or  of  understanding  demonstrable  truth  when  proved, 
but  not  before.  He  admits  that  the  mind  has  innate  powers, 
or  powers  born  with  us. 

What  is  really  born  with  us  is  innate  powers;  and  in  regard 
to  this,  the  two  philosophers  were  perhaps  in  agreement. 
The  addition  nisi  ipse  intellectus,  made  by  Leibniz,  is  not  an 
idea,  innate  or  produced  by  the  intellect,  but  the  capability 
of  the  intellect  to  produce  the  idea;  yet  Leibniz  was  correct 
in  his  contention  that  fundamental  principles  are  supplied  by 
reason,  and  not  acquired  through  the  senses,  though  they 
may  be  called  out  to  give  the  conditions  of  knowledge  thus 
acquired,  since  rational  truth  is  the  possibility  of  contingent 
facts. 

Leibniz  distinguished  space,  from  extension,  and  time 
from  duration,  maintaining  that  extension  is  the  largeness 
of  an  object,  and  is  measured  by  the  space  it  occupies,  and 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— METAPHYSICAL    187 

that  duration  is  the  persistence  of  an  event,  and  is  measured 
by  the  time  it  continues.  But  space  is  the  room  giving  the 
possibility  of  the  extension  or  motion  of  objects,  and  time  the 
duration  giving  the  possibility  of  the  continuance  or  suc- 
cession of  events.  As  conditions,  that  is  to  say,  of  bodies 
and  their  motion,  and  of  events  and  their  succession,  space 
and  time  are  absolute  and  eternal  realities. 

Leibniz,  however,  calls  space  and  time  innate  ideas;  but  as 
the  earth  existed  and  revolved  around  the  sun,  and  the  geolo- 
gic periods  continued  and  succeeded  one  another  long  before 
the  human  race  existed  upon  the  earth,  we  must  distinguish 
between  space  and  time  themselves  and  our  ideas  of  them. 

The  writings  of  Leibniz  may  be  briefly  mentioned,  as 
Letters,  of  which  there  is  a  multiplicity  on  almost  every  con- 
ceivable variety  of  subjects;  Essais  de  Theodic'ee;  Meditationes; 
Nouveaux  Essais'La  monadologie;  Principes  de  la  nature  et  de 
la  grace;  and  Mamematical  correspondence. 

Leibniz  was,  without  doubt,  the  most  versatile  genius  that 
has  appeared  in  the  world  since  Aristotle. 

3.  Wolff  (1679-1754).  Christian  Wolff  was  born  at  Bres- 
lau  and  died  at  Halle,  where  he  was  professor  of  mathematics, 
though  he  lectured  chiefly  on  philosophy. 

In  his  philosophic  opinions,  he  was  influenced  by  both 
Descartes  and  Spinoza  but  especially  by  Leibniz.  He  culled 
the  thoughts  of  Leibniz  from  his  numerous  writings,  and 
published  them  in  a  systematic  form  so  that  they  could  be 
used  by  students  of  philosophy,  and  in  fact  they  became  the 
prevailing  standards  in  the  German  universities,  till  after  the 
time  of  Kant. 

Leibniz  had  established  two  principles — the  principle  of 
identity,  and  that  of  sufficient  reason.  Wolff  attempted  to 
deduce  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  from  that  of  identity, 
or  of  contradiction,  as  it  may  be  called,  and  thus  place  all 
philosophy  and  even  theology,  on  a  rational  basis.  He  held 
that  God  could,  by  a  miraculous  intervention,  change  any 
fact,  but  not  a  necessary  principle,  as  the  ratio  of  the  cir- 
cumference of  a  circle  to  its  diameter.  In  Ethics,  both 
Leibniz  and  Wolff  taught  the  wholesome  doctrine  of  a  pro- 
gressive perfectionism. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

Modern  Philosophy — English 

1.  Cudworth  (1617-1688).  A  reaction  against  the  extreme 
sensationalism  of  Hobbes  was  inevitable,  and  the  representa- 
tives of  this  reaction  were  Cudworth,  More  and  Cumberland. 

Ralph  Cudworth  was  carefully  instructed  in  his  preparatory 
studies  by  his  step-father,  Dr.  Stoughton,  and  entered  as  a 
pensioner  in  Emmanuel  College,  Cambridge,  of  which  his 
father  had  been  a  fellow.  After  receiving  his  M.  A.  degree 
he  was  elected  a  fellow,  and  became  a  tutor,  in  which  capacity 
he  distinguished  himself,  and  was  accounted  one  of  the  most 
learned  men  of  the  University. 

He  received  the  degree  B.  D.  and  was  chosen  to  the  rector- 
ate  of  several  churches,  and  preached  before  the  House  of 
Commons.  He  was  elected  professor  of  Hebrew,  and  shortly 
after  was  appointed  to  the  mastership  of  Christ's  College. 

He  was  a  voluminous  writer,  the  author  of  the  following 
works:  True  Nature  of  the  Lord's  Supper;  Union  of  Christ 
and  the  Church;  True  Intellectual  System  of  the  Universe, 
a  ponderous  work  in  three  parts — On  Atheism,  on  Eternal 
Immutable  Morality,  and  a  Discourse  on  Liberty  and 
Necessity.  A  fourth  part,  on  Free  Will,  was  left  in  Ms.,  but 
published  in  1838,  and  other  Mss.  were  left  which  have  not 
been  published. 

The  part  of  the  "Intellectual  System,"  against  Atheism, 
deals  heavy  blows.  His  first  proof  of  the  existence  of  God 
is,  with  some  modification,  that  of  Anselm  and  Descartes, 
founded  on  the  idea  of  an  absolutely  perfect  being,  showing 
that  this  idea  involves  no  contradiction  and  is  in  accord 
with  reason.  Instead,  however,  of  inferring  existence  from 
the  idea  of  perfection,  he  infers  in  his  second  proof,  the  exist- 
ence of  an  eternal  and  absolute  or  perfect  being  from  the 
fact  of  the  existence  of  the  universe. 

In  the  part  on  "Liberty  and  Necessity"  Cudworth  men- 
tions three  kinds  of  fatalism — the  first  materialistic,  which 
suppresses  not  only  the  idea  of  liberty,  but  also  the  idea  of 

188 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH  189 

God  and  spirituality,  and  reduces  all  changes  to  mechanical 
action;  the  second  is  a  Theological  fatalism,  which  makes  good 
and  evil,  right  and  wrong  depend  on  the  will  of  God ;  the  third 
is  a  Stoical  necessity,  which  affirms  that  all  that  happens  is 
determined  by  unavoidable  necessity. 

To  the  first  of  these  forms  of  fatalism,  Cudworth  opposes 
the  existence  of  God  and  a  spiritual  world;  to  the  second,  the 
immutable  distinctions  between  right  and  wrong;  to  .the  third, 
the  freedom  and  responsibility  of  man.  He  elaborates  his 
arguments,  at  great  length  in  support  of  his  views. 

Knowledge,  according  to  Cudworth,  does  not  begin  with 
the  individual  object,  but  with  the  universal,  and  in  this  he 
agrees  with  Plato  and  Leibniz,  that  the  individual  is  known, 
by  bringing  it  under  the  universal;  he  disagrees  with  Bacon, 
that  the  universal  is  collected  from  a  multitude  of  individuals. 
He  held  that  these  universals  underlying  all  knowledge,  have 
existed  eternally  in  the  Divine  mind. 

The  treatise  on  "Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality," 
opposes  the  second  form  of  fatalism  that  moral  good  or  evil 
is  such  by  the  arbitrary  will  of  God.  We  often  know,  by  our 
own  reason,  that  a  certain  act  is  right  or  wrong;  yet  even  in 
case  we  can  not  know  this  by  our  own  reason,  but  only  from 
the  revelation  of  the  will  of  God,  we  still  believe  that  an 
act  is  right,  not  because  God  wills  it,  but  that  He  wills  it 
because  it  is  right;  and  knowing  his  will,  we  know  that  the 
act  is  right.  God's  will  is  not  arbitrary,  but  is  founded  upon 
his  wisdom. 

An  act  morally  indifferent,  if  enjoined  by  law,  civil  or 
divine,  becomes  obligatory,  because  not  to  obey  would  intro- 
duce diversity  of  practice,  and  involve  discord  in  society, 
which  is  an  evil,  and  therefore  to  obey  is  right.  Consequences 
whether  good  or  bad,  determine  the  quality  of  conduct, 
whther  right  or  wrong,  and  the  character  of  the  consequences 
is  apprehended  by  reason,  human  or  Divine. 

2.  More  (1614-1687).  Henry  More  took  his  preparatory 
course  at  Eton,  and  his  University  course  at  Christ's  College, 
Cambridge.  His  parents  were  rigid  Calvinists,  but  their 
son  said  he  "could  never  swallow  that  hard  doctrine." 

He  was  a  Platonist  in  philosophy  and  was  especially  en- 
chanted with  Neo-Platonism,  and  consequently  somewhat 
of  a  mystic.  He  was  a  prolific  writer,  and  threw  into  his 
productions  the  charms  of  a  poetic  imagination. 


190  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

His  Opera  Theologica  and  Opera  Philosophica  contain  his 
theological  and  philosophical  speculations.  He  also  pub- 
lished a  collection  of  philosophical  poems.  In  his  Manual 
of  Metaphysics,  he  discusses  the  views  of  Jacob  Bcehme  and 
Spinoza;  but  his  Divine  Dialogues  mark  the  culmination  of 
his  intellectual  efforts. 

In  his  work  on  Ethics  called  "Enchiridion  Ethicum"  More 
answers  the  question,  why  should  one  conform  to  an  ethical 
principle  when  he  believes  that  in  so  doing  he  acts  contrary 
to  his  own  interest?  by  saying  that  the  obligation  to  do  right 
is  apprehended  by  reason,  and  that  the  sweetness  and  flavor 
of  right  conduct  and  of  the  resulting  good  are  appreciated 
by  the  boniform  faculty,  that  is,  by  conscience;  that  in  this 
sweetness  is  found  the  motive  to  virtuous  conduct;  and  that 
Ethics  is  the  art  of  living  happily,  since  true  happiness  con- 
sists in  the  satisfaction  from  the  consciousness  of  virtue. 
Hence  to  do  right  is  to  act  in  accordance  with  our  highest 
interests.  He  also  adds  some  practical  principles:  things 
differ  in  quality  as  well  as  in  quantity  and  duration.  Future 
good  or  evil,  if  certain,  or  even  probable,  is  to  be  regarded  as 
well  as  present  good  or  evil.  The  amount  of  good  varies  as 
the  number  receiving  the  same  benefit.  Hobbes  and  More 
agree  in  making  happiness  the  aim  of  virtue;  but  right  con- 
duct, according  to  Hobbes  is  known  through  law,  but  accord- 
ing to  More,  by  reason.  Cudworth  did  not  make  happiness 
the  aim  of  right  conduct,  but  the  fulfillment  of  the  obligation 
to  conform  to  the  immutable  principles  of  reason;  but  evident- 
ly to  satisfy  the  claims  of  reason  gives  the  very  highest  and 
purest  enjoyment,  and  not  to  do  so  would  disquiet  our  con- 
science, and  render  us  dissatisfied  with  ourselves. 

3.  Cumberland  (1632-1718).  Richard  Cumberland  was 
educated  at  St.  Paul's  school  and  at  Magdalene  College, 
Cambridge,  where  he  received  his  degrees  and  obtained  a 
fellowship. 

He  studied  medicine,  but  did  not  actively  engage  in  its 
practice.  He  turned  his  attention  to  Theology  and  Philoso- 
phy, and  to  some  extent  to  Science  and  Philology. 

He  had  several  influential  friends,  and  to  them,  in  connec- 
tion with  his  industry,  he  owed  his  success  in  life.  His  first 
preferment  was  the  rectory  of  Brampton,  and  he  was  also 
appointed  one  of  the  twelve  preachers  to  the  University. 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH  191 

While  zealously  engaged  in  performing  the  duties  of  his 
office,  he  still  found  time  for  the  abstruse  studies  which  were 
his  delight.  He  was  advanced  to  a  more  important  position, 
the  rectory  of  Allhollows,  and  into  this  work  he  entered  with 
his  usual  energy.  He  gave  one  lecture  each  week,  besides 
preaching  two  sermons,  and  still  found  time  to  pursue  his 
favorite  studies  of  Theology  and  Philosophy. 

At  the  age  of  fortv,  he  published  his  earliest  and  greatest 
work,  entitled  De  Legibus  Naturae.  The  merit  of  this  work 
is  found  in  the  matter  rather  than  in  its  style,  which  is  prolix 
and  destitute  of  strength  and  perspicuity. 

One  day  entering  into  a  coffee-house  to  read  the  papers, 
as  was  his  custom,  he  was  greatly  surprised  to  see  the  item : 
"The  King  has  nominated  Dr.  Cumberland  to  the  Bishopric  of 
Peterborough."  He  accepted  this  appointment,  with  some 
hesitation,  and  applied  himself  to  the  duties  of  this  new 
office  with  his  usual  zeal. 

He  prepared  several  other  works,  besides  that  on  the  laws 
of  nature,  among  which  was  one  on  Jewish  Weights  and 
Measures,  and  he  undertook  the  study  of  the  Coptic  language 
when  eighty-three  years  of  age. 

Cumberland's  greatest  work,  however,  was  De  Legibus 
Naturae,  in  which  are  found  his  philosophical  theories.  He 
says:  "The  laws  of  nature  are  immutably  true  propositions, 
regulative  of  voluntary  actions  as  to  the  choice  of  good  and 
the  avoidance  of  evil,  and  which  carry  with  them  an  obliga- 
tion to  outward  acts  of  obedience,  even  apart  from  civil 
laws,  and  from  any  considerations  of  compact  constituting 
governments." 

The  above  definition,  by  its  prolixity  and  range,  shows  his 
defects,  both  in  style  and  thought.  A  proposition  is  a  state- 
ment in  some  form  of  language.  How  then  can  a  law  of 
nature  be  a  proposition?  Again,  his  definition  can  apply 
only  to  a  moral  law.  Cumberland  said  it  would  be  accepted 
by  all  parties,  forgetting  that  it  is  the  very  thing  that  would 
not  be  accepted  by  Hobbes,  against  whom  he  was  contending. 

In  the  discovery  of  the  laws  of  nature,  Cumberland  does  not 
have  recourse  to  innate  ideas,  or  employ  the  intuitions  of 
reason,  but  he  rises  by  induction  from  nature  to  nature's 
God,  and  thence  descends  to  universal  laws.  All  the  laws 
of  morals,  Cumberland  reduces  to  the  law  of  benevolence, 


192  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

which  he  thus  states:  "The  common  good  is  the  supreme 
law,"  and  again:  "The  greatest  possible  benevolence  of  every 
rational  agent  towards  all  the  rest  constitutes  the  happiest 
state  of  each  and  all  so  far  as  depends  on  their  own  power, 
and  is  necessarily  required  for  their  happiness."  Again: 
"No  action  can  be  called  morally  good  which  does  not,  in  its 
own  nature,  contribute  to  the  happiness  of  men."  These 
statements  are  propositions  expressing  moral  law,  and  do  not 
include  physical  laws.  Cumberland,  however,  did  well  to 
give  benevolence  its  high  rank  among  the  virtues.  An  act 
which  contributes  to  the  comfort  of  a  brute  is  a  benevolent 
act,  though  it  has  no  reference  to  the  happiness  of  men, 
except  to  the  pleasure  of  the  doer.  The  last  quotation  from 
Cumberland  shows  that  he  was  not  a  critical  thinker,  and 
his  defects  in  style  and  thought  hindered  the  general  useful- 
ness of,  his.  work. 

4.  <*Jjocke)  (1623-1 704).  John  Locke  enjoyed  the  advan- 
tages of  a  good  education,  afforded  by  the  wisdom  of  his 
father,  a  liberal  Puritan,  and  a  lawyer  of  Pensford,  Somerset 
county,  England.  His  home  training  was  thorough,  and 
continued  till  he  was  fourteen  years  of  age,  when  he  was  sent, 
for  six  years,  to  the  Westminster  School,  which  under  Puritan 
control,  was  a  center  of  political  agitation.  From  Westmin- 
ster he  went  to  Oxford,  and  was  placed  in  the  charge  of  John 
Owen  of  Christ  Church  College. 

Locke  was  not  pleased  with  the  intolerance  and  fanaticism 
he  saw  manifested  at  Oxford,  and  became  a  firm  believer  in 
religious  liberty  and  freedom  of  thought,  and  these  sentiments 
he  maintained  all  his  life.  He  received  the  bachelor's  degree 
in  1656,  and  the  master's  degree  in  1658.  In  1660,  he  was 
made  tutor,  and  lectured  on  Greek,  Rhetoric  and  Philosophy. 

Locke  was  acquainted  with  the  writings  of  Descartes  and 
Hobbes,  and  especially  admired  the  clearness  of  the  style  of 
Descartes,  though  he  differed  from  him  on  many  points; 
but  his  general  philosophical  point  of  view,  not  the  ethical 
or  political,  was  more  nearly  in  agreement  with  that  of 
Hobbes. 

The  natural  sciences,  jespecially  physics,  chemistry  and 
meteorology,  engaged  hisSbttention.  He  studied  medicine, 
and  though  he  did  not  take  the  degree,  nor  engage  systematic- 
ally in  the  practice,  he  acquired  some  reputation  for  his 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH  193 

knowledge.  As  secretary  of  William  Swan,  minister  to  the 
court  of  Berlin,  he  spent  a  year  in  that  city,  and  returning 
to  Oxford,  was  introduced  to  Ashley  Cooper,  afterwards 
Earl  of  Shaftesbury,  and  gave  him  medical  advice  greatly  to 
the  benefit  of  his  health,  and  they  became  fast  friends  for 
life.  His  relations  with  Shaftesbury  brought  him  into  con- 
tact with  public  men,  and  thus  broadened  his  views  of  the 
world.  He  became  acquainted  with  Lord  Halifax,  the  Duke 
of  Buckingham,  the  Earl  of  Northumberland,  whom  he 
accompanied  to  France.  Having  gone  to  Montpelier  for  his 
health,  he  made  the  acquaintance  of  Lord  Herbert,  Earl  of 
Pembroke,  and  to  him  he  afterwards  dedicated  his  great 
work  on  Human  Understanding. 

The  papers  left  by  Locke,  in  his  Oxford  period,  throw  light 
on  his  mental  development.  They  relate  to  the  following 
subjects :  Rom(fa  Commonwealth,  Sacerdotal  Christianity,  In- 
fallibility  in  the  Interpretation  of  Scripture,  Utilitarian  Ethics. 

Locke  shared  in  the  political  fortunes  of  Shaftesbury  and 
accompanied  him  to  Holland,  when  he  was  forced  to  leave 
England.  Influenced  by  the  Court  party,  Charles  II  signed 
a  warrant  which  struck  Locke's  name  from  the  list  of  names 
of  the  members  of  the  University  of  Oxford;  but  for  this  he 
was  more  than  compensated  by  his  gaining  the  friendship  of 
William  of  Orange,  whom  he  accompanied  to  England,  which 
had  chosen  him  and  his  wife,  Mary,  joint  sovereigns  of  the 
realm. 

Locke  spent  the  last  years  of  his  life  in  the  home  of  Sir 
Francis  Masham  at  Oates,  in  the  vicinity  of  London.  Lady 
Masham,  a  highly  gifted  woman,  was  the  daughter  of  Cud- 
worth,  the  distinguished  philosopher  of  Cambridge.  Tender- 
ly cared  for  by  this  kind  family,  the  great  philosopher  quietly 
passed  to  his  rest. 

While  at  Oxford,  Locke  was  in  the  habit  of  meeting  with  a 
few  select  friends  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  important 
subjects.  He  thus  gives  the  origin  of  his  greatest  work: 
"Five  or  six  friends  meeting  in  my  chamber,  and  discoursing 
on  a  subject  very  remote  from  this,  found  themselves  quickly 
at  a  stand,  by  the  difficulties  that  rose  on  every  side.  .  .  . 
It  came  into  my  thoughts  that  we  took  a  wrong  course;  and 
that  before  we  set  ourselves  upon  inquiries  of  that  nature 
it  was  necessary  to  examine  our  own  abilities,  and  see  what 


194  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

objects  our  understandings  were,  or  were  not,  fitted  to  deal 
with.  ...  It  was  agreed  that  this  should  be  our  first 
inquiry.  .  .  .  When  I  put  pen  to  paper,  I  thought  all 
I  should  have  to  say  on  this  matter  would  have  been  in  one 
sheet  of  paper;  but  the  farther  I  went,  the  larger  prospect 
I  had;  new  discoveries  led  me  still  on,  and  so  it  grew  insensi- 
bly to  the  bulk  it  now  appears  in." 

The  writing  continued,  with  many  interruptions,  for 
a  period  of  twenty  years,  when  the  great  work  appeared  with 
the  title:  An  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding.  The 
"Essay"  consists  of  four  books:  In  the  first,  Locke  criticizes- 
the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas;  in  the  second,  Ee~attempts  to 
show  that  all  knowledge  is  gained  from  experience,  through 
sensation  and  reflection;  in  the  third,  he  treats  of  the  bearing 
of  language  on  thought,  and  considers  the  nature  of  generic 
concepts ;  in  the  fourth,  he  distinguishes  between  the  differ- 
ent kinds  of  knowledge,  and  discusses  the  limits  of  knowledge. 
It  is,  however,  probable  that  the  fourth  and  second  books 
were  written  first,  and  that  the  order  was  changed  in  the 
final  make  up  of  the  treatise. 

Locke  says:  "First,  I  shall  inquire  into  the  original  of  those 
ideas,  or  whatever  else  you  please  to  call  them,  which  a  man 
observes  and  is  conscious  to  himself  he  has  in  his  mind,  and 
the  ways  whereby  the  understanding  comes  to  be  furnished 
with  them. 

Secondly,  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  what  knowledge  the 
understanding  hath  by  those  ideas,  and  the  certainty,  evi- 
dence, and  extent  of  it. 

Thirdly,  I  shall  make  some  inquiry  into  the  nature  of 
faith  or  opinion,  .  .  .  and  shall  have  occasion  to  examine 
the  reason  and  degrees  of  assent." 

Locke  means  by.  the  word  idea,  "whatsoever  is  the  object  of 
the  understanding  when  a  man  thinks;  '."".  .  whatever  is 
meant  by  phantasm,  notion,  species"  Two  things  need  to  be 
considered:  The  nature  of  ideas,  and  their  origin.  It  would 
seem  to  be  necessary  first  to  inquire  into  the  nature  of  ideas, 
and  then  ascertain  their  origin,  otherwise  we  should  raise 
inquiries  as  to  the  origin  of  that  of  which  we  have  no  clear 
conception. 

Locke,  however,  first  inquires  how  ideas  come  into  the 
mind.  His  contention  is  that  there  are  no  innate  ideas,  no 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH  1 95 

innate  principles.  In  this  Locke  is  certainly  right;  for  neither 
Ideas  nor  principles  are  born  with  us,  and  this  Locke  shows 
by  abundant  argument  and  illustrations.  Though  ideas  are 
not  innate,  yet  it  is  true  that  powers,  susceptibilities,  or  faculties 
are  innate,  that  they  assert  themselves  under  proper,  condi- 
t  ions,  and  this  Locke  did  not  deny.  We  have  no  innate  ideas, 
J&ut  we  have  innate  powers,  though  at  Urst  undeveloped. 

Locke  lays  down   the  proposition  that  all  our  ideas  came  ^ 
from  sensation  or  reflection.     "Let  us  then  suppose  the  mind 
to  be,  as  we  say,  white  paper,  void  of  all  characters,  without , 
any  ideas;  how  comes  it  to  be  furnished?     .     .     .     To  this 
I  answer,  in  one  word,  from  experience."     This  experience 
relates  either  to  external  objects  or  to  the  internal  operations 
of  our  minds. 

"First,  Our__senj£s,  conversant  ahoi it  part  .fa i lar  sensible 
objects,  do  convey  into  the  mind  several  distinct  perceptions 
of  thmgs_,  .  .  and  thus  we  come  by  those  ideas  we  have 
of  yeUaw,  white,  *keat,  cold,  soft,  hard,  bitter,  sweet.  . 
This  great  source  of  most  of  the  ideas  we  have,  depending 
wholly  upon  the  senses,  .  .  I  call [Sensation" 

"Secondly,  The  other  fountain  Trom  which  experience 
furnisheth  the  understanding  with  ideas  is  the  perception 
of  the  operations  of  our  own  mind.  .  .  and  such  are  per- 
ception, thinking,  doubting,  believing,  reasoning,  knowing, 
willing.  .  .  .  This  source  of  ideas  every  man  has  in  him- 
self, .  .  .  and  might  properly  enough  be  called  internal 
sense.  But  as  I  call  the  other  Sensation,  so  I  call  this  Reflec- 
tion." 

As  Locke  lays  down  a  thesis:  All  ideas  come  from  sensation 
or  reflection,  which  he  then  attempts  to  prove,  his  method  is 
rather  that  of  an  advocate  or  controversialist,  than  that  of  an 
investigator.  He  thus  ignores  rational  intuition,  or  reason. 
not  reasoning.  But  Eocke  says:  "He  would  be  thought 
void  of  common  sense,  who,  asked,  on  the  one  side,  or  on  the 
other  side,  went  to  give  a  reason,  why  it  is  impossible  for  the 
same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be.  It  carries  its  own  light  and 
evidence  with  it,  and  needs  no  other  proof:  he  that  under- 
stands the  terms  assents  to  it  for  its  own  sake,  or  else  nothing 
will  be  ever  able  to  prevail  with  him  to  do  it."  Did  Locke 
know  that  by  sensation?  Did  he  know  it  by  reflection?  — j 
He  knew  it  by  reason,  or  rational  intuition^  yet  he  ignored 
that  method  of  knowledge. 

•         •    '    • 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Though  the  principle,  "It  is  impossible  for  the  same  thing  to 
be  and  not  to  be,"  is  not  innate,  yet  the  reason,  which  appre- 
hends this  impossibility,  is  innate,  and  the  apprehension 
occurs  as  soon  as  the  mind  understands  the  significance  of 
the  proposition.  Experience  may  tell  us  that  this  or  that 
event  has  a  cause,  but  not  that  every  event  must  have  a 
cause. 

Locke's  views  in  regard  to  H/HICC  are  not  altogether  con- 
sistent. He  says:  "We  get  the  idea  of  space  both  fronf 
signt  and  touch."  Can  we  see  space?  Can  we  touch  it? 
We  see  bodies  and  touch  them,  but  not  space  itself.  A  body 
is  contained  in  space  and  moves  in  space;  yet  the  body  is  not 
the  space  which  contains  it,  and  in  which  it  moves.  This 
Locke  himself  admits.  He  says:  "I  appeal  to  every  man's 
own  thought  whether  the  idea  of  space  be  not  as  distinct 
from  that  of  solidity,  as  it  is  from  the  idea  of  scarlet  color. 

.  .  .  Motion  is  not  space  nor  space  motion;  space  can 
exist  without  motion;  but  motion  can  not  be  without  space." 

In  fact,  space  is  the  necessary  condition  of  body  and  of 
motion;  it  is  that  in  which  bodies  are  situated  and  motion 
takes  place;  it  is  the  infinite  room  for  the  entire  universe; 
it  is  that  in  which  the  sun  and  its  attendant  planets  speed  on 
their  course;  that  in  which  the  stars,  with  their  accompanying 
worlds,  pursue  their  ceaseless  journeys.  The  annihilation 
of  the  universe  would  not  be  the  annihilation  of  space.  Ether, 
so  far  as  we  know,  may  fill  all  space,  leaving  no  void,  but 
ether  is  not  the  space  it  fills,  and  were  there  no  ether,  space 
would  still  remain.  It  is  not  the  object  of  power,  and  it 
implies  no  limitation  of  God's  power  to  say  that,  as  necessary 
and  eternal,  it  was  not  created,  neither  can  it  be  destroyed; 
but  our  idea  of  space  might  be  destroyed. 

It  implies  no  contradiction  to  suppose  any  body  or  all 
bodies  non-existent;  body  is  contingent,  and  the  idea  of 
body  is  gained  by  experience;  but  body  being  known,  space 
is  apprehended  by  reason  as  a  necessary  existence,  not  only 
necessary  to  the  existence  of  body,  but  absolutely  necessary. 
In  the  order  of  acquisition,  the  idea  of  body  is  chronologically 
the  antecedent  of  the  idea  of  space;  but  in  the  order  of  depend- 
ence, space  is  the  logical  antecedent  of  body,  that  is,  if  there 
were  no  space,  there  could  be  no  body.  We  get  the  idea  of 
body  through  the  senses,  but  we  do  not  get  the  idea  of  space 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH  197 

through  any  of  the  senses,  nor  by  reflecting  on  the  ideas  we 
acquire  through  the  senses,  but  we  apprehend  space  by 
reason,  as  that  without  which  body  could  not  be,  as  the 
necessary  condition  of  body.  Locke's  thesis  that  all  our 
ideas  come  from  sensation  or  reflection  is  therefore  not  true. 
The  idea  of  space  is,  however,  not  innate,  but  reason  itself 
is  innate,  and  it  apprehends  space  when  the  proper  condi- 
tions are  met,  though  not  before. 

Let  a  point  move  in  a  straight  line,  with  the  velocity  of 
light,  for  a  million  years,  and  let  this  line  revolve  about  its 
origin,  in  the  same  plane,  it  will  generate  an  immense  circle 
and  let  the  generated  circle  revolve  about  any  diameter,  the 
immense  sphere  generated  by  the  revolving  circle  is  to  the 
outlying  space  as  one  to  infinity.  Experience  is  no  witness, 
the  senses  fail,  even  the  imagination  cannot  picture  the 
immensity,  yet  reason  apprehends  the  sublime  reality  of  the 
infinity  of  spaced 

In  regard  to  time  Locke  says:  "Men  derive  their  ideas  of 
duration  from  their  reflection  on  their  trains  of  ideas  they 
observe  succeed  one  another  in  their  own  understandings. 
The  constant  and  regular  succession  of  ideas  is  the  measure 
and  standard  of  all  other  succession."  This  is  well  enough; 
men  get  their  notion  of  succession  from  their  experience  of 
phenomena  appearing  then  disappearing,  followed  by  other 
phenomena,  and  so  on  in  continued  series. 

But  Locke  goes  on  to  say:  "Time  is  duration  set  out  by 
measures.  .  .  This  consideration  of  duration,  as  set  out 
by  certain  periods,  and  marked  by  certain  measures  of  epochs 
is  that,  I  think,  which  we  most  properly  call  time." 

The  consideration  of  duration,  as  set  out  by  certain  periods, 
may  give  the  idea  of  time,  but  is  not  time  itself.  Succession 
requires  time,  but  is  not  time  itself.  The  idea  of  time,  ho'w- 
ever,  is  not  innate,  ready  in  the  mind  to  account  for  succes- 
sion, but  time  is  apprehended  by  reason  as  the  necessary 
condition  of  succession;  it  is  that  in  which  things  persist  and 
succession  takes  place.  In  the  chronological  order  succession 
is  experience  before  time  is  apprehended,  and  without  this 
experience,  there  would  be  no  call  for  the  apprehension  of 
time;  but  succession  requires  time  for  its  possibility;  but 
time  being  apprehended,  it  is  known  to  be  an  eternal  reality. 


198  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  function  of  reason,  or  rational  intuition,  is  to  give  the 
fundamental  conditions  of  phenomenal  reality;  but  reason 
Locke  ignored. 

Locke  identifies  time  with  succession.  Time,  however,  is 
the  condition  of  succession;  it  is  that  without  which  succession 
could  not  take  place;  it  is  not  cause,  the  dynamical  condition 
of  succession;  but  it  is  the  blank  continuance,  the  non-dynam- 
ical condition  of  succession,  the  room,  to  draw  a  figure  of 
speech  from  space,  in  which  succession  takes  place.  A  con- 
sciousness of  succession  is  the  condition  of  our  apprehension 
of  the  reality  of  time,  though  time  itself  does  not  cease  to  be 
when  we  are  asleep  and  are  no  longer  conscious  of  succession. 
Time,  not  in  its  Theological  acceptance,  but  in  its  Metaphysi- 
cal, is  infinite,  and  is  identical  with  eternity. 

Without  the  idea  of  succession,  we  never  would  have  had 
that  of  time.  In  the  order  of  acquisition,  the  idea  of  suc- 
cession is  before  that  of  time,  but  in  the  logical  order,  the 
order  of  dependence,  time  itself  is  the  antecedent  of  succession, 
and  without  time,  succession  would  be  impossible.  In 
Locke's  system,  however,  these  obvious  distinctions  are  con- 
fused. 

The  ideas  of  body,  of  succession,  external  or  internal,  of 
motion,  and,  in  general,  of  the  phenomenal,  are  acquired 
through  the  senses  or  by  consciousness,  but  the  ideas  of  space, 
or  time,  of  the  infinite,  are  apprehended  by  reason,  whenever 
we  have  the  ideas  of  the  phenomenal,  of  the  finite.  The 
phenomenal,  the  finite,  is  known  empirically,  through  the 
senses  or  by  consciousness;  but  the  necessary,  the  infinite, 
is  apprehended  rationally;  yet  the  idea  of  the  infinite  is  no 
less  clear  and  positive  than  that  of  the  finite.  Obscure  the 
infinite  may  be  to  the  senses  or  to  the  imagination,  but  it  is 
clear  and  positive  to  the  reason. 

Locke  calls  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  negative.  Of  course, 
the  infinite  is  the  negative  of  the  finite,  and  so  is  the  finite 
the  negative  of  the  infinite;  the  ideas  of  the  finite  and  infinite 
are  equally  negative,  and  also  equally  positive. 

Locke  says  number  affords  the  clearest  idea  of  infinity; 
but  every  specified  number  is  definite  and  finite,  however 
great  it  may  be.  The  succession  of  numbers,  however  far 
it  may  be  carried,  gives  the  indefinite,  a  much  vaguer  idea 
than  that  of  the  infinite. 

A 


MODERN    PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH          199 

As  to  personal  identity,  Locke  begins  well  by  saying:  "We 
must  consider  what  person  stands  for,  which  I  think  is  a 
thinking  intelligent  being  that  has  reason  and  reflection,  and 
can  consider  itself  as  itself,  the  same  thinking  thing  in  different 
times  and  places,  which  it  does  only  by  that  consciousness 
which  is  inseparable  from  thinking  and,  as  it  seems  to  me, 
essential  to  it.  .  .  For  since  consciousness  always  accompanies 
thinking,  and  it  is  that  which  makes  every  one  to  be  what 
he  calls  self,  and  thereby  distinguishes  himself  from  all  other 
thinking  things;  in  this  alone  consists  personal  identity,  that 
is,  the  sameness  of  a  rational  being;  and  as  far  as  consciousness 
can  be  extended  backwards  to  any  past  action  or  thought, 
so  far  reaches  the  identity  of  that  person,  it  is  the  same 
self  now  it  was  then;  and  it  is  by  the  same  self  with  this 
present  one  that  now  reflects  on  it  that  that  action  was 
done." 

In  saying:  "In^his  (consciousness)  alone  consists  personal 
identity  and  as  far  as  this  consciousness  can  be  extended 
backwards  to  any  past  action  or  thought,  so  far  reaches  the 
identity  of  that  person",  Locke  seems  to  identify  the  person 
with  his  consciousness,  and  assumes  that  consciousness  can 
be  extended  backwards;  but  the  fact  is,  personal  identity  is 
the  essential  sameness  of  the  ego  or  self,  and  continues  while 
the  ego  is  unconscious  in  sleep,  while  consciousness  is  a 
phenomenon  of  the  ego;  nor  can  consciousness,  which  is  a 
present  psychical  phenomenon,  but  not  the  ego  itself,  be 
extended  backwards  at  all.  Locke  probably  meant  memory ; 
but  memory,  though  affording  the  evidence  of  personal  identi- 
ty, does  not  constitute  it.  If  personal  identity,  the  essential 
sameness  of  tne  ego,  were  not  a  fact,  memory  itself  would  be 
impossible;  for  a  person  losing  his  identity,  and  turning  into 
another  person,  would,  as  this  second  person,  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  the  experience  of  the  first;  but  since  he  remembers  his 
former  experience,  he  must  be  the  same  person  that  had  that 
experience,  otherwise  he  could  not  remember  it.  Memory, 
though  the  proof  of  personal  identity,  is  not  personal  identity 
itself.  Consciousness,  though  not  the  ego,  is  the  recognition 
of  the  activity  of  the  ego. 

In  regard  to  substance,  Locke  says:  "I  confess  there  is 
another  idea,  which  would  be  of  general  use  for  mankind  to 
have,  as  it  is  of  general  talk,  as  if  they  had  it,  and  that  is  the 


200  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

idea  of  substance,  which  we  neither  have  nor  can  have  by 
sensation  or  reflection."  If  we  neither  liave  nor  can  have 
the  idea  of  substance  by  sensation  or  by  reflection,  then  it  is 
plain,  that,  according  to  Locke's  theory,  we  can  not  have  the 
idea  of  substance  at  all,  since  he  derives  all  our  ideas  through 
sensation  or  reflection. 

The  fact,  however,  that  the  word  substance  js  i^  enm.mon 
use,  is  evidence  that  we  attach  some  meaning  to  it,  and  what 
T;Eat  meaning  is  may  be  inferred  from  the  etymology  of  the 
word.  <Subsiajjcer.from  sub  and  sto,  signifies  an  underlying 
support  of  attributes,  qualities,  activities,  operations,  acci- 
dents, such  as  form,  hardness,  elasticity,  etc.,  of  material 
bodies,  known  as  external  phenomenon  by  perception  through 
the  senses,  or  the  source  of  cognitions,  feeling,  volitions, 
known  as  internal  phenomena  through  consciousness.  But 
'  jittribuj£s,qualities,  activities,  are  not  self-supporting;  they 
are  not  attributes  of  nothing,  but  of  something  capable  of 
supporting  them;  they  require  substance  as  their  ground  or 
source.  Thus,  hardness  is  the  attribute  of  a  solid  body;  so 
also  thinking  implies  a  thinker.  A  vacuum  is  not  hard; 
neither  can  a  vacuum  think,  nor  feel,  nor  will.  Thinking, 
as  an  act,  is  not  the  act  of  nothing,  but  of  an  actor  capable 
of  thinking. 

Again  we  have,  says  Locke,  "no  clear  ideas  of  substance  in 
general."  Of  course  not  if  we  attempt  to  obtain  this  idea 
through  sensation  or  reflection,  neither  of  which  can  give 
us  this  idea.  The  idea  of  substance  is  rationally  apprehended 
as  the  necessary  condition  or  aiippnrt.  nf  att.i^i-tes;  ft  is  thg 
fact  of  substance  that  is  clear  to  the  eye  of  reason,  not  its 
essence  or  the  mystery  of  its  existence. 

Locke  says :  "Substance  and  attributes  are  of  little  use  in 
philosophy;"  but  the  fact  is,  the  modes  of  acquiring  a  knowl- 
edge of  attributes  and  of  substance,  reveals  to  man  the 
nature  of  his  intellect  as  both  empirical  and  rational;  facts, 
phenomena,  are  acquired  by  experience  through  sensation 
or  consciousness ;  substance,  the  source  of  the  facts,  is  appre- 
hended by  reason  as  their  condition,  as  that  without  which, 
the  facts  would  be  impossible. 

Again  says  Locke:  '^Alljour  ideas  of  the  several^ sorts  of 
substances,  are  nothingfbut  collections  ot  simple  ideas,  with  a 
supposition  of  something  to  which  they  belong,  and  in  which 
they  subsist,  though  of  this  supposed  something,  we  have 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY—  ENGLISH  201 

no  clear  or  distinct  idea  at  all."  Not  clear  empirically, 
it  is  true,  but  clear  when  rationally  apprehended.  ^Locke's  y 
doctrine  naturally  led  to  the  skepticism  of  Hume,  wfib  denied 
I  lie  substantial  existence  of  mind,  though  allowing  a  string  of 
ideas  belonging  to  nobody.  Concerning  cause,  Locke  says: 
"jCcai/.?f?  '«  tiiijt  which  makes  any  other  thing,  eitJiex-sififtple  • 
idea,  substance  or  mode,  begin  to  be;  and  an  effect  is  that 
which  had  its  beginning.  from  some  other  things."  Again: 
We  may  observe  that  the  notion  of  cause  and  effect  liasjjts, 
rise,  fromideas  received  from  sensajjoji  or  rpfl****1'™1  '  '  Also  : 
""We  call  the  simple  Idea  of  heat,  in  relation  to  fluidity  in 
wax,  the  cause  of  it,  and  fluidity  the  effect."  Locke  di 
properly  Between  creation,  generation  making  n 


^ 

lion,  all  of  which  are  effects  of  causes,  though  different  kinds 
oieffects. 

~The   senses,   indeed,   give  us  succession,   vicissitude,    but 
evidently  do  not  give  the  efficiency,  the  energy  which  produces    WA 
succession  ;  neither  does  reflection  on  sensation  give  us  efficien-     f- 
cy,  but  only  an  expectation  of  like  consequences  in  similar  «// 
cases.     The  relation  of  cause  and  effect  is  more  than  that  of 
antecedence  and  consequence.     The  cause  is  efficient  in  pro- 
ducing the  effect;  for  if  it  had  no  influence  in  bringing  the 
effeet  into  existence,  if  it  has  no  efficiency,  it  might  as  well 
be  absent;  but  if  not  present,  the  effect  does  not  occur;  it.  is, 
therefore,  efficient  in  producing  the  effects. 

The  energy,  the  efficiency,  the  nature  of  cause  is  indeed 
revealed  to  us  by  our  own  efforts  in  producing  results.  Thus 
in  raising  a  heavy  weight,  I  first  will  to  raise  it,  and  then  put 
forth  the  effort  to  execute  the  decision  of  the  will.  The  ^« 
effort  taxes  my  strength,  and  reveals  to  me  the  nature  of 
cause  as  force,  energy,  efficiency,  or  power,  called  into  action. 
Thus  having  acquired  the  idea  of  cause,  we  rationally  appre- 
hend that  every  event  proves  the  necessity  of  a  cause;  for 
an  event,  before  its  occurrence,  is  a  non-entity;  and  non- 
entity, having  no  existence,  has  no  power  to  turn  itself  into 
entity.  We  acquire  the  knowledge  of  events  and  the  nature  of 
cause,  empirically,  and  without  this  empirical  knowledge, 
reason  would  have  no  occasion  for  affirming  cause;  but  events 
being  given  empirically,  also  the  nature  of  cause,  mi80" 
e  necessity  oTV^use  as  the  condition  nf  Pwntg 
^  ifliW  Of  pmijuflfy  —  '*»"'  ™"~y  ffl'^f  ^nust  have  a 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

In  regard  to  morals,  Locke  says:  "Good  and  evil  are 
nothing  but  pleasure  and  pain,  or  that  which  occasions  or 
procures  pleasure  or  pain  to  us."  Again:  "Things  are  good 
or  evil  only  in  reference  to  pleasure  or  pain."  In  Ethics, 
Locke  was  a  utilitarian;  but  "good"  should  signify  not  only 
sensational  pleasure,  but  happiness,  the  rational  satisfaction 
of  a  clear  conscience. 

Locke  considers  three  kinds  of  law:  "Divine  law,  the 
measure  of  sin  and  duty;  civil  law,  the  measure  of  crime  and 
innocence;  and  philosophic  law,  the  measure  of  virtue  and 
vice." 

With  respect  to  the  divine  law,  Locke  says:  "God   has 
given  a  rule  whereby  men  should  govern  themselves;     . 
and  he  has  power  to  enforce  the  law  by  rewards  and  punish- 
ments of  infinite  weight  and  duration  in  another  life.     .     .     . 
This  is  the  only  true  touchstone  of  moral  rectitude." 

As  to  the  civil  law,  Locke  says:  "The  civil  law  is  another 
rule  to  which  men  refer  their  actions  to  judge  whether  they 
be  criminal  or  no."  The  commonwealth  protects  the  obedi- 
ent, and  punishes  the  disobedient. 

In  regard  to  the  philosophic  law,  the  law  of  opinion  or 
reputation,  Locke  says:  "Virtue  and  vice  are  names  pre- 
tended and  supposed  everywhere  to  stand  for  actions  in 
their  own  nature,  right  and  wrong;  and  as  far  as  they  really 
are  so  applied,  they  are  so  far  coincident  with  the  divine 
law.  .  .  .  These  names,  virtue  and  vice,  in  the  particu- 
lar instances  of  their  application,  through  the  several  notions 
and  societies  of  men  in  the  world,  are  constantly  attributed 
only  to  such  actions,  as  in  each  country  and  society  are  in 
reputation  or  discredit;  but  everywhere  virtue  and  praise, 
vice  and  blame  go  together."  The  accepted  standards  may 
differ  in  different  nations. 

Locke  is  not  quite  clear  as  to  the  essence  of  virtue  or 
the  foundation  of  moral  obligation.  An  act  is  not  right  be- 
cause it  is  rewarded;  neither  is  it  wrong  because  it  is  punished. 
It  is  rewarded  because  it  is  considered  right,  and  punished 
because  it  is  considered  wrong.  An  act  is  indeed  right  or 
wrong  according  as  it  obeys  or  disobeys  a  righteous  law. 

But  what  makes  ajawjrighteousj Is  it.  because-iHis-^mcted- 

by~Sn~  authority  able  to  reward  obediencejand  to_punish 
disobedience?    No,,  a  law  is  righteous  because  obedience  to 


. 

MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH  203 

it  results  in  good  and  disobedience  in  evil.  The  good  or  the  j 
evil  is  not  chiefly  the  reward  or  the  punishment,  externally, 
artificially,  or  arbitrarily  annexed  to  obedience  or  to  disobedi- 
ence, though  it  is  true  that  these  may  properly  be  considered. 
The  good  secured  by  obedience  to  righteous  law  is  threefold 
— the  ennobling  and  satisfying  effect  upon  self,  the  good  confer- 
red upon  others  by  sympathy,  justice,  or  benevolence,  and  the 
external  reward.  The  evil  following  disobedience  is  likewise 
threefold — the  degradation  and  the  consequent  dissatisfac- 
~~ti5n7~tKe  wrong  to  others  through  antipathy,  injustice,  or 
malevolence,  and  the  external  punishment.  Why  is  a  certain 
action  right  or  wrong?  To  say  that  it  is  righf  Because  it  is 
right,  or  wrong  because  it  is  wrong,  or  that  right  and  wrong 
are  ultimate,  right  finding  its  justification  in  itself,  and  like- 
wise, that  in  itself,  wrong  finds  its  condemnation,  however 
well  meant,  ^altogether  a  mistake.  Right  finds  its  basis 
in  good  and  wrong  in  evil,  in  general  prosperity,  or  adversity. 
SuBJectlvTgobd  of  the  evil  is  not  chiefly  pleasure  or  pain,  but 
the_satisf action  of  conscience  bestowed  on  distmterested- 

COnducTor  nobjp  p/»h  Wmnftnt    nr  fliq  remnrfip  of  rf>nBflmVTP 

from  unjust  conduct  or  degrading  vice. 

Locke's  treatment  of  the  association  of  ideas,  l^is  discussion 

of  language,  and  proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  are  of  great 
value,  and  certainly  are  well  worthy  of  careful  study. 

Locke  was  a  man  of  great  ability,  honest  and  candid,  and 
he  expressed  his  thoughts  in  such  language  as  can  be  under- 
stood by  people  of  average  intelligence.^ 

5.  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke  (1765-1729).  Samuel  Clarke  was 
the  son  of  Edward  Clarke,  an  alderman  of  Norwich,  who, 
for  several  years,  represented  that  city  as  member  of  the 
House  of  Commons. 

Having  completed  his  preparatory  course  at  Norwich, 
Clarke  entered  Caius  College,  Cambridge,  where  he  soon 
made  himself  felt  by  the  manifestation  of  superior  ability. 

Clarke  may  be  regarded  as  the  leader  of  the  reaction 
against  the  extreme  empiricism  of  Locke,  as  will  be  apparent 
from  a  consideration  of  his  works.  Descartes'  system,  then 
dominant  at  the  University,  was  mastered  by  Clarke,  as  also 
were  the  new  doctrines  of  Newton,  and  the  Physics  of  Ro- 
hault  of  which  Clarke  gave  an  accurate  translation,  adding 
explanatory  notes. 


204  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Whiston,  a  celebrated  mathematician  and  divine,  meeting 
Clarke,  at  a  coffee  house,  and  entering  into  conversation  with 
him,  was  surprised  to  find  a  young  man  so  well  informed 
in  regard  to  the  researches  of  Descartes,  Rohault  and  Newton, 
which  were  generally  unknown  except  to  a  few  leading 
mathematicians. 

Clarke  turned  his  attention  to  Theology,  and  taking 
holy  orders,  he  became  chaplain  to  Bishop  Moore,  of  Norwich. 
In  1699,  he  published  two  essays — one  on  practical  religion, 
and  the  other  a  defence  of  some  of  Milton's  writings;  and 
in  1701,  he  published  a  paraphrase  of  Matthew's  gospel, 
which  was  followed  by  like  paraphrases  of  the  other  gospels. 
About  this  time,  Bishop  Moore  gave  him  the  rectory  of 
Draton,  and  secured  for  him  a  parish  in  the  city. 

In  1704,  having  been  appointed  to  the  Boyle  lectureship, 
he  took  for  his  subject,  "  The  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  the 
Obligations  of  Natural  Religion,  and  the  Truth  and  Certainty 
of  Christianity."  He  wrote,  in  1706,  a  refutation  of  some 
opinions  of  Dr.  Dodwell  on  immortality,  which  led  to  a  con- 
troversy with  Collins.  About  this  time,  he  wrote  a  Latin 
translation  of  Newton  s  Optics,  for  which  Newton  presented 
him  with  £500. 

He  was  appointed  by  Queen  Anne,  as  one  of  her  chaplains, 
and  in  1709  was  made  rector  of  St.  James',  Westminster. 
With  this  elevation,  he  received  the  Degree  of  Doctor  of 
Divinity,  defending,  as  his  thesis,  the  two  propositions: 
"No  article  of  Christian  Faith,  delivered  in  the  Holy  Scriptures, 
is  repugnant  to  right  reason;"  and  "Without  the  liberty  of 
human  action,  there  can  be  no  true  religion."  Also,  in  the 
same  year,  he  revised  Whiston 's  translation  of  the  Apostolic 
Constitutions. 

In  1712,  Clarke  published  an  annotated  and  illustrated 
edition  of  Caesar's  Commentaries,  also  a  treatise  on  the 
Trinity  which  called  forth  a  lively  discussion.  In  1715-16, 
he  was  engaged  in  a  discussion  with  Leibniz,  and  in  1724, 
he  published  a  volume  of  sermons. 

On  the  death  of  Newton  in  1727,  he  was  offered  the  master- 
ship of  the  mint,  worth  £1500  a  year;  but  this  offer  he  de- 
clined, which  self-denying  act,  Whiston  regarded  as  one  of 
the  most  glorious  actions  of  his  life. 

By  royal  command,  he  published,  in  1729,  an  edition, 
in  quarto  form,  of  the  first  twelve  books  of  Homer's  Iliad, 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH  205 

which  task  he  performed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  worthy 
of  the  perusal  of  the  young  prince  for  whose  use  it  was  in- 
tended. 

Sunday  morning,  May  17,  1729,  on  going  out  to  preach 
before  the  judges,  he  was  suddenly  taken  with  sickness  which 
caused  his  death  on  the  following  Saturday. 

An  exposition  of  the  church  catechism,  which  he  had,  for 
some  months,  been  giving  as  lectures,  Thursday  mornings,  at 
St.  James'  church  and  ten  volumes  of  his  sermons  were 
published  soon  after  his  death.  Truly  it  can  be  said  that 
Dr.  Clarke  lived  a  strenuous  life. 

Clarke  had  a  cheerful  disposition  and  was  a  man  of  fine 
social  qualities,  and  if  he  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  of  the  first 
rank  in  philosophy,  he  had  great  ability  as  a  philologist, 
mathematician  and  logician,  as  shown  in  his  controversy 
with  Collins  and  Leibniz. 

Clarke's  standing,  as  a  philosopher,  rests  chiefly  upon  his 
demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God  and  his  theory  of 
morals. 

In  his  Theistic  argument,  Clarke  maintained  the  following 
propositions:  That  something  is  eternal;  that  there  has  ex- 
isted from  eternity  some  one  immutable  and  independent 
being;  that  the  eternal  being  is  self -existent;  that  the  sub- 
stance or  essence  of  the  self -existing  being  is  incomprehensible; 
that  many  of  the  attributes  of  that  being  are  demonstrable 
as  well  as  his  existence;  that  the  self -existent  being  is  infinite 
and  omnipresent;  that  he  is  one;  that  he  is  intelligent;  that 
he  has  liberty;  that  he  has  infinite  power;  that  he  is  infinitely 
wise  and  good. 

To  establish  the  proposition  that  God  is  eternal  and  omni- 
present, Clarke  contended  that  time  and  space  are  not  sub- 
stances, but  that  they  are  attributes  of  God.  Of  course, 
they  are  not  substances;  they  have  no  dynamic  power;  they 
did  not  create  the  universe.  Are  time  and  space  attributes 
of  God,  in  the  sense  that  they  exist  only  in  him,  and  that  if 
God  did  not  exist,  time  and  space  would  not  be  realities? 
It  is  true  that  reason  affirms  the  eternity  of  God  and  does  not 
deny  his  omnipresence;  but  the  eternity  and  omnipresence 
of  God,  no  more  imply  that  time  and  space  are  not  inde- 
pendent realities,  and  that  they  can  have  no  existence,  save 
as  attributes  of  God,  than  that  the  time  of  a  man's  life,  or 


206  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

the  space  his  body  occupied,  at  a  particular  time,  can  hav 
no  existence  save  as  attributes  of  that  man.  The  actual  tim 
of  a  man's  life  and  the  space  his  body  occupied,  at  any  time 
are  realities  that  would  have  been  if  the  man  had  neve 
existed;  and  the  same  is  true  in  regard  to  any  other  man,  o 
in  regard  to  all  human  beings,  or  to  any  being  whatever. 

If  God  did  not  exist,  time  and  space  would  still  remain 
they  can  not  be  annihilated.  Should  it  be  said  that  God  is  ; 
necessary  existence,  and  that,  therefore,  it  is  absurd  t< 
suppose  his  non-existence,  the  reply  is,  it  is  true  that  God  i 
the  necessary  condition  of  the  universe,  and  since  the  univers 
is,  God  must  be;  that  is,  God  is  conditionally  necessary 
Reason  affirms,  not  the  absolute  necessity  of  God,  but  hi 
conditional  necessity,  just  as  reason  affirms  the  necessity  o 
cause,  if  an  event  takes  place;  but  reason  does  not  affirn 
the  absolute  existence  of  cause,  that  is,  of  cause,  if  there  i 
no  event  to  be  accounted  for;  neither  does  reason  affirm  th 
absolute  necessity  of  God,  but  only  his  conditional  necessity 
from  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  the  universe.  Time  an< 
space  might  have  been  eternal  blanks,  nothing  else  existing 
so  far  as  reason  declares  the  contrary. 

Clarke  based  his  theory  of  morals  on  the  eternal  fitness  o 
things ;  but  the  eternal  fitness  of  things  can  exist  only  betweei 
eternal  things,  and  if  things  were  not  eternal  they  woulc 
have  no  eternal  fitness;  and  herein  morals  differ  from  mathe 
matics.  The  truths  of  Geometry,  relating,  as  they  do,  to  th< 
forms  of  space,  would  still  be  eternal,  were  there  nothing 
existing  save  time  and  space. 

The  fitness  of  things,  in  their  relations  to  one  another 
within  the  moral  sphere,  affords  reasons  for  the  moral  laws,  a 
divine  commandments,  and  renders  conformity  theretc 
reasonable  and  obligatory.  The  moral  laws,  therefore,  hav< 
relation  to  the  will,  and  should  regulate  its  decisions  when 
ever  moral  principle  is  involved;  and  though  a  human  bem; 
can  violate  these  laws,  he  is  under  moral  obligation  to  rende 
them  cheerful  obedience.  Virtue  is  the  voluntary  conformity 
of  conduct  to  the  fitness  of  things  in  the  moral  realm.  A: 
secondary  reasons  for  right  conduct,  reward  follows  obedienci 
to  moral  law,  and  punishment  follows  disobedience.  Thesi 
are  prudential  reasons  for  obeying  the  law. 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY— ENGLISH  207 

Clarke  insisted  on  reason  or  rational  intuition,  as  having 
great  value  in  philosophy,  and  herein  he  differs  from  Locke, 
who  theoretically  ignores  reason,  as  a  primitive  source  of 
knowledge,  yet  he  uses  rational  intuition  in  his  reasonings, 
as  seen  in  his  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God,  which 
does  not  differ  materially  from  that  of  Clarke's. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

Berkeley  and  Hume 

1.  Bishop  Berkeley  (1685-1753).  George  Berkeley,  son 
of  William  Berkeley,  was  born  in  a  cottage  attached  to  the 
castle  of  Dysert  in  the  county  of  Kilkenny,  Ireland.  He 
received  his  primary  education  at  the  Kilkenny  School,  from 
which  he  passed  to  Trinity  College,  Dublin. 

The  incidents  of  his  life  at  Trinity  are  revealed  chiefly 
through  his  Commonplace  Book.  The  head  of  the  college 
was  Browne,  a  controversialist,  and  the  antagonist  of  the 
free  thinker  Tolland.  At  that  time,  William  King,  the 
Archbishop  of  Dublin,  the  author  of  a  treatise  on  the  Origin 
of  Evil,  and  well  worthy  of  his  reputation  as  a  speculative 
thinker,  was  an  important  factor  in  promoting  the  philosophi- 
cal activity,  then  the  prevailing  influence  at  Trinity  College. 

The  works  of  Bacon,  Descartes,  Hobbes  and  Locke,  to- 
gether with  the  Physics  of  Boyle,  the  Principia  of  Newton, 
and  his  method  of  Fluxions,  the  Calculus  of  Leibniz,  and  his 
controversies  and  philosophic  speculations,  were  all  well 
known  at  the  college  and  were  subjected  to  careful,  critical 
study.  A  philosophical  society  was  formed  by  Berkeley  and 
a  few  of  his  friends  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  the  doctrines 
of  these  great  thinkers,  chiefly  those  of  Boyle  and  Newton 
in  Physics,  and  Locke  in  Metaphysics.  This  was  a  good 
atmosphere  to  develop  the  philosophic  genius  of  such  a  mind 
as  Berkeley's. 

The  Master's  degree  was  conferred  on  Lerkeley  in  1707, 
and  in  the  same  year  he  was  made  tutor  in  the  College  and 
admitted  to  a  Junior  Fellowship.  About  this  time,  he  pub- 
lished some  mathematical  tracts,  which  show  his  familiarity 
with  the  works  of  Descartes,  Newton  and  Leibniz.  In  1709, 
he  received  Deacon's  orders. 

In  Berkeley's  Commonplace  Book  are  found  such  records 
as  the  following:  "I  do  not  pin  my  faith  on  the  sleeve  of  any 
great  man.     I  act  not  out  of  prejudice  or  prepossession.     . 
The  chief  thing  I  do,  or  pretend  to  do,  is  only  to  remove  the 

208 


BERKELEY  AND  HUME  209 

mist  and  veil  of  words.  This  it  is  that  has  occasioned  ignor- 
ance and  confusion.  .  .  If  men  would  lay  aside  words 
in  thinking,  'tis  impossible  they  should  ever  mistake,  save 
only  in  matters  of  fact.  .  .  The  philosophers  talk  much 
of  a  distinction  between  absolute  and  relative  things,  that  is, 
things  considered  in  their  own  nature,  and  the  same  things 
considered  in  respect  to  us.  I  know  not  what  they  mean  by 
things  considered  in  themselves.  This  is  nonsense — jargon. 
Thing  and  idea  are  words  of  much  about  *hp  samp  prfpnt 
and  meaning.  ^By^^dea,  1  jmfi^jx  .any.  sensible  pLJmagin^ljlfi,. 

A  thing  not,  perceived  is  a  contfp^iinfinn      KviatAnnp  IffU. 
is  no    conceivable  withouT  perception  and  volition.     1  only" 
declare  the  meaning  of  tlie  word,  as  far  as  I  can  comprehend 
it.     Existence  is  perceiving  and  willing,  or  else  being  per-, 
ceived    and    willed.      Existence    is    not    intelligible    without 
perception  and  volition— not  distinguishable  therefrom.     All 
things  are  ideas. "  TEis  is  idealism  outright,  pure  and  srniple^ 
A  thing,  of  course,  is  neither  perceivable  nor  intelligible 
without  mental  action,  but  that  does  not  prove  that  it  may  ^ 

lout  mental  action. 

'he  word  idea,  as  employed  by  Locke,  was  not  restricted 
to  the  usage  of  Plato,  signifying  the  archetype  after  which  the 
thing  was  made,  nor  was  it  restricted  to  a  mental  picture,  as 
in  the  prevailing  more  modern  usage,  but  as  signifying  what- 
ever is  apprehended  whether  a  mental  fact  or  an  external 
appearance.  Things,  it  is  true,  can  be  realized  by  our  con- 
sciousness, only  as  phenomena,  internal  or  external;  but  there 
may  be  an  objective  factor,  so  far  as  shown  to  the  contrary, 
unrealized  until  brought  within  synthetic  relation  to  our 
senses,  when  it  is  then  followed  by  sensation  caused  by  the 
action  and  reaction  of  object  and  subject.  The  sensation  is 
interpreted  by  the  judgment  and  ideated  by  the  imagination, 
which  is  the  process  called  perception.  The  word  phenomenon, 
as  a  synonym  of  idea,  may  therefore  be  applied  to  whatever 
we  are  conscious  of,  whether  a  mental  state  or  an  external 
appearance. 

,Locke  regarded  the  secondary  qualities  of  matter,  the 
snien,jta.53te»..c.olorj  as  subjective  affections,  or  possibly  as  the 
occult  qualities  of  things  which  cause  these  affections;  but 
tlic  primary  qualities,  as  objective,  lie  considered  as  really 
existing  in  things,  and  corresponding  to  our  notions  of  them. 


210  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Berkeley  regarded  the  so-called  material  objects,  with  all 
their  qualities,  primary  and  secondary,  as  ideas.  He  held 
that  things  objective  to  ourselves  are  ideas  of  the  Divine 
mind,  which,  as  objects  of  our  perceptions,  are  mistaken  for 
.material  bodies. 

Berkeley's  career  as  a  philosopher  finds  its  origin  especially 
in  Locke's  treatise  on  the  Human  Understanding,  and  natur- 
ally divides  into  three  periods:  The  first  at  Trinity  College; 
the  second  in  England,  France  and  America;  the  third,  again 
in  Ireland. 

In  the  first  period,  he  published  his  Essay  towards  a  New 
Theory  of  Vision.  He  maintained  that  the  so-called  material 
things  are  merely  phenomenal;  that  they  are  ideas  truly 
objective,  existing  in  the  mind  of  God,  or  that  it  is  God 
that  causes  the  ideas  we  see. 

The  genesis  of  Berkeley's  Idealism  is  revealed  by  the 
theories  of  perception  made  by  Descartes,  Malebranche,  and 
Locke.  Descartes  held  that  the  essence  of  matter  is  exten- 
sion, that  it  has  no  dynamic  properties,  and  that  the  percep- 
tion of  matter  is  a  miracle.  Malebranche  though  admitting 
that  matter  might  act  on  the  sense  organs,  denied  that  it 
could  act  on  mind,  but  that,  on  the  occasion  of  the  excitation 
of  an  organ  of  sense  by  an  external  object,  God  intervenes, 
and  causes  a  sensation  to  incite  attention  to  the  idea  which 
«  he  then  presents  and  which  is  the  thing  actually  perceived. 
Locke  says :  " X06  ""**<!  knows  not  things  in^mpriifltelv.  hut 
onryTSy  the  intervention  of  ideas  it  has  of  them.  Our  knowledge 
is  therefore  real  only  so  far  as  there  is  a  conformity  between 
our  ideas  and  the  relation  of  things."  But  what  shall  be 
the  criterion,  how  shall  the  mind,  when  it  perceives  nothing 
but  its  own  ideas,  know  that  they  agree  with  the  things 
themselves?  It  is  evident  that  the  mind  can  not  know  this 
\  agreement,  unless  it  knows  the  things  independently  of  the 
\  ideas;  but  then  the  ideas  would  not  be  necessary  to  a  knowl- 
Vedge  of  the  things.  Either  the  ideas  or  the  things  are  super- 
fluous; but  as  we  certainly  knows  the  idea,  Berjkelgy^rejected 
the  material  thing  as  an  incumbrance  and  altogether  useless, 
and  denied  its  existence,  maintaining  that  the~idea-is  the 
thing  and  the  thing  the  idea.  We  quote  from  his  Principles 
of  Human  Knowledge:  "But,  say  you,  though  the  ideas  them- 
selves do  not  exist  without  the  mind,  yet  there  may  be  things 


BERKELEY  AND  HUME  211 

like  them,  whereof  they  are  copies  or  resemblances,  which 
things  exist  without  the  mind  in  an  unthinking  substance. 
I  answer,  .an  idea  can  be  like  nothing  hut  a.n  idea,  ^  rolor  OE 
figure  can  be  like  nothing  but  another  color  or  figure.  .  . 
But,  say  you,  there  is  nothing  easier  than  for  me  to  imagine 
trees,  for  instance  in  a  park,  or  books  existing  in  a  closet,  and 
nobody  by  to  perceive  them.  I  answer,  you  may  do  so, 
there  is  no  difficulty  in  it;  but  what  is  all  this,  I  beseech  you, 
than  framing  in  your  mind  certain  ideas  which  you  call  books 
and  trees,  and  omitting  to  frame  the  idea  of  any  one  that  may 
perceive  them.  But  do  you  not  yourself  perceive  or  think 
of  them  all  the  while?  .  .  A  little  attention  will  discover 
to  us  that  the  very  beirffi  of  an  idea  implies  passiveness  find 
inertness  in  it,  insomuch  that  it  is  impossible  for  an  idea  to 
do  anything,  or  strictly  speaking,  to  be  the  cause  of  anything. 
.  .  .  It  remains  |frereforp  that  flip  r»miaft  of  ideas  is  an 
mcorporeal  active  substance^  or  snirit  .  .  I  find  I  can  ex- 
cite ideas  in  my  mind  at  pleasure  and  vary  and  shift  the 
scene  as  oft  as  I  think  fit.  .  .  But  whatever  power  I  may 
^  '  have  over  my  own  thoughts,  1  find  the  ideas  actually  per-1 
ceived  by  sense  have  not  a  like  dependence  on  my  will.  When 
in  broad  daylight  I  open  my  eyes,  it  is  not  in  my  power  to 
choose  whether  I  shall  see  or  no,  or  to  determine  what  particu  - 
lar  objects  shall  present  themselves  to  my  view;  and  so  like- 
wise as  to  the  hearing  and  the  other  senses,  the  ideas  im- 
printed on  them  are  not  creatures  of  my  will.  There  is, 
therefore,  some  other  Will  or  Spirit  that  produces  them. 
Now  the  set  of  rules,  or  established  methods  wherein  the 
Mind  we  depend  on  excites  in  us  the  ideas  of  sense,  are 

^called  the  laws  of  Nature.     .     .     .     TVip  jdpas  ^pTlPtfd  flP--^- 
the  senses  by  the  Author  of  nai.yre  are  called  rgal  things;  and 

{  those  excited  in  the  imagination,  being  less  regular,  vivid  and 
constant,  are  more  properly  termed  ideas,  or  images  .of  things. 
I  do  not  argue  against  the  existence  of  any  thing  that  we 
can  apprehend  either  by  sense  or  by  reflection.  That  the 
things  1  see  with  my  eyes  and  touch  with  iny  hands,  really 
exist,  1  make  not  the  least  question.  The  only  thing  whose 
existence  we  deny  is  that  which  philosophers  call  Matter 
or  Corporeal  substance.  .  .  .  But  after  all,  you  say,  it 
sounds  very  harsh  to  say  we  eat  and  drink  ideas,  and  are 
clothed  with  ideas.  I  acknowledge  it  does  so — the  word  idea 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

not  being  used  in  common  discourse  to   signify  the   several 
combinations  of   sensible  qualities  which  are  called  things." 

In  calling  the  ideas  imprinted  on  our  senses,  by  the  Author 
of  nature,  the  real  things,  Berkeley  is  more  nearly  in  agree- 
ment with  the  popular  view  than  is  commonly  supposed; 
for  the  people  generally  regard  the  appearances  of  what  they 
see,  as  fields,  trees,  houses,  cattle  grazing  on  the  hills,  the 
clouds,  birds  flying  in  the  air,  as  the  things  themselves;  he 
is  in  disagreement  with  the  philosophers,  who  suppose,  what 
Berkeley  denied,  a  substance  or  underlying  substratum,  not 
visible,  nor  manifest  to  any  of  the  senses,  but  as  the  cause 
exhibiting  the  phenomena.  We  do  not  see  the  energy  of  the 
thing  which  acts  on  our  senses. 

Berkeley  differed  from  the  people  in  this,  that  they  hold^ 
that  things  would  remain  though  no  mind  were  present  to 
behold  them,  or  that  no  mind  anywhere  imagined  their  ex- 
istence, while  fre,  identifying  the  idea  with  the  thing,  main- 
tained that  the  thing,  as_Jdea,  ceases  to  be  when  no  longer 
present  to  any  mind;  f of  TxTsuppose  otherwise  is  to  call  that 
an  appearance,  which  does  not  appear,  which  is  a  contradic- 
tion.^ True,  but  the  energy  of  the  thing  does  not  cease^to  be 
when  the,  idea  of  the  thing  vanishes  from  a  human  mind^ ) 

There  is,  however,  in  perception,  something  more  than  an 
idea  imprinted  on  the  senses — that  which  imprints  the  idea, 
/  an  energy,  a  cause;  and  this  energy,  this  cause,  is  not  the 
idea  itself;  for  this  idea,  as  Berkeley  himself  shows,  is  not 
active  but  passive  or  inert,  and  though  we  may  admit  with 
Berkeley  that  the  idea  he  calls  the  thing  no  longer  exists 
when  not  in  any  mind,  this  energy,  this  cause  remains,  as  we 
may  verify  by  placing  ourselves  in  the  proper  relation  within 
the  reach  of  its  influence.  Berkeley  declares  this  energy  to 
be  manifested  by  the  Author  of  nature,  whose  presence  per- 
vades every  object  of  the  universe,  and  whose  will  is  the 
cause  of  their  manifestations.  This  cause  Berkeley  holds 
is  not  a  dead  material  substratum,  but  is  a  living,  intelligent, 
active  spirit..  Objects  thus  constituted  would  remain, 
though  no  human  being  were  present  to  behold  them,  or 
though  no  one,  any  where  represented  them  as  pictures  in 
his  imagination.  Their  esse  is  not  percipi;  but  their  esse  is 
the  energy  which  would  make  them  percipi,  were  a  mind 
present  to  perceive  them.  It  may  be  said  that,  on  this 


\ 


BERKELEY  AND  HUME  213 

supposition,  their  being  is  present  to  the  mind  of  God,  and 
that  it  is  still  true  that  their  esse  is  percipi  by  the  mind  of 
God;  true,  still  they  do  not  vanish  into  non-entity,  when  no 
longer  ideas  of  any  human  mind.  It  is  well  to  keep  in  mind 
that  God  has  given  to  human  beings  such  a  degree  of  liberty 
and  independence  that  they  often  act  contrary  to  God's  will. 
This  sinful  volition  is  the  man's  own  act,  not  God's.  A 
human  being  would  not  be  annihilated,  if  no  other  human 
being  thought^  him;  the  same  would  hold  true  of  an  animal, 
or  a  plant,  or  a  crystal,  or  of  any  inanimate  object;  each  has 
the  energy  of  its  nature,  which  causes  it  to  be  what  it  is,  and 
this  energy  is  not  annihilated,  when  separated  from  the 
thought  of  any  human  being. 

v  Suppose  some  one  should  say  to  an  egoistic  idealist  of  the 
extreme  subjective  type:  "You  are  nothing  but  an  idea  of 
mine,  and  if  I  should  cease  to  think  of  you,  at  that  moment, 
you  would  drop  out  of  existence."  The  idealist  would,  no 
doubt,  retort:  "Your  doctrine  is  all  right,  in  principle,  but 
you  have  made  a  mistake  in  its  application.  I  am  conscious 
of  my  existence,  which  is,  therefore,  a  fact,  and  would  be  a 
fact,  whether  you  thought  of  me  or  not;  but  nothing  exists 
except  myself  and  my  ideas.  It  is  then  yourself  that  would 
vanish  into  non-entity  were  I  to  cease  to  think  of  you. " 

This  colloquial  contest  would  be  a  drawn  game.  In  fact  no 
idealist  has  the  temerity  to  contend,  as  he  ought  to,  if  con- 
sistent, that  he  and  his  ideas  are  the  only  realities.  Berke-  ' 
ley  had  the  good  sense  to  admit  the  existence  of  objective 
realities:  "I  assert  as  well  as  you,  that  since  we  are  affected "<^ 
from  without,  we  must  allow  powers  to  be  without  in  a  being, 
distinct  from  ourselves.  .  .  From  the  effects  I  see  pro- 
duced, I  conclude,  there  are  actions;  and  because  actions, 
volitions;  and  because  there  are  volitions,  there  must  be  a  will. 
Again,  the  things  I  perceive  must  have  an  existence,  they  or 
their  archetypes,  out  of  my  mind;  but  being  ideas,  neither  they 
nor  their  archetypes,  can  exist  otherwise  than  in  an  under- 
standing. There  is  therefore  an  Understanding.  But  Will 
and  Understanding  constitute  in  its  strictest  sense,  Mind  or 
Spirit."  Granting  all  this,  it  does  not  follow,  that  the  spirit 
affecting  us  is  always  God,  the  infinite  Spirit;  human  spirits 
affect  us,  so  do  animals,  with  their  lower  minds;  and  so  do 
objects  of  the  vegetable  kingdom,  and  so  may,  since  the 


£14  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

contrary  can  not  be  proved,  objects  of  the  so-called  inorganic 
world.  A  molecule  is  a  commonwealth  of  atoms,  or  monads, 
as  Leibniz  held,  each  of  which  is  an  inextended  point  of 
energy,  and  who  can  tell  whether  it  may  not  be  a  spirit, 
having  intellect,  sensibility  and  will? 

To  explain  perception:  External  things,  the  objects  of 
knowledge,  have  the  power  to  act  upon  and  to  excite  the 
sense-organs  of  the  ego  or  subject,  of  knowledge,  this  mechan- 
ical action,  attended  with  the  physiological  excitement  of  the 
organ,  is  followed  by  a  sensation,  which  is  a  psychical  phe- 
nomenon. Reason  then  apprehends  the  conditional  necessity 
of  an  objective  cause  of  the  sensation,  and  of  the  ego  or 
subject  of  the  sensation.  The  judgment,  by  the  light  of 
experience,  infers  what  the  cause  is,  as  a  real  thing.  The 
imagination  then  pictures  this  inference,  or  constructs  the 
subjective  idea,  which  is,  therefore,  not  the  objective  reality 
perceived,  but  the  mental  construction  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious, embodying  our  discoveries  and  inferences  in  regard 
to  the  object,  and  representing  it,  so  far  as  it  is  possible  for  a 
mental  picture  to  represent  an  objective  reality.  The  idea 
is  not  the  objective  reality,  any  more  than  the  image  of 
yourself,  seen  behind  a  mirror,  is  yourself  who  stands  before 
the  glass.  We  do  not  perceive  ideas,  but  construct  them  and 
are  conscious  of  them.  Our  ideas  embody  our  judgments 
concerning  the  objective  causes  of  our  sensations. 

In  his  Theory  of  Vision,  Berkeley  maintains  that,  at  first, 
the  sense  of  sight  gives  only  colors,  which  may  appear  to 
have  outness  to  one  another  in  a  mental  picture,  but  not  with 
respect  to  the  eye  itself;  and  that  originally  outness  from 
the  spectator  is  not  revealed  through  the  sense  of  sight, 
which  instructed  by  the  tutorship  of  touch  and  muscular 
movement,  fatally  infers  distance  and  magnitude  with 
approximate  correctness,  by  the  interpretation  of  signs 
whose  significance  is  gradually  correctly  learned  by  experi- 
ence. Likewise,  by  experience,  the  sensations  gained  through 
all  the  other  senses,  are  interpreted,  and  the  whole  com- 
bined into  the  connected  appearances  of  what  is  called  ex- 
ternal nature,  a  knowledge  of  whose  phenomena  and  laws 
constitute  Natural  Science.  Partial  phenomena  may  indeed 
be  referred  to  finite  spirits,  but  the  universal  order  must  be 
referred  to  God  the  Infinite  Spirit. 


BERKELEY  AND  HUME  215 

Berkeley's  principal  works  are,  New  Theory  of  Vision, 
Principles  of  Human  Understanding.,  Discourse  on  Passive 
Obedience,  Essay  towards  preventing  the  Ruin  of  Great  Britain, 
Dialogues,  Alciphron,  or  the  Minute  Philosopher,  and  The 
Analyst,  a  series  of  mathematical  speculation,  and  his  Common- 
place Book,  containing  with  many  other  things,  an  attack 
on  the  fundamental  conceptions  of  the  fluxional  and  infinites- 
imal calculus. 

2.  Hume^.7ll-l77Q).  David  Hume  was  born  at  Edin- 
burgh of  good  family,  both  on  his  father's  and  mother's  side. 
He  passed,  with  credit,  his  educational  career,  but  not  being 
the  eldest  son,  he  received  but  a  slender  inheritance,  which 
rendered  it  necessary  that  some  means  of  support  be  found. 
His  family  supposed  Law  to  be  the  proper  profession  for 
him,  but  he  soon  found  it  not  to  accord  with  his  tastes. 

He  says:  "I  found  an  unsurmountable  aversion  to  every- 
thing but  the  pursuit  of  philosophy  and  general  learning." 
Necessity,  however,  drove  him  to  more  active  measures  for 
his  own  support,  and  he  resolved  to  become  a  merchant,  but 
found  himself  unsuited  to  that  business. 

He  went  to  France,  and  spent  three  years  very  pleasantly 
in  study  and  in  composing  his  Treatise  on  Human  Nature, 
which  was  published  in  1737,  in  London,  when  he  was  only 
twenty-six  years  old.  Of  this  publication,  Hume  says: 
"Never  literary  attempt  was  more  unfortunate  than  my 
Treatise  of  Hitman  Nature.  It  fell  dead-born  from  the  press, 
without  such  distinction  as  even  to  excite  a  murmur  among 
the  zealots."  Naturally  cheerful  and  sanguine,  he  soon 
recovered  from  the  disappointment,  and  in  1742,  published 
the  first  part  of  his  Essays,  which  was  favorably  received. 

On  the  invitation  of  the  Marquis  of  Annandale,  Hume 
spent  a  year  with  him  in  England,  and  as  a  tutor  to  the 
family  of  the  Marquis,  he  received  such  remuneration  as 
materially  increased  his  fortune. 

Accepting  an  invitation  from  Gen.  St  Clair  to  attend  him, 
as  secretary,  in  his  expedition  against  Canada,  but  which 
ended  as  an  incursion  on  the  coast  of  France,  he  was  thrown 
into  military  circles,  and  in  the  uniform  of  an  aide-de-camp 
to  the  general,  associated  with  officers  of  high  rank.  The 
next  year,  he  attended  the  general  to  the  courts  of  Vienna 
and  Turin. 


216  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

At  Turin,  he  recast  the  first  part  of  his  Treatise  of  Human 
Nature,  and  named  it  Inquiry  concerning  Human  Under- 
standing, which  met  with  but  little  success. 

In  1749,  he  went  to  the  home  of  his  family,  where  he 
composed  the  second  part  of  his  essay,  calling  it  Political 
Discussions,  and  he  also  wrote  his  Inquiry  concerning  the 
Principles  of  Morals,  another  part  of  his  Treatise  of  Human 
Nature,  cast  anew. 

In  the  mean  time,  answers  and  criticisms  of  his  works 
began  to  come  in,  of  which  he  says:  "These  symptoms  of  a 
rising  reputation  gave  me  encouragement,  as  I  was  ever 
more  disposed  to  see  the  favorable  than  the  unfavorable 
side  of  things,  a  turn  of  mind  which  it  is  more  happy  to 
possess  than  to  be  born  to  an  estate  of  ten  thousand  a  year. " 

In  1752,  his  Political  Discourses  were  published  in  Edin- 
burgh where  he  then  resided,  and  these  Discourses  were 
successful  on  their  first  publication.  In  the  same  year, 
having  been  chosen  librarian  for  the  Faculty  of  Advocates, 
and  enjoying  the  command  of  a  large  library,  he  formed  the 
plan  of  writing  the  History  of  England,  but  appalled  by  the 
magnitude  of  the  undertaking,  he  began  with  the  accession 
of  the  house  of  Stuart.  The  work  was  received  with  a  general 
howl  of  indignation,  and  then  seemed  to  be  altogether  for- 
gotten. 

In  his  disappointment,  Hume  thought  of  retiring  into 
France,  changing  his  name,  and  never  more  to  set  foot  in 
his  native  country;  but  war  breaking  out  between  England 
and  France,  he  was  prevented  from  executing  his  intention. 
In  the  next  two  years,  he  published  his  Natural  History  of 
Religion,  and  in  1756,  the  second  volume  of  his  History  of 
England,  continuing  the  narrative  from  the  execution  of 
Charles,  the  first,  to  the  revolution  which  placed  William 
and  Mary  on  the  throne.  This  volume  of  the  History  gave 
less  offense  than  the  first,  but  was  only  moderately  success- 
ful. 

In  1759,  Hume  published  his  History  of  the  House  of  Tudor, 
but  this  volume,  especially  the  part  treating  of  the  reign  of 
Elizabeth,  was  generally  unpopular.  He  finally  completed  his 
History,  going  back,  in  the  reverse  order,  to  the  beginning. 

Accepting,  in  1763,  an  invitation  from  the  Earl  of  Hert- 
ford to  attend  him,  as  secretary,  in  his  embassy  to  Paris,  he 
found  the  association  with  the  Earl  to  be  agreeable,  and  he 


BERKELEY  AND  HUME  217 

was  highly  pleased  with  the  civilities  and  consideration  he 
received  from  the  highest  literary  and  social  circles  of  Paris. 
Ho  had  now  become  a  famous  man. 

Returning  to  Edinburgh,  Hume  engaged  again  in  philo- 
sophical labors,  but  in  1767,  he  was  secretary  to  Gen.  Con  way, 
brother  of  the  Earl  of  Hertford.  In  1769,  he  returned  to 
Edinburgh,  enjoying,  as  the  fruit  of  his  arduous  labors,  an 
income  of  one  thousand  pounds  a  year. 

Hume  makes  the  following  final  statement  in  regard  to  his 
own  life:  "My  friends  never  had  occasion  to  vindicate  one 
circumstance  of  my  character  and  conduct.  .  .  I  cannot 
say  there  is  no  vanity  in  making  this  funeral  ovation  of  my- 
self, and  I  hope  it  is  not  a  misplaced  one."  Hume  died  in 
1776. 

What  is  the  relation  of  Hume  to  Locke's  philosophy?  As 
it  was  with  Berkeley,  so  it  was  with  Hume.  Berkeley  ac- 
cepting Locke's  fundamental  principle,  that  all  our  knowledge 
is  derived  from  sensation  and  reflection,  logically  denied  the 
substance  of  matter,  and  resolved  the  objects  of  perception 
into  ideas;  but  inconsistently  he  held  that,  "since  we  are 
affected  from  without,  there  must  be  powers  without  in  a 
being  distinct  from  ourselves."  How  did  Berkeley  know 
these  powers  or  this  powerful  Being?  Not  from  sensation, 
but  perhaps  he  smuggled  it  in  under  the  head  of  reflection. 
Reflection  on  sensation,  however,  does  not  give  us  the  idea 
of  power,  which  is  given  only  by  reason,  or  rational  intuition; 
but  this  adds  reason,  as  a  source  of  knowledge,  to  sensation 
and  reflection,  which  Locke  held  to  be  the  only  sources. 

In  like  manner,  Hume  accepting  Locke's  principles,  re- 
jected mind  as  the  source  of  the  psychical  phenomena  of 
cognition,  feeling,  and  volition.  He  says:  "For  my  part, 
when  I  enter  most  intimately  into  what  I  call  myself,  I  always 
stumble  on  some  particular  perception  or  other,  of  heat  or 
cold,  light  or  shade,  love  or  hatred,  pain  or  pleasure.  I  never 
can  catch  myself,  at  any  time,  without  a  perception,  and 
never  can  observe  anything  but  the  perception.  .  .  If 
any  one,  upon  serious  and  unprejudiced  reflection,  thinks  he 
has  a  different  notion  of  himself,  I  must  confess  I  can  reason 
no  longer  with  him.  .  .  He  may,  perhaps,  perceive  some- 
thing simple  and  continued,  which  he  calls  himself,  though  I 
am  certain  there  is  no  such  principle  in  me."  Was  Hume 
certain  of  this? 


218  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

It  is  true  that  we  are  conscious  only  of  phenomena;  but 
perception  is  not  the  only  phenomenon  of  which  we  are 
conscious.  We  have  sensations,  emotions,  affections,  desires, 
conceptions,  judgments,  reasonings,  volitions,  all  of  which  are 
phenomena,  and  of  all  of  which  we  are  conscious.  But  are 
these  phenomena  self-supporting?  Does  thinking  think? 
Thinking  implies  a  thinker  who  thinks. 

When  Hume  said:  "I  always  stumble  on  some  perception 
or  other,"  what  did  he  mean  by  I?  Did  he  mean  percep- 
. .  tion?  Does  perception  stumble  on  itself?  The  /  which 
stumbles  on  the  perception  is  different  from  the  perception 
on  which  it  stumbles.  Does  the  /  change  with  the  percep- 
V  tion?  Memory,  the  evidence  of  personal  identity,  is  proof 
that  /  who  have  a  certain  perception  am  the  same  /  who  had 
a  different  perception  yesterday.  We  are  conscious  of  the 
perception.  The  /,  as  the  subject  of  the  perception,  we 
know  by  rational  intuition,  not  as  a  fact  of  experience,  but 
as  the  necessary  condition  of  the  perception — as  the  one 
that  perceives.  The  same  /  that  perceives,  has  sensations, 
instincts,  appetites,  emotions,  affections,  desires,  volitions; 
he  loves  and  hates,  does  right  or  wrong,  and  has  the  approba- 
tion or  remorse  of  conscience.  Perception  is  not  the  only 
mental  act. 

Hume  admits  that  his  reasoning  could  destroy  the  belief 
neither  in  an  external  world  of  matter  nor  in  an  internal 
world  of  mind.  The  belief  is  natural  and  unavoidable,  and 
is  based  on  experience. 

To  trace  the  connection  of  Locke's  views  of  causation  and 
Hume's:  Locke,  in  calling  a  sensation  or  an  idea  the  product 
of  power,  presupposes  substance  as  truly  as  in  calling  it  a 
sensible  quality;  but  he  regarded  quality  as  inhering  in  the 
substance,  but  power  he  conceived  to  be  a  cause  producing 
an  effect,  a  sensation  in  us,  not  found  in  the  substance;  for 
"whatever  is  considered  by  us  to  operate  to  the  producing 
of  any  particular  simple  idea  which  did  not  before  exist,  hath 
thereby  in  our  minds  the  relation  of  cause."  Here  the  idea 
has  an  objective  factor  in  the  thing;  it  has  also  a  subjective 
factor  in  the  mind  which  interprets  the  sensation  caused  by 
the  thing,  and  ideates,  pictures,  or  represents  the  cause. 
The  idea  following  a  sensation  implies  the  presence  of  a 
thing  acting  on  an  organ  of  sense;  but  the  idea  called  up  in 


BERKELEY  AND   HUME  219 

the  absence  of  the  thing  is  a  pure  creation  of  the  imagination, 
not  caused  by  a  sensation,  yet  if  vivid,  it  may,  by  reflex 
action,  produce  a  sensation,  which,  except  in  extraordinary 
cases,  is  much  fainter  than  the  sensation  caused  by  the 
object.  The  idea  of  pain,  following  the  imaginary  thrust 
of  the  hand  into  the  fire,  is  faint  compared  with  the  real  pain 
attending  the  actual  thrust,  and  lacks  theffearful  effect  on  the 
hand.  •% 

The  relation  of  cause  and  effect  is,  according  to  Locke,_jipt 
contained  in  the  thing  itself,  but  is  extraneous,  and  arises 
from  the  notice  our  senses  take  of  the  vicissitudes  of  things, 
that  which  produces  an  idea  we  call  cause,  and  that  which 
is  produced  the  effect.  Science  assumes  that,  in  the  order  of 
nature,  cause  signifies  that  which  accounts  for  change. 

Now  let  us  pass  to  Hume's  theory  of  causation.  He  says: 
"I  find,  in  the  first  place,  that  whatever  objects  are  considered 
as  causes  or  effects  are  contiguous,  and  that  nothing  can 
operate  in  a  time  or  place  which  is  ever  so  little  removed 
from  those  of  its  existence.  Though  distant  objects  may 
sometimes  seem  productive  of  each  other,  they  are  commonly 
found,  upon  examination,  to  be  linked  by  a  chain  of  causes 
which  are  continuous  among  themselves  and  to  the  distant 
objects,  and  when  we  can  not  discover  the  connection,  we 
still  presume  it  to  exist.  We  may,  therefore,  consider  the 
relation  of  contiguity  as  essential  to  that  of  causeT^ 

The  second  relation  between  cause  and  effect,  Hume  de- 
clares to  be  that  of  priority,  in  time,  in  the  cause  before 
the  effect;"  that  is,  the' cause  i"s  the  antecedent,  and  the  effect 
the  consequent.  This  may,  in  general,  be  allowed,  as  when 
heat  melts  ice.  Suppose,  however,  that  we  have  the  equa- 
tion: y  =f(x) ;  that  is,  y  is  a  function  of  x,  or  that,  if  x  changes, 
y  changes,  so  as  always  to  be  equal  to  f(x) .  It  is  proper  to 
say  the  change  in  x  is  logically  followed  by  a  change  in  y ; 
but,  chronologically,  the  change  in  y  is  simultaneous  with  a 
change  in  x,  otherwise  y  would  not  always  be  equal  to  f(x) . 
Here  there  is  no  priority  in  time  in  the  cause. 

The  third  relation  between  cause  and  effect  is,  according 
to  Hume,  tluit  of  ncceiwary  connection,  which  he  considers  of 
greater  importance~tKantfie  citKers  before  mentioned;  but 
says  he:  **When  I  cast  my  eyes  on  the  known  qualities  of 
objects,  I  immediately  discover  that  the  relation  of  cause 


220  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

and  effect  depends  not  in  the  least  on  them.  When  I  con- 
sider their  relations,  I  can  find  none  but  those  of  contiguity 
and  succession,  which  I  have  already  recorded  as  imperfect 
and  unsatisfactory." 

Hume  then  asks:  "First,  for  what  reason  we  pronounce  it 
necessary  that  everything  whose  existence  has  a  beginning 
should  have  a  cause?  Secondly,  why  we  conclude  that 
such  particular  causes  must  necessarily  have  such  particular 
effects;  and  what  is  the  nature  of  that  inference  we  draw  from 
the  one  to  the  belief  we  repose  in  it?" 

Hume  then  examines  the  first  question,  Why  do  we  pro- 
nounce a  cause  to  be  necessary  to  account  for  everything 
whose  existence  has  a  beginning?  He  says:  '*  'Tis  a  general 
maxim  in  philosophy,  that  whatever  begins  to  exist  must 
have  a  cause."  The  truth  of  this  maxim,  Hume  4enies- 
He  says:  "All  certainty  arises  from  the  comparison  of  ideas, 
and  from  the  discovery  of  such  relations  as  are  unalterable, 
so  long  as  the  ideas  continue  the  same.  These  relations  are 
resemblance,  proportion  in  quantity  and  number,  degrees  of 
any  quality,  and  contrariety,  none  of  which  are  implied  in 
this  proposition,  whatever  has  a  beginning  has  also  a  cause  of 
existence.  That  proposition  is  therefore  not  intuitively 
certain."  Hume  reaches  this  conclusion  by  consistently 
applying  Locke's  principle;  All  our  knowledge  is  derived  from 
sensation  and  reflection.  Locke  saved  the  principle  of  causali- 
ty, by  lugging  in,  contrary  to  his  principle,  the  necessity  of 
cause,  given  by  rational  intuition,  to  account  for  the  occur- 
rence of  an  event.  Locke  says,  Book  IV,  Chap.  10,  Sec.  2: 
"In  the  next  place,  man  knows,  by  an  intuitive  certainty, 
that  bare  nothing  can  no  more  produce  any  real  being,  than 
that  it  can  be  equal  to  two  right  angles.  .  .  If,  therefore, 
we  know  there  is  some  real  being,  and  that  non-entity  cannot 
produce  any  real  being,  it  is  an  evident  demonstration,  that 
from  eternity  there  has  been  something,  since  what  was  not 
from  eternity,  had  a  beginning,  and  what  had  a  beginning 
must  be  produced  by  something  else."  Locke  here  reached 
the  truth  by  his  inconsistency  to  his  principle;  and  by  Hume's 
consistency  with  this  principle,  which  he  accepts,  he  misses 
the  truth. 

But  let  Hume  explain  himself.     He  says:  "We  can  never 
demonstrate  the  necessity  of  a  cause  to  every  new  existence, 


BERKELEY  AND  HUME  221 

or  new  modification  of  existence,  without  showing,  at  the 
same  time,  the  impossibility  there  is  that  anything  can  ever 
begin  to  exist  without  some  productive  principle;  and  where 
the  latter  proposition  cannot  be  proved,  we  must  despair  of 
ever  being  able  to  prove  the  former.  ...  As  these  ideas 
of  cause  and  effect  arc  evidently  distinct,  'twill  be  easy  for 
us  to  conceive  any  object  to  be  non-existent  this  moment, 
and  existent  tfte  next,  without  conjoining  to  it  the  distinct 
idea  of  a  cause  or  productive  principle.  The  separation, 
'  therefore,  of  the  idea  of  a  cause  from  that  of  a  beginning  of 
existence,  is  plainly  possible  for  the  imagination;  and  is 
therefore  incapable  of  being  refuted  by  any  reasoning  from 
mere  ideas,  without  which  it  is  impossible  to  demonstrate 
the  necessity  of  a  cause." 

The  imagination  can  indeed  picture  an  event  without  a 
cause,  but  what  has  the  reason  to  say?  To  suppose  an  event 
to  happen,  or  a  being  begin  to  be  without  a  cause  is  to  sup- 
pose non-entity  to  jump  into  being;  but  non-entity  is  nothing, 
cannot,  therefore,  jump  into  being;  to  jump  is  to  act,  and  to 
act  implies  that  it  already  is,  and  that  it  is,  therefore,  not 
non-entity.  We  have  here  no  event  without  a  cause.  Even 
Hume's  imaginary  object  was  caused  by  an  act  of  his  imagi- 
nation. If  cause  is  not  necessary  to  an  event,  an  event  with- 
out a  cause  should  be  found,  which  has  never  been  the  case. 

But  Hume  goes  on  with  his  objections  to  the  necessity  of 
cause.  He  says:  "Everything,  'tis  said,  must  have  a  cause; 
for  if  anything  wanted  a  cause,  it  would  produce  itself;  that 
is,  exist  before  it  existed,  which  is  impossible.  But  this 
reasoning  is  plainly  inconclusive;  because  it  supposes,  that  in 
our  denial  of  a  cause,  we  still  grant  what  we  expressly  deny, 
viz.,  that  there  must  be  a  cause,  which,  therefore,  is  taken  to 
be  the  object  itself,  and  that,  no  doubt,  is  an  evident  contra- 
diction." Here  Hume  displays  his  subtle  power  of  reason- 
ing. The  argument  criticized  does  not  assume  that  there  must 
be  a  cause,  but  asserts  that,  according  to  Hume's  view,  non- 
entity jumps  into  entity,  without  any  cause  for  its  jumping, 
which  is  impossible,  and  from  this  impossibility,  it  infers, 
not  assumes,  a  cause;  but  the  idea  of  this  extraordinary 
feat  of  non-entity  jumping  into  being,  was  caused  by  the 
brilliant  imagination  of  Hume  himself. 

Again,  Hume  says:  *"Tis  exactly  the  same  case  with  the 


222  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

third  argument,  which  has  been  employed  to  demonstrate 
the  necessity  of  a  cause,  whatever  is  produced  without  any 
cause  is  produced  by  nothing,  or  in  other  words  has  nothing 
for  its  cause.  .  .  'Tis  sufficient  only  to  observe,  that  when 
we  exclude  all  causes  we  really  do  exclude  them,  and  neither 
suppose  nothing  nor  the  object  itself  to  be  the  causes  of  the 
existence."  Hume's  answer  is  a  just  criticism  on  the  use 
of  the  word  produced;  for  produced  means  to  be  caused. 
Instead,  therefore,  of  saying,  whatever  is  produced  without 
any  cause  is  produced  by  nothing,  or  has  nothing  for  its 
cause,  let  us  say  that  the  denial  of  the  cause  of  any  event  is 
the  affirmation  that  the  event  was  not  produced,  but  came  of 
itself  from  non-entity  into  being,  which  is  the  assumption 
of  an  absolute  commencement.  Let  any  one  accept  this 
who  will.  If  an  existing  thing  could  not  have  come  of  itself 
from  non-entity  into  being,  it  must  have  been  produced  or 
caused. 

Hume  next  raises  the  question,  "How  experience  gives 
rise  to  such  a  principle?"  But  this  question  he  sinks  into  the 
following:  "Why  we  conclude  that  such  particular  causes 
must  necessarily  have  such  particular  effects,  and  why  we 
form  an  inference  from  one  to  the  other?" 

In  answer  to  this  question,  Hume  says:  "All  our  arguments 
concerning  causes  and  effects  consist  both  of  an  impression 
of  the  memory  or  senses,  and  of  the  idea  of  that  existence 
which  produces  the  object  of  the  impression,  or  is  produced 
by  it.  Here,  therefore,  we  have  three  things  to  explain,  viz., 
First,  the  original  impression.  Secondly,  the  transition  to  the 
idea  of  the  connected  cause  and  effect.  Thirdly,  the  nature 
and  qualities  of  that  idea."  As  to  the  first  question,  he  says: 
"  'twill  always  be  impossible  to  decide  with  certainty  whether 
they  arise  immediately  from  the  object,  or  are  produced  by 
the  creative  power  of  the  mind,  or  are  derived  from  the 
author  of  our  being." 

Hume  holds  that  "the  vividness  of  the  impressions  on  the 
senses  and  memory  alone  distinguishes  them  from  the  imagi- 
nation. .  .  'Tis  therefore  by  experience  only  that  we  can 
infer  the  existence  of  one  object  from  that  of  another.  .  . 
Thus  in  advancing,  we  have  insensibly  discovered  a  new 
relation  betwixt  cause  and  effect,  where  we  least  expected 
it,  and  were  entirely  employed  on  another  subject.  This 


BERKELEY  AND  HUME  223 

relation  is  their  constant  conjunction.  Contiguity  and  suc- 
cession are  not  sufficient  to  make  us  pronounce  any  two 
objects  to  be  cause  and  effect  unless  we  perceive  that  these 
two  relations  are  preserved  in  several  instances." 

From  the  constant  conjunction,  Hume  attempts  to  explain 
our  belief  in  the  necessary  connection  between  cause  and 
effect.  He  inquires:  "Whether  experience  produces  the 
idea  by  meanwof  the  understanding  or  imagination;  whether 
we  are  determined  by  reason  to  make  the  transition,  or  by  a 
certain  association  and  relation  of  perceptions.  If  reason 
determined  us,  it  would  proceed  on  the  principle,  that  the 
course  of  nature  continues  always  uniformly  the  same.  .  . 
There  can  be  no  demonstrative  arguments  to  prove  that 
those  instances  of  which  we  have  had  no  experience  resemble 
those  of  which  we  have  had  experience.  .  .  It  shall  there- 
fore be  allowed  for  a  moment  that  the  production  of  one 
object  by  another,  in  any  one  instance,  implies  a  power,  and 
that  this  power  is  connected  with  this  effect.  But  it  having 
been  already  proved  that  the  power  lies  not  in  the  sensible 
qualities  of  the  cause,  and  there  being  nothing  but  the  sensi- 
ble qualities  present  to  us,  I  ask  why,  in  other  instances, 
you  presume  that  the  same  power  still  exists  merely  upon 
the  appearance  of  these  qualities?.  .  .  Thus  not  only  our 
reason  fails  us  in  the  discovery  of  the  ultimate  connection  of 
causes  and  effects,  but  even  after  experience  has  informed  us 
of  their  constant  conjunction,  'tis  impossible  for  us  to  satisfy 
ourselves  by  our  reason  why  we  should  extend  that  experience 
beyond  those  particular  instances  which  have  fallen  under 
our  observation." 

Again:  "When  the  mind,  therefore,  passes  from  the  idea 
or  impression  of  one  object  to  the  idea  or  belief  of  another, 
it  is  not  determined  by  reason,  but  by  certain  principles 
which  associate  together  the  ideas  of  these  objects,  and  unite 
them  in  the  imagination." 

The  relation  of  cause  and  effect  is,  therefore,  resolved  by 
Hume,  into  that  of  the  association  of  ideas  induced  by  habit 
or  customs.  But  is  it  not  strange  that  Hume,  who  attached 
so  great  importance  to  experience,  should  overlook  the  ex- 
perience of  the  effort  we  make  in  producing  effects  on  material 
objects  that  surround  us?  To  lift  a  chair,  we  exert  an  effort. 
This  experience  reveals  to  us  that  the  relation  of  cause  and 


224  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

effect  is  more  than  that  of  contiguity,  or  antecedence  and 
consequence,  or  a  necessary  association  of  ideas,  or  a  con- 
stant conjunction;  it  proves,  and  that  too  by  experience,  that 
the  very  nature,  the  very  essence  of  cause  is  efficiency,  energy 
force,  the  exertion  of  power.  The  real  essential  element  of 
cause,  the  theory  of  Hume  leaves  out;  but  in  this  he  was  con- 
sistent with  his  acceptance  of  Locke's  theory  of  knowledge — 
that  all  knowledge  is  derived  from  sensation  and  reflection. 

Cause  is,  doubtless,  an  immediate  and  invariable  ante- 
cedent; but  why?  Because  it  is  efficient  in  producing  the 
effect.  If  it  exerts  no  influence  on  the  effect,  it  might  as 
well  be  absent;  its  presence  or  absence  would  make  no  differ- 
ence; but  when  absent,  the  effect  does  not  appear;  it,  there- 
fore, exerts  an  influence,  or  is  efficient;  and  this  would  be 
true,  though  cause  and  effect  were  subjective  ideas;  but  in 
this  case  the  cause  requires  explanation  and  the  cause  of  that 
cause,  and  so  on. 

Hume's  argument  against  miracles,  found  in  his  Essays, 
is  loosely  connected  with  his  system  of  philosophy.  If 
reality  is  found  only  in  ideas  and  their  relations,  and  if  the 
necessity  of  causation  is  simply  subjective,  the  necessary 
connection  of  ideas,  induced  by  constant  association  of  one 
idea  with  another,  the  imagination  is  at  liberty  to  pass  from 
the  command  of  a  powerful  being  to  any  conceivable  conse- 
quence, however  wonderful.  It  is  only  by  giving  objective 
reality  to  nature  and  to  the  laws  of  nature,  and  by  assuming 
that  a  miracle  is  a  violation  or  suspension  of  these  laws,  that 
Hume's  argument  has  any  force. 

Hume  says:  "It  is  experience  only  which  gives  authority 
to  human  testimony,  and  it  is  the  same  experience  which 
assures  us  of  the  laws  of  nature.  When,  therefore,  these  two 
kinds  of  experiences  are  contrary,  we  have  nothing  to  do  but 
to  subtract  the  one  from  the  other,  and  embrace  an  opinion, 
either  on  one  side  or  the  other,  with  that  assurance  which 
arises  from  the  remainder.  But,  according  to  the  principle 
here  explained,  this  subtraction,  with  regard  to  all  popular 
religions,  amounts  to  an  entire  annihilation;  and  therefore 
we  may  establish  it  as  a  maxim,  that  no  human  testimony 
can  have  such  a  force  as  to  prove  a  miracle,  and  to  make  it 
a  just  foundation  for  any  suclr  system  of  religion." 

The  weighty  objection  to  miracles  entertained  by  scientific 


i 


BERKELEY  AND  HUME  225 

minds,  is  that  they  are  violations  of  the  laws  of  nature,  which 
such  minds  hold  to  be  inviolable.  But  is  a  miracle  a  viola- 
tion or  a  suspension  of  a  law  of  nature?  Cannot  God,  by  a 
special  intervention,  without  violating  any  law,  produce  a 
marvelous  event  which  would  not  otherwise  occur?  When 
I  lift  a  weight,  against  the  force  of  gravity,  do  I  suspend  the 
law  of  gravrty?  If  I  can  do  such  things,  much  more  can 
God,  without  violating  any  law,  perform  wonders,  which 
would  not  take  place,  without  his  intervention.  A  miracle, 
then  being  possible,  can  be  proved  by  testimony  properly 
sifted,  and  though  testimony  is  sometimes  false,  it  may  be 
employed  to  establish  the  fact  of  miracles,  as  under  proper 
conditions,  it  is  employed  to  prove  many  other  facts.  Neither 
Hume  nor  any  other  man,  is  authorized  in  saying  that  a 
miracle  is  contrary  to  all  experience,  or  that  miracles  have 
never  been  wrought. 

Hume's  dialogues  on  Natural  Religion  are  interesting  and 
will  well  repay  the  readingralTwilT all  his  writings. 

If  the  series  of  causes  and  effects  goes  back  to  infinity,  or 
has  no  beginning,  where  each  event  is  accounted  for  by  its 
antecedent  cause,  which  cause  is  an  event  accounted  for  by 
its  cause,  have  we  really  accounted  for  anything?  The 
last  cause  considered  is  still  not  accounted  for?  In  his  ad- 
mirable colloquy  between  Philo,  Demea  and  Cleanthes, 
Hume  makes  Cleanthes  answer  the  question  thus:  "In 
such  a  chain  or  succession  of  objects,  each  object,  each  part 
is  caused  by  that  which  preceded  it,  and  causes  that  which 
succeeds  it.  Where  then  is  the  difficulty?  But  you  say  the 
whole  wants  a  cause.  I  answer  that  the  uniting  of  these 
parts  into  a  whole,  like  the  uniting  of  several  distinct  counties 
into  one  body  is  performed  merely  by  an  arbitrary  act  of  the 
mind,  and  has  no  influence  on  the  nature  of  things.  Did  I 
show  you  the  particular  cause  of  each  individual  in  a  collec- 
tion of  twenty  particles  of  matter,  I  should  think  it  very 
unreasonable  should  you  afterwards  ask  me  what  is  the 
cause  of  the  whole  twenty.  This  is  sufficiently  explained  by 
explaining  the  cause  of  the  parts." 

The  question,  however,  is  not  fairly  answered.  Let  the 
particles  be  in  a  serial  order.  Suppose  the  first  explains  the 
second,  the  second  the  third,  the  third  the  fourth,  and  so  on, 
to  the  twentieth.  All  are  explained  except  the  first  which 


226  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

is  left  without  explanation.     Is  the  explanation  satisfactory? 

So  in  an  infinite  series  of  causes  and  events,  however  far 
back  we  go,  there  is  always  something  unexplained.  The 
infinite  series,  therefore,  can  never  satisfy  the  human  mind; 
and  hence  must  be  rejected  as  unsatisfactory.  But  if  we  go 
back  to  the  eternal  first  cause,  we  have  the  cause  of  the  entire 
universe.  The  skeptic,  however,  will  say,  you  have  not 
accounted  for  the  first  cause.  The  first  cause,  as  eternal, 
was  not  caused,  and  does  not  need  to  be  accounted  for. 
Something  must  be  eternal,  or  there  would  never  have  been 
anything.  The  eternal  First  Cause  is  a  necessary  affirma- 
tion of  the  human  reason;  it  is  eternal  being  and  not  an  event, 
and  therefore  requires  no  cause. 

Hume  was  a  sharp  critic;  and  it  may  be  true,  as  Hamilton 
says,  that  he  was  a  skeptic  and  while  holding  that  his  con- 
clusions were  the  legitimate  outcome  of  the  prevailing  philos- 
ophy, yet  that  he  was  not  a  dogmatist,  and  had  no  faith  in 
the  truth  of  those  conclusions.  He  says:  "After  the  most 
accurate  and  exact  of  my  reasoning,  I  can  give  no  reason  why 
I  should  assent  to  it." 

Hume  has  had  an  immense  influence  on  all  subsequent 
philosophy;  he  was  an  epoch  maker,  and  awoke  Kant  from 
his  dogmatic  slumbers. 


CHAPTER  XX 

Kant 

Kant  (1724-1804).  Immanuel  Kant  was  born  in  Konigs- 
berg,  where  he  was  educated,  and  where  he  thought,  and 
taught  and  wrote,  and  died. 

He  was  of  Scotch  descent,  a  fact  not  without  interest  in 
regard  to  the  relation  of  his  philosophy  to  that  of  Hume. 
His  father  was  an  industrious  saddler,  and  his  mother  an 
intelligent  woman,  who  taught  her  son  to  be  a  lover  of  nature, 
by  walking  with  him  in  the  open  fields,  calling  his  attention 
to  the  plants  and  animals  they  met  with  on  their  way,  re- 
minding him  they  were  the  works  of  God.  He  always  spoke 
with  reverence  of  his  parents,  and  valued  the  moral  training 
they  had  given  him. 

There  were  ten  children  in  the  family  besides  Immanuel — 
three  sons  and  seven  daughters.  Two  of  the  sons  and  four 
of  the  daughters  died  early.  His  remaining  brother,  John 
Henry,  was  eleven  years  younger  than  Immanuel.  He 
turned  out  well,  graduated  from  the  university  and  became 
a  useful  minister. 

The  social,  intellectual,  and  religious  character  of  the 
people  of  Konigsberg  exerted  a  favorable  influence  on 
Kant's  development,  as  some  of  the  citizens  were  enterprising 
business  men,  or  officers  in  the  army,  or  professors  in  the 
university.  Kant  repaid  the  good  he  received  from  his 
fellow  citizens  by  the  fame  he  gave  to  his  native  city,  entitling 
Konigsberg  to  be  called  the  city  of  pure  reason. 

The  pastor  of  the  family,  Dr.  Schulz,  noticed  the  early 
indications  of  ability  displayed  by  Immanuel,  which  he  had 
favorable  opportunities  of  doing,  as  he  was  at  the  head  of  the 
gymnasium  where  the  young  Kant  received  his  preparation 
for  the  University,  and  accordingly  advised  his  parents  to 
give  him  a  good  education. 

At  home,  in  the  gymnasium,  the  university,  or  the  church, 
he  was  under  the  influence  of  the  pietistic  party,  and  in  this 

227 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

pure  atmosphere  he  grew  up  to  manhood  with  uncontaminated 
morals,  though  he  did  not  fully  accept  the  pietistic  theology. 

Heydenreich,  his  teacher  of  Latin  in  the  gymnasium, 
inspired  in  him  such  a  love  for  that  language,  that  he  with 
his  conrades,  Ruhnken  and  Cunde,  formed  a  little  club  for 
the  purpose  of  reading  Latin  authors,  not  in  the  course  of 
study,  and  this  proved  a  great  advantage  in  giving  him  a 
broader  culture.  The  poem  of  Lucretius,  De  Rerum,  Natura 
was  his  especial  favorite,  and  probably  gave  him  a  distaste 
for  theology. 

Kant  remained  eight  years  at  the  gymnasium,  and  entered 
the  university  at  the  age  of  sixteen.  While  at  the  gymna- 
sium, Kant's  tastes  were  for  the  classics,  and  Ruhnken's  for 
philosophy;  but  their  after  lives  reversed  this  preference, 
Kant  becoming  the  renowned  philosopher,  Ruhnken  a  dis- 
tinguished linguist.  Cunde  became  a  very  superior  teacher 
of  Latin. 

In  the  university,  the  lectures  of  Professor  Knutzen, 
extending  over  a  variety  of  subjects — physics,  metaphysics, 
ethics  and  mathematics,  gave  him  great  satisfaction,  and 
these  were  Kant's  specialties  for  a  time  after  he  had  finished 
his  course,  though  he  did  not  at  first  make  prominent  the 
study  of  metaphysics.  For  several  years  after  his  graduation 
he  directed  his  efforts  chiefly  to  physics  and  mathematics. 

Kant  had  free  access  to  the  library  of  Knutzen,  and  was 
encouraged  to  converse  freely  with  him  on  the  intricacies  of 
his  studies.  He  was  also  greatly  profited  by  the  lectures  of 
Professor  Tecker,  and  enjoyed  his  friendship  and  instructive 
conversation.  The  influence  of  these  advantages  is  shown  in 
Kant's  career  as  a  philosopher. 

Though  Kant  matriculated  in  the  University,  as  a  theologi- 
cal student,  he  did  not  choose  the  ministry  as  his  calling,  yet 
he  attended  the  lectures  of  Dr.  Schulz  on  theology,  and  was 
greatly  profited  by  the  thorough  discussions  and  broad  views 
which  Schulz  never  failed  to  present. 

Kant's  first  book  treated  of  Kinetics.  Its  chief  value 
now  is  historic,  showing  that  the  bent  of  Kant's  mind  at  that 
time  was  towards  physics  and  mathematics. 

Kant  was  a  family  tutor  for  nine  years,  first  in  the  family 
of  a  preacher  near  home,  then  in  the  family  of  Von  Hiillesen, 
about  sixty  miles  from  Konigsberg,  the  greatest  distance 


KANT  229 

from  his  native  city  he  ever  reached.  Later  he  was  tutor  in 
the  family  of  Count  Kayserling,  whose  residence  was  near 
Konigsberg.  This  position  was  of  great  advantage  to  him, 
since  here  he  met,  on  friendly  terms,  persons  of  distinction, 
and  learned^the  usages  of  good  society,  and  these  refining 
influences  were  seen  in  Kant's  life  by  his  ease  of  manner  and 
the  versatility  it  gave  to  his  mind.  The  training  he  gained  in 
his  tutorship  was  valuable  in  cultivating  the  ability  to  make 
his  points  clear  in  his  university  lectures. 

In  1754-5,  Kant  published  discussions  of  the  subjects: 
Has  the  earth  been  subject  to  any  change  in  its  revolution  on  its 
axis?  General  Natural  History,  or  Theory  of  the  Heavens. 
In  the  last  of  these,  Kant  anticipated  the  Nebular  Hypothesis 
of  La  Place.  These  books  were  prepared  while  he  was  tutor. 

To  entitle  one  to  a  nomination  to  a  professorship  in  the 
University,  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  prepare  and  defend  in 
Latin  three  dissertations.  Kant's  first  dissertation  was  On 
Fire;  his  second,  A  New  Explanation  of  the  First  Principles 
of  Metaphysical  Knowledge;  his  third,  The  Advantages  to 
Natural  Philosophy  of  a  Metaphysic  connected  with  Geometry. 
All  were  in  the  line  of  his  specialties.  The  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  obtaining  a  professorship  in  a  German  University  is  a 
spur  to  efforts  and  to  a  thorough  preparation. 

In  1755,  Kant  was  graduated  as  doctor,  and  was  appointed 
Privatdocent,  which  subordinate  position  he  held  for  fifteen 
years,  with  a  gradually  increasing  popularity,  as  well  as 
increasing  knowledge,  and  a  development  of  his  ability. 
For  his  first  course  of  lectures,  Kant  chose  for  his  subjects, 
Mathematics  and  Physics — subjects  on  which  he  was  sure  of 
success. 

As  it  was  customary  for  professors  to  use  compends  as  a 
basis  for  his  lectures,  Kant  chose  Wolff's  for  Mathematics, 
and  Eberhard's  for  Physics.  In  a  short  time  he  added  Logic 
and  Metaphysics  to  his  subjects,  choosing  for  Logic  the 
compend  of  Meyer,  and  for  Metaphysics  those  of  Baumister 
and  Baumgarten.  He  made  thorough  preparation  for  his 
lectures,  and  delivered  from  three  to  four  each  day,  taking 
great  care  to  make  his  points  clear  to  the  students,  aiming 
to  show  the  practical  signification  and  application  of  his 
theories. 

In  1770,  Kant  gained  the  object  of  his  ambition  by  his 
appointment  to  the  chair  of  logic  and  metaphysics.  The 


230  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

subject  of  his  inaugural  address  was :  De  Mundi  Sensibilis  et 
Intelligibilis  Forma  et  Principiis.  Eleven  years  later,  ap- 
peared his  great  work,  Kritik  of  Pure  Reason,  which  we  shall 
now  proceed  to  examine,  dropping  for  the  present  further 
details  respecting  his  life,  and  taking,  as  the  acceptable  and 
reliable  text,  the  English  translation  by  F.  Max  Miiller. 

The  forerunners  of  Kant,  of  the  English,  were  Bacon, 
Locke,  Berkeley  and  Hume.  Of  the  continental,  Descartes, 
Spinoza,  Leibniz  and  Wolff.  All  Kant's  previous  study  was  a 
preparation  for  his  great  work;  he  was  twelve  years  in  plan- 
ning it  and  thinking  it  out,  but  only  five  months  in  writing 
it. 

On  the  first  page  of  the  Introduction,  Kant  says:  "Experi- 
ence tells  us  what  is,  but  not  that  it  must  be  necessarily  as  it 
is,  and  not  otherwise.  It,  therefore,  never  gives  us  any  really 
general  truths,  and  our  reason  which  is  particularly  anxious 
for  that  class  of  knowledge,  is  roused  by  it  rather  than  satis- 
fied. General  truths,  which  at  the  same  time  bear  the 
character  of  an  inward  necessity,  must  be  independent  of 
experience, — clear  and  certain  by  themselves. "  Calling  that 
a  condition  which  must  be  in  order  that  something  else  may  be, 
necessary  truths  are  the  conditions  of  the  facts  of  experience, 
but  they  are  not  apprehended  apart  from  experience.  Rea- 
son would  never  affirm  that  every  event  must  have  a  cause, 
.  if  no  knowledge  of  an  event  had  ever  been  acquired  by  exV 
|  perience.  Knowledge  of  necessary  truth,  Kant  calls  knowl- 

iedge  a  priori,  while  the  knowledge  of  contingent  facts,  lie 
calls  knowledge  a  posteriori.  But  knowledge  a  priori,  is  not 
knowledge  already  existing  in  the  mind,  though  latent,  as 
innate  ideas,  as  Kant  seems  to  teach^but_ready  f or  use  when 
called  for;  yet  reason  has  the  power  to  apprehend  the  neces- 
sity of  the  conditions  of  facts  known  by  experience;  it  is  not 
a  priori  knowledge,  but  the  a  priori  power  of  reason  to  know 
though  the  power  gives  the  knowledge  only  after  the  experi- 
ence of  the  facts. 

Again,  Kant  says:  "If  we  remove  from  experience  every- 
thing that  belongs  to  the  senses,  there  remain,  nevertheless, 
certain  original  concepts,  and  certain  judgments  derived  from 
them,  which  must  have  had  their  origin  entirely  a  priori,  and 
independent  of  all  experience,  because  it  is  owing  to  them 
that  we  are  able,  or  imagine  that  we  are  able,  to  predical 


KANT  331 

more  of  the  objects  of  our  senses  than  can  be  learnt  from  mere 
experience,  and  that  our  propositions  contain  real  generality 
and  strict  necessity,  such  as  mere  empirical  knowledge 
can  never  supply. "  Are  there  original  concepts  and  certain  | 
judgments  independent  of  all  experience?  No;  we  have  the/ 
experience  first  of  certain  facts,  facts  not  self-supporting,  facts 
that  require  certain  conditions;  and  when  these  facts  are  given 
by  experience,  reason  wakes  up  and  apprehends  the  necessity 
of  the  conditions  of  these  facts,  by  seeing  that  without 
these  conditions,  the  facts  themselves  would  be  impossible. 
The  reason,  as  a  faculty,  is  a  priori,  not  the  knowledge  of  the  ) 
conditions  of  the  facts,  but  the  power  to  know  the  necessity  j 
of  the  conditions  which  render  the  facts  possible.  Chrono- 
logically the  knowledge  of  the  facts  is  antecedent  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  conditions  of  the  facts,  but  both  the  condi- 
tions and  the  power  to  know  the  conditions  are  antecedent 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  facts,  and  give  to  these  facts  a  rational 
explanation.  The  knowledge  of  the  conditions  has  not  its 
origin  entirely  a  priori,  and  independent  of  all  experience,  as 
Kant  asserts;  were  it  not  for  the  facts,  we  should  never  know 
the  conditions. 

Kant  points  out  the  tendency  to  enlarge  the  sphere  of  our 
judgments  beyond  the  limits  of  experience,  and  states  that, 
first  of  all,  "we  should  ask  the  question,  how  the  mere  under- 
standing could  arrive  at  all  this  knowledge  a  priori,  and 
what  extent,  what  truth,  what  value,  it  could  possess.  The 
brilliant  example  of  mathematics  gives  ground  for  encourage- 
ment; but  mathematics  deals  with  objects  only  so  far  as  they 
can  be  represented  by  intuition;  and  though  a  dove  finds  the 
air  a  resistance  to  its  flight,  yet  it  can  make  no  progress 
through  empty  space."  Certain  facts,  however,  being 
given,  reason  does  apprehend  the  necessity  of  their  conditions, 
but  not  without  the  facts. 

"Reason  finds  legitimate  employment,  even  a  large  part' 
of  its  work,  in  the  analysis  of  our  concepts,  and  if  this  does 
not  give  us  knowledge  strictly  new,  yet  it  renders  the  obscure 
clear,  and  the  confused  distinct;  yet  reason  should  avoid 
adding,  as  it  sometimes  does,  without  being  aware,  other 
concepts  totally  different  in  character,  and  thus  deducing 
new  judgments  void  of  all  validity."  Reason  may  legiti- 
mately assert  the  necessity  of  the  conditions  of  the  phenom- 
enal. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Kant   then   proceeds   to   make   the   distinction   between 
analytic  and  synthetic  judgments,  in  their  affirmative  form. 
An  analytic  judgment  is  one  in  which  the  conception  of  the 
predicate  is  involved  in  that  of  the  subject;  as  A  body  is  ex-  » 
tended.     A  synthetic  judgment  is  one  in  which  the  predicate  : 
adds  something  not  involved  in  the  conception  of  the  subject; 
as  A  body  is  heavy.     Analytic  judgments  render  the  knowledge 
of  the  subject  clear;  synthetic  judgments  add  something 
foreign  to  the  subject. 

Synthetic  judgments  a  posteriori  present  no  difficulty, 
since  the  relation  of  the  subject  and  predicate  is  known  by- 
experience;  but  how  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possi-  \ 
ble?  How  do  I  know,  for  example,  that  every  event  must  have 
a  cause?  This  is  Kant's  great  question,  and  we  shall  see,  as 
we  proceed,  how  he  answers  it.  In  the  meantime,  to  state 
our  own  position,  we  do  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  valid 
synthetic  judgments,  strictly  a  priori,  that  is,  apart  from  all 
experience,  are  altogether  impossible.  To  be  able  to  affirm 
that  every  event  must  have  a  cause,  I  must  first  have,  by 
experience,  knowledge  of  events;  body  and  motion  being 
given  by  experience,  reason  apprehends  space  as  their  neces- 
sary condition;  persistence  and  succession  require  time;  the 
universe,  or  any  existing  concrete  thing  demands  as  its  ulti- 
mate condition,  the  eternal  existence  of  the  first  cause.  The 
non-existence  of  an  eternal  existence  involves  the  non-exist- 
ence of  all  realities  save  space  and  time.  Psychical  phenom- 
ena require  an  ego  as  their  necessary  condition.  Kant 
calls  his  treatment  a  critique  of  pure  reason,  not  a  doctrine; 
declaring  that  it  is  meant,  not  to  extend  our  knowledge,  but 
to  rectify  it,  and  to  become  the  test  of  the  value  of  all  a  priori 
knowledge.  It  must  contain  both  the  doctrine  of  elements, 
and  the  doctrine  of  method  of  pure  reason,  with  their  sub- 
divisions. 

The  effect  produced  in  the  sensibility  by  an  object  is  a 
sensation  followed  by  an  empirical  intuition  of  the  object 
whose  appearance  is  called  a  phenomenon.  That  in  the 
phenomenon  corresponding  to  the  sensation,  Kant  calls  the 
matter;  but  that  which  causes  the  matter  to  be  perceived  in 
a  certain  order,  he  calls  its  form.  The  matter  is  known  a 
posteriori;  but  as  it  cannot  be  sensation  which  arranges  sen- 
sation in  certain  forms,  Kant  holds  that  their  form  must  be 


KANT  233 

ready  for  them  in  the  mind  a  priori,  and  can  therefore  be  con- 
sidered as  separate  from  all  sensation.  It  is,  however,  evi- 
dent that  tfe  form  as  a  conception  of  a  necessary  reality, 
does  not  exist  in  the  mind  before  the  sensation,  but  the  reason 
exists  as  a  power  to  arrange  the  form  required  by  the  sensa- 
tions, in  conformity  with  their  necessary  condition,  without 
which  reality,  the  sensations  themselves  would  be  impossible. , 
The  forms  are  not  innate;  they  are  not  known  till  called  forf  ^ 
by  the  facts  of  experience,  as  the  rational  explanation  of 
these  facts.  It  suffices,  if  they  are  ready  when  needed.  The 
science  of  all  the  principles  of  sensibility  a  priori,  Kant  calls 
Transcendental  Aesthetic. 

Separating  from  the  sensibility  everything  added  by  the 
understanding,  and  from  the  remainder,  whatever  belongs 
to  sensation,  Kant  finds  two  pure  forms  of  sensuous  intui- 
tion— -space  and  tim*,.  He  then  inquires:  "What  then  are 
space  and  time?  Are  they  real  beings?  Or,  if  not  that,  are 
they  determinations  or  relations  of  things,  but  such  as  would 
belong  to  them  even  if  they  were  not  perceived?  Or  lastly, 
are  they  determinations  and  relations  which  are  inherent  in 
the  forms  of  intuition  only,  and  therefore  in  the  subjective 
nature  of  our  mind,  without  which  such  predicates  as  space 
and  time  would  never  be  ascribed  to  anything?" 

1.  As  to  space,  Kant  holds  that  it  is  not  an  empirical 
concept  derived  from  external  experience.  That  if  certain 
sensations  be  referred  to  things  outside  of  myself,  or  as  side 
by  side,  the  representation  of  space  must  be  already  there; 
nor  is  it  borrowed  through  experience  from  relations  of  exter- 
nal phenomena,  which  become  possible  only  by  means  of  the 
representations  of  space.  Hence,  "space  is  a  necessary 
representation  a  priori,  forming  the  very  foundation  of  all 
external  intuitions. "  The  truth  is,  space  is  not  a  representa- 
tion at  all  though  we  may  represent  it.  Reason  apprehends 
space  when  it  is  needed,  not  before.  SpAGeos^fhaijECS^^h| 
bodies  exist  and  motion  takes  place.  The  power  to  represent 
space,  not  the  representation,  is  a  priori. 

Is  space  a  representation,  or  is  it  an  external  reality?     Let 
us  first  inquire  whether  there  is  any  distinction  between  the 
idea  of  a  thing  and  the  thing  itself.     Is  thejdea  the  thing,  and 
the  thing  the  idea?     Is  it  true  that  esse '  e'st  percipi?     It  is,  \/ 
however,  true  that  we  have  no  knowledge  of  a  thing  in  itself; 


234  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

for  knowledge  relates  a  thing  to  a  mind.  But  who  can  prove 
that  nothing  exists  wholly  unknown,  or  that  existence  is 
impossible  without  an  idea  of  that  existence?  Kant  had  I 
the  good  sense  not  to  deny  the  existence  of  a  thing  in  itself,  j 
Berkeley's  statement  has  not  been  refuted,  that  since  we 
are  affected  from  without,  there  are  powers  without  capable 
of  affecting  us.  Berkeley  was  right  in  affirming  external 
powers,  but  mistaken  in  what  they  are.  Two  persons  are 
talking  with  one  another.  If  one  should  go  away  and  lose 
all  thought  of  the  other,  that  would  not  annihilate  the  other, 
as  he  would  testify  still  to  his  own  existence.  Neither  would 
the  separation  of  one's  thought  from  anything,  a  dog,  a  tree 
or  what  not,  annihilate  that  thing;  and  if  the  separation  of 
any'  particular  thought  from  any  thing  would  not  annihilate 
that  thing,  the  separation  of  all  thought  from  it  would  not 
strike  it  out  of  existence.  We  notice  the  planet  Jupiter  rising 
about  sunset,  and  watch  its  movement  night  after  night,  with 
respect  to  the  stars  in  nearly  the  same  range.  For  a  month 
or  so,  Jupiter  appears  to  retrograde,  or  go  westward,  with 
respect  to  the  stars,  then  it  becomes  stationary,  and  finally 
its  motion  is  direct,  or  eastward.  All  this  is  explained  by 
the  supposition  that  both  the  Earth  and  Jupiter,  are  real 
bodies  and  revolve  eastward  round  the  sun,  the  earth  being 
nearer,  revolves  more  rapidly,  throwing  the  range  of  Jupiter 
westward,  as  the  earth  sweeps  by,  but  otherwise  the  phenom- 
ena are  inexplicable.  If  Jupiter  is  a  real  objective  body, 
moving  round  the  sun,  then  space  is  an  objective  reality,  and 
not  a  mere  representation.  Space  is  not  dynamic,  it  is  not 
substance,  either  matter  or  spirit;  it  is  the  condition  of  body 
and  motion,  but  indifferent  to  either,  and  is  one  whole,  in- 
finite in  extent,  and  eternal  in  duration.  As  an  absolute 
existence,  space  is  a  reality,  and  must  be,  whether  any  thing 
else  exists  or  not.  It  is  apprehended  by  reason  as  the  possi- 
bility of  body  or  motion,  which  call  for  its  representation. 
Phenomena  are  pictures  representing  the  real,  as  a  pho 
graph  the  original. 

Reason  apprehends  space  as  soon  as  it  is  needed,  as 
logical  antecedent,  to  account,  not  simply  for  the  representa- 
tion of  body  and  motion,  but  for  the  facts  of  body  and  motion, 
but  not  before;  it  was  no  more  known  before  the  experience 
of  these  facts,  than  was  cause  before  the  experience  of  an 
event,  though  it  is  true  that  it  existed  before.  Here  we  ha 


on. 

:• 


KANT  235 

a  reality  existing  before  it  was  known.  Did  not  the  earth 
move  before^any  human  being  knew  of  its  motion?  Would 
the  denial  of  this  motion  arrest  the  progress  of  the  earth  as  it 
sweeps  in  its  annual  course  around  the  sun?  Did  not  the 
planet  Neptune  cause  perturbations  in  the  motion  of  Uranus, 
before  Neptune  was  discovered,  or  even  before  its  existence 
was  suspected?  Is  not  the  whole  universe  contained  in 
space  extending  infinitely  in  all  directions?  Would  the 
annihilation  of  the  universe  annihilate  space? 

"Taste  and  color,"  as  Kant  says,  "are  sensations  of  which 
no  one  can  have  an  idea,  a  priori;  butjspace  refers  to  a  pure 
form  of  intuition,  and  involves  no  sensation;"  yet  there  are 
appearances  which  require  space  for  their  explanation. 
"Objects  by  themselves  are  not  known  to  us  at  all,  and  what 
we  call  external  objects  are  nothing  but  representations  of 
our  senses,  the  form  of  which  is  space,  and  the  true  corre- 
lative of  which,  that  is,  the  thing  by  itself,  is  not  known, 
nor  can  be  known  by  these  representations,  nor  do  we  care  to 
know  anything  about  it  in  our  daily  experience." 

Of  course,  objects  by  themselves  are  not  known  to  us  at 
all;  for  to  be  known  by  us,  they  must  be  brought  in  relation 
to  us,  and  would  no  longer  be  by  themselves.  The  appear- 
ances of  external  objects  in  space  are  pictures  constructed 
by  our  imagination,  as  representations,  according  to  our 
judgment  of  the  external  realities  which  cause  our  sensations, 
and  thus  embody  our  knowledge,  or  discoveries,  or  belief, 
in  regard  to  these  objects.  As  pictured  knowledge  or  belief, 
they  represent  external  objects,  no  doubt,  more  or  less  imper- 
fectly; but  it  is  the  best  we  can  do,  and  we  must  be  content. 
To  deny  the  existence  of  external  objects,  as  some  idealists 
do,  is  illogical.  On  them  falls  the  burden  of  proof,  which 
they  artfully  attempt  to  shift  upon  their  opponents. 

2.  Of  time,  Kant  says:  "Time  is  not  an  empirical  concept 
deduced  from  any  experience,  for  neither  co-existence  nor 
succession  would  enter  into  our  perception,  if  the  representa- 
tion of  time  were  not  given  a  priori.  Only  then  can  we 
imagine  that  certain  things  happen  at  the  same  time  or  at 
different  times."  The  representation  of  time  is  not  given 
a  priori,  that  is,  the  idea  of  time  is  not  innate ;  but  the  instant 
we  experience  succession,  time  is  rationally  apprehended  as 
the  condition  of  succession.  Reason  apprehends  time  as 
that  without  which  there  could  be  no  succession. 


236  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

"We  cannot  take  time  away  from  phenomena,  though  we 
can  take  phenomena  away  from  time.  In  time  alone  is  the 
reality  of  phenomena  possible.  Time  has  one  dimension 
only.  Different  times  are  not  simultaneous,  but  successive, 
while  different  spaces  are  never  successive,  but  simultaneous." 
Experience  gives  facts,  but  reason  gives  us  the  necessity  of  the 
conditions  of  the  facts.  Before  the  experience  of  succession, 
the  rational  apprehension  of  time,  as  the  condition  of  succes- 
sion, was  impossible.  We  experience  succession  before 
rationally  apprehending  the  necessity  of  time;  but  before 
man  existed,  and  hence  before  the  intuition  of  time,  did  not 
the  earth  exist  and  undergo  geological  changes?  Time, 
therefore,  of  which  the  geological  periods  are  parts,  existed 
long  ages  before  its  representation  by  the  human  mind. 
Hence,  it  is  not  true,  as  Kant  says:  "Time  is  nothing  but  the 
form  of  the  internal  sense."  Time  existed  before  the  inter- 
nal sense;  it  is  not  substance,  either  matter  or  spirit.  It  is 
that  in  which  things  persist  or  succession  takes  place.  It  is 
neither  persistence  nor  succession,  but  their  necessary  condi- 
tion, and  would  exist  were  there  no  persistence  nor  succession. 

Again,  Kant  says:  "Time  has  objective  validity,  with 
reference  to  phenomena  only,  but  time  is  no  longer  objective, 
if  we  remove  the  sensuous  character  of  our  intuition,  that 
is  to  say,  that  mode  of  representation  which  is  peculiar  to 
ourselves,  and  speaks  of  things  in  general.  Time  is  therefore 
simply  a  subjective  condition  of  our  intuition,  but  by  itself, 
apart  from  the  subject,  nothing."  Events,  independent  of 
our  knowledge  or  representation,  took  place  and  were  succes- 
sive long  before  man  existed,  and  time  was,  therefore,  a 
reality  then  as  it  is  now. 

Kant  was  aware  that  intelligent  men  would  object  to  his 
theory  of  time,  and  reject  it;  he  said,  therefore,  "what  they 
object  to  is  this:  Changes,  they  say,  are  real;  this  is  proved 
by  the  change  of  our  own  representations,  even  if  all  external 
phenomena  and  their  changes  be  denied.  Changes,  how- 
ever, are  possible  in  time  only,  and  therefore  time  must  be 
something  real. 

The  answer  is  easy  enough.  I  grant  the  whole  argument. 
Time  is  certainly  something  real,  the  real  form  of  our  inter- 
nal intuition.  Time,  therefore,  has  subjective  reality  with 
respect  to  internal  experience;  that  is,  I  really  have  the 


KANT  237 

representations  of  time  and  of  my  determinations  in  it.  .  . 
There  remains,  therefore,  the  empirical  reality  of  time,  only 
as  the  condition  of  experience,  while  absolute  reality  cannot, 
according  to  what  has  been  shown,  be  conceded  to  it.  Time 
is  nothing  but  the  form  of  our  own  internal  intuition. "  The 
geologic  periods  were  not  real  and  successive  before  man  ex- 
isted, and  were  not  therefore  the  forms  of  our  internal  intuition. 
Time  is  not  an  innate  a  priori  representation,  since  it  is 
apprehended  by  reason  only  as  the  necessary  condition  of 
the  co-existence  and  succession  of  events,  whether  subjective 
or  objective.  It  is  the  necessary  reality  without  which  per- 
sistence, co-existence,  or  succession  would  be  impossible. 

Again,  Kant  says:  "Motion  presupposes  the  perception  of 
something  moving;"  but  a  body  might  move  without  such 
perception.  The  perception  of  motion,  however,  does  pre- 
suppose a  moving  body,  and  also  both  time  and  space.  Nep- 
tune moved  before  its  motion  was  perceived.  If  motion  is 
actual,  that  is,  if  anything  moves,  space  is  not  ideal,  but  real. 
If  succession  is  actual,  that  is,  if  one  event  follows  another, 
time  is  not  ideal,  but  real.  Neither  body,  nor  succession, 
nor  motion  can  be  proved  to  be  simply  subjective,  though  our 
ideas  of  them  are  subjective  with  an  objective  factor.  Reason 
apprehends,  at  least  my  reason  does,  that  both  space  and 
time  are  absolute  realities,  infinite,  eternal.  They  are  not 
substance,  either  matter  or  spirit;  they  are  not  dynamic, 
and  therefore  not  rivals  of  God,  but  they  afford  him  infinite 
possibilities  for  the  display  of  his  matchless  perfections,  in 
the  magnificent  universe  which  his  power  and  wisdom  have 
called  into  being. 

Kant  sums  up  his  doctrine  of  sensuous  perception  by  say- 
ing: "All  intuition  is  nothing  but  the  representation  of  phe- 
nomena. "  Mental  phenomena  are  facts  of  mind  known  by 
consciousness;  representations  of  external  objects  are  the 
phenomena  of  perception.  Facts,  whether  internal  or  exter- 
nal, are  contingent,  and  are  known  by  experience,  and  the 
intuitions  relating  to  these  facts  are  empirical;  but  the  intui- 
tions relating  to  the  necessary  conditions  of  these  facts  are 
rational — the  apprehension  of  fundamental  truth.  Rational 
intuitions  are  not  representations  of  phenomena,  but  are 
apprehensions  of  the  necessity  of  the  conditions  of  phenom- 
ena. 


238  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Again,  says  Kant:  "The  things  which  we  see  are  not,  by 
themselves,  what  we  see."  Of  course  not;  we  see  the  ap- 
pearances of  things,  that  is  phenomena,  or  our  representa- 
tions of  things.  The  things  represented  are  not  by  them' 
selves,  but  in  relation  to  ourselves,  otherwise  we  could  not  see 
them;  but  seeing  is  judging  what  kind  of  objects  those  are 
which  cause  in  us  certain  sensations,  and  embody  our  judg- 
ments in  mental  pictures,  which  represent,  more  or  less  cor- 
rectly, so  far  as  it  is  possible  for  a  picture  to  represent  objects, 
our  discoveries  or  opinions  regarding  those  objects. 

"If  we  drop  our  subject,  or  the  subjective  form  of  our 
senses,  all  qualities,  all  relations  of  objects  in  space  and 
time,  nay  space  and  time  themselves  would  vanish. "  If  we 
drop  the  subject,  all  qualities,  even  space  and  time  them- 
selves, would  vanish  with  respect  to  that  subject,  for  the 
subject  then  is  nothing,  or  no  longer  subject,  and  could  know 
nothing.  Dropping  the  actual  subjective  form  of  our  senses, 
though  giving  them  another  form,  the  appearances  having 
still  a  subjective,  as  well  as  an  objective  factor,  would  of  course, 
change,  just  as  the  color  of  objects  appears  to  change,  as  we 
view  them  through  different  colored  glasses;  but  space  and 
time  are  not  seen  by  the  sense  of  sight,  but  are  rationally 
apprehended,  and  would  be  held  to  be  the  same  by  all  ration- 
al beings  who  have  perceptions  of  body  and  motion,  of  per- 
sistence or  succession.  It  may  be  asked  then,  why  did  not 
Kant  so  regard  space  and  time?  He  did  say:  "Space,  as 
the  very  condition  of  external  objects,  is  essential  to  their 
appearance  or  intuition,"  and  "changes  are  possible  in  time 
only,  and  therefore  time  must  be  something  real."  But 
Kant  was  carried  away  by  his  theory  which  makes  space  and 
time  merely  subjective  forms  of  thought.  Not  only  is  the 
representation  of  space  necessary  to  the  representation  of 
objects,  but  space  is  necessary  to  the  objects  themselves. 

To  deny  the  objective  reality  of  space  and  time  is  to  render 
all  clearness  of  thought  impossible,  and  to  introduce  the  utter 
confusion  of  reducing  the  universe  to  a  point,  and  all  events 
of  history  to  a  moment  of  time.  That  is  not  clear  thinking; 
it  is  utter  confusion. 

The  understanding  Kant  calls  a  non-sensuous  faculty  of 
knowledge,  not  intuitive,  but  discursive,  by  means  of  con- 
cepts, and  holds  that  all  knowledge  is  either  intuitive  or  dis- 


KANT  239 

cursive;  and  jj^is  is  well,  if  we  divide  intuitions  into  empirical 
and  rational — empirical,  when  sensuous  or  known  by  experi- 
ence, and  rational,  when  apprehended  by  reason  as  the  neces- 
sary conditions  of  the  phenomenal,  as  space,  time  and  cause. 
We  cannot  even  imagine  body  or  motion  without  space,  or 
succession  without  time;  and  though  we  can  imagine  an 
event  without  a  cause,  yet  we  know,  by  reason,  that  an 
event  without  a  cause,  is  impossible,  since  that  would  're- 
quire non-entity  to  act,  or  to  come  into  being  of  itself,  which 
is  impossible,  since  it  is  nothing,  it  cannot  act. 

Concepts  are  our  ideas  of  the  combinations  of  the  common 
elements  of  resembling  phenomena,  thus  giving  unity  to 
separate  acts  of  cognition  and  harmony  to  thought.  Leaving 
out  matter,  considering  form  alone,  Kant  gives  as  pure  con- 
cepts or  categories  of  the  understanding,  quantity,  quality, 
relation  and  modality;  under  quantity  he  gives  universal, 
particular,  individual;  under  quality,  affirmative,  negative, 
indefinite;  under  relation,  categorical,  hypothetical,  disjunc- 
tive; under  modality,  problematic,  assertatory,  apodictic. 
Pure  concepts  are  recognized  as  a  priori  conditions  of  possible 
experiences,  whether  of  sense,  intuition  or  thought.  The 
concepts  are  not  strictly  a  priori,  but  are  formed  to  account 
for  experiences. 

Judgment  is  the  decision  that  a  certain  relation  exists  be- 
tween two  objects  of  thought.  The  elements  of  a  judgment, 
the  subject  and  predicate,  are  derived  from  sense,  or  imagi- 
nation, or  rational  intuition,  called  also  apperception. 

The  stream  of  phenomena,  always  changing,  the  immediate 
object  of  consciousness,  does  not  constitute  the  ego,  or  per- 
manent subject  of  all  these  changes.  The  necessity  of  the 
ego,  as  the  subject  of  psychical  phenomena,  is  apprehended 
by  rational  intuition,  as  the  identical  subject,  the  necessary 
condition  of  these  manifold  experiences,  otherwise  memory 
would  be  impossible. 

Cause  is  the  dynamical  condition  of  an  event.  How  do  we 
arrive  at  the  judgment  that  every  event  must  have  a  cause? 
It  is  true  we  can  imagine  an  event  without  a  cause,  yet  reason 
declares  that  it  is  no  more  possible  for  an  event  to  happen 
without  a  cause,  though  it  be  thus  pictured,  than  for  a  body 
to  exist  without  space,  or  for  succession  without  time,  neither 
of  which  can  be  represented  by  the  imagination.  Reason 


240  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

gives  the  causal  judgment  that  every  event  must  have  a 
cause,  by  apprehending  the  impossibility  of  non-entity 
springing  into  being.  The  causal  judgment  is  not  based  on 
the  impotence  of  the  imagination  to  picture  an  absolute 
commencement,  but  on  the  potency  of  the  reason  to  apprehend 
the  impossibility  of  nothing  turning  itself  into  something. 
The  relation  between  cause  and  effect  is  that  of  reciprocity. 
Whatever  the  cause  gives  to  the  effect  is  taken  from  itself. 
An  event  is  always  an  effect. 

How  does  Kant  account  for  the  judgment  that  a  cause  is 
the  necessary  condition  of  an  event?  He  says:  "Our  con- 
ception of  the  relation  of  all  knowledge  to  its  object  contains 
something  of  necessity,  the  object  being  looked  upon  as  that 
which  prevents  our  knowledge  from  being  determined  at 
haphazard.  .  .  It  is  clear  also  that,  as  we  can  only  deal 
with  the  manifold  in  our  representations,  and  as  the  x,  (the 
object),  corresponding  to  them,  if  it  is  something  different 
from  all  our  representations,  is  really  nothing  to  us,  it  is 
clear,  I  say,  that  the  unity,  necessitated  by  an  object,  cannot 
be  anything  but  the  formal  unity  of  our  consciousness  in  the 
synthesis  of  the  manifold  in  our  representations."  That  is 
the  very  thing  that  is  not  clear.  It  is  truly  wonderful  that 
the  object  corresponding  to  our  representations  can  have  no 
interest  to  a  philosopher.  Ten  thousand  people  witness  the 
same  thing,  say  the  ascent  of  a  balloon.  Can  the  unity  of 
each  spectator's  representations,  or  the  common  agreement, 
as  to  the  object  seen,  be  accounted  for  by  the  unity  of  a  single 
consciousness  or  of  their  collective  consciousness?  It  is 
evidently  explained  by  the  one  object  at  which  they  are  all 
gazing.  The  appearance  has  a  double  cause,  for  any  specta- 
tor— first,  the  object  which  reflects  light  to  his  eye,  causing 
a  sensation;  secondly  the  representation  of  the  cause  of  the 
sensation  as  pictured  by  the  imagination  of  the  spectator. 
The  appearance,  essentially  the  same  to  all  the  spectators, 
is  accepted  by  them,  as  the  object  itself,  as  known  to  sight; 
but  really,  it  is  a  picture  of  what  they  infer  to  be  true  of  the 
object. 

Idealism  holds  good  for  the  picture  but  not  for  the  objec- 
tive cause.     Cause  is  something  more  than  the  formal  unity 
of  our  consciousness;  it  is  dynamic;  its  very  essence  is  energy 
it  is  the  necessary  condition  of  every  event;  it  is  not  explain 


?y; 

• 


KANT  241 

by  the  syntl^sis  of  the  manifold  in  consciousness,  or  by  the 
uniformity  of  antecedent  and  consequent,  as  for  example 
in  the  succession  of  day  and  night,  or  of  the  phases  of  the 
moon,  or  of  the  change  of  seasons.  It  is  supplied  to  thought 
by  reason,  which  sees  the  impossibility  of  nothing  springing 
into  being. 

The  laws  of  nature  are  something  more  than  the  laws  of 
man's  understanding;  but  Kant  says:  "However  exaggerated 
therefore  and  absurd  it  may  sound  that  the  understanding  is 
in  itself  the  source  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  of  its  formal 
unity,  such  a  statement  is  nevertheless  correct  and  in  accord- 
ance with  experience."  Were  not  the  planets  kept  in  their 
orbits,  according  to  the  laws  of  nature,  before  the  existence 
of  man  on  the  earth? 

We  have  impressions  or  sensations,  not  produced  but 
known  by  experience,  not  produced  by  ourselves,  for  we  are 
passive  in  sensation,  which  are  consequently  excited  in  us 
by  foreign  causes.  The  nature  of  these  causes  we  interpret 
and  represent  as  phenomena,  which  are,  therefore,  pictures 
of  what  we  know  or  believe  respecting  external  objects. 
These  objects  are  not  absolutely  unknown,  but  are  known 
more  or  less  perfectly  by  their  pictures — the  phenomena. 
The  conceptions  of  space  and  time  are  the  necessary  forms  of 
phenomena;  but  space  and  time  themselves  are  not  concep- 
tions but  necessary  conditions  of  the  objects  represented 
by  the  phenomena.  The  conception  of  cause  is  necessary 
to  our  understanding  of  an  event;  but  cause  itself  is  the 
necessary  condition  of  the  event.  Kant  asks:  "How  are 
synthetic  judgments,  a  priori,  possible?"  The  answer  is, 
reason  apprehends  the  impossibility  of  facts  without  condi- 
tions, that  is,  the  necessity  of  conditions  as  the  ground  of 
the  facts.  That  the  conceptions  of  space  and  time  are  mere 
forms  of  sensuous  thought  in  which  phenomena  are  arranged 
is  certainly  true;  but  antecedent  to  the  phenomena,  we  have 
sensations,  the  raw  material  out  of  which  the  phenomena 
are  constructed;  these  sensations  have  causes,  the  causes  are 
not  non-entities  but  real  things,  and  real  prior  to  their  acts 
on  us.  Now  to  say  that  these  causes  are  not  real  things,  at 
least  not  real  till  they  act  on  us,  that  they  do  not  exist  in 
space  and  time,  is  to  dogmatize,  not  to  philosophize.  This 
cause  of  sensation,  Kant  himself  was  constrained  to  postulate, 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

calling  it  the  thing  in  itself,  or  the  noumenon,  in  distinction 
from  the  phenomenal  appearance,  designating  it  by  x,  as  the 
unknown,  saying,  "if  it  is  something  different  from  all  our 
representations,  it  is  really  nothing  to  us. "  But  is  not  this 
the  thing  of  interest  in  philosophy,  the  real  object  of  our  quest, 
the  object  of  which  the  phenomenon  is  a  representation, 
though  doubtless  a  partial  and  imperfect  picture.  The  phe- 
nomena of  sight  are,  therefore,  the  pictured  knowledge  of  the 
objects,  and  phenomena  of  the  senses  in  general  are  related 
to  the  objects  as  their  representatives,  adequate  only  to  a 
certain  degree.  Likewise  the  ego  is  the  noumenon,  or  the  xy 
the  essential  condition  of  subjective  phenomena. 

It  will  not  be  necessary  to  follow,  in  all  its  details,  the 
Critique,  the  great  work  of  Kant,  which  is  eminently  worthy  of 
the  most  careful  consideration  of  every  thinker  in  philosophy; 
but  we  shall  content  ourselves,  by  calling  attention  to  his 
so-called  antinomies  of  the  pure  reason,  and  his  criticisms  of 
the  theoretical  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God,  the  freedom  of 
the  will,  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  In  regard  to  the 
antinomies,  that  is,  that  two  contradictory  propositions 
may  both  be  proved  true  by  reasoning,  as  Kant  maintains, 
may  be  shown  to  be  false.  Let  us  take  two  truths,  both  true 
by  hypothesis,  that  is,  both  true  in  fact,  and  suppose  them 
to  conflict,  which  means  that  the  truth  of  either  involves 
the  falsity  of  the  other;  then  each  is  both  true  and  false  at 
the  same  time,  and  taking  in  the  same  sense,  which  is  self- 
destructive  and  impossible.  It  therefore  follows  that  all 
truths  exist  in  harmony.  This  is  an  intuition  of  reason. 
Furthermore  it  may  be  said  that  no  two  demonstrations  can 
clash,  that  is,  be  mutually  destructive,  for  a  demonstration 
is  the  logical  proof  of  a  proposition  from  true  premises. 
Kant  claims  to  prove  both  of  the  following  propositions : 

1.  The  world  has  a  beginning  in  time  and  is  limited  in 
space. 

2.  The  world  has  no  beginning  in  time  and  no  limit  in 
space. 

Evidently,  these  propositions  cannot  both  be  proved  true, 
and  there  must  be  some  flaw  in  Kant's  demonstration.  Logi- 
cal reasoning  from  true  premises  cannot  involve  error,  that 
is,  if  the  premises  are  true  and  the  reasoning  logical,  the 
conclusion  must  be  true.  Thus  we  may  know  the  unsound- 


; 


KANT  243 

ness  of  Kant's  reasoning  without    examining  his  argument. 

What  Ka%Lt  intended  to  teach  by  these  antinomies  was, 
not  that  two  conflictive  propositions  could  both  be  proved 
true  in  any  legitimate  application  of  reason  in  the  field  of 
experience,  but  that  these  contradictories  would  result 
whenever  we  ventured  with  speculative  reason  beyond  the 
limits  of  experience;  and  that  though  God,  freedom  and 
immortality  could  not  be  theoretically  proved,  neither  can 
they  be  theoretically  disproved,  yet  he  vindicated  these 
great  objects  of  belief  within  the  sphere  of  practical  reason, 
which  shows,  not  what  we  must  accept  as  a  matter  of  demon- 
stration, but  what  we  ought  to  believe  as  helpful  guides  to  a 
moral  life.  It  is,  however,  questionable  whether  Kant  has 
shown  the  impossibility  of  proving  these  great  doctrines  by 
speculative  reasoning.  We  shall  see. 

The  usual  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God  may  be  classified 
as  the  Ontological,  the  Cosmological,  the  Physico-Theological. 

Kant's  criticism  of  the  Ontological  proof  as  formulated  by 
Descartes,  may  be  regarded  as  conclusive.  The  mere  fact 
that  we  have  a  conception  of  a  perfect  being,  together  with 
the  fact  that  existence  is  necessary  to  perfection,  ia  no  proof 
that  such  a  being  exists.  Descartes  himself  seemed  to  have 
a  doubt  of  its  validity,  as  we  infer  from  the  fact  that  he 
attempted  to  strengthen  the  argument,  by  saying  that  the 
idea  of  a  perfect  being  is  too  great  for  us  to  form,  and  hence 
that  it  must  have  been  formed  within  us  by  this  perfect 
being  himself,  and  that,  therefore,  this  perfect  being  actually 
exists.  We  certainly  can  form  the  idea  of  a  more  perfect 
being  than  ourselves,  and  what  is  the  limit  to  the  degree  of 
perfection  of  the  idea  which  we  can  form?  Granting  the 
existence  of  an  unconditioned  being,  still  the  necessity  of  our 
idea  of  that  being  is  not  unconditioned.  The  fact  of  the 
necessity  of  the  existence  of  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle, 
and  that  their  sum  is  equal  to  two  right  angles,  is  not  abso- 
lute, but  conditioned  on  the  existence  of  the  triangle.  To 
accept  the  triangle  and  to  reject  the  three  angles  is  contra- 
dictory, but  to  reject  the  triangle  as  well  as  the  angles  is  not 
contradictory,  but  is  simply  error. 

The  same  thing  applies  to  the  concept  of  an  absolutely 
necessary  being.  Remove  his  existence,  or  rather,  if  his 
existence  be  not  assumed,  his  perfection  is  not  implied  as 


244  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

necessary.  The  only  way  to  evade  this  is  to  say  that  the 
absolute  being  cannot  be  removed;  but  this  is  what  Kant 
calls  in  question,  saying  it  is  the  very  thing  to  be  proved, 
rightly  declaring  that  the  so-called  Ontological  proof  is  no 
demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God. 

Kant  now  takes  up  the  Cosmologic  proof  of  the  existence 
of  God,  and  attempts  to  show  its  fallacy.  He  states  the 
argument  thus:  "If  there  exists  anything,  there  must  exist 
an  absolutely  necessary  being.  Now  I,  at  least,  exist;  there- 
fore there  exists  an  absolutely  necessary  Being."  With 
regard  to  this,  Kant  says:  "This  proof  therefore  begins  with 
experience,  and  is  not  entirely  a  priori,  or  ontological ;  and  as 
the  object  of  all  possible  experience  is  called  the  world,  this 
proof  is  called  the  cosmological  proof.  As  it  takes  no  account 
of  any  peculiar  property  of  the  objects  of  experience,  by 
which  this  world  of  ours  may  differ  from  any  other  possible 
world,  it  is  distinguished  in  its  name.  It  also  is  distinguished 
from  the  physico-theological  proof,  which  employs  as  argu- 
ments, observations  of  the  peculiar  property  of  this  our 
world  of  sense. " 

"In  order  to  have  a  secure  foundation,  this  proof  takes  its 
stand  on  experience,  and  pretends  to  be  different  from  the 
ontological  proof,  which  places  its  whole  confidence  in  pure 
concepts  a  priori  only.  The  cosmological  proof,  however, 
uses  that  experience  only  in  order  to  make  one  step,  namely, 
to  the  existence  of  a  necessary  Being  in  general.  What  prop- 
erties that  Being  may  have,  can  never  be  learnt  from  the 
empirical  argument,  and  for  that  purpose,  reason  takes 
leave  of  it  altogether,  and  tries  to  find  out,  from  among  con- 
cepts only,  what  properties  an  absolutely  necessary  Being 
ought  to  possess,  i.  e.,  which  among  all  possible  things  con- 
tains in  itself,  the  requisite  conditions  of  absolute  necessity. 
This  requisite  is  believed  by  reason  to  exist  in  the  concept 
of  an  ens  realissimum  only,  and  reason  concludes,  at  once, 
that  this  must  be  the  absolutely  necessary  Being.  In  this 
conclusion  it  is  simply  assumed  that  a  concept  of  a  being  of 
the  highest  reality  is  perfectly  adequate  to  the  concept  of 
absolute  necessity  in  existence;  so  that  the  former  might  be 
concluded  from  the  latter.  This  is  the  same  proposition  as 
that  maintained  in  the  ontological  argument,  and  is  simply 
taken  over  into  the  cosmological  proof,  nay  made  its  founda 
tion,  although  the  intention  was  to  avoid  it. " 


KANT  245 

The  cosmological  proof  claims  more  than  is  warranted 
when  it  says  that  the  existence  of  the  universe  is  proof  of  the 
absolute  necessity  of  an  eternal  cause.  The  cause  is  con- 
ditionally necessary;  that  is,  necessary  as  the  condition  of 
the  universe;  it  is  not  known  to  be  absolutely  necessary;  for, 
we  can  conceive  of  its  non-existence,  then  the  universe  would 
be  non-existent;  but  the  universe  exists;  therefore,  the  cause 
of  the  universe  is  actual,  and  this  cause  is  either  the  first 
cause  or  the  effect  of  preceding  causes.  These  causes  cannot 
go  back  in  an  infinite  series,  which  would  never  end;  nor  in 
the  direct  order  could  it  ever  reach  the  present.  The  series, 
traced  back,  must  therefore  reach  an  end  or  first  cause. 
Now  this  first  cause  must  be  eternal,  otherwise  there  never 
would  have  been  anything,  for  non-entity  can  not  jump  into 
being.  The  first  cause  is,  therefore,  conditionally  necessary 
and  actual,  and  is  adequate  to  the  production  of  the  universe, 
and  is  called  God,  the  actuality  of  whose  existence  we  know, 
its  mystery  is  beyond  our  reach.  But  the  actuality  of  the 
first  cause  and  its  adequacy  to  the  production  of  the  universe 
sufficeth  for  reason;  it  is  open  to  faith  to  believe  the  first 
cause  absolute. 

We  are,  therefore,  warranted  in  inferring  that  the  present 
state  of  the  universe  is  proof  of  a  series  of  past  events 
connected  by  the  law  of  causality,  indefinite,  though  not 
infinite,  in  extent,  terminating  in  a  head  or  first  cause,  who 
is  unconditioned  and  eternal.  Why  is  not  the  series 
infinite  in  extent?  There  are  two  reasons  why:  First,  though 
every  event  seems  to  be  explained  by  the  preceding  cause, 
there  is  always  left  one  thing  unexplained,  however  far  back 
we  may  trace  the  series — the  cause  of  the  last  event;  ex- 
plained— hence  the  whole  series  is  without  explanation. 
Secondly,  the  end  of  an  infinite  series  can  never  be  reached, 
eternity  itself  would  not  suffice;  for  it  has  not  end.  Then  as 
the  reverse  order,  or  order  backward,  would  never  cease, 
the  direct  order,  or  order  f orward,could  never  reach  the  present. 
The  series,  therefore,  has  an  end,  or  in  the  direct  order,  a 
beginning.  Now  this  end  in  the  reverse  order,  or  the  be- 
ginning in  the  direct  order,  is  rationally  apprehended,  not 
empirically  known,  for  then  it  would  require  explanation. 
As  not  dependent  on  any  thing  antecedent,  it  is  unconditioned; 
it  is  eternal,  else  it  jumped  from  non-entity  into  being, 


246  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

which  is  impossible.  This  first  cause  is  therefore  condition- 
ally necessary,  that  is,  necessary  on  the  assumption  that  the 
universe  is,  which  we  know  to  be  a  fact.  We  go  beyond  our 
warrant  when  we  say  that  the  first  cause  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary; for  we  do  not  know  that,  and  we  can  even  conceive 
of  its  non-existence;  but  then  if  that  were  true,  the  universe 
would  be  non-existent,  which  is  not  the  case;  therefore,  the 
first  cause  is  actual.  As  the  first  cause,  it  is  adequate  to 
the  production  of  the  universe,  that  is,  contains,  within 
itself,  everything  of  power,  wisdom  and  goodness  requisite 
for  the  execution  of  the  mighty  work  of  creation.  How  God 
can  be,  whether  he  is  absolutely  necessary  or  not,  reason 
does  not  inform  us;  but  that  God,  the  first  cause,  transcend- 
ent in  power,  wisdom  and  goodness,  actually  exists,  we  may 
know  with  the  full  assurance  of  certainty;  and  that  is  suffi- 
cient. The  cosmological  proof,  however,  does  not  den  any 
perfection  to  God. 

Space  will  not  allow  us  to  follow,  in  the  details  of  his  crit- 
icisms of  the  physico-theologico  proof  of  the  existence  of 
God,  but  refer  our  readers  to  the  Critique  itself,  quoting,  how- 
ever, three  sentences:  "The  utmost,  therefore,  that  could  be 
established  by  such  a  proof,  would  be  an  architect  of  the  world, 
always  very  much  hampered  by  the  material  with  which  he 
has  to  work,  not  a  creator  to  whose  idea  everything  is  subject. 

.  .  .  Those  who  adopt  the  physico-theological  argu- 
ment have  no  reason  to  be  so  very  coy  towards  the  trans- 
cendental mode  of  argument,  and  with  the  conceit  of  en- 
lightened observers  of  nature,  to  look  down  upon  such  argu- 
ments as  the  cobwebs  of  dark  speculators.  .  .  The  physico- 
theological  proof  rests  on  the  cosmological  and  the  cosmo- 
logical on  the  ontological  proof  of  the  existence  of  one  original 
Being  as  the  Supreme  Being."  Though  Kant  denies  the 
validity  of  the  theoretical  argument,  yet  he  grants  that 
practically  we  may  act  upon  the  conclusions  as  true.  The 
cosmological  argument,  however,  and  the  physico-theological 
based  upon  it,  hold  good  for  all  that  is  required,  but  render 
themselves  open  to  criticism,  by  claiming,  according  to  the 
presupposed  necessities  of  preconceived  opinions,  more  than 
the  premises  logically  support. 

As  to  the  freedom  of  the  will,  Kant  accepts  the 
though  denying  the  validity  of  its  theoretical  proof.     It  ma;j 


KANT  247 

be  said,  however,  that  we  are  conscious  of  activity  in  volition, 
not  of  passive  determination.  The  motives  are  reasons  on 
account  of  which  we  act,  and  that  without  constraint,  yet 
not  without  solicitation.  The  volitions,  as  events,  are 
caused;  but  the  mind  which  causes  them  is  not  an  event, 
but  a  being  existing  at  the  moment  of  volition,  not  then 
requiring  a  cause.  If  it  is  inquired  what  made  the  mind 
make  the  volition,  the  reply  is,  it  was  not  made  to  make  it, 
but  made  it  freely,  in  view  of  motives  as  reasons,  yet  not 
compelled  by  them  as  causes.  We  believe  ourselves  free, 
and  not  compelled  by  irresistible  influences,  and  hence  the 
explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  conscience,  approving  the 
right  and  condemning  the  wrong.  The  consciousness  of 
effort  in  volition  proves  that  we  are  not  passive  but  active 
in  willing. 

Likewise  Kant  admits  the  fact  of  immortality,  though 
denying  the  validity  of  its  proof.  As  our  thoughts  cannot  be 
explained  by  material  agencies  we  refer  them  to  mind. 
Matter  and  mind,  as  species  of  the  common  genus,  substance, 
the  ground  of  union  of  body  and  soul,  are  united  in  life  and 
separated  at  death.  As  thought  can  not  be  explained  by 
matter,  it  is  referred  to  mind  or  spirit,  as  its  noumenon  or 
necessary  condition.  Death  the  dissolution  of  the  union  of 
soul  and  body  does  not  imply  the  annihilation  of  either,  and 
we  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  soul  becomes  extinct 
at  death,  but  rather  that  it  survives  in  an  eternal  state. 
But  we  must  take  leave  of  Kant's  immortal  work,  the  Critique 
of  the  Pure  Reason. 

In  his  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason,  Kant  shows  that 
various  principles,  empirically  determined,  serve  as  guides 
to  the  will.  These  principles  are  subjective,  if  the  condition 
holds  only  for  the  will  of  the  subject,  but  objective  if  they 
hold  for  all  rational  beings. 

Kant  says:  "It  is  a  matter  for  surprise  that  men  of  intelli- 
gence should  imagine  that  a  real  distinction  may  be  drawn 
between  the  lower  and  higher  faculty  of  desire  on  the  ground 
that  some  ideas  which  are  associated  with  the  feelings  of 
pleasure  have  their  source  in  sense  and  others  in  under- 
standing. "  The  distinction  is  not  drawn  between  the  lower 
and  higher  faculty  of  desire  but  between  the  lower  and  higher 


248  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

objects  of  desire.  Sense  and  understanding  are  not  faculties 
of  desire,  but  they  furnish  objects  of  desire,  some  of  which 
are  more  worthy  to  be  desired  than  others. 

The  desire  for  happiness  Kant  holds  to  be  the  usual  sub- 
jective condition  of  individual  action,  but  will  not  serve  for 
a  practical,  universal  guide.  Kant,  however,  does  not  recog- 
nize any  distinction  between  higher  and  lower  forms  of 
pleasure;  for  he  says:  "The  feeling  of  pleasure,  which  is  the 
real  motive  by  which  the  will  is  determined  to  act,  is  always 
the  same  in  kind,  not  only  because  it  can  be  known  only 
empirically,  but  because  in  every  desire  the  same  vital  energy 
is  always  expressed.  The  only  difference  between  pleasures 
is,  therefore,  one  of  degree."  The  will,  as  a  faculty,  is  not 
determined  by  motive,  but  the  ego  itself  exerts  its  power  of 
choice  and  determines  its  own  volitions  in  view  of  the  motive 
which  is  a  reason  not  a  cause.  Again,  the  desire  for  pleasure 
is  not  the  only  motive  for  action.  Conscience  has  a  voice, 
which  is  often  heard  and  obeyed.  Suppose  that  in  desire 
the  same  vital  energy  is  always  expressed,  it  does  not  follow 
that  the  objects  of  desire  are  always  the  same  in  quality,  or 
that  ,one  ought  not  to  be  preferred  to  another.  Worthiness 
of  character  is  the  supreme  subjective  object  of  desire,  and 
God  the  objective;  these  are  the  ultimate  good. 

Kant  teaches  that  the  Practical  Reason  gives  us  God, 
freedom  and  immortality,  though  the  Pure  Reason  fails  to 
demonstrate  their  reality.  In  this,  the  practical  reason 
must  be  our  guide. 

Self-love  cannot  be  a  practical  law,  for  the  motive  is  sub- 
jective and  empirical;  but  the  supreme  law  of  practical 
reason,  of  which  we  are  primarily  and  directly  conscious, 
declares:  "So  act  that  the  maxims  of  your  will  may  be  in 
perfect  harmony  with  a  universal  system  of  laws."  Free- 
dom is  the  ratio  essendi  of  the  moral  law,  but  the  moral  law 
is  the  ratio  cognoscendi  of  freedom. 

Virtue  is  the  supreme  good.  The  will  to  be  virtuous  is 
the  chief  moral  excellence.  Not  only  perfection,  but  happi- 
ness, even  continued  happiness,  is  a  legitimate  object  of 
desire.  The  will  is  to  be  disciplined  and  confirmed  in  its 
desire  for  perfect  moral  excellence,  which  it  is  needful  to 
manifest  in  conduct,  habit  and  character;  but  as  this  work 
can  never  be  completed  in  this  life,  "the  highest  good  is 


KANT  249 

therefore,  practically  possible,  only  if  we  presuppose  the 
immortality  of  the  soul."  Immortality,  therefore,  as  the 
necessary  condition  for  continued  moral  progress,  and  for 
the  unceasing  enjoyment  which  springs  from  advancement 
towards  perfection,  may  be  accepted  as  a  doctrine  warranted 
by  the  practical  reason. 

As  to  the  existence  of  God,  Kant  says:  "The  moral  law 
leads  us  to  postulate,  not  only  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
but  the  existence  of  God.  For  it  shows  us  how  happiness, 
in  proportion  to  morality,  which  is  the  second  element  of 
the  highest  good,  is  possible,  and  to  postulate  it  for  reasons 
as  perfectly  disinterested  as  in  the  former  case.  This  second 
postulate  of  the  existence  of  God  rests  upon  the  necessity 
of  presupposing  the  existence  of  a  cause  adequate  to  the 
effect  which  has  to  be  explained." 

These  three  postulates  of  practical  reason,  God,  freedom, 
and  immortality,  are,  therefore,  not  theoretical  dogmas, 
but  are  presuppositions  which  are  practically  necessary. 
They  follow,  as  corollaries,  from  the  intuition  of  the  moral 
law  as  the  supreme  rule  of  conduct. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

Fichte,  Jacobi,  Schelling 

1.  Fichte  (1762-1814).  Johann  Gottlieb  Fichte  was  born 
in  Rammenau,  a  village  in  Upper  Lusatia.  Before  going  to 
school,  he  was  taught  many  things  by  his  father,  which  he 
eagerly  listened  to  and  readily  assimilated,  as  he  was  pre- 
cocious in  his  mental  development.  His  intellectual  turn  of 
mind  impressed  his  friends  and  neighbors,  who  said,  after 
he  had  reached  distinction,  "we  always  knew  that  Gottleib 
was  a  remarkable  boy." 

He  was  so  intelligent,  and  read  with  such  an  appreciation 
of  the  sense,  that  his  father  assigned  to  him  the  duty  of 
reading  the  prayers  for  the  family,  and  cherished  the  desire 
that  he  would  become  a  minister. 

His  imagination  was  so  powerfully  impressed  by  a  remark- 
able book  called  Siegfried  the  Horned,  that  for  a  time  he  lost 
interest  in  other  things,  and  for  neglect  of  duty,  was  severely 
punished.  Resolving  to  obey,  at  least  the  spirit  of  the 
injunction,  If  thy  right  hand  offend  thee,  cut  it  off  and  cast 
it  from  thee,  he  resolved  to  make  the  sacrifice,  and  taking 
the  book  to  the  river  bank  and  after  a  short  struggle  with  his 
affection,  cast  it  into  the  stream,  and  gave  way  to  his  tears, 
as  he  saw  it  float  forever  beyond  his  reach.  His  father,  coming 
up  at  the  moment,  and  misunderstanding  the  motive  of  his 
son,  chastised  him  unmercifully  for  the  supposed  wicked 
deed,  an  illustration  of  how  the  purest  motives  may  be  "mis- 
understood. 

Gottlieb  was  a  favorite  with  the  village  pastor,  wrho  one 
day  asked  him  how  much  of  the  last  sermon  he  remembered, 
and  was  astonished  at  the  accurate  report  he  heard  from  t 
boy.  Soon  after  this,  Baron  von  Miltiz,  who  was  one 
at  Rammenau,  on  a  visit  to  Count  Hoffmansegg,  the  1 
of  the  village,  expressed  his  regret  that  he  was  too  late  for  t 
sermon,  Sunday  morning.  The  Count  said,  "It  is  no  matter, 
for  there  is  a  boy  in  the  village  who  can  preach  the  sermon 

250 


FICHTE,  JACOBI,  SCHELLING  251 

from  memory."  Accordingly  Gottlieb  was  sent  for,  and  to 
the  astonishment  of  the  Baron,  delivered  the  discourse  in  an 
eloquent  manner. 

The  Baron  was  so  impressed  that  he  resolved  to  provide 
for  his  education,  and  accordingly  took  him  to  his  castle; 
but  the  glooVn  of  the  castle  depressed  the  spirits  of  the  boy, 
and  unfavorably  affected  his  health.  Sympathizing  with 
the  boy's  feelings,  the  Baron  removed  him  to  the  family  of  a 
neighboring  clergyman,  where  he  spent  some  of  the  happiest 
years  of  his  life.  Here  he  began  the  study  of  language,  which 
he  continued  at  the  High  School  of  Meissen  and  then  at 
Schulpforte. 

His  life  at  Schulpforte  was  far  from  pleasant.  His  fellow 
students  were  for  the  most  part  uncongenial,  and  the  one 
who  especially  had  him  in  charge,  was  unreasonable  and 
overbearing;  but  Gottlieb  learned  the  important  lesson  of 
self-reliance. 

Meeting  with  a  copy  of  Robinson  Crusoe,  he  read  it  with 
great  zest,  and  inflamed  with  enthusiasm,  resolved  to  make 
his  abode  in  some  island,  afar  off  in  the  ocean,  out  of  the 
reach  of  troublesome  companions.  Having  reported  his 
resolution  to  his  churlish  guardian,  as  he  scorned  to  sneak 
away,  he  felt  free  to  put  his  resolve  into  execution.  An 
opportunity  presenting  itself,  he  set  off  for  Noumberg.  As  he 
trudged  on,  he  called  to  mind  what  he  had  often  heard  his 
pastor  say:  "It  is  best  when  about  to  engage  in  a  new  under- 
taking to  ask  for  the  blessing  of  God  to  rest  on  the  enter- 
prise." Kneeling  by  the  road-side,  he  prayed  for  divine 
direction  in  his  wanderings.  It  occurred  to  him,  while  pray- 
ing, that  he  would  never  see  his  parents  again,  and  that  they 
would  grieve  over  his  loss.  This  he  could  not  bear,  and  at 
once  resolved  to  retrace  his  steps.  On  returning  he  was  met 
by  a  party  in  pursuit,  as  his  purpose  to  leave  had  been  re- 
ported by  the  student  to  whose  charge  he  had  been  assigned. 
He  was  taken  before  the  Rector,  and  to  him  he  so  frankly 
related  the  whole  matter,  that  he  was  not  only  forgiven,  but 
placed  in  the  charge  of  another  student  who  treated  him  with 
so  great  kindness  that  Fichte  ever  after  felt  for  him  great 
affection. 

Knowing  the  wishes  of  his  parents,  Fichte  became  a  candi- 
date for  orders,  but  his  patron  dying,  he  abandoned  all  hope 


252  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

of  becoming  a  minister,  and  accepted  the  position  of  a  tutor 
in  a  family  in  Zurich,  Switzerland,  where  he  remained  two 
years,  making  in  the  meantime,  the  acquaintance  of  Johanna 
Rahn,  a  niece  of  Klopstock.  This  proved  a  most  fortunate 
acquaintance  for  Fichte,  for  this  lady  became  his  wife,  most 
devoted  and  helpful.  While  a  tutor,  Fichte  kept  a  journal 
in  which  he  noted  the  faults,  not  only  of  his  pupils,  but  also 
those  of  their  parents,  which  he  read  to  them  every  week. 

This  overstrained  relation  of  his  tutorship  could  not  endure, 
and  it  was  at  length  broken  off,  much  to  the  relief  of  all  con- 
cerned. Fichte  went  to  Leipzig,  and  engaged  in  giving 
private  lessons  in  language  and  philosophy.  It  was  in  Leip- 
zig that  Fichte  first  became  acquainted  with  the  writings 
of  Kant.  The  philosophy  of  Kant,  especially  his  ethical 
writings,  gave  Fichte  great  satisfaction,  and  he  characterizes 
this  period  as  the  happiest  of  his  life.  He  writes  to  Kant: 
"To  you  especially  I  owe  the  declaration  that  I  now  believe, 
with  my  whole  heart,  in  free  will,  and  that  I  see  that  under 
this  supposition  alone  can  duty,  virtue,  and  morality  have 
any  existence." 

He  visited  Kant  at  Konigsberg,  taking  with  him,  by  way 
of  introduction,  a  treatise  which  he  had  just  finished,  entitled 
A  Critique  of  every  possible  Revelation.  Kant  at  once  recog- 
nized the  value  of  the  production,  and  received  him  warmly. 
Fichte  was  in  straits  for  money,  but  Kant,  who  was  not  rich, 
could  render  him  but  little  aid. 

Fichte  revised  his  Critique  and  published  it  anonymously. 
It  gained  great  applause,  partly  by  its  merits,  and  partly, 
no  doubt,  because  it  was  generally  taken  to  be  the  work  of 
Kant  himself;  but  its  authorship  becoming  known,  Fichte 
acquired  great  celebrity,  which  secured  for  him  the  chair  of 
philosophy  in  the  University  at  Jena,  one  of  the  leading 
universities  of  Germany.  Here  he  labored  earnestly,  not 
only  for  the  intellectual  development,  but  for  the  moral 
elevation  of  the  students.  The  position  was  favorable  for 
the  calm  maturing  of  his  philosophy,  and  was  so  considered 
at  first,  by  Fichte  himself;  but  the  cry  of  Atheism  was  raised 
against  him,  and  the  charge  made  that  he  was  endeavoring 
to  undermine  the  institutions  of  the  Church.  Fichte  prompt- 
ly resigned  his  position.  He  was  called  to  the  chair  of 


FICHTE,  JACOBI,  SCHELLING  255 

Let  us  now  return  to  Fichte.  Starting  with  the  philosophy 
of  Kant,  it  was  almost  inevitable  that  he  would  reject  the 
noiiMKMioM,  or  Iliiug  iii  itself,  as.  held  by  Kant.  If  the  thing 
in  itself  is  unknowable,  why  retain  it,  rather  why  not  reject 
it  altogether?  And  this,  accordingly,  Fichte  did.  Rejecting 
the  noumenon,  he  began  with  something  he  knew  without 
question;  and  what  was  that?  Fichte  answered,  I  know  the 
rational  principle  to  be  true,  that  if  anything  exists,  it  is 
itself;  if  A  is,  then  A  is  A,  which  is  the  highest  principle,  or 
law  of  identity.  Since  /  know  this  law  to  be  true,  then  / 
exist,  and  since  I  exist,  then  /  am  /,  by  the  law  of  identity. 
The  law  of  identity  is  the  fundamental  rational  principle; 
1  lie  ego,  which  knows  the  truth  of  this  law,  is  the  fundamental 
reality,  ihe  only  fact  absolutely  known  to  be,  and  from  the 
ego,  by  the  aid  of  the  law  of  identity,  is  evolved  all  genuine 
philosophy.  That  external  thing  which  seems  to  limit  the 
ego,  which  Kant  calls  the  noumenon,  the  thing  in  itself, 
Ding  an  sick,  is  simply  the  proper  act  of  the  mind,  or  the  self- 
limitation  of  the  ego.  The  foundation  of  the  Fichtean  phi- 
losophy is,  therefore,  the  ego,  which,  with  the  law  of  identity, 
evolves,  by  its  acts,  including  its  self -limitations,  every  thing 
from  itself. 

Fichte  fortified  the  ego,  as  the  point  of  departure  thus: 
We  have  conjointly  the  ego  and  an  object.  Which  of  these 
must  be  reduced  to  the  other?  If  we  abstract  the  ego,  we 
have  left  the  object  as  the  essential  thing,  and  our  sensations 
and  representations  must  be  the  products  of  this  object;  if 
we  abstract  the  object,  we  have  left  the  ego  with  its  sensations 
and  representations.  The  former,  Fichte  calls  dogmatism, 
the  latter  idealism,  and  maintains  that  each  is  irreconcilable 
with  the  other,  and  that,  as  there  is  no  third  way,  we  must 
choose  between  the  two.  There  is,  however,  a  third  way,  we 
need  not  abstract  either  the  ego  or  the  object. 

Fichte  says  the  ego  appears  in  consciousness;  and  is  there- 
fore real,  while  the  object  is  a  mere  invention,  since  in  con- 
sciousness we  have  only  that  which  is  perceived;  hence  dog- 
matism, to  account  for  representation,  must  start  with  some- 
thing not  given  in  consciousness,  that  is,  with  assumed 
being,  not  representation,  nor  capable  of  giving  representa- 
tions. Idealism  is,  therefore,  the  only  correct  alternative, 
for  that  does  not  start  with  being  of  which  we  know  nothing, 


256  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

but  with  conscious  acts  of  intelligence;  hence  intelligence  is 
active,  not  passive,  and  there  belongs  to  it  no  being,  but 
simply  acting. 

But  does  not  acting  require  something  which  acts?  Can 
acting  act?  To  my  reason,  this  is  impossible.  Acting  is 
acting,  of  course,  as  A  is  A ;  but  acting  can  no  more  act  than ' 
running  can  run.  Acting  requires  a  being  who  acts;  knowing 
implies  an  ego  who  knows;  but  the  knowing  is  not  the  ego, 
any  more  than  running  is  the  boy  who  runs;  but  knowing  is 
the  act  of  the  ego,  a  being  having  personal  identity,  as  proved 
by  his  memory  of  past  acts. 

Fichte  has  not  shown  that  acting  is  possible  without  an 
actor,  or  that  thinking  is  possible  without  a  thinker.  He 
has  not  shown  that  the  noumenon,  or  thing  in  itself  is  im- 
possible. Of  course,  an  object  known  is  no  longer  a  thing 
in  itself,  but  is  a  thing  in  relation  to  a  mind  that  knows  the 
thing;  the  phenomenon  which  we  represent,  as  the  appear- 
ance of  the  thing,  is  our  knowledge  of  the  thing  expressed  in 
pictorial  form,  and  is  more  or  less  a  truthful  representation 
of  that  thing.  The  idealism  of  Fichte  is  simply  hypothesis, 
and  by  no  means,  the  most  reasonable  explanation  of  knowl- 
edge. 

Let  us  take  the  out-come  of  Fichte' s  philosophy  as  stated 
by  himself:  "The  sum  total  is  this:  There  is  absolutely 
nothing  permanent,  either  without  me  or  within  me,  but 
only  an  unceasing  change.  I  know  absolutely  nothing  of 
any  existence,  not  even  of  my  own.  I  myself  know  nothing, 
and  am  nothing.  Images  there  are;  they  constitute  all  that 
apparently  exist,  and  what  we  know  of  them  is  after  the 
manner  of  images;  images  that  pass  and  vanish  without  there 
being  aught  to  witness  their  transition;  that  consist  in  fact  of 
the  images  of  images,  without  significance  and  without  aim. 
I,  myself,  am  one  of  the  images;  nay,  I  am  not  even  thus 
much,  but  only  a  confused  image  of  images.  All  reality  is 
converted  into  a  marvelous  dream,  without  a  life  to  dream 
of,  and  without  a  mind  to  dream;  into  a  dream  made  up 
only  of  a  dream  of  itself.  Perception  is  a  dream ;  thought— 
the  source  of  all  the  existence  and  all  the  reality  which  I 
imagine  to  myself  of  my  existence,  of  my  power,  of  my  destina- 
tion— is  the  dream  of  that  dream." 

Fichte  supposed  that  his  view  was  Kantian,  and  that  the 
other  interpreters  of  Kant  were  mistaken  when  they  affirmed 


FICHTE,  JACOBI,  SCHELLING  257 

that  Kant  held  that  sensations  must  be  given  to  the  subject 
from  some  transcendental  object  without,  as  the  material 
condition  of  objective  reality.  He  says:  "So  long  as  Kant 
does  not  expressly  declare  that  he  derives  sensations  from 
an  impression  of  some  essential  thing,  or  to  use  his  termin- 
ology, that  sensation  must  be  explained  from  a  transcendental 
object  existing  externally  to  us,  so  long  I  will  not  believe  what 
these  expounders  tell  us  of  Kant."  But  Kant  emphatically 
rejected  the  Fichtean  interpretation  of  his  system  which  he 
declared  presupposed  something  external  called  the  noumenon 
or  the  thing  in  itself. 

It  may  be  true,  however,  that  Fichte's  interpretation  of 
Kant's  doctrine  in  regard  to  the  thing  in  itself  is  a  logical 
deduction  from  that  doctrine.  Kant  held  that  the  noumenon 
or  thing  in  itself  was  unknown  and  unknowable.  It  is  true 
that  if  the  thing  itself  is  entirely  unrelated  to  us,  so  as  in  no 
way  to  affect  us,  we  would  know  nothing  of  it,  that  is,  it 
would  be  to  us  unknown  and  unknowable;  but  if  it  is  to 
related  to  us  as  to  give  us  sensations,  as  Kant  believed  to  be 
the  case,  it  is  no  longer  a  thing  in  itself,  but  is  in  relation 
to  us.  If  this  is  true,  as  we  have  reason  to  believe,  since 
sensations  are  not  caused  by  ourselves,  but  produced  in  us 
by  a  foreign  cause,  the  noumenon,  now  no  longer  regarded 
as  a  thing  in  itself,  we  know  as  the  cause  of  our  sensations, 
and  the  phenomenon  is  the  graphic  expression  of  our  knowl- 
edge or  belief  respecting  the  noumenon  or  objective  cause  of 
our  sensations.  The  phenomena  we  witness  around  us,  on 
every  side,  are  not  phantoms,  mere  illusions  of  the  subject, 
but  are  the  appearances  of  real  things.  An  idealist  walking 
the  street  is  suddenly  encountered  by  a  dog,  which  growls, 
barks,  and  bites.  The  philosopher  perhaps  swears  at  the 
dog,  and  kicks  it,  and  walks  on  regarding  the  pain  from  the 
bite  and  the  whole  performance  a  freak  of  his  imagination. 

To  continue  the  exposition  of  Fichte's  philosophy,  returning 
to  his  starting  point:  If  anything  is,  it  is  itself;  A  is  A,  if  A 
is;  but  that  does  not  say  that  A  is,  nor  what  A  is;  it  only  says, 
if  A  is,  then  A  =A.  Now  if  I  know  this,  I  can  say,  with 
absolute  certainty,  that  I  am,  which  is  the  original  real  fact. 
Since  I  am,  or  ego  is,  I  am  I,  or  ego  =  ego.  This  ego  is  not 
any  individual  ego,  but  the  universal  ego,  the  universal 
rationality.  The  ego  is  known  to  be,  because  it  is  conscious 


258  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

of  positing  itself;  the  ego  is,  therefore,  the  original  thesis  or 
starting  point,  the  first  principle  of  philosophy  giving  the 
category  of  reality.  The  ego,  the  subject  of  any  special 
consciousness  is,  however,  a  unique  individual  ego,  the  original 
reality  known. 

The  second  fundamental  principle  is,  non-A  is  not  A,  which 
supposes  that  A  has  been  previously  posited.  What  non-A  is 
in  itself,  I  do  not  yet  know,  I  only  know  that  it  is  the  opposite 
of  A;  but  A  is  posited  through  the  ego,  the  only  reality  ab- 
solutely posited.  Hence  there  can  be  an  absolute  opposition 
only  to  the  ego,  and  that  opposition  is  the  non-ego.  The 
logical  law  of  contradiction  is,  Ego  is  not  non-ego,  or  non-ego 
is  not  ego.  This  second  principle  gives  the  category  of 
negation. 

It  might  seem  that  by  the  law  of  identity  we  could  affirm 
that  non-ego  =  non-ego,  and  this  we  can  indeed,  if  we  mean 
by  it  that  any  non-ego  is  itself;  but  not  if  the  two  non-egos 
are  not  the  same;  for  it  will  not  do  to  say  that  any  non-ego 
is  any  other  non-ego,  so  that  it  is  not  safe  to  use  the  formula 
non-A  =  non-A. 

The  third  step  is  to  explain  the  reciprocal  relation  of  the 
ego  to  the  non-ego.  Each  seems  to  suppress  the  other. 
How  can  the  ego  know  the  non-ego?  Fichte  answers:  the 
ego  knows  the  non-ego  as  a  hindrance  or  limitation  of  itself. 
In  the  impression  of  limitation,  the  ego  seems  passive  and 
the  non-ego  active.  But  is  not  this  non-ego  identical  with 
Kant's  noumenon,  or  thing  in  itself?  In  one  sense  it  is,  that 
is,  in  the  sense  of  being  something,  the  opposite  of  the  ego; 
but  the  non-ego  is  regarded  differently  by  the  two  philoso- 
phers. Kant  regarded  it  as  something  independent  of  the  sub- 
ject, a  thing  in  itself,  while  Fichte  supposed  it  to  be  the 
creation  by  the  subject,  made  by  its  own  act  of  self -limitation. 
We  thus  have  the  category  of  limitation.  The  ego  and  the 
non-ego  reciprocally  limit  each  other;  hence  also  the  cate- 
gories of  quantity  and  divisibility.  The  ego,  the  original 
activity,  posits,  in  itself,  a  divisible  non-ego,  as  limitation.'* 
of  a  divisible  Ego. 

Can  we  regard  the  apparent  objects  about  us  as  posited 
by  the  Ego?  A  person  walking  through  a  dark  room,  stum- 
bles, unexpectedly  to  himself,  on  a  chair.  Did  he  posit 
chair  in  the  sense  of  creating  a  hindrance?  Here  Kan 


tnoi 


FICHTE,  JACOBI,  SCHELLING  259 

explanation  seems  better  than  Fichte's.  The  chair  seemed 
to  exist  independently  of  the  ego,  and  proved  to  be  a  hin- 
drance. But  Kant's  theory  appears  also  at  fault.  The  chair 
was  no  longer  a  thing  by  itself,  when  the  person  stumbled  on 
it,  but  was  in  sharp  conflict  with  him,  as  an  obstruction  to  his 
progress.  Kant  would  say,  however,  all  he  knows  is  the 
phenomenon,  the  shock,  the  noise  made,  the  imaginary 
image  of  what  the  appearance  would  be,  if  the  room  should 
be  suddenly  lighted.  He  knows  also  that  there  is  an  objec- 
tive cause  of  the  shock,  the  noise,  the  surprise,  and  the  appear- 
ance, a  cause  no  longer  a  thing  in  itself,  but  in  decided  rela- 
tion to  himself  who  ran  against  the  chair. 

We  may  regard  the  phenomena  of  the  reciprocal  relation 
of  the  ego  and  non-ego  in  two  lights:  With  the  conception 
of  cause  we  posit,  through  the  passivity  of  the  Ego,  the 
activity  of  the  non-ego,  as  the  ground  of  that  passivity.  The 
passivity  and  the  activity  differ  in  quality,  the  passivity  being 
not  simply  a  diminished  activity  of  the  ego.  This  is  the  view 
of  Dogmatic  Realism.  With  the  conception  of  substance, 
we  posit  the  passivity  of  the  ego  through  its  activity,  by  a 
diminished  activity,  as  the  real  ground  of  the  apparent 
passivity,  the  passivity  of  the  ego  being  of  the  same  quality 
as  its  activity,  but  less  in  quantity.  The  apparent  passivity 
and  the  activity  differ  in  quantity.  This  is  the  view  of  Dog- 
matic Idealism.  Thus,  Dogmatic  Idealism,  affirms  that  all 
reality  of  the  non-ego  is  only  the  reality  given  to  it  by  the 
ego;  and  Dogmatic  Realism  asserts  that  nothing  can  be  given 
to  the  non-ego  unless  it  be  something  to  receive,  as  an  inde- 
pendent reality,  or  thing  in  itself. 

The  contradiction  between  these  views,  Fichte  attempted 
to  reconcile  in  a  new  ideal  synthesis,  making  the  real  ground 
identical  with  the  ideal  ground,  by  showing  that  the  simple 
activity  of  the  ego  is  not  the  ground  for  the  reality  of  the 
non-ego,  and  that  the  simple  activity  of  the  non-ego  is  not 
the  ground  for  the  passivity  of  the  ego.  In  Fichte's  new 
ideal  synthesis,  he  conceives  that  the  ego  meets  a  hindrance 
when  its  activity  can  be  no  farther  extended,  and  is  drawn 
back  into  itself,  producing  self-limitation.  The  non-ego,  or 
what  we  call  an  external  object,  is  the  activity  of  the  ego 
impinging  on  some  inconceivable  hindrance,  which  we  repre- 
sent as  an  object  filling  a  portion  of  space. 


258  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

of  positing  itself;  the  ego  is,  therefore,  the  original  thesis  or 
starting  point,  the  first  principle  of  philosophy  giving  the 
category  of  reality.  The  ego,  the  subject  of  any  special 
consciousness  is,  however,  a  unique  individual  ego,  the  original 
reality  known. 

The  second  fundamental  principle  is,  non-A  is  not  A,  which 
supposes  that  A  has  been  previously  posited.  What  non-A  is 
in  itself,  I  do  not  yet  know,  I  only  know  that  it  is  the  opposite 
of  A;  but  A  is  posited  through  the  ego,  the  only  reality  ab- 
solutely posited.  Hence  there  can  be  an  absolute  opposition 
only  to  the  ego,  and  that  opposition  is  the  non-ego.  The 
logical  law  of  contradiction  is,  Ego  is  not  non-ego,  or  non-ego 
is  not  ego.  This  second  principle  gives  the  category  of 
negation. 

It  might  seem  that  by  the  law  of  identity  we  could  affirm 
that  non-ego  =  non-ego,  and  this  we  can  indeed,  if  we  mean 
by  it  that  any  non-ego  is  itself;  but  not  if  the  two  non-egos 
are  not  the  same;  for  it  will  not  do  to  say  that  any  non-ego 
is  any  other  non-ego,  so  that  it  is  not  safe  to  use  the  formula 
non-A  =  non-A. 

The  third  step  is  to  explain  the  reciprocal  relation  of  the 
ego  to  the  non-ego.  Each  seems  to  suppress  the  other. 
How  can  the  ego  know  the  non-ego?  Fichte  answers:  the 
ego  knows  the  non-ego  as  a  hindrance  or  limitation  of  itself. 
In  the  impression  of  limitation,  the  ego  seems  passive  and 
the  non-ego  active.  But  is  not  this  non-ego  identical  with 
Kant's  noumenon,  or  thing  in  itself?  In  one  sense  it  is,  that 
is,  in  the  sense  of  being  something,  the  opposite  of  the  ego; 
but  the  non-ego  is  regarded  differently  by  the  two  philoso- 
phers. Kant  regarded  it  as  something  independent  of  the  sub- 
ject, a  thing  in  itself,  while  Fichte  supposed  it  to  be  the 
creation  by  the  subject,  made  by  its  own  act  of  self -limitation. 
We  thus  have  the  category  of  limitation.  The  ego  and  the 
non-ego  reciprocally  limit  each  other;  hence  also  the  cate- 
gories of  quantity  and  divisibility.  The  ego,  the  original 
activity,  posits,  in  itself,  a  divisible  non-ego,  as  limitatk 
of  a  divisible  Ego. 

Can  we  regard  the  apparent  objects  about  us  as  posited 
by  the  Ego?  A  person  walking  through  a  dark  room,  stum- 
bles, unexpectedly  to  himself,  on  a  chair.  Did  he  posit  tho 
chair  in  the  sense  of  creating  a  hindrance?  Here  Kant'; 


PICHTE,  JACOBI,  SCHELLING  259 

explanation  seems  better  than  Fichte's.  The  chair  seemed 
to  exist  independently  of  the  ego,  and  proved  to  be  a  hin- 
drance. But  Kant's  theory  appears  also  at  fault.  The  chair 
was  no  longer  a  thing  by  itself,  when  the  person  stumbled  on 
it,  but  was  in  sharp  conflict  with  him,  as  an  obstruction  to  his 
progress.  Kant  would  say,  however,  all  he  knows  is  the 
phenomenon,  the  shock,  the  noise  made,  the  imaginary 
image  of  what  the  appearance  would  be,  if  the  room  should 
be  suddenly  lighted.  He  knows  also  that  there  is  an  objec- 
tive cause  of  the  shock,  the  noise,  the  surprise,  and  the  appear- 
ance, a  cause  no  longer  a  thing  in  itself,  but  in  decided  rela- 
tion to  himself  who  ran  against  the  chair. 

We  may  regard  the  phenomena  of  the  reciprocal  relation 
of  the  ego  and  non-ego  in  two  lights:  With  the  conception 
of  cause  we  posit,  through  the  passivity  of  the  Ego,  the 
activity  of  the  non-ego,  as  the  ground  of  that  passivity.  The 
passivity  and  the  activity  differ  in  quality,  the  passivity  being 
not  simply  a  diminished  activity  of  the  ego.  This  is  the  view 
of  Dogmatic  Realism.  With  the  conception  of  substance, 
we  posit  the  passivity  of  the  ego  through  its  activity,  by  a 
diminished  activity,  as  the  real  ground  of  the  apparent 
passivity,  the  passivity  of  the  ego  being  of  the  same  quality 
as  its  activity,  but  less  in  quantity.  The  apparent  passivity 
and  the  activity  differ  in  quantity.  This  is  the  view  of  Dog- 
matic Idealism.  Thus,  Dogmatic  Idealism,  affirms  that  all 
reality  of  the  non-ego  is  only  the  reality  given  to  it  by  the 
ego;  and  Dogmatic  Realism  asserts  that  nothing  can  be  given 
to  the  non-ego  unless  it  be  something  to  receive,  as  an  inde- 
pendent reality,  or  thing  in  itself. 

The  contradiction  between  these  views,  Fichte  attempted 
to  reconcile  in  a  new  ideal  synthesis,  making  the  real  ground 
identical  with  the  ideal  ground,  by  showing  that  the  simple 
activity  of  the  ego  is  not  the  ground  for  the  reality  of  the 
non-ego,  and  that  the  simple  activity  of  the  non-ego  is  not 
the  ground  for  the  passivity  of  the  ego.  In  Fichte's  new 
ideal  synthesis,  he  conceives  that  the  ego  meets  a  hindrance 
when  its  activity  can  be  no  farther  extended,  and  is  drawn 
back  into  itself,  producing  self -limitation.  The  non-ego,  or 
what  we  call  an  external  object,  is  the  activity  of  the  ego 
impinging  on  some  inconceivable  hindrance,  which  we  repre- 
sent as  an  object  filling  a  portion  of  space. 


260  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

But  what  is  this  hindrance?  Fichte's  new  synthesis  brings 
us  back  only  to  what  Kant  called  the  thing  in  itself,  but 
which  is  truly  a  thing  in  relation  to  us.  It  is  not  an  incon- 
ceivable hindrance,  as  Fichte  calls  it,  but  a  real  object  which 
we  represent,  as  well  as  we  can,  in  the  phenomenal  appearance, 
which  with  the  help  of  the  object,  is  a  construction  of  our 
own  minds,  and  in  this  phenomenal  appearance  lies  the  real 
truth  of  idealism.  The  appearance  is  ideal;  the  objective 
cause  is  real. 

Fichte's  ethical  philosophy  grew  out  of  his  theoretical. 
Moral  action  is  a  striving  after  ideal  perfection;  but  as  we 
advance  the  goal  advances  before  us,  and  seems  more  remote 
as  our  vision  becomes  clearer.  The  rule,  Do  that  which 
conscience  requires,  will  lead  us  to  conform  our  conduct 
to  the  moral  order  of  the  universe,  which  is  the  order  or- 
dained by  God  himself,  or  as  Fichte  conceived  it,  is  itself 
God. 

2.  Jacobi  (1743-1819).  Friedrich  Heinrich  Jacobi,  born 
at  Diisseldorf,  was  the  second  son  of  a  wealthy  merchant. 
He  was  educated,  according  to  the  direction  of  his  father, 
for  a  commercial  career,  partly  at  Diisseldorf  and  at  Frank- 
fort-on-the-Main.  To  complete  his  education,  he  was  sent 
to  Geneva,  at  the  age  of  sixteen,  where  he  spent  four  years 
in  thoughtful  study,  associating  himself  with  the  literary  and 
scientific  circles  of  the  city,  and  enlarging  his  range  of  thought 
by  extensive  reading. 

In  1763,  he  returned  to  Diisseldorf,  and  in  the  following 
year  married  and  took  his  father's  place  as  the  head  of  the 
large  commercial  establishment,  which  he  managed  with 
great  success. 

He  gave  up  his  commercial  career  in  1770,  and  became  a 
member  of  the  council  for  the  duchies  of  Juliers  and  Berg, 
and  gained  distinction  as  a  financier  and  reformer.  He 
continued,  however,  to  keep  up  his  interest  in  literature  and 
philosophy,  and  his  home  was  the  center  of  a  circle  of  friends 
distinguished  for  literary  ability. 

Some  of  his  earliest  writings,  both  on  Economics  and 
Philosophy,  were  contributions  to  the  Mercury,  a  new  liter- 
ary journal  projected  by  himself  and  Wieland,  with  the  aid 
of  other  friends.  Among  his  contributions  to  this  journal 
may  be  mentioned,  the  Correspondence  of  Attwell,  a  com- 


FICHTE,  JACOBI,  SCHELLING  261 

bination  of  fiction  and  philosophy,  and  Waldemar,  a  phil- 
osophic novel,  which  exhibits  Jacobi's  peculiar  method  of  phil- 
osophizing, by  a  genial  speculation,  in  a  pleasing  pictorial 
manner. 

Lessing,  in  a  conversation  with  Jacobi,  had  avowed  that 
he  knew  no  philosophy  in  the  true  sense  of  the  term,  save 
Spinoza's,  and  this  remark  led  Jacobi  to  make  a  thorough 
study  of  Spinoza's  works.  Making  the  statement  of  Lessing 
concerning  Spinoza  public,  drew  Jacobi  into  controversy  with 
Moses  Mendelssohn,  who  however,  showed  but  slight 
acquaintance  with  Spinoza's  philosophy.  In  his  published 
letters  on  Spinoza's  philosophy,  Jacobi  expressed  decided 
objections  to  a  demonstrated  philosophy,  but  this  brought 
upon  him  the  ridicule  of  the  Berlin  clique  of  which  Mendels- 
sohn was  the  head.  He  was  charged  with  being  an  enemy 
to  reason,  an  advocate  of  blind  faith,  a  fanatic,  and  probably 
a  Jesuit  in  disguise.  To  vindicate  himself,  he  wrote  in  1787, 
a  dialogue  entitled  David  Hume,  or  Faith,  Idealism,  and 
Realism,  in  which  he  develops  his  principle  of  faith,  or  im- 
mediate knowledge.  The  truth,  however,  is  faith  is  not 
knowledge,  though  based  on  knowledge. 

In  1804,  Jacobi  was  called  to  the  new  Academy  of  Sciences 
in  Munich,  and  in  1807,  he  was  chosen  president  of  the 
Institution,  which  position  he  held  till  his  death  in  1819. 

Jacobi  directed  his  polemic  against  the  doctrine  that  all 
knowledge  is  mediate,  or  that  philosophy  is  demonstrable 
throughout.  He  maintained  that  Spinozism  is  fatalism  and 
atheism;  it  is  fatalism,  because  it  asserts  that  the  human 
will  falsely  holds  itself  free,  since  freedom  is  a  delusion,  as  all 
events  occur  from  necessity  according  to  invariable  law;  it 
is  atheism,  because  it  holds  that  the  cause  of  the  world  is  not 
a  being  endowed  with  reason  and  will,  not  a  free  creator  and 
governor  of  the  world,  not  a  God  having  great  plans  to 
accomplish  and  benevolent  ends  to  realize  by  the  employment 
of  wise  means,  but  that  nature  is  the  only  God,  working 
blindly  according  to  the  law  of  strict  necessity. 

Fatalism  and  atheism,  Jacobi  endeavored  to  show,  are 
the  necessary  consequences  of  the  attempt  to  construct  a 
strictly  demonstrated  philosophy.  To  understand  a  thing  is 
to  explain  it  by  its  cause.  We  go  back,  in  a  regress  order, 
from  the  conditioned  to  the  condition,  which  is  also  condi- 


262  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

tioned,  and  so  on.  If  the  series  has  no  end,  though  we  seem 
to  account  for  everything,  yet  there  is  alway  one  thing  left 
unexplained,  the  condition  of  the  last  conditioned  that  was 
explained,  and  therefore  nothing  is  absolutely  explained;  but 
we  simply  assume  an  endless  chain  in  which  each  link  follows 
from  the  preceding  by  inexorable  necessity,  in  which  there 
is  neither  free  will,  nor  a  free  personal  God.  If  we  pause 
anywhere,  the  last  condition  is  not  explained;  if  we  accept 
this  last  condition  as  truly  ultimate,  it  is  unconditioned, 
absolute  or  infinite,  we  accept  it  without  explanation,  and 
the  so-called  demonstrated  philosophy  fails  to  be  demon- 
strative. Jacobi,  therefore  held  that  Spinoza's  philosophy  is 
the  only  demonstrated  philosophy,  but  demonstrated  only 
on  the  assumption  of  an  endless  chain,  which  with  its  necessi- 
tated links,  involves  both  fatalism  and  atheism.  Spinoza, 
however,  attempted  to  escape  atheism  by  identifying  God 
with  nature,  as  in  his  oft  repeated  expression,  Deus  vel  Natura, 
which  is  the  expression  for  pantheism. 

Jacobi's  philosophy  goes  back,  not  in  an  infinite  series, 
but  to  an  Unconditioned  Cause,  the  First  Cause,  or  God, 
which  he  accepted  by  faith.  He,  however,  explains  that  his 
faith  is  not  a  blind  faith,  resting  on  external  authority,  but  a 
faith  having  its  root  in  feeling,  not  in  sensation  so-called, 
which  has  physical  conditions,  but  in  pure  feeling,  through 
reason,  or  rational  intuition.  Jacobi's  faith  is  rational  intui- 
tion. This  rational  intuition  is  not  a  logical  consequent 
deduced  from  premises,  after  the  syllogistic  fashion,  but  is 
the  logical  antecedent,  presupposition  or  necessary  condition 
of  all  rational  knowledge,  and  is  apprehended,  at  once,  by  the 
direct  insight  of  the  reason,  whose  very  essence,  according  to 
Jacobi,  is  faith,  or  instinctive  feeling,  but  is  truly  rational 
insight.  Jacobi,  however,  resolved  all  cognition  ultimately 
into  feeling. 

Jacobi  complained  of  the  increasing  tendency,  in  the 
philosophic  schools,  since  the  time  of  Aristotle,  to  subordi- 
nate reason  to  the  understanding,  to  subject  immediate 
knowledge  to  mediate,  to  absorb  intuitive  knowledge  by 
demonstrative.  He  opposed  Kant's  theory  that  space  and 
time  are  given  a  priori  as  form  of  external  perception,  in 
which  phenomena,  mere  determinations  of  our  minds,  seem 
to  be  located,  though  they  have  no  external  existence,  holding 


FICHTE,  JACOBI,  SCHELLING  263 

that  Kant  was  illogical  in  postulating  the  thing  in  itself,  of 
which,  by  his  own  confession,  he  knew  nothing,  giving,  in 
this  respect,  the  palm  to  Fichte. 

It  is  true  that  phenomena  have  no  existence  apart  from 
mind,  for  they  are  mental  pictures,  yet  as  held  by  Jacobi, 
they  are  revelations  of  objective  facts,  representing  as  truly 
as  pictures  can,  our  discoveries  or  beliefs  concerning  external 
things. 

Jacobi  admitted  that  Kant  did  good  practical  work  in  his 
critique  of  the  understanding,  in  showing  its  insufficiency 
to  know  the  supersensible,  thus  destroying  a  delusive  error, 
and  clearing  the  way  for  genuine  rational  intuition,  the 
ground  of  valid  faith  in  God  and  in  the  reality  of  the  external 
world.  In  this  respect,  the  philosophy  of  Jacobi  passed 
beyond  that  of  Kant. 

But  Jacobi  was  not  in  sympathy  with  the  atheistic  tenden  - 
cies  of  the  post-Kantian  philosophy.  Kant  held  firmly  to  his 
belief  in  God,  freedom,  and  immortality,  as  necessary  postu- 
lates of  practical  reason.  Rational  intuition  was,  we  may 
believe,  the  foundation  of  Kant's  faith  in  these  realities, 
though  he  failed  clearly  to  apprehend  its  nature;  if  so,  he 
was  in  practical,  though  not  in  theoretical  agreement  with 
Jacobi.  Fichte  makes  the  living  working  order  itself,  with- 
out substance,  to  be  God,  an  inverted  Spinozism,  which  makes 
the  one  sole  substance  to  be  God,  who  thus  lives  and  works, 
though  blindly,  according  to  inherent  immutable  law. 

In  Jacobi's  philosophy,  the  understanding  and  the  feelings 
are  strictly  separated.  Jacobi  said:  "There  is  light  in  my 
heart,  but  it  goes  out  whenever  I  attempt  to  bring  it  into  the 
understanding."  Jacobi,  in  order  to  escape  this  contradic- 
tion, brought  in  immediate  knowledge,  but  this  will  not 
answer  for  conditioned  things,  but  only  for  the  condition,  and 
then  only  when  the  condition  is  a  rational  principle.  But 
will  this  hold  good?  Some  philosophers  say  not,  since  it  is 
not  divorced  from  all  other  knowledge;  yet  it  will  hold;  for 
it  is  not  deduced  from  other  knowledge  as  a  logical  conse- 
quent, but  the  other  knowledge  being  given,  it  is  apprehend 
immediately  by  reason  as  the  necessary  condition,  or  logical 
antecedent.  Thus  we  know  that  every  event  requires  a 
cause,  and  knowing  a  particular  event,  without  knowing  the 
cause,  we  know  that  it  has  a  cause. 


264  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

3.  Schelling  (1775-1854).  Friedrich  Wilhelm  Joseph  Von 
Schelling  was  born  at  Leonberg  in  Wiirtemberg.  His 
father,  an  excellent  Oriental  scholar,  was  chaplain  and  pro- 
fessor in  a  Seminary  at  Bebenhausen,  for  the  preparatory 
training  of  Theological  Students.  At  his  home,  Schelling 
received  his  early  training,  and  showed  great  quickness  of 
intellect.  In  his  tenth  year,  he  was  sent  to  a  Latin  school 
at  Nurtingen,  and  such  was  his  precocity,  that  he  acquired, 
in  two  years,  all  he  could  receive  from  that  school,  and  re- 
turning home,  was  permitted  to  study  with  the  students  of 
the  Seminary. 

In  1790,  though  three  years  under  age,  he  was,  by  special 
permission,  admitted  to  the  Theological  school  at  Tubingen, 
where  he  had  Hegel  for  a  fellow  student.  He  graduated  in 
1792,  presenting  a  Latin  thesis.  Continuing  his  Theological 
and  Philosophical  studies,  and  his  literary  activity,  he 
received  in  1795,  his  Theological  degree,  presenting  a  thesis 
entitled,  De  Marcione  Paulinarum  Epistolarum  Emendatore. 

From  1792  to  1795,  after  graduating  and  before  receiving 
his  degree,  he  had  studied  the  works  of  both  Kant  and  Fichte, 
and  with  his  usual  promptness,  and  perhaps  with  undue 
haste,  published  the  results  of  his  studies  in  an  essay  as  early 
as  1794.  This  essay  was  followed,  in  1795,  by  a  more  elab- 
orate attempt  to  combine  Fichte's  system  with  Spinoza's, 
thus  giving  it  a  more  objective  form. 

For  two  years  he  was  tutor  and  companion  of  two  youths 
of  noble  family,  at  Leipsic,  contributing  articles,  in  the 
meantime,  to  Fichte's  Philosophical  Journal,  besides  engag- 
ing ardently  in  the  study  of  medicine  and  physical  science. 

In  1798,  Schelling  was  called,  as  professor  extraordinary 
of  philosophy,  to  the  University  at  Jena,  and  became  a 
co-laborer  with  Fichte;  and  after  Fichte  resigned  his  position 
at  Jena,  Schelling  was  appointed  to  fill  the  vacant  chair, 
and  this  position  he  held  till  1803.  His  lectures  were  very 
attractive,  and  he  assumed  a  more  independent  position. 
While  holding  this  professorship,  he  published  several  works, 
and  made  numerous  contributions  to  various  Literary  and 
Scientific  Journals.  In  connection  with  Hegel,  whom  he  had 
invited  to  Jena  in  1801,  he  edited  a  Philosophical  Journal, 
thus  raising  the  university  of  Jena  to  the  height  of  its  reputa- 
tion, as  a  philosophic  center. 


PICHTE,  JACOBI,  SCHELLING  265 

Schelling  was  on  friendly  terms  with  Goethe,  who  was 
pleased  with  the  naturalistic  and  picturesque  turn  he 
gave  to  philosophy;  and  he  was  hailed  as  a  powerful  ally,  by 
the  representatives  of  the  Romantic  School. 

With  August  Wilhelm  Schlegel  and  his  wife,  Caroline,  a 
gifted  woman,  Schellmg  was  on  terms  of  intimate  friendship. 
Caroline  afterwards  became  his  wife,  and  with  his  marriage, 
on  account  of  impropriety,  his  life  at  Jena  came  to  an  end. 

He  was  called  to  Wurzberg  in  1803,  as  professor  of  Natur- 
philosphie,  where  he  remained  till  1806,  when  he  removed 
to  Munich,  where  his  positions  as  state  official,  associate  in  the 
Academy  of  Science,  secretary  of  the  Academy  of  Arts  and 
afterwards  that  of  Science,  requiring  little  work,  gave  him 
abundant  leisure  for  quiet  study  and  literary  work.  While 
holding  these  positions,  he  lectured  at  Stuttgart  and  at 
Erlangen.  His  wife,  Caroline,  having  died,  he  married 
Pauline  Gotter,  who  was  a  devoted  and  helpful  companion. 

In  these  years  at  WTiirzberg,  during  Hegel's  philosophical 
supremacy,  Schelling  was  comparatively  quiet;  but  after 
the  death  of  Hegel  in  1831,  Schelling  made  public  his  antag- 
onism to  the  Hegelian  philosophy,  stimulated  no  doubt  by  a 
remembrance  of  some  sharp  criticisms  which  Hegel  had 
made  on  Schelling's  philosophy. 

In  1841,  Schelling  was  appointed  a  privy  counsellor,  and 
made  a  member  of  the  Berlin  Academy,  which  gave  him  the 
right  to  lecture  in  the  University.  His  opening  lecture  drew 
an  appreciative  crowd,  and  thus  again  Schelling  appeared  as 
the  first  figure  in  philosophy  but  in  this  course,  nothing  new 
of  special  interest  was  developed. 

After  the  death  of  Schelling  in  1854,  his  sons  issued  three 
volumes  of  his  works — two  on  the  Philosophy  of  Mythology, 
and  one  on  the  Philosophy  of  Revelation. 

Schelling's  philosophy  is  not  a  complete  coherent  system, 
consistent  throughout,  but  rather  a  succession  of  stages 
without  organic  union,  corresponding  to  six  different  periods 
of  his  life,  but  each  displaying  the  peculiar  bent  of  his  genius. 

In  the  first  period,  Schelling's  point  of  view  is  that  of 
Fichte's.  His  essay  On  the  Possibility  of  a  Form  of  Philosophy 
shows  the  necessity  of  the  supreme  principle — The  Law  of 
Identity,  first  propounded  by  Fichte;  and  his  essay  On  the 


£66  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Ego  show  that  only  in  the  Ego  can  be  found  the  ultimate 
ground  of  knowledge,  reaching  as  Schelling  believes,  the  con- 
clusion that  Idealism  is  the  only  true  philosophy. 

In  the  second  period,  Schelling  distinguishes  between  the 
philosophy  of  nature  and  the  philosophy  of  mind.  This 
stage  of  his  thinking  is  found  in  A  System  of  Natural  Philoso- 
phy published  in  1799,  and  in  the  Journal  of  Speculative 
Physics  for  1800,  1801,  also  in  A  System  of  Transcendental 
Idealism  published  in  1800. 

In  the  third  period,  Schelling  returns  to  Spinoza,  and  takes 
his  stand  on  the  indifference  of  the  ideal  and  real  or  of  the 
subject  and  object.  His  chief  writings  of  this  period  are: 
Exposition  of  my  System  of  Philosophy;  Ideas  for  a  Philosophy 
of  Nature;  a  dialogue,  Bruno  or  the  Divine,  and  the  Natural 
Principle  of  Things;  the  Method  of  Academical  Study;  articles 
in  the  New  Journal  of  Speculative  Physics. 

In  the  fourth  period,  Schelling  inclines  to  Mysticism  and 
Neo-Platonism.  In  this  period,  his  writings  are:  Philosophy 
and  Religion,  Exposition  of  the  True  Relation  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Nature  and  the  Improved  Theory  ofFichte,  and  articles  in  the 
Medical  Journal. 

In  the  fifth  period,  Schelling  attempted  a  Theogony  and 
Cosmogony  after  the  manner  of  Jacob  Boehme. 

In  the  sixth  period,  Schelling  published  lectures  On  the 
Divinities  of  Samothrace;  a  Critical  Preface  to  Becker's  Transla- 
tion of  a  Preface  of  Cousin,  in  which  he  styles  his  philosophy 
Positive  Philosophy,  or  the  Philosophy  of  Mythology  and  Reve- 
lation. 

The  writings  of  Schelling  are  not  self-consistent.  In  fact, 
Fichte  said  Schelling  was  muddled.  He  was  imaginative, 
vacillating  and  inconsistent,  though  he  had  great  influence 
when  at  the  height  of  his  popularity. 


I 


CHAPTER  XXII 

Hegel 

Hegel  (1770-1831).  George  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel  was 
born  at  Stuttgart;  and  in  the  Gymnasium  of  the  same  place 
he  received  his  preparation  for  the  University. 

While  in  the  gymnasium,  he  kept,  for  some  time,  a  diary 
in  which  he  recorded  matters  which  interested  him.  He 
translated  the  Antigone  and  other  Greek  plays,  and  made  ex- 
tracts from  the  books  he  studied,  and  from  current  publica- 
tions and  standard  works,  arranging  them  under  alphabetic 
heads.  Not  only  did  he  acquire  from  others,  but  he  wrote 
many  essays  displaying  original  powers,  and  showing  his 
admiration  for  the  ancient  classics.  He  thus  combined  the 
two  characteristics  of  a  great  mind — the  power  of  acquisition 
and  of  origination. 

He  entered  the  University  of  Tubingen,  at  the  age  of 
eighteen,  as  a  student  of  Theology;  but  he  manifested  little 
interest  in  either  the  theology  or  the  philosophy  taught 
at  the  university,  preferring  to  spend  his  time  reading  the 
classics.  In  due  time  he  took  his  degree,  and  received  his 
certificate  crediting  him  with  good  abilities,  average  knowl- 
edge and  industry,  but  deficiency  in  philosophy.  Hegel  was, 
however,  all  the  time,  laying  up  stores  of  knowledge  of  the 
ancient  world,  and  gathering  a  mass  of  miscellaneous  informa- 
tion which  later  served  him  good  purpose,  not  only  for  general 
utility,  but  also  for  application  to  philosophy.  He  also 
gained  much  from  conversation  with  his  associates,  but 
especially  with  Holderlin  and  Schelling. 

After  his  university  course,  Hegel  was,  for  three  years,  a 
tutor  in  the  family  of  M.  Steiger,  whose  summer  residence 
was  Tschugg  and  winter  residence  Berne.  Hegel  made  but 
few  acquaintances  in  Berne,  yet  he  systematically  studied 
its  fiscal  system;  he  also  devoted  earnest  study  to  Christianity 
and  wrote  a  life  of  Jesus,  in  whom  he  found  a  noble  spirit, 
calm  in  the  consciousness  of  his  oneness  of  spirit  with  God. 

267 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

While  engaged  with  these  studies,  he  kept  up  a  correspond- 
ence with  Holderlin  and  Schelling.  He  was  stimulated  by 
Schelling,  whose  brilliant  genius  was  gaining  him  fame,  to 
direct  his  attention  more  especially  to  philosophy,  and  was 
thus  kept  abreast  in  the  latest  speculations,  especially  in 
Kantian  philosophy.  By  the  acquisitions  thus  gained, 
Hegel's  mind  was  enriched  and  furnished  with  material  for 
future  use. 

In  1797,  through  the  influence  of  his  friend,  Holderlin, 
Hegel  became  tutor  in  the  family  of  a  merchant  in  Frankfort, 
and  this  position  was  favorable  for  study,  and  brought  him 
into  intercourse  with  intellectual  society.  With  Holderlin 
he  renewed  his  interest  in  Greek  literature  and  with  Sinclare, 
a  disciple  of  Fichte,  he  revived  his  interest  in  philosophy, 
as  advanced  by  Fichte's  speculations.  While  in  Frankfort, 
he  also  turned  his  attention  to  Economics  and  the  science  of 
Government,  and  on  these  subjects  wrote  some  able  essays. 
He  attached  great  importance  to  religious  questions,  and 
emphasized  the  distinction  between  a  religion  enforced  by 
authority,  and  the  natural  religious  development  of  a  people. 

It  was  while  at  Frankfort  that  the  philosophic  ideas  of 
Hegel  were  first  reduced  to  systematic  form.  He  corre- 
sponded with  Schelling  in  reference  to  his  making.  Bamberg, 
a  place  of  residence;  but  the  result  of  the  correspondence 
was  an  invitation  to  come  to  Jena  as  an  assistant  of  Schelling 
in  philosophy.  The  two  philosophers  published  conjointly 
a  Critical  Philosophical  Journal,  for  which  Hegel  wrote  the 
majority  of  the  articles. 

The  subject  of  his  dissertation,  which  qualified  him  for  the 
position  of  Privatdocent  was  De  Orbitis  Planetarum,  in 
which  he  expressed  doubts  in  regard  to  the  existence  of  a 
planet  between  the  orbits  of  Mars  and  that  of  Jupiter,  and 
this  was  afterwards  made  the  ground  of  attack  on  his  a  priori 
philosophy,  as  a  method  for  the  deduction  of  facts. 

At  Jena,  Hegel  delivered  lectures  on  philosophy,  logic  and 
mathematics.  After  Schelling  left  Jena  in  1803,  Hegel  had 
the  field  of  philosophy  to  himself.  His  lectures  though  ex- 
pressing deep  thought  were  too  obscure  to  be  popular.  His 
view  of  art  was,  that  it  should  express  the  national  taste  in 
regard  to  beauty,  and  as  the  expression  of  the  general  sense 
of  beauty,  it  is  transmitted  enriched  from  generation 
generation. 


OC11OG 

an  to 


HEGEL  269 

Napoleon's  victory  at  Jena  disturbed  him  in  his  philosophi- 
cal labors,  and  threw  him  out  of  employment;  but  he  was 
offered  the  position  of  editor  of  the  Bamberger  Zeitung, 
which  he  accepted,  and  filled  the  place  for  eighteen  months, 
when  he  was  appointed  to  the  rectorship  of  the  Gymnasium 
at  Nuremberg. 

In  1811,  Hegel  married  Marie  Von  Tucher,  who  proved 
to  be  an  excellent  wife.  In  1816,  he  came  to  Heidelberg,  as 
professor  of  Philosophy,  where  he  published  the  Encyclopedia 
of  the  philosophical  sciences.  After  two  years*  service  at 
Heidelberg,  Hegel  accepted  the  chair  of  philosophy  at  Berlin, 
where  he  reached  the  zenith  of  his  fame.  The  conciliatory 
character  of  his  doctrines,  supporting  as  they  did  both  the 
church  and  the  state,  gave  them  great  popularity,  and. his 
system  was  hailed  as  the  national  philosophy. 

Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume,  form  a  chain  of  three  links. 
Locke,  the  first  and  original,  Berkeley,  the  intermediate 
link,  Hume  the  terminal  and  logical  outcome,  constitute  a 
natural  development.  Hume  awoke  Kant  from  his  dogmat- 
ic slumbers.  In  like  manner,  Kant,  Fichte,  Schelling,  Hegel, 
constitute  a  chain  of  four  links.  The  two  intermediate 
links,  Fichte  and  Schelling,  connect  Hegel  with  Kant,  and 
to  them  Hegel  is  truly  indebted;  but  it  is  from  Kant  that  he 
derives  his  inspiration. 

HegeFs  success  was  especially  due  to  three  facts :  he  had 
made  a  long  and  industrious  preparation;  he'  had  great 
capacity  for  acquisition;  he  had  strong  powers  of  origina- 
tion. 

The  following  is  the  list  of  his  principal  works,  in  seventeen 
volumes:  Vol.  1,  Minor  Articles;  2,  Phenomenology;  3-5, 
Logic;  6,  7,  Encyclopedia;  8,  Philosophy  of  Rights;  9,  Philos- 
ophy of  History;  10,  Aesthetics;  11,  12,  Philosophy  of  Relig- 
ion; 13-15,  History  of  Philosophy;  16,  17,  Miscellanies. 

The  Phenomenology  and  the  Logic  are  the  most  important 
of  Hegel's  works,  though  the  Philosophy  of  History  is  the 
most  readable  and  interesting.  The  Phenomenology  was 
published  in  1807,  and  the  Logic  six  years  later. 

Thd  Phenomenology  develops  the  concept,  and  by  analy- 
sis and  abstraction,  attempts  to  reach  the  Absolute  in  which 
the  All  is  reduced  to  the  One.  The  Logic,  beginning  with  the 


270  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Absolute,  reverses  the  process,  and  by  continued  synthesis, 
develops  the  One  into  the  All.  Individual  forms  of  concrete 
existence  are  regarded  as  subjective,  or  phenomenal  mani- 
festations of  the  Absolute. 

The  perception  of  a  tree,  for  example,  is  not  immediate, 
since  the  perception  cannot  exist  except  through  the  inter- 
vention of  the  tree  or  object  perceived,  nor  likewise  save 
through  the  intervention  of  the  ego  or  subject  perceiving, 
but  the  ego  and  the  tree  are,  according  to  Hegel,  merely 
phenomenal  manifestations  of  the  Absolute.  The  idea  of 
this  tree  is,  however,  individual.  Ideas  of  other  trees  can, 
in  like  manner,  be  formed. 

Now,  dropping  from  the  ideas  the  individual  peculiarities, 
retaining  what  is  common,  we  pass  to  the  concept  tree, 
which  is  equally  applicable  to  every  tree,  since  the  individual 
marks,  which  would  exclude  any  tree,  have  been  dropped. 
We  now  have  the  concept  of  the  class  tree.  Other  concepts, 
besides  that  of  tree,  can,  in  like  manner,  be  formed,  and  taken 
in  along  with  the  concept  tree,  if  we  drop  the  peculiar  charac- 
teristics of  each  concept,  retaining  only  what  is  common  to 
all  the  concepts;  and  so  on,  we  can  rise,  till  we  reach  the 
highest  genus,  embracing  every  actual  and  possible  concept, 
and  applicable  to  any  class  or  individual  object.  What 
then  have  we?  Evidently  Being;  not  Being  embracins 
both  extent  and  content,  but  only  content.  What  is  itg 
content?  Hegel  answers — Nothing;  Being  =  Nothing.  The 
true  answer,  however,  is  existence,  that  is  the  universal  content 
of  Being,  and  that  only. 

Hegel,  however,  deals  not  especially  with  the  extent 
of  a  class,  but  with  content,  the  concept,  the  idea  in 
the  Platonic  sense,  and  by  the  dialectical  method;  his 
philosophy  is  Idealism.  To  him,  as  to  Plato,  the  con- 
crete individual  object,  or  the  class,  the  whole  collection  of 
individuals  to  which  the  concept  is  applicable,  or  the  extent 
of  the  concept,  is  of  little  account,  save  as  specimens,  for 
these  are  transitory  and  will  pass  away.  The  individual 
diagram  of  a  triangle,  for  example,  drawn  on  paper  or  on  a 
black-board,  may  be  erased,  and  another,  or  many  others, 
drawn  instead,  which,  in  like  manner,  may  be  erased;  but 
the  idea,  the  concept  triangle,  abides ;  and  it  is  with  conce] 


HEGEL  271 

that  philosophy  deals.  Nature  herself  follows  this  method 
in  her  carefulness  for  the  species  and  carelessness  for  the 
individual : 

"So  careful  of  the  type  she  seems, 
So  careless  of  the  single  life." 

It  is,  however,  due  that  philosophy  give  some  account  of 
the  individual,  and  this  it  does  by  seeing  in  it  the  concept, 
the  idea  embodied,  whatever  individual  peculiarities,  or 
accidents,  it  may  contain. 

In  rising  from  the  individual,  a  tree  for  example,  to  Being, 
according  to  the  Hegelian  method,  we  neglected  the  extent, 
that  is,  individuals  and  classes,  and  considered  only  the 
content,  the  concept,  the  common  attributes,  which  become 
less  and  less,  as  we  ascend,  till  we  reach  Being,  the  highest 
genus,  when  the  content  is  a  minimum,  simply  Existence,  but 
not  Nothing. 

To  neglect  extent,  or  to  consider  only  content,  is  however, 
an  arbitrary  proceeding.  We  should  consider  both  kinds  of 
quantity — extent  and  content.  Then,  in  ascending  from  an 
individual  to  its  species  or  class,  reducing  the  idea  of  the 
individual  to  the  concept,  or  common  content  of  the  class, 
and  then  passing  from  the  species  to  the  genus,  and  so  on, 
we  continually  increase  the  extent  and  diminish  the  content, 
till  reaching  Being,  the  highest  genus,  which  is  a  maximum 
in  extent,  since  it  embraces  every  object  in  the  universe,  but 
is  a  minimum  in  content,  since  its  only  common  attribute  is 
existence. 

.  Does  Being,  then,  equal  Nothing?  No;  it  includes  in  its 
extent  every  actual  object  in  the  universe,  and  in  its  content, 
existence,  their  common  content  or  attribute.  It  is,  how- 
ever, to  be  understood  that  Being  in  its  extent,  contains 
all  objects,  and  in  it  content,  every  actual  attribute,  not  as 
common  to  all  Being,  but  as  found  somewhere  in  the  sub- 
divisions of  its  extent. 

We  can  now  begin  with  Being,  including  all  reality,  and 
descend  by  the  division  of  its  extent,  adding  the  proper 
content  to  the  several  divisions  and  sub-divisions,  till  we 
reach  individuals,  which  are  minima  in  extent,  but  maxima 
in  content.  The  law  of  the  relation  of  the  content  to  the 
extent  is:  The  content  varies  inversely  as  the  extent.  Any 
division  between  an  individual  and  Being  is  neither  a  maxi- 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

mum  nor  a  minimum,  either  as  to  extent  or  content.  We 
divide  extent,  and  analyze  content.  Any  subdivision  can  be 
defined  by  referring  it  to  its  class  and  designating  it  by  its 
characteristic  attribute.  Being  cannot  be  defined,  its  extent 
can  be  divided,  but  its  content  cannot  be  analyzed;  an 
individual  can  be  defined,  its  extent  cannot  be  divided,  but 
its  content  can  be  analyzed;  any  intermediate  class,  between 
the  Individual  and  Being,  can  be  defined,  its  extent  divided 
and  its  content  analyzed.  The  name  of  any  division  denotes 
its  extent  and  connotes  its  content. 

What  is  the  nature  of  Being?  It  is  not  necessarily  a 
particular  thing,  as  this  tree,  that  horse,  John  Brown;  but 
all  these  agree  in  existing,  in  being,  which,  as  common  to  all, 
we  can  abstract  from  each  of  these  objects.  The  being  is  no 
particular  thing,  and  that  is  what  Hegel  meant  when  he  said 
being  is  no  thing;  that  is,  Being  =  Nothing;  but  certainly 
when  we  say  this  tree  is,  that  horse  is,  John  Brown  is,  the  is, 
common  to  all  these  statements,  evidently  has  meaning.  Is 
the  meaning  of  is  nothing?  It  is  truly  no  concrete  thing 
taken  as  a  whole;  but  we  call  it  Being,  or  existence;  it  is  the 
actuality  of  these  objects,  as  opposed  to  their  non-existence. 

Being,  then,  is  existence,  not  a  determinate  existence,  as 
tree,  horse,  man,  but  it  has  a  real  meaning,  or  has  objective 
reality  in  everything,  as  their  common  attribute,  and  though, 
in  thought,  it  can  be  abstracted  from  any  or  all  determinate 
things,  and  has  no  objective  existence  apart  from  determinate 
things,  yet  it  has  subjective  existence  as  the  idea  of  the  com- 
mon content  of  all  existing  things  Its  objective  reality  is 
maintained,  not  by  its  own  energy,  but  by  the  energy  of  the 
determinate  things  of  which  it  is  the  common  attribute;  as 
subjective  idea,  it  is  formed,  and  may  be  kept  indefinitely 
in  mind,  by  thought.  Hence,  Being,  the  highest  genus,  has 
existence,  objective  as  the  common  attribute  of  things,  or 
subjective  as  the  idea  of  this  common  attribute,  and  is  kept 
in  existence,  in  the  one  case,  by  the  energy  of  the  objects, 
and  in  the  other,  by  the  energy  of  thought.  The  First  Cause, 
as  eternal  energy,  has  eternal  Being,  and  is  the  Ultimate 
Reality. 

The  Logic  of  Hegel,  descending  by  division,  from  Being, 
the  highest  genus,  attempts  to  develop  every  existing  thi 


HEGEL  273 

Hegel  says:  "Being,  pure  Being,  has  no  distinction  within 
itself,  and  none  in  any  reference  outwards.  .  .  There  is 
nothing  to  be  perceived  in  it,  .  .  or  it  is  only  this  pure 
void  perceiving  itself.  Just  as  little  is  anything  to  be  thought 
in  it,  ...  or  it  is  equally  only  this  void  thought,  this 
void  thinking.  Being,  the  indefinite  immediate,  is  in  fact 
Nothing,  neither  more  nor  less  than  Nothing." 

We  assent  that  Being  is  no  definite  thing,  and  that  is 
probably  what  Hegel  meant  by  Nothing;  but  Being  is  truly 
existence,  indeterminate  existence;  for  without  Being  there 
can  be  no  determinate  existence,  no  determinate  thing;  but 
there  are  determinate  things;  hence,  there  must  be  Being. 
Is  pure  Being,  then,  the  energy  which  keeps  determinate 
things  in  existence?  No;  but  determinate  things  must  have 
being,  and  it  is  their  persistent  energy  that  sustains  their 
Being  or  existence.  Pure  Being,  then,  is  Nothing  in  the 
sense  of  no  determinate  thing;  but  it  is  not  absolute  Nothing; 
it  is  that  without  which  there  cannot  be  any  determinate 
thing. 

We  now  can  see  why  Hegel  said:  "Nothing,  pure  Nothing, 
is  simple  equality  with  itself ;  .  .  .  it  is  empty  perception 
and  thought  themselves;  and  the  same  empty  perception  or 
thought  as  pure  Being.  .  .  Pure  Being  and  pure  Nothing 
are,  therefore,  the  same.  What  is  the  truth,  is  neither  Being 
nor  Nothing,  but  that  Being, — does  not  pass  over, — but  has 
passed  over  into  Nothing,  and  Nothing  into  Being.  But 
the  truth  is  just  as  much  not  their  undistinguishedness,  but 
they  are  not  the  same,,  that  they  are  absolutely  distinguished, 
but  still,  nevertheless,  unseparated  and  inseparable,  and 
either  immediately  disappears  in  its  opposite.  Their  truth  is, 
therefore,  this  movement  of  the  immediate  disappearance  of 
the  one  in  the  other;  Becoming,  a  movement  in  which  both 
are  distinguished,  but  by  a  distinction  which  has  equally 
immediately  resolved  itself." 

In  his  doctrine  of  Being  and  Becoming,  Hegel  combined  the 
Eleatic  and  the  Heraclitic  doctrines.  Hegel  is  an  Idealist. 
Thinking  of  Being,  the  common  attribute  of  all  existent 
things,  what  do  we  find?  Nothing  that  can  be  definitely 
imagined.  Our  thought  passes  over  to  Nothing,  and  finds 
Nothing.  Calling  Being  the  thesis,  Nothing  is  the  antithesis; 
hence,  the  movement  from  Being  to  Nothing,  from  the  thesis 


274  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

to  the  antithesis,  not  objective  movement,  but  subjective 
in  thought.  As  this  Nothing  is  what  thought  finds  Being 
to  be,  Being  =  Nothing;  in  thought,  therefore,  Nothing  swings 
back  into  Being;  that  is,  the  antithesis  returns  to  the  thesis. 
This  oscillating  process  of  thought  from  Being  to  Nothing, 
from  the  thesis  to  the  antithesis,  and  back  again  from  the 
antithesis  to  the  thesis,  from  Nothing  to  Being,  is  the  process 
called  Becoming.  The  result  is  the  synthesis  of  Being  and 
Nothing,  of  the  thesis  and  antithesis.  This  synthesis  is, 
however,  the  synthesis  of  pure  Being  and  pure  Nothing,  not 
of  determinate  Being  and  determinate  Nothing;  for  the 
Being  of  $100  is  not  identical  with  the  not-Being  of  100  miles, 
for  this  might  be  the  Being  of  100  acres,  since  the  Being  of 
100  acres,  is  the  not-Being  of  100  miles.  The  idea  of  Being, 
however,  is  not  the  idea  of  something  which  can  be  added  to 
the  idea  of  any  existing  thing;  for  it  is  already  involved  in  the 
idea  of  that  thing.  It  is  no  peculiar  or  special  element  of 
any  determinate  thing,  but  is  the  general  or  universal  element 
of  all  things,  and  is  the  same  in  all.  Being,  then,  is  not  that 
which  constitutes  objective  things,  but  is  constituted  by 
them;  it  does  not  constitute  the  subjective  idea  of  things, 
but  is  involved  in  and  constituted  by  the  subjective  idea. 

To  throw  further  tight  on  Hegel's  exact  meaning,  we 
quote  from  Stirling's  translation:  "We  think  that  Being  is 
rather  something  quite  other  than  what  Nothing  is;  that 
there  is  nothing  clearer  than  their  absolute  difference;  and 
that  there  seems  nothing  easier  than  to  show  it.  It  is,  how- 
ever, just  as  easy  to  convince  oneself  that  this  is  impossible, 
that  it  is  unsay  able.  To  those  who  would  persist  in  the  differ- 
ence of  Being  and  Nothing,  let  them  challenge  themselves  to 
assign  in  what  it  consists. 

Had  Being  and  Nothing,  each  any  determinateness  by 
which  they  might  be  distinguished  the  one  from  the  other, 
they  would  be,  as  has  been  observed,  determinate  Being  and 
determinate  Nothing — not  pure  Being  and  pure  Nothing,  as 
they  still  are  here.  Their  difference,  therefore,  is  entirely 
blank;  each  of  the  two  is  in  the  same  way  indeterminate: 
the  difference,  therefore,  lies  not  in  them,  but  in  a  tertium 
quid,  in  a  mere  supposition.  But  supposition  is  a  mere 
subjective  state  which  does  not  belong  to  this  course  of 
exposition.  The  tertium  quid,  however,  in  which  Being  and 


HEGEL  275 

Nothing  have  their  support,  must  also  present  itself  here, 
and  it  has  already  so  presented  itself:  it  is  Becoming.  In  it 
they  are  different;  Becoming  is  only  so  far  as  they  are  differ- 
ent. .  . 

The  challenge  to  assign  the  difference  of  Being  and  Nothing 
includes  this  other  also,  to  say,  what  then  is  Being  and  what 
is  Nothing?  Let  those  who  strive  against  perceiving  that 
the  one  as  well  as  the  other  is  only  a  transition,  the  one  into 
the  other — and  who  maintain  of  Being  and  of  Nothing  this 
and  that — just  say  what  it  is  they  speak  of,  that  is,  produce 
a  definition  of  Being  and  Nothing,  and  demonstrate  that  it  is 
correct." 

This  is  a  fair  challenge.  Let  us  see  what  can  be  done  by 
way  of  definition:  Considered  as  to  both  extent  and  content, 
Being  is  whatever  is;  it  is  all  reality,  including  object  and 
attribute;  it  is  reality  itself.  Considered  only  as  to  content, 
Being  is  the  common  attribute  of  all  existent  things;  it  is  the 
reality  of  their  existence;  it  is  that  without  which  things 
would  have  no  existence.  Nothing  is  no  thing;  it  is  non- 
existence  itself. 

It  is  true  that,  in  Hegel's  sense,  pure  Being,  that  is,  Being 
abstracted  from  every  existing  thing,  has  no  determinate 
existence,  or  pure  Being  =  pure  Nothing.  The  idea  of  pure 
Being  becomes  the  idea  of  pure  Nothing,  and  the  idea  of  pure 
Nothing  becomes  the  idea  of  pure  Being;  that  is,  the  idea  of 
either  pure  Being  or  pure  Nothing  makes  a  transition  to  that 
of  the  other,  by  the  process  of  Becoming.  Nothing  is  thought 
of,  spoken  of;  it  is  therefore,  in  idea,  and  has  its  being  in 
thought.  The  transition  of  Nothing  to  'Being  is  called 
arising,  that  of  Being  to  Nothing  departing. 

We  have  dwelt  on  the  fundamental  principle  of  Hegel, 
because  it  is  important  to  understand  this,  if  we  would 
understand  Hegel  at  all.  Being  =  Nothing,  Being  is  the 
thesis,  Nothing  the  antithesis,  and  Becoming  the  synthesis  of 
the  two,  the  reciprocal  transition  of  each  into  the  other. 

We  may  regard  the  sum-total  of  all  things  as  God's  ideas 
objectified;  and  as  all  things  are  related  to  God,  as  their 
origin,  they  are  related  to  one  another,  and  constitute  a  uni- 
verse. The  human  mind,  the  likeness  of  God,  thinks  his 
thoughts  after  him.  Philosophy  is  the  result  of  human 
thought  objectified  in  history;  it  is  not  specifically  the  system 


276  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

of  Plato,  or  of  Aristotle,  of  Descartes,  of  Locke,  of  Kant,  of 
Hegel,  only  so  far  as  the  individual  philosopher  seizes  the 
entire  result,  and  elaborates  it  in  a  cohering  system.  Stirl- 
ing says  of  Hegel:  "He  believes  himself  to  have  explained  the 
universe,  when  he  has  demonstrated  the  notion  and  the 
necessary  system  of  notions."  Again,  Stirling  says:  "Locke 
says,  Notions  are  abstractions  from  Sensations;  while,  for 
his  part,  Hegel  says,  Sensations  are  concretions  from  Notions: 
where,  at  bottom,  is  the  difference?  Yes,  but  observe. 
Hegel's  series  is  the  organic  system  of  thought,  complete,  so 
to  speak,  alive  in  itself." 

How  does  Hegel  pass  from  the  oscillation  of  pure  Being 
and  pure  Nothing,  through  the  process  of  Becoming,  to  the 
universe  of  objects,  to  every  thing  that  excites  curiosity  or 
elicits  thought?  Let  it  be  remembered  that  Hegel  was  an 
idealist;  that  he  held  the  phenomenal  universe  to  be  ideal- 
God's  ideas  objectified,  externalized,  arranged,  according  to 
his  thoughts,  by  the  act  of  his  will. 

I  quote  what  Stirling  says  of  Hegel's  view  of  the  external 
world:  "Every  finite  object,  whatever  truly  is,  every  finite 
object  whatever  truly  is  not,  every  finite  object  whatever 
truly  becomes,  and  becomes  in  one  or  other  of  the  modes  of 
its  double  form.  Nor  does  any  object  receive  such  deter- 
mination from  us;  it  possesses  such  determination  in  its  own 
self;  it  has  received  such  determination  from  God,  it  has 
been  so  thought  by  God,  it  has  been  created  by  God  on  and 
according  to  these  thoughts,  Being,  Nothing,  and  Becoming. 
These  thoughts  are  there — without  us* — in  the  universe,  and 
in  here — within  us — in  the  universe;  they  are  objective 
thoughts  in  obedience  to  which  the  whole  is  disposed.  They 
are  necessary  pressures  or  compressures  moulding  the  all  of 
things.  They  are  three  of  God's  thoughts  in  the  making  of 
the  universe." 

The  universe  is  understood  through  its  phenomena,  to  some 
extent  though  imperfectly  by  the  average  man,  but  more 
perfectly  by  the  philosopher  who,  from  the  history  of  specu- 
lation and  by  his  own  earnest  thought,  forms  opinions, 
beliefs,  ideas,  and  often  reaches  assured  knowledge.  With 
Hegel,  as  with  Plato,  the  idea,  or  concept,  is  the  chief  thing, 
the  individual  is  of  little  or  no  account;  but  the  individual  is 
certainly  not  nothing. 


10,*  ia 


HEGEL  277 

How  do  we  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  the  universe?  Berkeley 
says  by  perception;  we  perceive  God's  ideas,  and  mistake 
them  for  material  objects.  Hegel  says  by  conception;  we 
construct  notions  in  their  three-fold  character  of  thesis, 
antithesis,  and  synthesis.  A  determinate  being  excludes 
every  other  being  from  itself.  Omnis  determinatio  est  nega- 
lio,  says  Spinoza.  A  determinate  notion  is  not  any  other 
determinate  notion.  To  affirm  a  definite  notion  is  to  deny  all 
other  notions;  and  in  the  realm  of  notions,  to  deny  all  other 
notions  is  to  affirm  the  given  notion.  The  affirmation  be- 
comes the  denial  and  the  denial  the  affirmation,  and  by 
synthesis  the  two  become  one.  In  like  manner,  other  deter- 
minate notions  are  constructed,  and  so  on  throughout  all 
the  processes  of  thought. 

The  human  mind,  Godlike  by  nature,  constructs  its  ideal 
system  in  conformity  with  the  actual  universe,  which  it 
seems  to  construe  and  interpret.  This,  however,  has  been 
done  with  an  approach  towards  completeness,  not  by  one 
mind,  but  by  a  succession  of  minds,  through  the  process  of 
evolution.  The  different  systems  were  often  in  conflict;  but 
by  their  reactions  upon  one  another,  errors  ha  \-e  been  eliminat- 
ed and  knowledge  advanced.  The  process  has  been  con- 
struction, criticism,  reconstruction. 

Hegel's  mind  had  an  immense  sweep;  it  overlooked  neither 
quality,  quantity,  measure,  relation,  essence,  actuality, 
causality,  or  reciprocity;  it  considered  every  science — physics, 
chemistry,  astronomy,  geology,  biology  in  its  two-fold  form 
of  botany  and  zoology,  history,  language,  literature,  ethics, 
politics,  religion;  it  studied  every  art — landscape  and  archi- 
tecture, sculpture  and  painting,  music  and  poetry,  conversa- 
tion and  oratory. 

It  is  an  interesting  question,  How  could  Hegel,  employing, 
as  he  did,  the  a  priori  method,  constructing  notions  as  thesis, 
antithesis  and  synthesis,  make  his  constructions  correspond 
to  the  facts  of  the  universe,  and  to  the  various  arts,  and 
sciences,  and  institutions  of  mankind?  We  may  answer, 
the  facts  of  the  universe  are  God's  ideas,  and  as  the  human 
idea  is  a  finite  copy  of  the  Divine,  the  system  of  notions, 
constructed  by  a  mind  like  Hegel's,  would,  in  some  degree, 
correspond  to  the  creations  of  the  Divine  mind. 


278  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  correspondence,  however  is  assumed  rather  than 
proved.  An  idealist  would  say  my  own  ideas  are  all  I  know, 
and  all  with  which  I  am  concerned.  This  is  dangerously 
near  solipsism.  The  modesty  of  the  idealist,  in  spite  of  his 
logic,  would  probably  restrain  him  from  the  outrageous 
egotism  of  considering  himself  and  his  thoughts  the  sum- 
total  of  reality.  Hegel  had  all  the  senses — sight,  hearing, 
touch,  taste,  smell  and  most  likely  he  reached  many  of  his 
ideas  empirically  through  the  senses. 

The  better  way  for  philosophy,  as  for  science,  is  to  beg:n 
with  the  facts  of  experience,  and  by  examination,  generaliza- 
tion, classification,  definition,  induction,  and  verication, 
ascend  to  the  summit  of  Being,  increasing  the  extent,  as  we 
rise,  while  decreasing  the  content.  Now,  having  reached 
Being,  we  have,  instead  of  Nothing,  every  existing  thing, 
with  one  universal  attribute,  existence,  but  every  actual 
attribute  somewhere  in  the  subdivisions. 

We  can  now  descend  by  division,  by  the  process  roughly 
thus  indicated :  Being  is  divided  into  dynamic  being  and  non- 
dynamic; dynamic  into  matter  and  spirit,  the  non-dynamic 
into  space  and  time;  matter  into  organic  and  inorganic,  and 
organic  in  vegetable  and  animal,  and  so  on  till  we  reach  in- 
dividuals. 

Hegel  had  a  propensity  for  blending  opposites.  This  was 
true  of  the  Greek  philosopher  Heraclitus,  and  of  Ferrier,  the 
Scotch  philosopher.  Contrarieties  often  blend,  but  con- 
flictives,  never.  A  hollow  sphere  is  convex  without  and 
concave  within,  but  it  is  not  concave  without  nor  convex 
within.  A  body  may  be  both  spherical  and  red,  but  it  is 
not  at  the  same  time,  both  spherical  and  cubical. 

Attributes  are  congruent  or  connective — congruent  if  they 
will  blend,  conflictive  if  they  will  not  blend;  conflictive  attri- 
butes are  contraries  or  contradictories — contraries  when  they 
do  not  exhaust  their  genus,  contradictories  when  they  do 
exhaust  their  genus.  Thus  red  and  spherical  are  congruents; 
spherical  and  cylindrical  are  connectives  and  contraries, 
regular  and  irregular  are  conflictives  and  contradictories. 

The  fundamental  laws  of  thought,  if  not  respected,  will 
revenge  themselves  on  the  thinker  who  violates  them,  they 
are  the  following:  Law  of  identity;  A  thing  is  itself;  a  thii 
is  not  anything  else  than  itself. 


HEGEL  279 

Law  of  congruents:  Two  congruent  attributes  may  both  be 
present  in  the  same  object,  or  both  absent,  or  either  may  be 
present,  and  the  other  absent;  hence,  the  presence  or  absence 
of  either  does  not  involve  either  the  presence  or  absence  of 
the  other. 

Law  of  conflictives:  Two  conflictive  attributes  cannot  both 
be  present;  hence  the  presence  of  either  involves  the  absence 
of  the  other. 

Law  of  contraries:  Two  contrary  attributes  can  not  both  be 
present,  but  may  both  be  absent;  hence,  the  presence  of 
either  involves  the  absence  of  the  other,  but  the  absence  of 
either  does  not  involve  the  presence  of  the  other. 

Law  of  contradictories:  Two  contradictory  attributes  can- 
not both  be  present  nor  both  absent;  hence  the  presence  of 
either  involves  the  absence  of  the  other,  and  the  absence  of 
either  the  presence  of  the  other. 

Law  of  reason  and  consequent:  An  inference  requires  a 
sufficient  reason.  When  the  reason  is  a  cause,  we  infer  the 
effect,  when  an  effect  we  infer  some  cause. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

Herbart,  Schopenhauer,  Hartmann 

1.  Herbart  (1776-1841).  Johann  Friedrich  Herbart  was 
born  at  Oldenburg.  His  parents  were  cultured  people,  and 
their  son  was  an  intelligent  boy,  who  early  showed  a  taste 
for  philosophy.  He  studied  under  Fichte  at  Jena,  and  was 
elected  professor  of  philosophy  at  Gottingen  in  1805,  and 
appointed  Kant's  successor  at  Konigsberg  in  1808,  and 
recalled  to  Gottingen  in  1833,  where,  in  1841,  he  died. 

Instead  of  beginning  his  philosophy  with  an  idea  of  reason, 
as  Fichte,  Schelling  and  Hegel  had  done,  he  followed  the 
method  of  Kant,  and  subjected  to  a  critical  examination  the 
facts  of  experience.  His  results,  however,  were  peculiar  and 
widely  different  from  those  of  Kant.  He  regarded  antecedent 
systems  mainly  as  failures,  giving  phantoms  rather  than 
truth. 

As  the  beginning  of  his  system,  Herbart  takes,  for  his 
point  of  departure,  the  common  sense  view  of  things,  as  given 
by  experience.  The  facts  of  experience  being  accepted,  it 
becomes  the  business  of  philosophy  to  account  for  them. 

His  first  step  is  to  discriminate  between  immediate  experi- 
ence and  the  thought  which  endeavors  to  account  for  that 
experience.  Difficulties  are  thus  seen,  and  doubt  arises,  and 
the  first  result  is  skepticism.  This  was  seen  in  early  philoso- 
phy in  the  case  of  Pyrrho  and  of  Sextus  Empiricus,  and  later 
in  that  of  Hume.  In  its  lower  form,  Skepticism  doubts 
whether  things  are  as  they  appear,  but  in  its  higher  form, 
Skepticism  doubts  whether  things  have  any  existence  at  all. 

Doubts  arise  from  the  discovery  that  the  conceptions  of 
experience,  which  constitute  the  materials  for  philosophy, 
involve  incongruous  elements;  hence,  the  second  step  is  so  to 
remodel  the  conceptions  of  experience,  as  to  render  them 
congruous,  and  thus  to  transform  skepticism  into  philosophy. 

Herbart  agrees  with  Hegel  in  regard  to  the  conflictive 
elements  in  thought;  but  while  Hegel  teaches  that  these 
connectives  blend  into  one  by  the  process  of  becoming,  Her- 

280 


HERBART,  SCHOPENHAUER,  HARTMANN   281 

bart  holds  that  the  conflict  comes  from  false  conceptions, 
which  are  to  be  rectified  and  rendered  congruous  by  the 
elimination  of  the  false  elements,  and  remodelling  and  recon- 
ciling the  true.  Herbart  thus  conforms  to  the  fundamental 
laws  of  thought,  which  Hegel  disregards. 

At  this  point,  Herbart  introduces  his  doctrine  of  reals  or 
monads,  borrowed  from  Leibniz,  though  he  makes  a  different 
application  of  them.  If  there  are  no  reals,  there  could  be  no 
sensation,  representation  or  thought.  Real  being  is,  therefore, 
just  as  certain  as  appearance.  The  phenomenal  manifesta- 
tion implies  a  real  which  manifests  itself  in  the  phenomena, 
and  which  sound  philosophy  will  not  fail  to  recognize.  The 
real  is  positive;  its  absoluteness  is  not  destroyed  by  negation 
or  limitation;  it  is  simple,  neither  admitting  multiplicity  nor 
contradictions,  nor  of  any  conceptions  of  greatness,  discreet 
or  continuous;  it  is  not  a  creation  of  thought,  but  is  to  be 
recognized  by  thought  as  real  in  itself.  It  exists,  in  fact, 
only  in  the  imagination  of  Herbart.  We  have  no  positive 
evidence  of  its  existence. 

A  thing  is  not  simply  a  manifestation  of  attributes,  but  is 
a  substance,  or  rather,  a  combination,  a  complexus,  of  sub- 
stances or  monads,  each  as  a  real  manifesting  its  own  phenom- 
enal attributes.  There  are  therefore  as  many  causes  in  a 
thing  as  there  are  manifestations,  and  perhaps  more  also 
which  would  be  manifest,  if  we  had  other  senses,  or  if  our 
actual  senses  were  more  acute. 

Change  is  explained,  not  by  a  change  in  the  monads  them- 
selves, for  they  ever  remain  the  same,  though  differing  among 
themselves,  but  by  their  disturbance,  and  by  their  self-preser- 
vation in  their  resistance  to  disturbance.  To  explain  the 
appearance  of  change,  we  resort  to  accidental  views  from 
change  of  relation,  as  the  same  line  may  be,  for  example,  the 
radius  of  one  circle  and  tangent  to  another.  We  can  resort 
also  to  intellectual  space,  when  we  regard  two  points,  for  in- 
stance, as  either  coincident  or  consecutive.  We  can  eliminate 
the  contradictions  involved  in  motion,  or  in  the  conception  of 
a  body  made  up  of  inextended  atoms,  or  of  the  ego  as  an 
identical  personality,  and  at  the  same  time  as  continually 
changing  its  phenomena. 

The  ego  is  a  real  with  apparently  many  powers,  faculties, 
activities  changing  with  circumstances;  it  posits  itself,  and 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

is,  therefore,  both  subject  and  object,  or  subject-object,  and 
hence  full  of  apparent  contradictions.  It  seems  to  be  a 
commonwealth  of  reals,  yet  believes  in  its  own  unity;  but  as 
a  unity,  it  is  a  monad  or  real,  absolutely  simple,  indissoluble, 
immortal.  It  is  Kant's  noumenon. 

Herbart  holds  that  the  so-called  faculties  of  the  soul  are 
nothing  other  than  its  self-preservation,  changing  and  mani- 
fold, in  opposition  to  other  reals  with  which  it  comes  in  con- 
flict. The  causes  of  the  soul's  changing  phenomena  are, 
therefore,  other  reals  coming  in  conflict  with  the  soul-monad, 
and  these  changing  operations  apparently  imply  independent 
powers  or  faculties,  which  Herbart  rejects.  It  has,  however, 
the  power  of  resistance.  This  discarding  of  faculties,  is  well 
enough  so  long  as  faculties  are  regarded  as  subordinate  egos 
within  the  ego,  each  doing  its  own  independent  work.  The 
fact  of  different  mental  phenomena  cannot  be  denied,  as  it 
is  given  in  consciousness;  for  since  the  ego  feels,  it  is  suscepti- 
ble of  feeling,  or  has  sensibility;  since  it  thinks,  it  has  intellect; 
since  it  chooses,  it  has  will.  Feeling,  cognition  and  volition 
cannot  pass  into  one  another,  and  these  distinctions  are 
marked  by  the  words  sensibility,  intellect  and  will;  but  the 
same  ego  feels,  and  thinks,  and  wills.  It  is  a  thoughtless 
act  to  ridicule  the  term  faculty,  or  to  ridicule  those  who 
employ  the  term,  by  calling  them  "faculty-philosophers." 
It  is  better  for  a  philosopher  to  possess  faculties  than  to  be 
destitute  of  them.  Herbart  discards  the  term  faculty  because 
inconsistent  with  his  own  peculiar  views,  which  have  not 
yet  been  established  beyond  question.  Faculty  is  a  con- 
venient term  and  denotes  a  power  or  susceptibility  of  the 
ego. 

To  return  to  reals:  A  real  in  itself  can  be  the  object  of 
thought,  though  it  is  independent  of  thought;  it  is  absolute, 
simple,  spaceless.  A  line  regarded  as  made  up  of  consecutive 
points,  may  be  conceived  as  the  continuous  track  of  a  point 
moving  through  the  consecutive  points.  A  body  may  be 
conceived  to  be  made  up  of  reals  in  adjacent  positions. 

How  can  the  ego  exhibit  various  manifestations,  while,  as 
a  real,  it  remains  one  and  identical?  It  reacts  against  the  dis- 
turbances caused  by  various  other  reals,  each  reaction  giving 
a  different  manifestation,  because  the  other  reals  are  different. 
The  ego,  as  intelligent,  is  conscious  of  the  changing  mani- 


HERBART,   SCHOPENHAUER,  HARTMANN  283 

festations  caused  by  its  conflict  with  other  reals;  for  con- 
sciousness is  the  realization  of  these  disturbances  which 
appear  as  phenomena.  Representations  restrained  from  the 
clearness  of  thought  are  feelings.  The  resolution  to  realize 
the  object  of  desire  is  volition,  which,  as  a  dominant  repre- 
sentation, implies  the  hope  of  success.  The  character  of  a 
man  is  the  constant  presence  of  certain  dominant  representa- 
tions. 

Herbart  did  good  educational  work,  which  has  proved  to 
be  a  wholesome  stimulus  to  teachers.  He  taught  that 
Aesthetics  deals  with  beauty  which  has  an  absolute  value, 
making  no  appeal  to  self-interest,  but  calling  out  disin- 
terested admiration.  Ethics,  according  to  Herbart,  is  a 
branch  of  Aesthetics,  dealing  with  those  relations  among 
the  volitions  that  unconditionally  please  or  displease.  This 
would,  of  course,  bring  Ethics  under  Aesthetics,  if  to  please 
or  displease,  we  add  the  Aesthetic  sentiment  of  taste.  It 
would  be  better  to  say:  Ethics  deals  with  those  volitions 
which  meet  with  the  approval  or  disapproval  of  the  moral 
judgment.  Five  topics,  according  to  Herbart,  are  embraced 
in  Ethics:  Internal  freedom,  perfection,  benevolence,  right, 
retribution. 

In  beginning  with  the  facts  of  consciousness,  Herbart  was 
right;  and  he  was  also  right  in  maintaining  that  every 
phenomenon  implies  a  real,  and  in  general,  two  reals — the 
objective  real,  and  the  subjective  real,  or  ego.  The  two 
reals  become  one  when  the  subject  is  also  the  object;  but 
here  is  a  case  of  difficulty.  How  can  the  subject  be  its  own 
object?  Empirically,  it  cannot.  The  ego  is  conscious  of 
phenomena;  but  the  necessity  of  the  ego  itself  is  apprehended 
by  rational  intuition.  Psychology  deals  with  the  facts  of 
mind,  metaphysics  with  the  ego,  or  in  general,  with  the  con- 
ditions of  phenomena. 

There  is,  of  late,  a  tendency  to  use  the  word  consciousness 
instead  of  mind,  or  ego;  but  consciousness,  as  an  act  or  state 
of  mind,  is  phenomenal,  and  demands,  for  its  condition  the 
ego,  or  as  Herbart  would  say,  a  real,  without  which  it  would 
be  impossible.  Consciousness  takes  note  of  mental  opera- 
tions; but  it  is  not  the  ego;  it  is  the  experience  of  the  ego,  the 
realization  of  the  ego's  activity  or  disturbances. 

Herbart  found  contradictions  in  all  phenomena,  and  these 
contradictions  he  attempted  to  eliminate.  To  do  this  he 


284  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

resorted  to  mathematics,  expressing  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness by  formulae,  by  means  of  which  he  endeavored  to  get 
rid  of  contradictions,  and  thus  to  purify  conceptions.  By 
this  method,  psychology  becomes  mental  mechanics,  exclud- 
ing all  freedom,  which  Herbart  allowed,  But  his  mathemat- 
ical method  has  not  been  eminently  successful.  Herbart, 
however,  had  a  penetrating  mind,  and  was  a  deep  thinker. 

2.  Schopenhauer  (1788-1860).  Arthur  Schopenhauer  was 
born  at  Dantzic,  a  free  imperial  city.  His  father  was  a  well- 
to-do  merchant,  and  his  mother  a  novelist.  After  Dantzic 
became  incorporate  with  Prussia,  the  family  withdrew  to 
Hamburg.  Arthur's  early  education  was  under  the  care  of 
his  mother. 

The  family  spent  some  time  in  France  and  England,  and 
by  his  acquaintance  with  the  languages  of  these  countries, 
he  acquired  a  more  sprightly  style  than  was  usual  for  a 
German.  At  first,  he  was  not  a  diligent  student,  but  finally, 
from  the  Greek  scholar,  Passow,  he  acquired  familiarity  with 
the  Greek  and  Latin  languages. 

He  entered  the  University  of  Gottingen,  and  by  the  advice 
of  Prof.  Schulze,  his  philosophic  studies  were  directed  espe- 
cially to  Plato  and  Kant,  both  of  which  he  held  in  high  admi- 
ration. While  in  the  university  he  was  unsocial,  gloomy  and 
became  a  confirmed  pessimist.  With  him  happiness  was 
not  positive  enjoyment,  but  negative,  the  absence  of  misery. 
After  spending  two  years  at  Gottingen,  he  entered  the  Uni- 
versity at  Berlin,  and  attended  the  lectures  of  Fichte  and 
Schleiermacher. 

Awakened  by  the  general  enthusiasm  for  German  liberty, 
and  against  French  dominion,  he  bought  a  set  of  arms,  but 
could  not  make  up  his  mind  to  enlist.  He  withdrew  to 
Weimar,  and  from  thence  to  Rudolstadt,  where  in  quiet,  he 
prepared  a  very  able  essay  for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philos- 
ophy, on  The  four  roots  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason. 
These  four  roots,  according  to  Schopenhauer,  are:  Causa 
fiendi,  causa  cognoscendi,  causa  essendi,  causa  agendi,  relating 
respectively,  to  the  reason  for  events,  the  reason  of  knowing, 
the  reason  of  being,  the  reason  for  acting.  He  received  his 
diploma  from  Jena. 

From  the  press  of  Rudolstadt,  he  issued  his  first  philosophic 
work.  Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung,  which,  though 


HERBART,  SCHOPENHAUER,  HARTMANN    285 

written  in  good  style,  and  abounding  in  sharp  criticisms,  fell 
flat  from  the  press,  winning  neither  readers,  nor  notices  from 
periodicals,  a  result  probably  due  to  the  prevailing  Hegelian- 
ism  ;  but  after  thirty  years,  it  came  to  be  regarded  as  a  work 
of  merit.  Schopenhauer  considered  himself  the  true  succes- 
sor to  Kant;  but  though  our  scientific  knowledge  is  limited 
by  the  line  of  experience,  yet  we  can  penetrate  to  the  mys- 
terious Ding  an  sich,  by  the  study  of  ourselves.  The  desires 
and  volitions  within  ourselves,  leading  to  our  hopes  and 
fears,  strivings  and  disappointments,  reveal  to  us  the  core 
of  our  own  nature,  and  through  us  the  hidden  essence  of  the 
world  itself,  and  that  core,  that  essence,  that  centraling 
principle,  is  the  desire  to  be,  the  will  for  continued  existence, 
the  desire  to  rise  to  consciousness,  as  in  man.  The  world,  as 
idea,  exhibits  these  struggles  of  the  will,  as  revealed  through 
gravitation,  crystalization,  chemical  affinities,  magnetic  and 
electrical  attractions  and  repulsions  and  in  organization, 
through  feelings,  perceptions,  reason,  and  deliberate  will; 
but  every  where  no  satisfaction,  only  unrest,  unsatisfied 
desire,  defeat,  pain,  disgrace;  nor  can  we  hope  for  anything 
better;  all  is  vanity  and  vexation  of  spirit. 

Schopenhauer  wasjno  admirer  of  Fichte,  Schelling  and 
Hegel,  and  became  suspicious  that  Schelling  and  Hegel 
especially  conspired  against  his  own  success,  and  regarding 
these  great  philosophers  with  contempt,  he  still  more  despised 
their  disciples. 1  All  this,  however,  only  added  to  his^own 
unhappiness,  and  intensified  his  pessimism. 
|  Perception,  Schopenhauer  held,  is  to  be  explained  by  an 
external  cause  exciting  sensation.  This  cause  in  connection 
with  time  and  space,  is  known  a  priori,  not  a  posteriori;  it 
has  a  rational  root,  not  an  empirical  origin.  The  necessity 
of  a  cause  is  known  a  priori,  what  the  cause  is,  a  posteriori. 
From  the  principle  of  causality,  the  law  of  inertia,  and  of  the 
conservation  of  matter  and  energy  follow  as  necessary  conse- 
quences. 

The  appearance  of  the  world  to  us  is  determined  by  the 
mode  of  our  knowledge,  and  would  change  with  the  change 
in  the  constitution  of  our  senses.  The  world  is  a  series  of 
ideas  held  together  by  the  four-fold  principle  of  sufficient 
reason;  but  its  empirical  result  is  not  disturbed  by  the  theory 
of  its  ideal  existence;  but  as  ideal,  its  explanation  falls  back 


286  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

to  the  subject  whose  very  core  is  will  accompanied  by  feeling 
and  thought.  But  does  not  this  make  each  ego  the  center 
of  things,  and  the  creator  of  his  own  universe?  It  is  true 
that  it  does,  and  that  is  the  logical  outcome  of  idealism. 
Any  ego,  if  idealism  is  true,  can  say:  I  am  the  sole  creator  of 
all  things,  and  all  other  egos,  so-called,  are  only  the  creatures 
of  my  own  act  of  creation.  But  the  essence  of  ego  is  will, 
and  this  will  is  identical  with  the  will,  the  essence  of  nature, 
or  the  will  of  ego  is  the  will  of  nature.  How  can  will,  if  only 
phenomenal,  if  only  volition,  be  the  essence  of  nature?  Voli- 
tion is  an  event,  and  has  a  cause.  But  will  as  the  source  of 
volition,  is  therefore,  not  merely  phenomenal,  it  is  noumenal, 
it  is  cause  itself,  essential  Being.  The  individual  human 
ego  cannot  be  the  essential  will  of  the  universe;  for  this  will 
is  often  thwarted,  defeated,  disappointed,  and  does  not  have 
its  way;  the  essential  will  is  the  omnipotent  God,  who  created 
all  things,  and  upholds  them  by  the  word  of  his  power. 

Schopenhauer  discriminated  sharply  between  knowledge 
and  the  will,  but  confounds  the  feelings,  desires,  loves,  hat- 
reds with  the  volition,  and  this  is  accounted  for  by  his  own 
manner  of  life,  for  he  often  gave  way  to  passion  and  desire  in 
opposition  to  reason. 

Volition,  as  revealed  to  consciousness,  is  outwardly  visible 
in  the  movements  of  our  bodies;  the  volition  and  bodily  move- 
ment, Schopenhauer  held,  are  not  related  as  cause  and  effect, 
but  movement  is  the  visible  volition.  As  the  will  in  man 
manifests  itself  in  bodily  movements,  so  the  will  in  nature, 
its  different  forces,  become  visible  in  the  movements  in  the 
external  world.  According  to  its  degree,  the  will  is  blind  or 
conscious  deliberate  action,  as  in  the  voluntary  actions  of 
man.  Schopenhauer  held,  as  taught  by  Fichte,  that  the 
human  body  enables  man  to  struggle  against  the  limitations 
opposed  by  nature. 

With  Schelling,  Schopenhauer  held  that  matter  in  nature 
attempts  to  raise  itself  up  to  spirit,  striving  through  mechani- 
cal action  and  all  forms  of  activity  to  conscious  volition  and 
reasonable  action,  and  becomes  thus  the  universe  made 
visible.  The  optimist,  in  his  hopefulness,  looks  for  happi- 
ness; the  pessimist,  in  his  despondency,  anticipates  evil;  for 
he  sees  through  the  illusion,  and  is  confirmed  in  his  opini 
by  his  own  experience;  but  the  evil  he  encounters,  is  brouj 
upon  himself,  for  the  most  part,  by  his  own  folly. 


HERBART,  SCHOPENHAUER,  HARTMANN  287 

Schopenhauer  did  not  find  deliverance  from  evil  through 
obedience  to  the  moral  law,  but  he  sought  peace  in  aesthetic 
satisfaction,  and  in  intellectual  activity;  but  the  achievements 
of  authorship  only  subjected  him  to  the  envy  and  detraction 
of  rivals. 

3.  Hartmann  (1842-1906).  Edward  Von  Hartmann  was 
born  at  Berlin,  an  only  child  of  the  family.  His  father  was 
a  military  officer  permanently  stationed  at  Berlin,  at  the 
head  of  a  commission  for  testing  proposed  improvements  in 
heavy  firearms. 

Edward  was  a  precocious  boy,  and  at  a  very  early  age  was 
prepared  to  enter  the  University.  He,  however,  chose  the 
profession  of  his  father,  and  took  a  course  in  artillery  and 
engineering,  but  a  chronic  affection  of  the  knee  prevented  his 
entering  upon  active  service. 

He  turned  his  attention  to  art,  for  which  he  had  a  taste, 
and  even  published  a  poetical  drama  founded  on  the  story  of 
Tristan  and  Isolde;  but  as  this  did  not  prove  successful,  he 
turned  his  attention  to  philosophy. 

He  studied  carefully  the  works  of  Schelling,  Hegel  and 
Schopenhauer,  and  at  the  age  of  twenty-two,  began  The 
Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious.  This  work  was  first  published 
as  one  volume  of  800  pp.  The  book  was  at  once  popular, 
and  has  passed  through  at  least  nine  different  editions.  We 
use,  for  this  review,  the  authorized  translation  of  Coupland's, 
published  by  the  Macmillan  Company. 

Hartmann 's  superior  success,  as  an  author,  compared  with 
that  of  Schopenhauer's,  is  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  he 
found  a  publisher  who  interested  himself  in  the  success  of  the 
work,  which  he  vigorously  pushed,  while  Schopenhauer  pub- 
lished his  book  himself,  and  trusted  to  its  merits  in  giving  it 
circulation,  and  consequently  it  remained,  for  a  time,  com- 
paratively unknown.  Hartmann  also  introduced  into  his 
book  topics  suitable  for  popular  conversation,  review  and 
discussion,  and  consequently  the  book  at  once  attracted  a 
great  deal  of  attention;  even  the  criticisms  of  the  work  made 
it  the  better  known  and  the  more  sought  after. 

Hartmann  opens  his  work,  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious, 
with  "unconscious  idea, "  which  he  finds  in  Kant.  No  doubt 
there  are  subconscious  operations  of  mind,  those  processes 
which  have  not  yet  risen  to  the  plane  of  consciousness;  they  are 


288  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

subliminal  states,  as  they  are  called  by  others;  but  whatever 
rises  to  the  rank  of  knowledge,  becomes,  by  that  very  fact, 
an  object  of  consciousness;  because  if  I  know,  I  know  that  I 
know,  for  if  I  do  not  know  that  I  know,  I  do  not  know; 
knowledge  involves  consciousness. 

We  are  conscious  of  every  phenomenon;  for  a  phenomenon 
is  what  appears,  and  if  we  are  not  conscious  of  it,  then  it  does 
not  appear,  or  is  not  a  phenomenon;  but  it  does  not  follow 
that  there  may  not  be  latent  processes,  that  is,  processes  of 
which  we  are  not  conscious.  Thus  we  may  begin  the  investi- 
gation of  a  subject,  then  drop  it  for  awhile  in  order  to  attend 
to  something  else,  and  after  a  time  return  to  the  subject,  and 
find  that  we  have  advanced  in  its  development,  though  we 
were  not  conscious,  in  the  meantime,  that  it  had  occupied 
our  thought. 

To  let  Hartmann  open  the  subject  himself,  we  quote: 
"I  designate  the  united  unconscious  will  and  unconscious 
idea  'the  Unconscious.'  Since,  however,  this  unity  again 
only  rests  upon  the  identity  of  the  unconsciously  willing  and 
unconsciously  thinking  subject,  the  expression,  'the  Uncon- 
scious,' denotes  also  this  identical  subject  of  the  unconscious 
psychical  functions, — a  something  in  the  main  unknown,  it  is 
true,  but  of  which  we  may  at  least  affirm,  that  besides  the  neg- 
ative attributes  'being  unconscious  and  exercising  functions 
unconsciously,'  it  possesses  also  the  essentially  positive  at- 
tributes, willing  and  representing.  As  long  as  our  speculation 
does  not  transgress  the  limits  of  individuality,  this  may  be  suf- 
ficiently clear.  When  we,  however,  view  the  world  as  a  whole, 
the  expression,  'the  Unconscious,'  acquires  the  force,  not  only 
of  an  abstraction  from  all  unconscious  individual  functions  and 
subjects,  but  also  of  a  collective,  comprehending  the  foregoing 
both  extensively  and  intensively.  Lastly,  it  will  appear 
that  all  unconscious  operations  spring  from  one  and  the  same 
subject,  which  has  only  its  phenomenal  revelation  in  the 
several  individuals,  so  that  the  'Unconscious'  signifies  this 
one  Absolute  Subject. " 

Hartmann  says:  "In  each  succeeding  chapter,  one  piece 
more  of  the  world  crystallizes,  as  it  were,  around  this  nucleus, 
until,  expanding  to  all  unity,  it  embraces  the  Cosmos,  and 
at  last  is  suddenly  revealed  as  that  which  has  formed  the 
core  of  all  great  philosophies,  the  Substance  of  Spinoza,  the 
Ego  of  Fichte,  Schelling's  Absolute  Subject-Object,  the 


HERBART,  SCHOPENHAUER,  HARTMANN    289 

Absolute  Idea  of  Plato  and  Hegel  and  Schopenhauer's  Will;" 
and  we  may  add,  Spencer's  Ultimate  Reality,  and  the  God 
of  Theism. 

Like  a  living  tree  sustained  by  the  solid  stem  of  heart 
wood  within,  while  the  life  is  in  the  annular  growth,  in  the 
new  shoots  and  leaves,  so  all  present  vital  philosophy  is  a 
growth;  it  has  historic  roots  in  the  soil  of  the  past,  and  is 
sustained  by  the  solid  products  of  the  deep  thinkers  of  the 
past;  but  it  grows  anew  from  the  root,  rising  still  higher  and 
expanding  in  living  beauty. 

How  are  we  to  reach  truth  in  philosophy?  Shall  we  em- 
ploy the  deductive  or  the  inductive  method?  Or  shall  we 
use  one,  the  inductive,  in  discovery,  and  the  other,  the 
deductive  in  proof?  Different  causes  may  produce  the  same 
effect;  hence,  a  cause  may  be  assumed  which  might  produce 
the  effect,  and  yet  not  be  the  true  cause,  arid  it  is  not  to  be 
held  true,  because  accounting  for  the  effect. 

Philosophers  who  employ  deduction,  reach  their  first  princi- 
ple by  a  misty  flight;  but  deduction  cannot  prove  its  first 
principles,  and  its  conclusions  cannot  be  communicated. 
This  mode  of  proof  inspires  the  scientific  mind  with  an  aver- 
sion to  philosophy  conducted  by  the  deductive  method, 
leading  even  to  contempt.  Hartmann,  therefore,  contends 
that  the  inductive  method  is  the  only  legitimate  one  for 
philosophy  as  it  is  for  science,  whether  employed  for  dis- 
covery or  for  proof,  and  so  chooses  his  motto:  "Speculative 
results  according  to  inductive  scientific  method. " 

Hartmann  holds  to  a  purpose  in  nature  as  in  instinct, 
though  unconscious  of  the  purpose.  He  regards  causality 
as  a  logical  necessity.  Causality  may  indeed  co-operate 
with  logical  necessity,  but  does  not  a  logical  necessity  appeal 
to  reason  and  is  not  the  conclusion  clearly  apprehended? 
If,  in  a  measure,  this  is  true  of  instinct,  is  it  certainly  true  of 
the  functions  in  the  vegetable  kingdom? 

The  conception  of  an  end  is  a  familiar  experience  of  man, 
who  forms  plans  and  works  to  realize  them.  If  the  end, 
which  is  still  future,  cannot  be  realized  directly,  resort  is 
had  to  means,  or  causes  which  bring  the  end  to  pass.  To 
will  the  end  is  to  will  the  means;  to  employ  the  means  is  to 
realize  the*  end.  Necessity  reigns  throughout,  save  that 
freedom  exists  only  in  the  ego,  who  chooses  the  end  in  view 
of  reasons  which  solicit,  but  do  not  compel  the  choice, 


290  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Hartmann  holds  the  difference  between  man  and  the  lower 
animals  to  be  one  in  degree,  not  in  kind.  Man's  superiority 
arises  from  his  ability  to  generalize  in  the  formation  and 
application  of  concepts,  and  in  his  more  perfect  language. 
The  apparently  new  faculties  are  only  secondary  powers 
which  have  been  developed  in  certain  directions  by  the 
higher  cultivation  of  primary  capacities. 

The  mental  powers,  Hartmann  divided  into  those  of  will- 
ing and  thinking,  resolving  feeling  into  one  or  the  other  of 
these.  Will  in  animals  is  essentially  the  same  as  will  in  man; 
but  he  rightly  distinguished  between  volition  and  reflex 
action.  In  volition,  we  have  emotion,  and  the  carrying  out 
of  an  intention  with  a  purpose,  but  reflex  action  is  mechanical 
and  passionateless.  Emotion  is  often  present  in  animals, 
as  in  ants  when  one  community  makes  war  upon  another, 
the  conquering  tribe  reducing  the  conquered  to  slavery,  like- 
wise anger  is  exhibited  by  bees.  A  decapitated  frog  seems 
to  act  with  a  purpose,  indicating  that  thought  is  not  confined 
to  the  head;  and  hence  there  is  will  without  brains.  The 
spinal  chord  and  the  ganglia  exhibit  separate  will.  The 
meaning  of  the  word  will,  Hartmann  extends  so  as  to  take 
in  the  cause  of  unconscious  movements.  Will  with  a  con- 
scious aim,  he  calls  free-will,  and  unconscious  will  he  calls 
simply  will.  Desire  is  inchoate  volition,  and  impulse  is  latent 
disposition  to  action. 

Hartmann  maintains  that  when  a  person  wills,  for  example, 
to  lift  a  finger,  the  finger  is  lifted,  not  by  the  direct  act  of 
the  conscious  will,  but  by  the  unconscious;  the  right  nerve 
is  not  consciously  selected  to  do  the  work  of  contracting  the 
proper  muscle,  but  the  end  being  consciously  chosen  the 
mind  unconsciously  wills  the  right  means  by  selecting, 
though  unconsciously,  the  right  nerve  to  contract  the  right 
muscle. 

Instinct  is  first  defined  by  Hartmann  as  purposive  action 
without  consciousness  of  the  purpose;  it  directs  action  to  an 
end,  not  by  conscious  reflection,  though  the  result,  when 
realized,  gives  satisfaction.  Is  it  a  mere  consequence  of 
corporeal  organization?  or  is  it  a  result  of  mental  mechanism? 
or  is  it  the  consequence  of  unconscious  mental  activity? 

Hartmann  gives  reasons  for  denying  the  first  and  second  of 
these  alternatives,  and  for  affirming  the  third.  The  work 


HERBAJRT,.SCHOPENHAUER,  HARTMANN    291 

prompted  by  instinct  varies  according  to  circumstances, 
showing  that  instinct  is  somewhat  plastic,  approaching, 
in  certain  cases,  conscious  intelligent  action,  or  is  in  combina- 
tion with  it.  Thus  bees  build  hexagonal  cells  in  the  middle 
of  the  comb,  but  pentagonal  at  the  edges;  they  kill  off  the 
drones,  when  no  longer  needed.  Some  birds  brood  on  the 
eggs  in  the  cold  of  the  night,  and  leave  the  nest  in  the  heat  of 
the  day.  Instinct  is  sometimes  attended  with  pleasure,  and 
sometimes  with  pain,  and  in  the  latter  case  it  appears  like  a 
virtue.  Even  when  attended  with  pleasure,  we  cannot  con- 
sider pleasure  the  motive,  as  in  the  first  act  from  instinct, 
where  there  has  been  no  previous  experience  of  pleasure  from 
that  source.  Hartmann,  therefore,  concludes  that:  Instinct 
is  conscious  willing  of  the  means  to  an  unconsciously  willed  end. 

Though  Hartmann  peremptorily  rejects  the  hypothesis 
that  instinct  is  merely  the  action  of  a  pre-arranged  mechan- 
ism, he  does  not  exclude  the  constitutional  tendencies  of  the 
organism.  The  instinctive  tendency  is  augmented  either 
by  individual  habit,  or  by  inheritance,  through  the  customs 
of  many  generations,  or  it  may  be  called  forth  by  an  uncon- 
scious impulse  to  a  particular  line  of  action.  Instinct  ex- 
plains especially,  not  why  the  actions  of  one  individual  of  a 
class  differ  from  those  of  another  individual,  but  why  the 
actions  of  one  class  differ  from  those  of  another  class. 

Deviations,  from  customary  instinctive  acts  are  not  ac- 
counted for  by  mechanism;  inheritance  is  possible  only 
through  unconscious  influence  in  the  embryonic  develop- 
ment which  modifies  the  mechanism;  mere  instinctive  actions 
cannot  be  engendered  by  habit;  mechanism  may  predispose, 
but  does  not  necessitate  instinctive  acts.  Hence,  pur- 
posive action  without  consciousness  of  purpose  is  always 
found  in  instinct. 

Hartmann  now  raises  the  question,  whether  the  so-called 
instinctive  actions  are  not,  after  all,  the  results  of  premedi- 
tation. Narrowing  the  field  intensifies  the  action;  but  the 
lower  the  rank,the  narrower  the  field  relative  to  total  capacity, 
yet  as  the  instinctive  performances  remain  equal,  while  the 
perfection  of  those  acts  which  admittedly  proceed  from 
conscious  reflection  is  proportional  to  the  mental  capacity, 
the  instinctive  acts  have  a  different  origin.  The  instinctive 
acts  of  animals  are  as  well  performed  at  first  as  ever  after- 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

wards,  not  so  those  acts  learned  by  experience.  Instinct 
is  blind  as  to  the  reason  why,  clear  as  to  the  manner  how,  but 
immediately,  not  by  reflection,  as  we  rise  in  the  scale  of 
being,  instinct  is  gradually  supplanted  by  reflection,  as  in 
man,  though  traces  of  instinct  remain. 

Reflection  operates  only  on  data  given  in  consciousness, 
but  certain  acts  are  performed  when  the  data  for  reflection  are 
not  possible.  From  whence  then  do  such  acts  proceed? 
Hartmann  says  from  clairvoyance,  that  is  from  unconscious 
knowledge,  or  knowledge  not  produced  by  sensible  experience. 
Witness,  the  alarm  of  animals  at  the  approach  of  enemies 
they  have  never  before  seen.  Observe  their  discrimination 
in  their  choice  of  food;  their  avoidance  of  poisons.  Even  in 
man,  there  is  often  a  craving  for  a  certain  kind  of  food,  the 
reason  for  which  is  not  understood.  Cats  taken  from  home 
find  their  way  back  again  by  a  clairvoyant  instinct. 

The  instinctive  act  is  vividly  realized  by  the  individual, 
and  springs  from  its  inmost  nature,  while  neither  the  end  nor 
the  means  are  consciously  chosen. 

Clairvoyance  and  instinct,  though  not  identical,  are  often 
found  together,  then  clairvoyance  serves  to  throw  light  on 
instinct,  but  not  conversely.  Instinct  is  the  inmost  core  of 
being,  as  shown  in  the  effort  to  preserve  the  individual,  or 
in  the  more  important  effort  to  preserve  the  species,  even  at 
the  sacrifice  of  the  individual.  Instincts  are  unerring,  and 
within  the  same  species,  uniform. 

Hartmann  closes  his  chapter  on  instinct  by  quoting  from 
Schelling:  "There  is  no  better  touchstone  of  a  genuine  philos- 
ophy than  the  phenomena  of  animal  instinct,  which  must  be 
ranked  among  the  very  greatest  by  every  thoughtful  human 
bei  g."  Though  we  have  very  greatly  condensed  Hart- 
mann's  discussion  of  instinct,  we  have  endeavored  to  make 
it  clear. 

Hartmann  discusses  the  evils  commonly  attending  the 
course  of  ordinary  life.  These  evils  arise  chiefly  from  igno- 
rance or  from  the  selfish  desire  to  enjoy  the  unlawful  pleasures 
of  an  immoral  life.  These  evils  can  be  obviated  by  knowledge 
and  by  the  purpose  always  to  obey  the  moral  law.  Hartmann 
gives  many  valuable  directions  for  discovering  and  avoiding 
these  evils,  and  these  directions,  may  be  applied  in  avoidii 
or  greatly  modifying  these  evils,  and  thus  rendering 
satisfactorily  successful. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

Reid,  Stewart,  Brown 

1.  Reid  (1710-1796).  Thomas  Reid,  the  founder  of  the 
Scottish  school  of  philosophy,  was  born  at  Strachan,  near 
Aberdeen.  His  father,  a  clergyman  descended  from  a  long 
line  of  clergymen,  held  his  position  as  pastor  at  Strachan  for 
fifty  years.  His  mother  was  of  the  family  of  the  Gregories, 
which  was  distinguished  for  scientific  and  literary  attain- 
ments. 

After  receiving  his  primary  instruction  at  the  parish  school, 
Thomas  entered  Marischal  College,  Aberdeen,  and  was  in- 
structed in  philosophy  by  Dr.  George  Turnbull,  a  writer  of 
considerable  ability,  and  from  whom  Reid  received  his  bias 
in  philosophy. 

Reid  graduated  at  the  age  of  sixteen,  but  remained  ten 
years  longer  at  the  University  in  the  capacity  of  librarian, 
devoting  his  spare  time  to  reading  and  to  scientific  and  mathe- 
matical study. 

In  1737,  Reid  was  appointed  pastor  of  the  Church  at  New- 
machar.  At  first,  he  was  received  with  hostility  by  his 
parishioners,  but  finally,  he  won  them  by  his  affability  and 
goodness  of  heart.  While  pastor,  he  devoted  much  time  to 
study,  his  attention  being  turned  to  philosophy  by  Hume's 
treatise  on  Human  Nature.  He  was  chiefly  interested  in  the 
study  of  external  perception.  His  first  publication,  how- 
ever, treated  of  philosophical  method,  suggested,  as  was 
understood,  by  reading  the  works  of  Hutchison. 

In  1752,  Reid  was  elected  to  the  chair  of  philosophy  in 
King's  College,  Aberdeen,  which  position  he  held  for  twelve 
years.  In  1763,  he  filled  the  chair  of  moral  philosophy  at 
Glasgow.  Then  resigning  to  give  his  time  to  philosophical 
writing.  Owing  mainly  to  the  efforts  of  Reid,  the  Aberdeen 
philosophical  society  was  organized  of  which  he  was  the  first 
Secretary,  this  society  enrolled  the  distinguished  names  of 
Beattie,  Campbell,  and  Dr.  John  Gregory.  Among  the 
subjects  discussed  were  the  speculations  of  Hume;  and  thus 

293 


2i)4  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Reid,  in  his  opposition  to  Hume,  was  naturally  led  to  his 
philosophic  doctrine  of  Common  Sense.  By  common  sense, 
Reid  did  not  mean  the  crude  notions  of  the  vulgar,  but  the 
generally  accepted  opinions  of  sound  minds,  capable  of 
forming  reasonable  judgments. 

Reid  admitted  that  Hume's  conclusions  were  logical 
deductions  from  Locke's  philosophy,  and  therefore  concluded 
that  the  only  satisfactory  refutation  of  Hume's  doctrines  that 
could  be  made,  was  to  show  the  falsity  of  the  principles 
assumed  by  Hume,  as  the  basis  of  his  reasoning. 

To  the  assumption  of  Hume  that  "all  the  objects  of  my 
knowledge  are  ideas  in  my  own  mind,"  Reid  opposed  his 
doctrine  of  "Common  Sense."  This  designation  was  un- 
fortunate, because  misleading,  many  taking  it  to  mean  the 
crass  opinions  of  the  ignorant;  but  by  common  sense,  Reid 
meant  rational  intuition,  or  the  immediate  affirmations  of 
reason,  though  not  the  process  of  reasoning.  Evidently, 
reason  or  rational  intuition  is  authority  sufficient  to  estab- 
lish axioms,  or  rational  first  principles,  such  as,  for  example, 
Every  event  must  have  a  cause,  or  either  of  two  equals  is  a 
substitute  for  the  other. 

Reid,  however,  applied  his  doctrine  of  common  sense  to  the 
explanation  of  the  fact  of  perception,  maintaining  that  the 
mind  has  an  immediate  knowledge  of  external  objects.  Surely 
in  this  application  of  his  doctrine  of  Common  Sense,  Reid 
was  at  fault.  Our  perception  of  external  objects  is  not 
immediate,  but  mediate  through  sensations.  If  external 
objects  did  not  affect  us  giving  us  sensations,  we  should  not 
be  aware  of  their  existence.  We  pass  judgment  on  our 
sensations,  inferring  their  causes,  and  then  ideate  or  picture 
our  inferences  by  the  act  of  the  imagination.  This  fact  of 
mental  pictures  constitutes  the  truth  of  idealism  that  the 
appearances,  which  the  vulgar  call  things,  are  ideas  of  our 
own  creation  and  so  far  is  the  theory  of  idealism  true^but  it 
is  not  the  whole  of  the  truth.  We  create  the  pictures  but 
not  the  causes  of  our  sensations.  The  appearances  are  the 
pictures  of  our  discoveries  of  what  we  hold  to  be  true  of 
external  objects.  Common  sense  takes  the  appearances  for 
the  objects;  subjective  idealism  takes  the  pictures  as  ideas, 
which  they  truly  are,  but  denies  the  objective  causes  of  the 
sensations,  though  Berkeley  admitted  objective  causes 
sensation,  but  called  them  God's  ideas. 


REID,  STEWART,  BROWN  295 

In  affirming  the  existence  of  external  objects,  Reid  is  right; 
but  in  identifying  the  appearances  with  the  objects  he  is 
wrong.  In  identifying  the  appearances  with  ideas,  idealism 
is  right;  but  in  denying  external  objects,  apart  from  ideas, 
it  is  wrong. 

Sensations  are  produced  by  external  causes,  and  not  by  the 
ego,  which  is  passive  in  sensation.  Even  Berkeley  admitted 
this  in  saying:  *'I  assert,  as  well  as  you,  that  since  we  are 
affected  from  without,  we  must  allow  powers  to  be  without, 
in  a  being  distinct  from  ourselves."  That  we  are  affected 
from  without  is  clearly  evident  whenever  we  are  spoken  to 
by  another  person,  as  that  person  himself  will  testify. 

In  holding  that  we  have  knowledge  of  external  things, 
Reid  is  right;  but  he  is  wrong  in  holding  that  this  knowledge 
is  immediate;  for  if  immediate,  we  should  need  neither  senses, 
nor  sensation;  but  sensation  is  the  condition  of  perception, 
and  the  senses  point  to  external  objects.  Perception  is  the 
interpretation  of  sensation,  in  reference  to  its  cause,  and  the 
picture  or  appearance,  constructed  by  the  imagination, 
embodies  our  idea  of  the  cause  of  sensation. 

The  fact,  however,  is  that  Reid  is  not  always  self-consistent 
in  his  treatment  of  the  facts  of  perception.  Take  his  theory  of 
color:  "The  common  language  of  mankind  shows  evidently 
that  we  ought  to  distinguish  between  the  color  of  a  body 
which  is  conceived  to  be  a  fixed  and  permanent  quality  in  the 
body,  and  the  appearance  of  that  color  to  the  eye,  which 
may  be  varied  a  thousand  ways,  by  a  variation  of  the  light, 
of  the  medium,  or  of  the  eye  itself.  The  permanent  color 
of  the  body  is  the  cause  which,  by  the  mediation  of  various 
kinds  or  degrees  of  light,  and  of  various  transparent  bodies 
interposed,  produces  all  this  variety  of  appearances.  .  .  . 
In  particular,  the  idea  which  we  have  called  the  appearance 
of  color,  suggests  the  conception  and  belief  of  some  unknoum 
quality  in  the  body  which  occasions  the  idea;  and  it  is  to  this 
quality,  and  not  to  the  idea,  that  we  give  the  name  of  color.'* 
If  the  quality  which  Reid  calls  color  is  unknown,  the  mind 
does  not  perceive  the  very  thing  itself,  and  the  colored 
appearance  is  only  a  representative  idea,  or  picture  of  the 
external  cause.  The  phenomenal  color  as  sensation  is  im- 
mediately known;  the  external  cause  is  inferred. 

That  Reid's  doctrine  in  regard  to  external  perception  is 
somewhat  vacillating  can  be  readily  shown.  Does  he  hold 


296  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

that  jive  have  an  immediate  perception  of  external  objects? 
It  appears  so;  for  he  says  that  Hume,  "after  acknowledging 
that  it  is  a  universal  and  primary  opinion  of  all  men  that  we 
perceive  external  objects  immediately,  subjoins  what  follows; 
'But  this  uniyersal  and  primary  opinion  of  all  men  is  soon 
destroyed  by  the  slightest  philosophy  which  teaches  us  that 
nothing  can  ever  be  present  to  the  mind  but  an  image  or 
perception;  and  that  the  senses  are  only  the  inlets  through 
which  these  images  are  received,  without  being  ever  able  to 
produce  any  immediate  intercourse  between  the  mind  and 
the  object.  The  table  which  we  see  seems  to  diminish  as  we 
remove  farther  from  it;  but  the  real  table,  which  exists  inde- 
pendent of  us,  suffers  no  alteration.  It  was,  therefore, 
nothing  but  its  image  which  was  present  to  the  mind.  These 
are  the  obvious  dictates  of  reason;  and  no  man  who  reflects 
ever  doubted  that  the  existences  which  we  consider,  when 
we  say  this  house,  and  that  tree,  are  nothing  but  perceptions, 
in  the  mind,  and  fleeting  copies  and  representations  of  other 
existences  which  remain  uniform  and  independent.  So  far 
then  we  are  necessitated  by  reasoning  to  depart  from  the 
primary  instincts  of  nature,  and  to  embrace  a  new  system 
with  regard  to  the  evidence  of  our  senses."  Reid  resumes: 
"We  have  here  a  remarkable  conflict  between  two  contra- 
dictory opinions,  wherein  all  mankind  are  engaged.  On  the 
one  side  stand  all  the  vulgar,  who  are  unpracticed  in  philo- 
sophical researches  and  guided  by  the  uncorrupted  primary 
instincts  of  nature.  On  the  other  side  stand  all  the  philoso- 
phers, ancient  and  modern — every  man  without  exception 
who  reflects.  In  this  division,  to  my  great  humiliation,  I 
find  myself  classed  with  the  vulgar." 

Reid  here  admits  that  he  believes  we  have  an  immediate 
perception  of  external  objects.  The  quotation  from  Hume 
is  worthy  of  attention.  He  distinguishes  rightly  between  the 
appearance  and  the  real  object  as  the  table  which  he  admits 
to  be  independent  of  us.  The  fact  is,  the  appearance  of  the 
table  is  the  picture  constructed  by  the  imagination  embody- 
ing our  judgment  in  regard  to  the  real  external  object,  the 
table  itself. 

Does  Reid  hold  that  we  have  a  mediate  perception  of 
external  objects?  It  appears  so;  for  he  says:  "We  perceive 
no  external  object  but  by  means  of  certain  bodily  organs.'" 


gans." 


REID,  STEWART,  BRQWN  297 

Again,  "the  impression  made  upon  the  organs  of  sense  must 
be  communicated  to  the  nerves  and  by  them  to  the  brain." 
Reid,  therefore,  holds  to  the  doctrine  of  mediate  perception 
of  external  objects.  Hence  it  is  evident  that  Reid  incon- 
sistently holds  both  to  immediate  perception  and  mediate 
perception  of  external  objects. 

Again  Reid  says:  "If,  therefore,  we  attend  to  that  act  of 
our  mind  which  we  call  perception  of  an  external  object  of 
sense,  we  shall  find  in  it  these  three  things:  First,  some  con- 
ception or  notion  of  the  object  perceived.  Secondly,  a  strong 
and  irresistible  conviction  and  belief  of  its  present  existence. 
And,  thirdly,  that  this  conviction  and  belief  are  immediate, 
and  not  the  effect  of  reasoning." 

Perhaps  Reid  did  not  mean  to  say  that  the  conception 
or  notion  of  an  object  perceived  is  first  in  the  order  of  time, 
as  it  is  really  the  last  step  in  the  act  of  perception,  but  that 
the  conception  is  inseparable  from  the  perception.  There  is, 
of  course,  a  conviction  of  the  present  existence  of  the  object 
perceived.  This  conviction,  though  not  the  result  of  the 
ordinary  reasoning  process,  is  nevertheless  the  result  of  the 
intuition  that  the  sensation,  which  is  the  condition  of  percep- 
tion, has  an  external  cause,  and  that  the  cause  is  the  object 
which  the  judgment  declares  it  to  be. 

Reid  did  great  service  to  philosophy  by  exposing  the 
doctrine  that  ideas  are  something  intermediate  between  the 
objects  which  they  were  supposed  to  represent  and  the  mind 
which  perceives  the  ideas.  The  ideas  are  not  objects  of 
perception,  but  of  conception;  they  are  not  perceived  by  the 
mind,  but  are  created  by  the  mind,  and  embody  our  infer- 
ences concerning  the  objects  which  give  us  certain  sensations. 
These  inferences  are  spontaneous  judgments  which  are 
ideated  as  pictures  expressing  our  knowledge  or  belief  of 
what  we  hold  to  be  true  in  regard  to  the  objects.  The  ideas 
are  mental  pictures  of  the  objects  and  complete  the  act  of 
perception. 

Reid  succeeded  better  in  exposing  the  errors  of  others  than 
in  establishing  a  consistent  doctrine  of  his  own. 

2.  Stewart  (1753-1828).  Dugald  Stewart,  the  son  of 
Matthew  Stewart  who,  for  twenty-five  years,  held  the  pro- 
fessorship of  Mathematics  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh, 
was  educated  at  the  High  School  and  University  of  his 
native  city. 


298  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

At  this  school,  he  cultivated  his  taste  for  language  and 
literature,  and  acquired  that  elegance  and  finish  of  style  which 
distinguished  his  subsequent  writings.  At  the  University  his 
chief  studies  were  philosophy  and  mathematics,  in  which  he 
became  very  proficient. 

His  instructor  in  philosophy  at  Edinburgh  was  Adam 
Furgerson,  though  afterwards  he  attended,  at  Glasgow,  the 
lectures  of  Reid  whom  he  acknowledged  his  master  in  philoso- 
phy. At  Glasgow  he  formed  a  lasting  friendship  with  Alison, 
who,  later  in  life,  was  the  author  of  an  Essay  on  Taste 
celebrated  for  its  valuable  criticisms. 

Stewart  assisted  his  father  for  three  years  in  mathematics, 
and  in  1775,  in  conjunction  with  his  father,  was  appointed 
professor  of  mathematics,  which  position  he  filled  for  several 
years  with  distinguished  ability.  In  1778,  Furgerson,  being 
appointed  secretary  of  the  commission  to  the  American 
colonies,  requested  Stewart  to  supply  his  place  as  lecturer 
on  moral  philosophy  which  he  did  for  one  year,  in  addition 
to  his  mathematical  work,  but  called  it  the  most  laborious 
year's  work  of  his  life. 

In  1783,  Stewart  married  Helen  Baunatyne,  who  died  in 
1787,  leaving  an  only  son,  who  afterwards  became  a  colonel 
in  the  army. 

On  the  resignation  of  Furgerson  in  1785.  Stewrart  was 
transferred  to  the  chair  of  Moral  Philosophy,  and  for  twenty- 
five  years  adorned  his  position  by  the  eloquence  of  his  lectures, 
which  were  attended  by  many  young  men  who  afterwards 
became  celebrated.  Among  these  were  Sir  Walter  Scott, 
Lord  Brougham,  Sydney  Smith,  James  Mill,  Francis  Homer, 
Jeffrey,  Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  Archibald  Alison,  and  Sir  James 
Mackintosh. 

In  1790,  Stewart  married  Miss  Cranstoun,  a  lady  of  rank 
and  accomplishments,  who,  as  critic,  assisted  him  in  his 
writings.  Stewart  published  the  first  volume  of  the  Elements 
of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  in  1792  and  in  1793,  his 
Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy.  His  Philosophical  Essays 
appeared  in  1810;  the  second  volume  of  the  Elements  in  1814, 
and  the  third  volume,  not  till  1827. 

In  1815,  the  first  part  of  his  Dissertation  on  the  Progress  of 
Philosophy  was  published  in  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica 
Supplement,  and  in  1821,  the  second  part.  In  1828, 


REID,  STEWART,  BROWN  299 

weeks  before  his  death,  appeared  his  last  work,  entitled  The 
Philosophy  of  the  Active  and  Moral  Powers. 

Stewart  was  perhaps  more  distinguished  for  his  elegant 
style  than  for  his  originality  or  depth  of  thought.  Dr.  John 
Thomson  of  Edinburgh  University  said  that  what  impressed 
him  most,  in  the  course  of  his  life  was  the  acting  of  Mrs. 
Siddons  and  the  eloquence  of  Stewart. 

Stewart  avoided  daring  hypotheses  and  eccentric  theories, 
and  followed  the  safer  path  of  sound  judgment  and  conserva- 
tive opinion. 

By  the  elegance  of  his  style,  Stewart  rendered  the  Philoso- 
phy of  Common  Sense  attractive  to  many  minds  that  were 
repelled  by  the  bold  statements  of  Reid.  Any  cultivated 
mind,  though  not  trained  in  philosophy,  can  read  with 
delight,  approaching  fascination,  Stewart's  chapters  on 
memory  and  the  imagination. 

Though  Stewart  added  nothing  new  to  philosophy,  yet  he 
adjusted  and  made  coherent  the  doctrines  of  Reid,  making 
them  more  intelligible  and  attractive  to  the  common  mind, 
and  thus,  by  awaking  a  philosophical  taste,  promoted  higher 
culture  among  the  people.  His  works  may  still  be  read, 
with  interest  and  profit,  even  by  the  philosopher. 

Much  better  versed  than  Reid,  was  Stewart  in  the  history 
of  philosophy,  and  this  enabled  him  to  give  to  his  writings 
the  richness  of  all  the  ages  of  thought,  and  to  exhibit  all  the 
wealth  and  charm  of  scholarly  attainment. 

Stewart  improved  on  the  phraseology  of  Reid,  as  for 
example,  by  introducing,  in  place  of  the  term,  "The  Principles 
of  Common  Sense,"  which  is  objectionable  on  account  of  its 
ambiguity,  the  more  precise  and  dignified  expression,  "The 
Fundamental  Laws  of  Human  Belief." 

He  also  made  a  better  classification  of  the  phenomena  of 
the  mind.  In  fact,  he  was  a  much  better  psychologist  than 
Reid;  and  yet  Stewart's  analyses  and  classifications  are  by 
no  means  faultless.  Thus,  he  called  consciousness  a  special 
faculty,  co-ordinate,  for  example,  with  perception,  memory 
and  imagination,  whereas  it  is  an  accompaniment  of  the 
other  acts  and  states  of  the  mind,  and  is  involved  in  them  as 
a  necessary  element.  Thus,  if  I  know,  I  know  that  I  know, 
or  am  conscious  of  knowing.  Of  course,  if  we  are  conscious, 


300  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

we  are  capable  of  being  conscious,  but  this  capability  is 
involved  in  all  our  mental  powers.  It  is  the  present  tendency 
to  make  consciousness  equivalent  to  mind. 

Stewart  was  more  employed  in  defending  the  positions 
gained  by  Reid  than  in  making  advances  or  in  building  up  a 
complete  and  compact  system  of  philosophy  of  his  own. 

3.  Brown  (1778-1820).  Dr.  Thomas  Brown  was  born 
at  Kirkmabreck,  at  the  manse  of  his  father,  the  Rev.  Samuel 
Brown,  minister  of  the  united  parishes  of  Kirkmabreck  and 
Kirkdale. 

His  father  died  before  Thomas  was  two  years  old,  and  his 
mother,  shortly  after,  removed  with  her  family  to  Edinburgh, 
and  there  attended  to  the  primary  education  of  her  son,  who 
was  a  bright  and  very  precocious  child. 

When  about  seven  years  of  age,  Thomas  was  sent  to  London 
under  the  charge  of  his  uncle,  Captain  Smith,  by  whom  he  was 
placed  at  school.  He  showed  his  genius  for  poetry  by  writ- 
ing, on  the  assigned  theme,  verses  on  the  death  of  Charles 
the  First.  These  verses  so  pleased  his  teacher,  that  he 
secured  their  publication  in  a  literary  magazine.  He  attend- 
ed different  schools  while  in  London,  and  on  the  death  of  his 
uncle,  returned  to  Edinburgh,  at  the  age  of  fourteen,  and 
entered  the  University.  His  books  were  shipped  by  water 
and,  to  his  great  grief,  were  lost  at  sea. 

He  commenced  his  University  course  with  Logic,  under 
the  instruction  of  Dr.  Finlayson.  While  spending  his  vaca- 
tion at  Liverpool,  he  became  acquainted  with  Dr.  Currie, 
the  biographer  of  Burns,  who  placed  in  his  hand  the  first 
volume  of  Stewart's  Philosophy.  Brown  was  so  captivated 
with  it,  that  the  next  winter  he  attended  the  course  of 
lectures  given  by  Stewart.  Though  greatly  admiring  Stewart 
Brown  ventured  to  make  a  criticism  011  a  certain  point  of 
Stewart's  doctrine.  Stewart  listened  kindly,  and  then  read 
to  him  a  letter  from  the  distinguished  M.  Provost,  of  Geneva, 
making  the  same  criticism. 

Brown  spent  his  time  profitably  at  the  University,  under 
able  instructors,  giving  also  considerable  attention  to  general 
literature.  In  reading  "Zoonomia,"  the  work  of  the  learned 
Dr.  Erasmus  Darwin,  grandfather  of  the  celebrated  Charles 
Darwin,  Brown  found  certain  points  of  interest  which  he 
noted  in  the  margin.  These  notes"  were  finally  expanded 


REID,  STEWART,  BROWN 


301 


into  a  volume,  which  was  published  anonymously,  and 
attracting  great  attention,  was  by  the  high  authority  of  the 
Monthly  Review,  and  the  Annals  of  Medicine,  highly 
praised,  and  attributed  to  some  distinguished  philosopher. 

Brown  began  the  study  of  law,  but  abandoned  that  for 
medicine  in  which  he  finished  a  course  and  took  the  degree 
of  Doctor  of  Medicine.  In  the  practice  of  medicine,  he 
became  partner  of  the  famous  Dr.  Gregory. 

On  account  of  declining  health,  Stewart  invited  Brown  to 
lecture  for  him,  and  the  next  year,  1810,  at  the  request  of 
Stewart,  he  was  appointed  his  colleague  in  the  department 
of  philosophy,  and  thenceforward  discharged  all  the  duties 
of  the  professor  of  Moral  Philosophy. 

Stewart's  lectures  exhibited  classical  elegance;  Brown's 
poetic  imagery,  and  all  the  flowers  of  rhetoric.  They  com- 
pletely captivated  his  audience  of  students  from  sixteen  to 
twenty  years  of  age,  Brown's  books  were  exceedingly  popu- 
lar, not  only  in  Great  Britain,  but  in  the  United  States. 

For  what  was  Brown  distinguished?  Not  only  for  the 
attractiveness  of  his  style,  but  for  his  penetrating  discern- 
ment and  masterly  powers  of  analysis.  He  was  accustomed 
to  resolve  every  subject  he  took  up  into  simpler  elements, 
and  to  present  it  in  a  new  form.  He  attained  an  undue 
popularity  for  twenty  years,  his  reputation  culminating 
during  the  five  years  from  1830  to  1835,  and  then  through 
the  influence,  chiefly  of  Coleridge  and  Hamilton,  passed 
into  undeserved  neglect. 

Brown's  classification  of  mental  phenomena  is  as  follows: 


Mental 
phenomena 


External 
States 


Internal 
States 


\  Sensations 


Intellectual 


Emotional 


Simple  Suggestion 
Relative  Suggestion 

Passions 
Desires 


302  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  distinction  between  the  external  and  internal  states 
is  not  well  taken.  A  sensation,  though  its  immediate  antece- 
dent is  physical,  a  nervous  excitement,  is  just  as  clearly 
internal  as  an  intellectual  or  an  emotional  state.  Again,  the 
distinction  of  simple  suggestion  and  relative  suggestion  is 
not  clear,  nor  as  correct  as  that  of  memory  and  judgment, 
for  which  they  are  substituted.  Association  undoubtedly  is 
of  primary  importance  in  memory,  but  judgment  is  not 
merely  passive,  swayed  by  hints  from  various  sources,  but  is 
an  active  operation  of  the  intellect,  and  in  fact  is  the  typical 
form  of  thought. 

Brown  has  entirely  overlooked  the  will  as  a  distinct  act 
or  power  of  the  mind.  It  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  desire, 
as  many  of  the  Scotch  philosophers  are  inclined  to  do;  for  we 
desire  many  things  we  do  not  will  to  appropriate.  Will  is 
the  sovereign  power  of  the  mind,  and  a  moral  being  is  justified 
or  condemned,  according,  as  its  decisions  are  right  or  wrong. 

The  classifications  of  the  psychical  phenomena  as  cogni- 
tions, feelings,  and  volitions,  implying  the  powers  or  sus- 
ceptibilities of  intellect,  sensibility  and  will,  is  much  more 
clear,  comprehensive  and  correct  than  that  given  by  Brown. 

Brown  discarded  the  use  of  the  terms,  powers,  suscepti- 
bilities, or  faculties,  and  this  has  also  been  done  by  the 
German  philosopher,  Herbart,  but  without  good  reason.  If 
we  think,  we  are  capable  of  thinking;  if  we  feel,  we  are  sus- 
ceptible of  feeling;  if  we  will,  we  have  power  to  choose  or 
decide;  and  these  capabilities,  susceptibilities,  and  powers 
are  conveniently  designated  by  the  compendious  term 
faculties.  This  does  not,  of  course,  mean  that  the  mind  is 
triple,  but  that  the  one  mind  has  three  generic  capabilities; 
for  every  one  says:  I  think,  I  feel,  I  will.  It  is  the  same  7. 

He  who  thinks  that  he  is  no  more  than  a  succession  of 
thoughts,  feelings  and  volitions,  has  no  adequate  conception 
of  himself.  In  such  a  state  of  things,  there  can  be  no  personal 
indentity.  It  would  certainly  be  absurd  to  punish  a  certain 
collection  of  thoughts,  feelings,  and  volitions  now,  for  what 
an  entirely  different  collection  did  a  long  time  ago. 

It  is  true,  that  we  are  conscious  only  of  phenomena;  but 
thoughts,  feelings  and  volitions  are  neither  self-originating, 
nor  self-supporting.  Reason  refers  them  to  a  subject  who 
thinks,  feels,  and  wills.  It  is  by  rational  intuition,  and  by 


REID,  STEWART,  BROWN  303 

that  only,  that  the  ego,  conscious  of  phenomena,  knows 
itself  as  a  knowing,  sensitive,  and  active  being.  The  con- 
tinuous personal  identity  of  the  ego  is  the  condition  of  mem- 
ory, the  justification  of  punishment  or  reward,  and  the  seat 
of  conscience. 

Antagonistic  to  Reid's  theory  of  preception  was  that  of 
Brown  which  held  that  the  object  of  perception  is  the  mind 
itself  as  affected  in  such  a  manner  as  to  induce  in  it  a  certain 
state;  but  the  truth  is,  perception  goes  beyond  the  mental 
state  and  infers  and  ideates  its  cause.  But  more  about 
perception  in  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

Hamilton,  Ferrier,  McCosh 

1.  Hamilton  (1788-1856).  Sir  William  Hamilton,  Bart., 
was  the  son  of  Dr.  William  Hamilton,  who  succeeded  his 
father,  Dr.  Thomas  Hamilton,  as  professor  of  Anatomy  in 
the  University  of  Glasgow.  On  the  death  of  his  father, 
which  occurred  in  1791,  William  and  his  younger  brother, 
Thomas,  afterwards  Captain  Thomas  Hamilton,  were  brought 
up  under  the  care  of  their  mother,  a  woman  of  ability  and 
energetic  character. 

William  received  his  early  education  in  Scotland,  except 
for  two  years  at  a  private  school  near  London.  Returning 
to  Glasgow,  he  entered  the  University  at  the  age  of  fifteen, 
and  studied  Logic  under  Jardine,  and  Moral  Philosophy  under 
Mylne,  and  held  the  first  rank  in  both  classes. 

In  1807,  he  went  to  Oxford,  and  entered  Balliol  College. 
He  entered  heartily  with  the  English  students  into  the 
sports  of  boating  and  other  gymnastic  exercises  but  threw 
the  whole  force  of  his  intellect  into  his  studies,  delving 
especially  into  the  works  of  Aristotle.  At  the  close  of  his 
course  he  presented  himself  for  examination  on  many  more 
difficult  studies  than  those  required  for  the  first  honors. 
His  success  was  triumphant,  and  was  long  remembered  as  a 
tradition  in  the  College. 

Having  secured  the  degree  B.  A.  and  first  class  honors,  he 
went  to  Edinburgh,  with  the  intention  of  devoting  himself 
to  medicine,  but  shortly  abandoned  that  pursuit  for  the 
study  of  law.  Having  studied  for  the  legal  profession,  he 
became,  in  1813,  a  member  of  the  Scottish  bar.  Through 
a  legal  investigation,  he  recovered  for  himself  the  title  of 
Baronet,  which  formerly  had  been  held  by  the  representatives 
of  the  Hamilton  family,  but  which  had  been  suffered  to  lapse. 

In  1820,  at  the  solicitation  of  his  friends,  he  was  a  candidate 
for  the  chair  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Edin- 
burgh, but  failed  to  receive  the  appointment,  which,  through 

304 


HAMILTON,  FERRIER,  McCOSH  305 

political  influence,  was  given  to  John  Wilson;  but  in  1821, 
he  was  appointed  to  the  chair  of  History  in  the  University, 
through  the  suffrages  of  the  faculty  of  advocates,  who  were 
patrons  of  this  chair.  In  this  capacity,  he  delivered  several 
courses  of  lectures  on  the  history  of  Modern  Europe,  also 
on  general  literature. 

Hamilton  also  contributed  to  the  Quarterly  Magazines, 
and  otherwise  accomplished  a  great  amount  of  literary  work. 
He  examined  the  claims  and  exploded  the  pretensions  of 
Phrenology  as  a  science  of  mind.  He  reviewed  Cousin's 
philosophy  of  the  unconditioned,  also  Brown's  works,  and 
wrote  on  the  philosophy  of  perception,  on  logic,  and  unfortu- 
nately for  himself,  on  mathematics. 

In  1829,  he  married  his  cousin,  Janet  Marshall,  who  proved 
to  be  a  very  helpful  wife,  assisting  and  encouraging  him  in 
many  ways.  It  may  be  mentioned,  as  a  matter  of  interest, 
that  their  daughter,  in  co-operation  with  Miss  E.  E.  C.  Jones, 
translated  from  German  into  English,  Microcosmus,  the 
great  work  of  Lotze. 

In  1836,  Hamilton  was  elected  to  the  Chair  of  Logic  and 
Metaphysics  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh,  which  position 
he  held  for  the  next  twenty  years.  This  position  was  what 
he  desired,  and  was  exactly  suited  to  his  taste.  As  a  philoso- 
pher, Hamilton  exerted  a  most  powerful  influence,  not  only 
over  Scottish  youth,  but  throughout  the  philosophic  world. 

Hamilton's  lectures  on  Psychology  and  Metaphysics,  as 
well  as  those  on  Logic,  were  written  in  the  winters  of  1836-37 
and  38,  usually  shortly  before  they  were  to  be  delivered. 
They  were  repeated,  year  after  year,  as  long  as  he  occupied 
the  chair  of  philosophy. 

In  1846,  he  published  an  annotated  edition  of  Reid's  works, 
appending  notes  which  exhibited  critical  thought  and  an 
extensive  and  profound  knowledge  of  the  history  of  philoso- 
phy. Instead  of  spending  his  time  on  Reid's  works,  which 
were  scarcely  worth  the  pains,  we  believe  that  he  would 
have  done  a  greater  service  to  mankind,  had  he  devoted  his 
time,  learning  and  energy,  in  producing  a  work  on  the  History 
of  Philosophy. 

In  logic,  he  elucidated,  more  clearly  than  had  before  been 
done,  the  distinction  between  the  logical  quantities  of  com- 
prehension and  extension — the  comprehension  connoting  the 


306  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

collection  of  attributes  common  to  all  the  individuals  of  a 
species  or  to  all  the  species  of  a  genus,  and  the  extension 
denoting  all  the  individuals  of  a  species,  or  all  the  species  of  a 
genus  characterized  by  the  common  attributes.  He  showed 
how  we  could  reason  in  either  quantity,  emphasizing  that  of 
comprehension,  as  the  form  usually  overlooked.  Thus,  we 
can  reason  in  extensive  quantity :  The  class  morally  responsi- 
ble beings  belongs  to  the  class  free  beings;  man  belongs  to 
the  class  morally  responsible  beings;  therefore,  man  belongs 
to  the  class  free  beings.  In  comprehensive  quantity,  we 
reason:  The  attribute  responsibility  involves  the  attribute 
free  agency;  man  has  the  attribute  responsibility;  man,  there- 
fore, has  the  attribute  free  agency. 

Hamilton  claimed  originality  for  his  doctrine  of  the  thor- 
ough quantification  of  the  predicate,  making  eight  categori- 
cal propositions  instead  of  the  four  usually  recognized:  the 
affirmatives,  all  S  is  all  P,  all  S  is  some  P,  some  S  is  all  P, 
some  S  is  some  P;  the  negatives,  any  S  is  not  any  P,  any  S 
is  not  some  P,  some  S  is  not  any  P,  some  S  is  not  some  P. 
No  doubt  Hamilton  thought  that  these  propositions  were 
unambiguous,  but  this  is  true  of  only  four  of  them.  The 
other  four  are  all  ambiguous.  The  last  especially,  some  S 
is  not  some  P,  as  Mr.  De  Morgan  has  shown,  has  nothing  to 
contradict  it,  or  is  always  true,  except  when  S  and  P  denote 
the  same  individual  by  different  names. 

Relation  is  the  important  thing  in  logic,  and  in  extensive 
quantity,  only  four  relations  between  the  terms  of  a  proposi- 
tion are  possible:  one  is  co-extensive  with  the  other,  one  is 
excluded  from  the  other,  one  is  subordinate  to  the  other,  or 
one  intersects  the  other.  If  in  case  of  subordination,  we 
always  take,  as  we  may,  the  subordinate  term  for  the  sub- 
ject, we  can  write:  S  is  co-extensive  with  P,  S  is  excluded 
from  P,  S  is  subordinate  to  P,  S  intersects  P.  Denoting  these 
relations  by  (C),  (E),  (S),  (I,)  placed  between  the  terms,  we 
can  write:  S(C)  P,  S  (E)  P,  S  (S)  P,  S  (I)  P,  which  are 
as  above. 


HAMILTON,  FERRIER,  McCOSH  307 

We  give  the  syllogisms  which  prove  co-extension,  exclusion, 
subordination,  and  intersection,  using  the  notation  (C),  (E), 
(S),  (I).  These  conclusions  are  proved  in  order,  thus: 

1.  (C).         M(C)P,       S(C)M,  .'.S(C)P. 

/  P  (S)  M,      S  (E)  M,  .  •  .  S  (E)  P. 

2.  (E).        \  P  (C)  M,      S  (E)  M,  .  •  .  S  (E)  P. 

/  P  (E)  M,      S  (S)  M,  .  '  .  S  (E)  P. 
\  P  (E)  M,     S  (C)  M,  .  •  .  S  (E)  P. 

f  M  (S)  P,      S  (S)  M,  .  •  .  S  (S)  P. 

3.  (S).         {  M  (C)  P,      S  (S)  M,  .  •  .  S  (S)  P. 

I  M  (S)  P,     S  (C)  M,  .  •  .  S  (S)  P. 

;    4.  (I).          fM(C)P,      S(I)M,   .'.S(I)P. 
\  M  (I)  P,      S  (C)  M,  .  •  .  S  (I)  P. 

It  will  be  interesting  to  represent  the  arguments  by  Euler's 
notation  with  circles.  These  syllogisms  are  unambiguous,  and 
perfectly  clear.  I  give  the  above  as  a  contribution  to  logic. 
Reasoning,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  is  an  indirect  comparison. 
The  relation  of  two  terms  to  each  other  is  determined  by 
their  separate  relation  to  the  middle  term. 

As  to  psychology,  it  is  quite  clear  that  Hamilton's  classi- 
fication of  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  as  the  cognitive,  the 
emotive,  and  the  causative,  is  a  great  advance  beyond  that 
given  by  Brown,  though  he  is  certainly  wrong  in  including 
desire  under  the  causative  phenomena,  rather  than  under  the 
emotive,  a  mistake  characteristic  of  the  Scotch  philosophy. 
Desire  is  a  feeling  rather  than  volition. 

In  his  use  of  the  term  consciousness,  Hamilton,  though 
clearly  right  in  not  making  it  a  special  faculty,  seems  to  waver 
between  its  use  as  a  compendious  term,  co-extensive  with  all 
the  cognitive  powers,  and  its  use  in  a  special  sense,  which  he 
calls  self -consciousness,  as  affording  a  knowledge  of  all  the 
phenomena  of  the  mind;  but  this  designation,  self -conscious- 
ness, is  improper,  unless  by  self,  he  means  the  acts  and  states 
of  the  mind — its  cognitions,  feelings  and  volitions,  and  not 
the  mind  itself.  The  truth  is,  we  are  conscious  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  the  mind;  but  we  know  the  ego,  or  mind  itself,  by 
reason,  that  is,  by  rational  intuition,  as  the  condition,  or 
sine  qua  non,  of  mental  phenomena. 


308  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

In  maintaining  his  doctrine  of  perception,  which  he  called 
Natural  Realism,  Hamilton  exerted  all  his  strength,  which 
was  indeed  formidable,  as  his  antagonists  knew  to  their  cost. 
He  seems  to  teach  that  we  are  immediately  conscious  of  ex- 
ternal objects,  as  in  the  following  passage:  "For  example, 
I  see  the  inkstand.  How  can  I  be  conscious  that  my  present 
modification  exists,  that  it  is  a  perception,  and  not  another 
mental  state, — that  it  is  a  perception  of  sight  to  the  exclusion 
of  every  other  sense,  and  finally  that  it  is  a  perception  of 
the  inkstand,  and  of  the  inkstand  only, — unless  my  con- 
sciousness comprehends  within  its  sphere  the  object,  which 
at  once  determines  the  existence  of  the  act,  qualifies  its  kind, 
and  distinguishes  its  individuality.  Annihilate  the  inkstand, 
you  annihilate  the  perception;  annihilate  the  consciousness  of 
the  object,  you  annihilate  the  consciousness  of  the  operation. " 

It  is  true  that  if  you  annihilate  the  inkstand,  you  annihilate 
the  perception;  but  it  is  not  true  that  if  you  annihilate  the 
consciousness  of  the  object,  you  annihilate  the  consciousness 
of  the  operation.  Hamilton  holds  that  when  we  see  an 
inkstand  we  are  conscious,  not  only  of  the  perception,  but 
of  the  inkstand.  We  have  knowledge,  it  is  true,  of  the  ink- 
stand, but  mediate  knowledge  through  the  sensations  which 
it  causes  in  us;  but  consciousness  is  immediate  knowledge. 
Between  the  sensation  and  the  idea  of  the  inkstand,  there 
may  be  no  process  of  reasoning,  but  there  is,  at  least,  a  judg- 
ment as  to  the  object  causing  the  sensation,  and  the  idea, 
or  appearance,  embodies  this  judgment.  Of  this  idea,  as 
our  own  mental  construction,  we  are,  of  course,  conscious; 
but  the  idea,  as  our  own  construction,  formed  to  account  for 
the  sensation,  and  of  which  we  are  conscious,  is  to  be  dis 
tinguished  from  the  inkstand  itself,  the  cause  of  the  sensa- 
tion. 

On  the  other  hand,  Hamilton  seems  to  teach  that  we  are 
not  conscious  of  the  external  object.  He  says:  "What  is 
the  external  object  perceived?  Nothing  can  be  conceived 
more  ridiculous  than  the  opinion  of  philosophers  in  regard 
to  this.  For  example,  it  has  been  curiously  held  (and  Reid 
is  no  exception),  that  in  looking  at  the  sun,  moon  or  any 
other  object  of  sight,  we  are,  on  the  one  doctrine,  actually 
conscious  of  those  distant  objects,  or  on  the  other,  that  the 
distant  objects  are  those  really  represented  in  the  mine 
Nothing  can  be  more  absurd;  we  perceive  through  no  sem 


HAMILTON,  FERRIER,  McCOSH  309 

aught  external  but  what  is  in  immediate  relation  and  imme- 
diate contact  with  its  organ."  Then  we  are  not  conscious  of 
the  sun  nor  of  the  inkstand.  In  perception  we  are  conscious 
of  the  perception  and  of  the  idea,  but  not  of  the  object. 

A  system  of  philosophy,  to  be  impregnable,  must  be  based 
on  the  necessary  principles  of  reason.  Contingent  facts, 
known  empirically,  can  form  no  adequate  basis  for  philosophy; 
for  such  facts  not  being  necessary,  may  or  may  not  be; 
though  the  facts  do  not  constitute  philosophy,  yet  philosophy 
should  account  for  the  facts. 

The  primary  laws  of  thought  are  either  laws  of  sequence 
or  laws  of  harmony.  Take  the  law  of  causality:  Every  event 
must  have  a  cause.  Hamilton  derives  this  law  from  the 
impotence  of  the  mind  to  conceive  an  absolute  commence- 
ment; but  impotence  is  no  warrant  for  a  philosophical 
principle.  The  fact  is,  reason  is  potent  to  apprehend,  not 
that  every  thing,  but  that  every  event  has  a  cause;  for  non- 
entity cannot  spring  into  being.  Eternal  existence  is,  there- 
fore, a  reality.  Imagination,  it  is  true,  cannot  picture 
eternal  existence,  but  that  does  not  disprove  its  reality;  for 
imagination  cannot  show  its  impossibility.  It  is  not  im- 
possible to  the  reason.  On  the  other  hand,  an  absolute  com- 
mencement, though  it  can  be  pictured  by  the  imagination, 
is  impossible  to  reason.  It  is  reason,  not  imagination,  that 
deals  with  fundamental  truth,  and  this  explains  why  the 
common  sense  of  all  intelligent  minds,  in  choosing  between 
the  contradictory  alternatives,  a  cause  for  every  event,  and 
an  absolute  commencement,  rejects  the  absurdity  of  an 
absolute  commencement,  and  asserts  that  every  event  must 
have  a  cause.  An  event  without  a  cause,  Hamilton  can't 
see  how  it  can  be;  I  can  see  that  it  can't  be. 

The  principle  of  causality,  the  reason  of  being,  is  one 
branch  of  the  generic  law  of  reason  and  consequent,  the  other 
branch  being  merely  the  reason  of  knowing.  Thus,  cain 
causes  the  ground  to  be  wet;  it  is  thus  a  reason  of  being,  and 
it  may  also  be  a  reason  of  knowing.  The  witness  of  the 
ground,  after  a  drouth,  ia^  a  reason  of  knowing  that  it  has 
rained,  but  it  is  not  the  Vause  of  the  rain,  or  the  reason  of 
being. 

The  laws  of  harmony  of  which  Hamilton  gives  three,  that 
of  identity,  of  non-contradiction,  and  of  excluded  middle,  can 
be  more  fully  presented : 


S10  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  law  of  identity,  in  its  positive  form:  A  thing  is  itself; 
in  its  negative  form:  A  thing  is  not  any  other  than  itself. 

The  law  of  congruents:  Two  congruent  propositions  may  be 
both  true,  or  both  false,  or  one  true  and  the  other  false. 

The  law  of  conflictives:  Two  conflictive  propositions  cannot 
both  be  true. 

The  law  of  contraries,  the  species  of  conflictives  not  univer- 
sally inclusive:  Two  contraries  cannot  both  be  true,  but  may 
both  be  false. 

The  law  of  contradictories,  the  species  of  conflictives  uni- 
versally inclusive:  Two  contradictories  cannot  be  both  true  nor 
both  false. 

The  names  here  given  tell  what  these  laws  are  applicable 
to,  as  congruents,  conflictives,  contraries,  and  contradictories. 
The  name,  for  example,  of  excluded  middle,  does  not  tell  the 
kind  of  propositions  to  which  it  is  applicable,  that  is,  to 
contradictories. 

In  his  treatment  of  space  and  time,  Hamilton  was  too 
greatly  influenced  by  Kant.  The  contradictory  proposi- 
tions :  Space  is  finite,  and  space  is  infinite,  cannot  be  affirmed 
on  equal  authority.  The  imagination  is  impotent  to  con- 
ceive the  infinity  of  space,  but  it  cannot  prove  it  finite.  On 
the  other  hand,  reason  clearly  apprehends  that  there  is  no 
limit  beyond  which  there  is  no  ulterior  space.  Reason, 
therefore,  knows  that  space  is  not  finite.  In  knowing  that 
the  proposition,  space  is  finite,  is  false,  reason  knows  its 
contradictory,  space  is  infinite,  is  true. 

Hamilton  accepts  the  existence  of  God  on  faith,  not  on  the 
evidence  of  reason;  but  that  there  is  an  eternal  ultimate 
reality,  involving  the  possibility  of  all  actual  existence, 
reason  intuitively  apprehends,  otherwise  there  never  would 
have  been  anything. 

That  Hamilton  was  great  is  manifest  in  all  his  writings. 
His  works  will  live  and  be  read  for  all  coming  time,  yet  his 
philosophy  will  be  modified. 

2.  Ferrier  (1808-1864).  James  Frederick  Ferrier  was 
the  son  of  John  Ferrier  and  the  grandson  of  James  Ferrier, 
intimate  friend  of  Sir  Walter  Scott.  His  mother  was  the 
sister  of  Professor  John  Wilson. 

James  Frederick  was  born  in  Edinburgh,  and  received  his 
earliest  education  at  the  manse  of  Rothwell,  Dumfriesshire, 


HAMILTON,  FE&RIER,  McCOSH  311 

in  the  family  of  Rev.  Dr.  Duncan,  through  whose  influence 
he  acquired  a  love  for  the  Latin  poets,  Vergil,  Ovid,  and 
Horace,  which  he  never  lost.  He  attended  later  the  Edin- 
burgh High  School,  and  the  University  of  Edinburgh  from 
1825  to  1827.  He  entered  Magdalen  College,  Oxford, 
where  in  1831,  he  took  the  degree  of  Bachelor  of  Arts.  In 
1834,  he  spent  some  time  at  Heidelberg;  and  in  1837,  he 
married  his  cousin,  the  daughter  of  Professor  John  Wilson. 
He  studied  law,  and  was  admitted  as  an  advocate  in  1832. 

Ferrier  formed  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  and  lectured  for  him  in  the  session,  1844-5,  during 
Hamilton's  illness. 

On  the  death  of  Prof.  Wilson,  Ferrier  was  an  applicant 
for  the  vacant  chair  of  Moral  Philosophy,  but  failed  to 
receive  the  appointment.  He  failed  likewise  as  an  applicant 
for  the  chair  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  which  became  vacant 
by  the  death  of  Hamilton.  He,  however,  received  the 
appointment  of  Professor  of  Civil  History  at  Edinburgh, 
and  in  1845  was  elected  Professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  at 
St.  Andrews,  which  position  he  held  till  his  death. 

Ferrier  contributed  a  series  of  articles  for  Blackwood 
under  the  title,  An  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of  Con- 
sciousness. The  collected  works  of  Ferrier  have  been  pub- 
lished in  three  volumes,  entitled,  respectively,  Lectures  on 
the  Early  Greek  Philosophy,  Institutes  of  Metaphysics,  and 
Philosophical  Remains.  These  we  notice  in  the  above  order. 

It  is  safe  to  assert  that  no  more  interesting  book  on  Greek 
Philosophy  was  ever  written  than  that  of  Ferrier's.  He  had 
a  clear  conception  of  what  Philosophy  is  in  itself,  and  what 
a  History  of  Philosophy  ought  to  be.  He  exhibited  clearly 
the  significance  of  the  Ionic  Philosophy,  and  the  Eleatic, 
and  the  obscure  systems  of  Heraclitus  and  Pythagoras. 
He  entered  sympathetically  into  the  spirit,  and  traced  the 
connection  of  the  theories  of  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras, 
Democritus,  the  Sophists,  Socrates,  Plato,  Epicurus  and 
Zeno.  A  few  points  only  in  this  history,  it  is  needful  to 
mention. 

Ferrier  dwells  with  favor  on  the  principle  of  change,  brought 
forward  by  Heraclitus,  and  called  by  him  becoming,  a  com- 
bination of  being  and  not-being.  It  is,  however,  at  once 
evident  that  change  cannot  be  the  first  or  ultimate  principle; 


312  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

for  change  itself  is  an  effect  brought  about  by  the  action  of 
cause,  which  is  truly  the  ultimate  or  first  principle.  Cause 
is  also  apprehended  by  reason,  which  is  an  essential  requisite 
of  a  first  principle,  while  change  is  known  empirically,  either 
experienced  in  consciousness,  or  perceived  through  the  senses, 
which  excludes  it  from  being  a  first  principle. 

Ferrier  also  accepts  the  opinion  attributed  to  Heraclitus 
that  contrary  determinations  enter  into  the  constitution  of 
every  object.  This  is  true,  if  by  contrary  determinations  we 
mean  diverse  attributes,,  as  any  form,  as  spherical,  may  com- 
bine with  any  color  as  red;  but  it  is  not  true,  if  by  contrary 
we  mean  conflictive,  as  for  example  spherical  and  cubical. 

It  is  true  that  objects  are  undergoing  continuous  changes, 
and  Ferrier  would  say,  when  water  is  raised  from  the  freezing 
to  the  boiling  point,  calling  the  successive  temperatures, 
a,  b,  c, — that  a  is  not-a,  and  not-a  is  b,  that  b  is  not-b,  and 
not-b  is  c,  and  so  on  till  the  water  boils.  But  if  a  is  not-a,  and 
not-a  is  b  then  a  is  b;  if  b  is  not-b  and  not-b  is  c,  then  b  is  c, 
and  since  a  is  b  and  b  is  c,  then  a  is  c,  and  so  on.  Therefore, 
the  water  is  freezing  and  boiling,  and  has  all  intermediate 
temperatures  at  the  same  ime!  Ferrier  declares  that  the 
law  of  conflictions  holds  not-a  and  b  apart,  since  it  holds 
not-being  and  being  apart,  as  incompatible.  Yes,  it  s  true 
that  absolute  not-being  and  being  are  held  apart,  as  incom- 
patible; so  also  is  the  not-being  of  a  and  the  being  of  a;  but 
not  the  not  being  of  a  and  the  being  of  b,  which  are  not 
incompatible,  though  not  identical;  for  not-a  mayb  e  c  or  d. 

Again  Ferrier  says  a  body  falling  in  a  vacuum  changes  its  , 
velocity  every  instant,  and  that  no  calculus  can  tell  what 
its  velocity  is  at  any  instant,  since  at  the  instant  it  has  any 
velocity,  it  has  another  velocity;  but  that  is  the  very  thing  the 
calculus  can  tell,  and  this  velocity  can  be  stated  in  common 
language,  so  as  to  be  understood.  Its  velocity  at  any  instant 
is  the  distance  it  would  fall  the  next  second,  if  at  that  instant, 
gravity  should  cease  to  act. 

In  distinguishing  between  sensation  and  thought,  and  in, 
assigning  the  superiority  to  thought,  Ferrier  awards,  in  the 
antagonism  between  Socrates  and  the  Sophists,  the  palm 
to  Socrates.  Both  parties  said:  Follow  Nature,  but  what  is 
nature?  The  Sophists  said  Sensation-,  Socrates  answe 
Thought.  The  fact  is,  man  has  both  sensation  and  though 


* 


HAMILTON,  FERRIER,  McCOSH  313 

Why  ignore  either?  Yet  to  reason,  as  the  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  man,  should  be  assigned  the  control. 

Ferrier  upholds  Plato  in  his  doctrine  of  innate  ideas.  He 
says:  "It  may  be  asked,  for  example,  in  what  sense  are  the 
conceptions  expressed  by  the  words,  animal,  man,  tree,  to  be 
regarded  as  innate?  I  answer,  that  these  conceptions  are 
not  innate,  if  we  suppose  them  to  denote,  as  most  people  do, 
some  faint  or  vague  representation  of  animal,  man,  or  tree; 
nothing  which  is  representable  as  an  object  is,  in  any  degree, 
innate,  and  therefore  these  conceptions,  if  they  are  innate, 
must  not  express  anything  which  can  be  represented  as  an 
object.  What  then  do  these  terms  denote?  They  denote 
the  fact  that,  on  the  occasion  of  an  animal,  a  man,  or  a  tree 
being  presented  to  the  mind,  the  mind  thinks  not  merely  of 
the  one  man,  the  one  animal,  or  the  one  tree,  but  of  some- 
thing wider,  in  short  of  a  class,  which  class  is  to  be  construed 
to  the  mind  not  as  an  object,  but  as  a  fact  or  law;  a  fact  or 
law  by  means  of  which  unity  is  given  to  a  number  of  our 
resembling  impressions.  Viewed  in  this  way,  the  conception 
man  may  be  said,  with  perfect  truth,  to  be  innate.  I  place 
him  (man)  under  a  class,  that  is,  under  an  idea  wider  than 
himself.".  The  class  and  the  idea,  however,  are  not  identical; 
the  class  is  the  collection  of  objects,  the  idea,  as  here  used, 
is  the  concept  of  the  class — the  collection  of  attributes  com- 
mon to  all  the  objects  of  the  class,  and  by  the  possession  of 
which  the  individual  is  known  to  belong  to  that  class.  5ut 
is  the  idea  (concept)  innate?  No;  it  is  created  by  the  mind 
by  comparing  individuals  of  the  class,  abstracting  and  com- 
bining their  common  qualities.  Ferrier 's  doctrine  of  innate 
ideas  is  decidedly  in  opposition  to  the  ordinary  logical  doc- 
trine of  the  formation  of  classes  and  concepts. 

In  his  Institutes  of  Metaphysics,  Ferrier  has  undertaken  to 
develop  philosophy  as  a  body  of  reasoned  truth;  "because 
while  truth  may,  perhaps,  be  undiscoverable  by  man,  to 
reason  is  certainly  his  province  and  within  his  power;"  he 
therefore  concludes  that  "a  system  which  is  reasoned  without 
being  true  is  always  of  higher  value  than  a  system  which  is 
true  without  being  reasoned."  Ferrier 's  aim  is  worthy  of 
his  ambition;  his  failure  is  in  details,  and  in  restricting 
philosophy  to  necessary  truth,  thus  shutting  it  off  from  the 
facts  of  experience  which  mainly  absorb  our  attention, 


514  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

relating,  as  they  do,  to  the  joys  and  the  sorrows  of  life. 
Fundamental  truths,  the  necessary  conditions  of  the  phenom- 
enal, are  at  once  apprehended  by  rational  intuition.  The 
philosophy  which  accounts  for  sensations,  appetites,  instincts, 
emotions,  affections,  desires  and  aversions,  will  never  lose 
its  interest  for  the  human  mind.  The  truths  of  reason 
account  for  the  facts  of  experience.  Ferrier  says:  "All 
certainty  depends  on  rigorous  evidence — on  strict  demonstra- 
tive proof."  This  is  not  true  either  of  axioms,  or  of  the 
facts  of  consciousness,  which  are  as  certain  as  demonstrated 
truth. 

In  justification  of  the  polemic  character  of  his  system, 
Ferrier  says:  "The  object  of  philosophy  is  the  correction  of 
the  inadvertencies  of  ordinary  thinking;  and  as  these  inad- 
vertencies are  generally  confirmed,  and  never  corrected  by 
psychology,  and  are  thus  converted  from  oversights  into 
something  worse,  it  is  further  the  business  of  philosophy  to 
refute  psychology.  This  is  what  philosophy  has  to  do" 
Philosophy  may  properly  correct  the  errors  of  psychology; 
but  it  should  not  make  war  on  psychology  itself,  which  aims 
to  be  the  true  science  of  mind. 

As  each  deliverance  of  ordinary  thinking,  according  to 
Ferrier,  contradicts  some  necessary  law  or  truth  of  all  reason, 
he  confronts  the  natural  opinions,  and  the  psychological 
doctrines  which  conform  to  them,  with  the  necessary  truths 
or  laws,  which  they  contradict,  stating  first  the  necessary 
laws,  and  facing  each  with  the  counter  proposition  expressing 
the  ordinary  opinion,  or  the  corresponding  error  of  psychol- 
ogy. It  is,  however,  the  business  of  philosophy  not  only  to 
overthrow  error,  but  to  establish  positive  truth.  Ferrier 
thus  repudiates  the  common  sense  scheme  of  Reid  and  the 
Scotch  philosophy. 

Ferrier  treats  of  philosophy  in  three  divisions :  Episiemology, 
or  theory  of  knowledge;  Agnoiology,  or  theory  of  ignorance; 
and  Ontology,  or  the  theory  of  being.  This  order  of  proced- 
ure is  the  reverse  of  the  order  of  ordinary  thinking,  which  is 
the  secret  of  so  many  failures.  The  questions  of  being  can- 
not be  properly  answered  till  the  questions  of  knowledge  and 
ignorance  have  been  decided. 

Ferrier  contends  that  the  unit  or  minimum  of  knowledge, 
in  regard  to  what  is  known,  is  Object  plus  Subject,  and  that 


HAMILTON,  FERRIER,  McCOSH  315 

these,  though  distinguishable,  are  inseparable  in  cognition. 
This  is  true.  Knowledge  implies  an  object  known,  a  subject 
that  knows,  and  synthesis  of  subject  and  objects;  but  in 
knowing  the  object,  the  subject  knows  itself;  the  two  are 
known  together,  but  in  a  different  way.  The  object  is 
known  empirically,  if  a  fact,  but  rationally,  if  a  necessary 
truth,  and  in  either  case,  as  not-self;  the  subject  is  always 
known  rationally,  as  self.  Knowledge  is  not  self-supporting ; 
it  requires,  as  its  indispensible  condition,  an  ego  or  subject 
that  knows.  The  ego  in  knowing  an  object,  refers  the  knowl- 
edge to  itself,  in  saying  I  know  that  object.  That  knowledge 
is  impossible  without  a  subject  is  at  once  apprehended  by 
rational  intuition.  The  subject  is,  however,  not  strictly 
conscious  of  itself,  though  conscious  of  the  knowledge  of  an 
object;  that  is,  it  does  not  know  itself  empirically,  but  it 
rationally  apprehends  the  necessity  of  itself  as  the  indispens- 
able condition  of  knowledge,  and  that  whenever  it  knows 
any  object,  otherwise  knowledge  is  impossible.  The  ego, 
however,  being  always  present,  is  not  made  a  special  object 
of  attention,  and  on  this  account,  the  rational  intuition  of 
self  is  unobstrusive,  since  the  attention  is  usually  directed 
to  the  object.  The  subject  however,  may,  by  a  special 
effort,  be  made  the  chief  object  of  reflection. 

Ferrier  discusses  the  Minimum  object  of  knowledge,  before 
he  answers  the  question.  What  is  knowledge?  what  is  it  to 
know?  How  is  knowledge  distinguished  from  belief?  Knowl- 
edge involves  certainty;  but  does  certainty  always  involve 
knowledge?  Knowledge  excludes  doubt,  so  often  does 
belief. 

Ferrier  contends,  and  rightly  too,  that  independent  matter 
is  not  only  unknown  to  human  intelligence,  but  that  it  can- 
not be  known  by  any  intelligence,  and  is  thus  shut  out  from 
all  cognition,  by  a  necessary  law  of  reason;  for  cognition  of 
matter  implies  along  with  it,  a  rational  apprehension  of  the 
knowing  mind.  But  we  are  to  note  that  it  is  not  the  inde- 
pendent existence  of  matter,  but  the  independent  knowledge 
of  matter  that  is  thus  shut  out.  Ferrier  then  says :  "By  these 
considerations  matter  per  se  is  reduced  to  the  predicament 
of  a  contradiction."  A  contradiction  is  self -destructive; 
but  it  is  not  matter  per  se  that  is  self-destructive,  but  a 
knowledge  of  matter  per  se.  The  impossibility  of  matter, 
per  se  has  not  been  proved. 


316  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  above  answer,  Ferrier  anticipates,  and  endeavors  to 
set  it  aside,  thus:  "The  contradiction  besieges,  not  merely 
the  knowledge  of  the  thing,  but  the  thing  itself.  The  differ- 
ence between  the  two  contradictions  may  be  illustrated,  in 
this  way.  The  cognizance  of  a  circle  is  contradictory,  unless 
that  figure  be  presented,  either  really  or  ideally,  to  the  mind. 
This  contradiction,  however,  is  limited  exclusively  to  the 
cognizance;  it  does  not  extend  to  the  circle.  A  contradiction 
of  this  kind  would  leave  matter,  per  se  altogether  unaffected. 
But  the  cognizance  of  a  centerless  circle  is  not  only  a  contra- 
dictory cognizance,  the  object  of  it  is,  moreover,  a  contra- 
dictory object.  A  centerless  circle  is  absolutely  incogita- 
ble  in  itself."  Yes,  and  we  may  add  impossible  in  itself,  for 
by  definition,  a  circle  has  a  center  from  which  all  the  points 
of  the  circumference  are  equally  distant.  Ferriec  then  goes 
on  to  say:  "The  contradiction  which  attaches  to  matter, 
per  se,  is  of  this  character.  Matter  per  se  is  a  contradictory 
thing,  just  as  much  as  a  circle  without  a  center  is  a  contra- 
dictory thing."  This  Ferrier  has  signally  failed  to  show, 
though  he  attempts  it  thus:  "In  the  case  of  the  centerless 
circle,  the  object  is  contradictory,  because  it  lacks  an  element 
(to  wit,  the  center)  which  is  essential  to  the  constitution, 
not  only  of  every  known,  but  of  every  knowable  circle;  and 
in  like  manner,  matter,  per  se  is  contradictory,  because  it 
wants  the  element  (to  wit,  the  me)  which  is  essential  to  the 
constitution  not  only  of  every  known,  but  of  every  knowable 
thing.  It  is  thus  certain  that  matter  per  se  is  a  contradictory 
thing,  and  that  the  contradiction  (as  these  remarks  have 
been  introduced  to  show)  cleaves  not  only  to  the  cognition 
but  to  its  object." 

The  center  is  a  point  of  the  circle  which  is  impossible 
without  it;  but  Ferrier  has  not  shown  that  matter  is  impos- 
sible without  the  subject,  which  is  no  part  of  the  matter 
but  only  a  part  of  the  object  of  cognition.  Matter  may 
exist,  though  it  cannot  be  known,  apart  from  the  subject. 
Did  Ferrier  know  all  matter? 

Ferrier  then  contends  that  matter,  per  se,  as  an  object  of 
knowledge,  is  the  contradictory;  yes,  as  an  object  of  knowl- 
edge; for  an  object  of  knowledge  implies  a  subject;  that  is, 
a  known  object  implies  a  knowing  subject;  but  Ferrier  has 
not  shown  that  matter,  per  se,  as  a  reality,  is  the  contradictory. 
Where  is  the  contradiction?  If  it  is  asked  how  can  it  be 


HAMILTON,  FERRIER,  McCOSH  317 

known  that  matter,  per  se,  is  a  reality?  The  answer  is,  it  is 
not  needful  to  show  that;  but  only  to  show  that  Ferrier  has 
failed  to  prove  that  matter,  per  se,  is  not  a  reality.  He  has 
taken  the  burden  of  proof  upon  himself;  let  him  carry  it. 
Idealists  in  general  resort  to  the  expedient  of  asking  their 
opponents  to  prove  that  there  are  external  material  objects, 
when  the  burden  of  proof,  that  there  are  no  such  objects, 
falls  upon  the  idealists  themselves;  this  they  neither  have 
done  nor  can  do.  It  is  not  simply  the  reality  of  matter  that, 
brings  it  into  relation  with  mind,  but  the  conception  of  the 
reality. 

Ferrier  contends  that  matter  per  se  is  the  contradictory; 
but  the  contradictory  is  self-destructive  and  impossible;  yet 
Ferrier  holds  that  "this  system  is  as  far,  as  any  system  can 
be,  from  maintaining  that  matter  per  se  is  a  nonentity — a 
blank.".  .  .  "The  materialist  supposes  that,  according  to 
idealism,  when  a  loaf  of  bread  ceases  to  be  a  phenomenon 
of  consciousness,  and  is  locked  away  in  a  dark  closet,  it  must 
turn  into  nothing.  .  .  No — in  the  absence  of  all  con- 
sciousness, the  loaf,  or  whatever  it  may  be,  lapses,  not  into 
nothing,  but  into  the  contradictory."  Contradictory  to 
what?  to  .itself?  Then  it  lapses  into  the  impossible,  for  the 
contradictory  is  the  impossible.  The  appearance  or  idea 
of  the  loaf  vanishes,  but  not  the  loaf  itself.  Suppose  after 
a  week,  the  loaf,  for  the  time,  not  thought  of,  the  closet  is 
opened,  and  the  loaf  is  found  to  be  moldy,  what  has  been 
going  on  in  the  mean  time?  There  was  an  object  there, 
apart  from  the  idea. 

As  a  compact  example  of  reasoning,  Ferrier 's  Metaphysics 
ranks  with  Spinoza's  Ethics ;  its  study  is  a  valuable  discipline, 
but  as  a  body  of  information,  it  reminds  one  of  the  Latin 
proverb : 

Parturiunt  monies,  nascetur  ridiculus  mus. 

The  Philosophical  Remains  consist  of  papers  on  philosophi- 
cal subjects  published  in  Blackwood's  Magazine,  also  several 
occasional  lectures  delivered  at  various  times,  and  deemed 
worthy  of  publication.  They  exhibit  the  characteristic 
clearness  and  attractiveness  of  all  of  Ferrier's  writings,  and 
will  abundantly  repay  for  their  perusal.  This  is  especially 
true  of  the  articles  on  the  Philosophy  of  Consciousness,  Reid, 
and  the  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense,  and  A  Speculation  on 
the  Senses. 


318  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Ferrier,  however,  overestimated  the  influence  of  his  works, 
when  he  took  it  for  granted  that  they  would  overthrow  the 
older  Philosophy  and  Modern  Psychology. 

3.  McCosh  (1811-1884).  James  McCosh  was  born  in 
Ayrshire,  Scotland.  After  acquiring  his  primary  education 
at  home,  he  received  his  university  training  at  Glasgow  and. 
at  Edinburgh.  He  was  both  a  Theologian  and  a  Philoso- 
pher. 

While  at  Edinburgh,  he  wrote  an  essay  on  Stoic  Philosophy, 
for  which,  on  account  of  its  merit,  he  received,  on  motion  of 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  the  honorary  degree  of  Master  of 
Arts. 

In  1835,  McCosh  was  ordained  minister  of  the  church  of 
Scotland,  "and  in  1839  became  pastor  at  Brechin,  where  he 
was  active  in  the  movement  for  the  establishment  of  the 
Free  Church,  which  was  organized  in  1843.  While  at  Brech- 
in, he  published  his  book  entitled  Methods  of  Divine  Govern- 
ment, Physical  and  Moral,  which  Hamilton  commended  by 
saying:  "It  is  refreshing  to  read  a  work  so  distinguished  for 
originality  and  soundness  of  thinking."  This  book  laid  the 
foundation  for  his  reputation  as  a  philosophical  thinker. 

In  1841,  he  was  elected  professor  of  Logic  and  Meta- 
physics in  Queen's  College,  Belfast,  where  he  distinguished 
himself  as  a  lecturer.  Jointly  with  Professor  George  Dickey, 
in  1856,  he  wrote  Typical  Forms  and  Special  Ends  in  Creation, 
and  in  1862,  the  Supernatural  in  Relation  to  the  Natural. 
In  1866,  he  published  Intuitions  of  the  Mind  Inductively 
Investigated,  being  a  Defense  of  Fundamental  Truth.  It  is, 
however,  somewhat  difficult  to  understand  what  the  induc- 
tive method  has  to  do  with  fundamental  truth,  which  is  at 
once  apprehended  by  rational  intuition.  Truths  reached 
by  induction  are  not  fundamental. 

There  is,  however,  an  interesting  relation  existing  between 
intuition  arid  induction  which  may  be  discovered  by  the 
investigation  of  the  nature  of  cause.  We  find  by  our  experi- 
ence, for  example  in  the  effort  we  make  to  lift  a  weight,  that 
cause  is  the  efficiency  of  force  or  power.  In  this  case,  the 
effort,  the  exertion  of  power,  is  an  object  of  observation;  but 
in  an  external  event,  we  do  not  observe  the  efficiency.  How 
then  do  we  know  that  an  external  event  requires  a  cause? 
We  know  it  by  the  intuition  that  non-entity  cannot  spring  into 


HAMILTON,  FERRIER,  McCOSH  319 

being,  for  that  would  require  action  of  which  mere  nothing  is 
incapable.  This  is  the  real  intuition,  and  it  is  known  at 
once  by  reason,  not  by  induction. 

As  it  is  true  of  any  event  that  it  requires  a  cause,  we  may 
generalize  by  induction  and  affirm  that  every  event  requires  a 
cause;  but  this  generalization  by  induction  is  not  the  intuition 
that  any  particular  event  requires  a  cause.  The  real  intui- 
tion is  known  at  once  by  reason,  that  is  by  rational  intuition, 
but  the  generalization  of  the  intuition,  which  is  not  intuition, 
is  reached  by  induction. 

The  induction  here  employed  is  not  ordinary  probable 
induction  in  which  a  certain  thing  is  found  by  observation 
to  be  true  of  many  instances  of  a  class,  that  is  of  all  the 
instances  examined,  and  is  therefore  probably  true  of  the 
whole  class;  but  is  a  perfect  induction,  not  the  ordinary  case 
where  the  number  of  instances  are  limited,  and  each  has 
been  examined  and  the  fact  found  true;  for  the  number  of 
events  are  indefinite,  or  practically  infinite.  But  it  is  known 
by  rational  intuition  that  each  has  a  cause,  then  by  a  perfect 
induction,  we  know  that  every  event  has  a  cause. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  after  making  the  generaliza- 
tion that  every  event  requires  a  cause,  we  can  reach,  by 
deduction,  the  conclusion  that  any  particular  event  has  a 
cause.  Suppose  we  witness  an  occurrence.  The  witnessed 
occurrence  is  identical  with  an  observed  event.  The  occur- 
rence is  an  event.  Then  we  can  say:  Every  event  has  a 
cause;  this  occurrence  is  an  event;  therefore  this  occurrence 
has  a  cause.  But  as  this  occurrence  is  identical  with  this 
particular  event,  we  can  say  this  particular  event  has  a 
cause. 

McCosh  also  published  An  Examination  of  Milis  Philoso- 
phy in  which  he  makes  some  telling  hits. 

In  1865,  McCosh  was  elected  president  of  New  Jersey 
College  at  Princeton,  and  gave  to  the  institution  a  wide 
reputation  and  greatly  enlarged  its  usefulness. 

In  1869,  McCosh  published  a  treatise  on  Lo.^ic  entitled 
The  Laws  of  Discursive  Thought.  In  this  treatise  lie  gave 
much  thought  to  the  discussion  of  concepts. 

McCosh  gave  a  series  of  lectures  on  Christianity  and  Pos- 
itivism in  1871,  at  the  Union  Theological  Seminary  in  New 
York. 


320  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

McCosh  engaged  in  a  controversy  with  Mark  Hopkins 
on  the  fundamental  principle  of  Ethics,  Hopkins  maintain- 
ing the  opinion  that  benevolence  is  the  fundamental  princi- 
ple, while  McCosh  held  that  other  principles  are  combined 
with  benevolence  in  forming  the  foundation  of  virtue.  Mc- 
Cosh found  Hopkins  a  worthy  foeman. 

In  1875,  McCosh  published  a  book  entitled  The  Scottish 
Philosophy.  This  book,  which  is  very  interesting  and  valu- 
able, treats  of  Scotch  philosophy  for  the  period  extending 
from  Hutcheson  to  Hamilton.  In  the  same  year  he  wrote 
a  reply  to  Tyndale's  Belfast  lecture. 

In  1887,  McCosh  published  two  volumes  on  Realistic 
Philosophy.  These  volumes  contain  his  mature  thoughts 
forcibly  expressed. 

In  addition  to  these  works,  McCosh  was  a  frequent  contrib- 
utor to  the  Princeton  Review,  and  also  gave  many  public 
lectures.  He  thus  lived  a  notable  and  useful  life,  and  will  be 
held  by  many  for  the  future  in  grateful  remembrance. 

Without  adding  much  that  is  original  in  thought,  McCosh 
was  a  stout  defender  of  Scotch  Philosophy,  not  that  of  Brown 
or  Ferrier,  but  that  of  Reid,  Stewart  and  Hamilton. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

Associational  and  Empirical  Philosophy 

1.  Hartley  (1705-1757).  To  bring  the  Associational 
Philosophers  together,  we  go  back  in  time  to  David  Hartley 
who,  by  common  consent  is  justly  regarded  the  founder  of 
the  Associational  School  of  Philosophy. 

His  father,  the  Vicar  of  Armley,  in  Yorkshire,  designed 
him  for  the  church,  and  sent  him  to  Jesus  College,  Cambridge. 
Hartley  studied  under  Sanderson,  a  celebrated  mathematician, 
and  distinguished  himself  so  much  by  his  attainments  that 
he  was  elected  a  fellow  of  his  college.  Feeling  that  he  could 
not  conscientiously  subscribe  to  the  Thirty-nine  Articles,  he 
abandoned  the  design  of  entering  the  ministry,  and  devoted 
himself  to  the  study  of  medicine,  though  he  remained  in 
communion  with  the  church,  deeming  it  his  duty  to  obey 
ecclesiastical  law  as  well  as  civil.  He  had  many  intimate 
friends  among  the  churchmen,  as  Bishop  Butler,  Warberton, 
Law,  and  Young.  Having  completed  his  course  of  study,  he 
entered  upon  the  practice  of  medicine,  and  became  a  con- 
scientious and  successful  physician. 

At  the  age  of  twenty-five,  he  commenced  a  series  of  essays 
entitled  Observations  on  Man,  His  frame,  his  duty,  and  his 
expectations.  In  these  essays,  he  exhibited  keen  observation 
and  original  thought.  He  agreed  with  Locke  in  asserting 
that  all  knowledge  comes  from  sensation  and  reflection,  and 
that  prior  to  sensation  the  human  mind  is  a  blank.  In  the 
order  of  time,  this,  no  doubt,  is  true.  Reason  is  dormant 
till  it  is  called  upon  to  account  for  sensation,  which  it  does, 
not  by  its  innate  ideas,  but  by  its  innate  power  of  apprehend- 
ing the  necessity  of  the  conditions  of  phenomena. 

Locke  accounted  for  all  knowledge  by  sensation  and  re- 
flection; but  Hartley  attempted  to  account  for  reflection 
itself,  by  showing  how  from  sensation  those  states  of  con- 
sciousness arise  which  are  remote  from  simple  sensation. 
He  believed  that  he  had  discovered  what  really  was  the  sole 

321 


322  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

law,  which  he  styled,  The  Law  of  Contiguity,  Synchronous 
and  Successive.  This  law  he  applied  to  explain,  not  only 
memory,  as  had  been  done  by  others,  but  emotion,  reasoning, 
volition,  and  action,  both  voluntary  and  involuntary. 

Following  Hartley,  in  this  respect,  other  philosophers  of 
this  school  are  wont  to  explain  every  mental  state  or  process 
by  an  inseparable  association;  and  undoubtedly,  thought  may 
pass  from  one  idea  through  a  second  to  a  third,  and  the  second 
may  be  dropped.  This  may  be  observed  in  the  course  of  a 
conversation. 

In  his  physical  theory,  Hartley  led  the  way  in  tracing  the 
intimate  connection  between  physiological  facts  and  psychi- 
cal states,  and  thus  originated  Physiological  Psychology. 
He  held  sensation  to  be  the  result  of  the  vibrations  of  the 
minute  particles  of  the  nerves,  postulating  a  subtle  elastic 
ether  thus  caused  to  vibrate  in  the  interstices  of  the  brain; 
but  the  vibration  of  the  minute  particles  of  the  nerves  is  not 
thought,  neither  is  the  vibration  of  the  ether,  unless  the  ether 
itself  is  intelligent  spirit.  We  may,  however,  suppose  the 
ego,  the  human  spirit,  to  be  so  intimately  connected  with 
the  ether,  as  to  experience  sensation  whenever  the  ether 
vibrates,  and  upon  this  sensation,  the  ego,  as  intelligent, 
passes  judgment,  which  is  thought,  and  thought  awakens 
emotions,  affections,  desires,  volitions,  which  transcend 
sensation. 

Hartley's  opinion  cannot  be  admitted  that  reasoning  is 
nothing  more  than  a  series  of  ideas  united  by  association; 
for  it  has  cogency.  The  premises  are  not  merely  associated 
with  the  conclusion,  but  they  necessitate  the  conclusion. 
In  mere  association,  the  premises  would  simply  lead  us  to 
think  of  the  conclusion,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  truth  of 
the  premises,  there  being  no  formal  fallacy,  compels  us  to 
accept  the  truth  of  the  conclusion. 

Hartley  also  gave  attention  to  ethical  and  theological 
questions;  but  he  derives  all  knowledge  of  these  subjects  from 
sensation.  His  style  is  simple  and  attractive,  and  his  specu- 
lations entertaining,  whatever  may  be  said  of  the  truth  of  his 
conclusions. 

The  doctrines  of  Hartley  were  warmly  advocated  by  Dr. 
Priestley,  who  was  distinguished  in  science,  and  who  hoped 
to  reduce  the  science  of  mind  to  a  branch  of  physics,  as  he 


ASSOCIATION AL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

was  inclined  to  materialism.  In  regard  to  Hartley,  Priestley 
said:  "Dr.  Hartley  has  thrown  more  useful  light  upon  the 
theory  of  mind  than  Newton  did  upon  the  theory  of  the 
external  world." 

2.  Paley     (1743-1805).     William     Paley,     a    celebrated 
theologian  and  moralist,  followed  in  philosophy  the  line  of 
thought  marked  out  by  Locke  and  Hartley.     Paley  had  the 
power  of  clear  statement,  and  the  ability  to  make  a  con- 
vincing argument.     In  ethics  he  was  an  extreme  utilitarian; 
and  in  the  pursuit  of  virtue  he  had  his  eye  on  the  loaves  and 
fishes,  as  is  seen  in  his  celebrated  definition  of  virtue  which 
he  thus  states:  "Virtue  is  the  doing  of  good  to  mankind,  in 
obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  for  the  sake  of  eternal  happi- 
ness."    Utility  has  its  place  in  ethics,  both  egoistic  utility 
and  altruistic;  but  we  should  aim  to  be  virtuous,  not  solely 
for  the  reward  external  to  virtue  itself,  but  chiefly  for  the 
satisfaction  we  take  in  virtue  as  the  most  worthy  attainment 
of  a  moral  being. 

3.  Bentham  (1748-1832).     Jeremy  Bentham  was  born  in 
London.     His  father,  who  was  wealthy,  gave  him  the  advan- 
tages of  a  good  education.     He  early  studied  Latin  and  Greek, 
and    became    proficient    in    those    languages.     He    entered 
Queen's  College,  Oxford,  where  he  thoroughly  studied  Sander- 
son's logic.     He  received  the  bachelor's  degree,  and  became 
a  student  of  law  at  Lincoln's  Inn.     He  listened  with  delight 
to  the  decisions  of  Lord  Mansfield,  and  heard  the  lectures  of 
Blackstone  at  Oxford. 

He  investigated  the  principles  on  which  all  sound  legisla- 
tion must  be  based,  and  published  his  views.  His  reputation 
as  a  thinker  rapidly  extended,  and  he  was  consulted,  as  an 
authority,  in  regard  to  legal  principles,  by  many  correspond- 
ents in  different  countries. 

In  1823,  he  established  The  Westminster  Review,  a  journal 
noted  for  vigorous  thought  and  liberal  opinions. 

Bentham  was  the  author  of  many  works,  on  finance, 
politics,  and  morals.  Seeking  for  a  solid  foundation  for 
both  law  and  morals,  he  accepted  the  principle  of  Beccaria, 
the  Italian  jurist,  "The  greatest  happiness  to  the  greatest 
number."  He  made  a  systematic  application  of  this  vital 
principle  in  his  treatises  on  Rewards  and  Penalties,  as  also 
in  his  writings  on  Law  and  Ethics. 


324  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Bentham  was  intimate  with  James  Mill  and  John  Stuart 
Mill,  and  in  no  small  degree  influenced  their  speculations. 

4.  Mill  (1773-1836).  James  Mill  was  born  in  the  village 
called  Northwater  Bridge,  in  the  county  of  Forfar,  Scotland. 
His  parents  were  respectable  people,  and  his  mother,  who 
was  an  ambitious  woman,  resolved  to  give  her  son  a  good 
education.  He  was  sent  to  the  Montrose  Academy,  where  he 
remained  till  his  eighteenth  year,  and  then  entered  the 
university  at  Edinburgh.. 

Mill  enjoyed  the  friendship  of  Sir  John  and  Lady  Jane 
Stuart,  and  was  a  tutor  of  their  daughter.  He  was  distin- 
guished, at  Edinburgh,  for  his  attainments,  in  Greek  and 
Logic.  He  greatly  admired  Dugald  Stewart,  whose  lectures 
he  attended. 

After  graduating,  he  was  licensed  as  a  preacher,  but  did 
not  continue  to  preach,  owing  probably  to  doubts  he  enter- 
tained in  regard  to  certain  doctrines,  and  to  the  great  interest 
he  took  in  the  study  of  history  and  moral  and  political  philos- 
ophy. 

In  1802,  he  accompanied  Sir  John  Stuart,  who  was  a 
member  of  parliament,  to  London,  where  he  soon  found 
literary  occupation  suited  to  his  mind,  and  to  which  he 
applied  himself  with  great  assiduity. 

He  started  a  new  periodical  called  The  Literary  Journal 
which,  comprehensive  in  its  scope,  was  enriched  by  the 
contributions  of  distinguished  scholars,  Mill  himself  writing 
articles  for  it  on  history,  biography,  and  on  political  and 
social  subjects. 

In  1804,  he  wrote  a  pamphlet  on  the  Corn  Trade  which  was 
the  first  of  his  economic  writings.  In  1805,  he  married 
Harriet  Burrow.  His  eldest  son  was  named  John  Stuart, 
after  his  distinguished  friend  and  patron,  Sir  John  Stuart. 
In  1806,  he  began  his  History  of  India  on  which  he  was  en- 
gaged for  twelve  years. 

Mill  became  acquainted  with  Jeremy  Bentham  in  1808, 
and  co-operated  with  him  in  elaborating  and  disseminating 
his  political  and  ethical  doctrines,  and  by  his  clear  statements 
and  logical  reasoning  gave  to  the  Utilitarian  philosophy  wide 
currency. 

From  1806  to  1818,  he  contributed  able  articles  to  various 
periodicals,  such  as  the  Edinburgh  Review,  the  British 


ASSOCIATIONAL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  325 

Review,  the  Eclectic  Review,  and  the  Annual  Review.  For 
the  Annual,  he  wrote  a  review  of  "Fox's  History"  and  an 
article  on  "Bentham's  Law  Reforms,"  also  one  on  Money 
and  Exchange  for  the  Edinburgh.  He  also  wrote  on  the 
Liberty  of  the  Press,  and  a  severe  article  on  the  East  India  Com- 
pany. Mill  co-operated  with  William  Allen  in  founding  and 
writing  for  a  periodical  called  "  The  Philanthropist,"  which 
was  published  from  1811  to  1817.  He  also  contributed 
many  valuable  articles  to  the  fifth  edition  of  the  Encyclopedia 
Britannica. 

In  1878,  Mill  published  his  History  of  India,  which  met 
with  great  success,  and  gave  him  an  important  position  in 
the  India  House,  in  which  he  gradually  rose  to  the  headship 
of  the  office. 

Mill  was  a  principal  writer  for  the  Westminster  Review, 
one  of  his  articles  was  a  vigorous  criticism  of  the  Edinburgh 
Review.  Other  articles  dealt  with  English  History  and  with 
Ecclesiastic  establishments. 

In  1821,  he  published  his  Political  Economy,  and  in  1829, 
appeared  his  Analysis  of  the  Human  Mind.  In  addition  to 
all  these  labors,  Mill  took  charge  of  the  education  of  his  son, 
John  Stuart  Mill. 

These  various  labors  exemplify  the  activity  of  his  mind 
and  exhibit  the  immense  amount  of  intellectual  effort  he  put 
forth.  All  his  writings  show  deep  logical  thought  and  clear- 
ness of  expression. 

Mill's  Analysis  of  the  Human  Mind  is,  however,  the  work 
that  chiefly  claims  our  attention.  We  shall  make  use  of  the 
second  edition,  in  two  volumes,  with  valuable  notes  by 
Alexander  Bain,  Andrew  Findlater,  George  Grote  and  John 
Stuart  Mill. 

Mill  begins  with  sensation,  following,  in  his  exposition  of 
the  five  special  senses,  the  following  order:  Smell,  hearing, 
sight,  -  taste  and  touch.  He  considers  also  the  muscular 
sensations,  and  those  of  the  Alimentary  canal. 

Mill  properly  begins  his  "Analysis"  with  a  discussion  of  the 
senses,  for  they  are  the  means  of  communication  with  the 
external  world,  pointing  unmistakably  to  the  fact  that  there 
is  an  outer  world,  not  ideal,  but  real. 

After  an  interesting  discussion  of  the  senses,  Mill  passes 
on  to  the  treatment  of  ideas.  He  says : "  The  sensations  which 


326  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

we  have  through  the  medium  of  the  senses  exist  only  by  the 
presence  of  the  object,  and  cease  upon  its  absence.  .  .  . 
When  our  sensations  cease  by  the  absence  of  their  objects, 
something  remains;  so  like,  that  I  call  it  a  copy,  an  image  of 
the  sensation;  something,  a  representation,  or  trace  of  the 
sensation.  Another  name  by  which  we  denote  this  trace, 
this  copy  of  the  sensation,  which  remains  after  the  sensation 
ceases,  is  idea.  .  .  The  one  class  of  feelings  I  call  sensa- 
tions; the  other  class  of  feelings  I  call  ideas. " 

The  consequence  of  an  object  exciting  any  of  the  senses  is 
more  than  a  sensation.  There  is  the  rational  intuition  of 
the  conditional  necessity  of  a  cause  of  the  sensation,  and  of 
the  subject  which  experiences  the  sensation;  there  is  also  the 
judgment  inferring  what  the  cause  is;  also  the  ideation,  or 
formation  of  the  idea  or  image  representing  not  the  sensation, 
but  the  cause,  constructed  by  the  imagination,  embodying 
the  inferential  judgment  concerning  the  cause.  The  idea 
is  reinforced  and  made  vivid  so  long  as  the  cause  is  present, 
and  is  strengthened  by  a  co-operation  of  several  of  the  senses. 

The  actual  sensations  induce  definite  judgments  and 
corresponding  ideas  giving,  in  normal  cases,  clear  perceptions 
answering  to  the  objects.  Thus,  a  tree  near  by,  clothed  with 
verdure,  cannot  be  made  to  appear  denuded  of  leaves,  since 
the  actual  sensations  will  not  permit.  Going  from  the  tree, 
we  can,  by  an  act  of  the  imagination,  call  up  in  memory  the 
idea  of  the  tree  representing  the  actual  perception,  though 
less  vividly,  because  of  the  absence  of  the  sensations  caused 
by  the  presence  of  the  object.  Now,  the  tree  being  absent, 
we  can  vary  the  idea,  and  imagine  it  stripped  of  leaves  and 
even  of  branches,  or  picture  a  very  different  tree,  or  any 
other  object,  in  its  place. 

Mill  calls  the  entire  process  of  perception  sensation,  which 
term  is  more  properly  restricted  to  the  feeling  occasioned  by 
the  presence  of  an  object  affecting  any  of  the  senses.  The 
idea  formed  in  the  absence  of  the  object  has  usually  but  a 
faint  trace  of  sensation,  though  in  extraordinary  circum- 
stances, it  may  become  so  vivid  as  to  call  back  the  sensation, 
and  cause  an  apparent  perception  of  the  object.  Thus  a 
ghost  may  be  apparently  seen  by  a  vivid  idea  stimulated  by 
credulous  anticipation  or  fearful  apprehension. 


ASSOCIATION AL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  327 

Mill's  greatest  service  to  philosophy  is  his  treatment  of  the 
association  of  ideas.  This  led  to  the  formation  of  the  school 
of  Assodational  Psychology.  Ideas,  often  thought  of  to- 
gether, tend,  according  to  Mill,  to  form  an  indissoluble  union, 
so  that  when  one  is  revived,  the  other  is  an  invariable  accom- 
paniment. Instead  of  the  word  indissoluble  John  Stuart 
Mill  suggested  the  word  inseparable,  which,  however,  means 
much  the  same  thing. 

Bain  represented  the  associated  ideas  as  adhering  to  one 
another,  as  if  there  was  an  attraction  between  them.  The 
real  explanation  is  the  law:  That  the  mind  tends  to  act  as  it  has 
acted  before.  The  associated  ideas  having  been  thought  of 
together,  or  in  immediate  succession,  the  mind  passes  from 
the  one  to  the  other,  since  it  has  passed  that  way  before. 

The  laws  of  association  can  be  most  clearly  expressed  as 
three:  1.  The  law  of  recurrence:  Ideas  tend  to  recur;  for  the 
mind  tends  to  act  as  it  has  acted  before. 

2.  The  law  of  integration:  A  revived  train  of  ideas  once 
begun,  tends  to  completion;  for  the  mind  has  completed  that 
train  before. 

3.  The  law  of  transition:  A  transition  from  one  train  of 
ideas  to  another  is  liable  to  occur,  when  the  two  trains  have 
similar  or  antithetical  links;  for  the  mind  has  passed  from 
the  similar  links  to  the  completion  of  either  train;  and  in 
case  of  antithetical  links,  since  the  knowledge  of  opposites 
is  one,  the  antithesis  is  suggested,  and  the  mind  passes  to 
the  second  train,  since  it  has  passed  that  way  before.     In 
either  case,  when  the  second  series  is  reached,  the  mind  tends 
to  complete  that  train  by  the  law  of  integration. 

The  fault  of  the  Assodational  Psychology,  however,  is  that 
the  philosophers  of  that  school  make  too  much  of  it,  and 
endeavor  to  account  for  almost  any  process  whatever  by 
the  inevitable  law  of  association.  A  good  thing  may  be 
greatly  overworked. 

Following  the  example  of  Locke,  Mill  devotes  considerable 
space  to  the  subject  of  language;  and  though  this  part  of  his 
work  is  worthy  of  consideration,  we  must  pass  i*  without 
further  notice. 

In  regard  to  the  words  conscious  and  consciousness,  Mill 
correctly  says:  "If  we  are  in  any  way  sentient,  that  is,  have 
any  of  the  feelings  of  a  living  creature,  the  word  conscious 


328  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

is  applicable  to  the  feeler,  and  consciousness  to  the  feeling. " 
This  is  a  fine  distinction  between  the  mind  and  its  activities. 
Likewise  it  can  be  properly  said:  If  we  have  any  thought  or 
volition,  the  word  conscious  is  applicable  to  the  thinker  or 
wilier,  and  the  word  consciousness  to  the  thinking  or  willing. 
Feeling  is  not  the  only  mental  phenomenon.  If  we  are 
conscious,  we  are  capable  of  being  conscious;  but  Mill  cor- 
rectly held  that  consciousness  as  a  capability,  is  not  a  special 
faculty,  but  an  element  of  any  faculty,  or  a  general  capability 
of  being  aware  of  what  is  going  on  in  the  mind,  and  con- 
sciousness, as  -a  state,  is  involved  in  any  mental  phenomenon 
whatever. 

Mill  uses  the  expression,  the  conception  of  an  object  to  signify 
the  same  thing  as  the  idea  of  an  object.  In  logical  usage, 
however,  the  conception  of  a  class  of  objects  signifies  the 
formation  of  the  notion  of  the  qualities  common  to  all  the 
objects  of  the  class.  The  product  of  the  act  of  conception 
is  called  a  concept,  which  is  not  the  same  as  idea;  for  an  idea 
can  be  imagined,  since  it  is  a  mental  picture  of  an  object; 
but  a  pure  concept  cannot  be  imagined;  it  can  only  be  thought. 
The  word  imagination,  Mill  employs  as  the  name  of  a  train 
of  ideas,  and  shows  why  it  is  especially  applicable  to  poetic 
creations. 

In  regard  to  classification,  Mill  maintains  that  men  resort 
to  classification  for  the  sake  of  economy  in  the  use  of  names. 
He  says:  "Man  first  becomes  acquainted  with  individuals. 
He  first  names  individuals;  but  individuals  are  innumerable, 
and  he  can  not  have  innumerable  names.  He  must  make 
one  name  serve  for  many  individuals.  It  is  thus  obvious, 
and  certain,  that  men  were  led  to  classify  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  economizing  in  the  use  of  names. " 

Little  account  Mill  makes  of  the  common  qualities,  or 
similar  attributes  found  in  all  the  objects  of  a  class,  though 
these'  objects  have  individual  attributes  that  distinguish  the 
objects  of  the  class  from  one  another.  The  common  qualities 
form  the  basis  of  the  class. 

Classification  is,  however,  of  greater  value  in  securing 
economy  of  thought  than  economy  of  names.  If  objects 
were  studied  singly,  the  finite  powers  of  man  would  be  over- 
whelmed by  the  infinite  wealth  of  nature.  Take  a  flock  of  a 
hundred  thousand  black-birds.  It  would  be  a  hopeless  task 


ASSOCIATION AL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  329 

to  study  them  all  individually;  but  they  are  essentially  so 
nearly  alike,  that  if  we  study  a  Jew,  we  know  all.  The  same 
holds  true  of  the  various  classes  of  objects,  whether  mineral, 
vegetable,  or  animal. 

The  name  denotes  the  class  itself,  with  all  its  subdivisions, 
down  to  and  including  the  individuals,  called  the  extent  of 
the  class;  also  the  name  connotes  all  the  similar  attributes 
common  to  all  the  subdivisions  including  the  individuals  of 
the  class,  called  the  content  of  the  class.  The  higher  we 
ascend  in  classification,  the  greater  the  extent  and  the  less 
the  content;  and  the  lower  we  descend  the  greater  the  con- 
tent and  the  less  the  extent.  We  ascend  by  generalization; 
we  descend  by  division;  and  classification  properly  embraces 
both  processes. 

In  division,  we  find  certain  agreements  running  through 
only  a  part  of  a  class  to  be  divided.  Withdrawing  the 
thoughts  from  the  differences  and  retaining  the  agreement 
is  properly  called  abstraction.  Mill  says:  "We  have  already 
observed  the  following  remarkable  things  in  the  process  of 
naming : 

1 .  Assigning  names  of  those  clusters  of  ideas  called  objects, 
as  men,  fish. 

2.  Generalizing  these  names  so  as  to  make  them  represent 
a  class. 

3.  Framing  adjectives  by  which  minor  classes  are  cut  out 
from  larger."     Mill  speaks  of  "those  clusters  of  ideas  called 
objects,  as  man."     Suppose  one  man  says  to  another,  "You 
are  my  idea."     The  other  man  could  retort,  "You  are  mis- 
taken.    I  am  myself,  and  you  are  my  idea."     Surely  we 
have  here  a  drawn  game.     The  truth  is,  in  such  cases,  the 
object  is  more  than  an  idea.     What  is  the  difference  in  the 
wealth  of  two  men,  one  having  a  million  dollars,  and  the  other 
an  idea  of  a  million  dollars? 

James  Mill  says  the  name  denotes  the  attributes  and 
connotes  the  object,  thus  reversing  the  usage  of  the  old 
logicians;  but  John  Stuart  Mill  has  properly  restored  the 
older  and  better  usage,  by  saying  that  the  name  denotes 
the  objects  of  a  class,  and  connotes  their  common  attributes. 
James  Mill  says:  Adding  the  syllable  ness  to  black,  we  have 
blackness,  in  which  all  connotation  is  dropped.  The  fact  is, 
all  denotation  is  dropped,  while  the  connotation  is  retained. 
The  common  qualities,  or  the  connotation,  or  content  of  the 


380  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

species  cut  out  from  the  genus  are,  of  course,  associated  with 
the  denotation,  or  extent,  and  the  name  of  the  species,  so 
that  the  content,  the  extent,  or  the  name,  will  call  out  all 
with  which  it  is  associated. 

As  to  memory,  Mill  says:  "Now  these  two,  1,  the  idea  of 
the  thing,  2,  the  idea  of  my  having  seen  it,  combined,  make 
up,  it  will  not  be  doubted,  the  whole  of  that  state  of  con- 
sciousness which  we  call  memory."  Yet  J.  S.  Mill  adds: 
"The  belief  of  my  having  seen  it."  We,  however,  remember 
other  experiences  than  those  acquired  through  sight.  We 
remember  what  we  have  heard,  touched,  tasted,  smelt  or 
thought. 

Memory  is  the  present  recognition  of  past  experiences;  it 
involves  the  retention,  reproduction,  and  recognition  of  these 
past  experiences.  In  retention  without  memory,  though 
there  is  a  retiring  of  the  idea  from  consciousness,  yet  there 
is  a  conserving  of  the  effect,  otherwise  the  past  experience 
could  not  be  recalled.  In  reproduction  there  is  a  recalling  of 
the  idea  back  to  consciousness,  and  the  reconstruction  of  the 
idea.  Recognition  identifies  the  idea  as  representing  a  former 
experience,  localized  in  space  and  time.  There  is  also  in- 
volved a  belief  in  our  personal  identity,  and  in  the  trust- 
worthiness of  memory.  Mill,  of  course,  explains  the  whole 
process,  as  he  was  bound  to  do,  by  the  law  of  association;  and 
his  explanations  are  remarkably  clear,  calling  it  "a  train  of 
antecedents  and  consequents  of  which  the  present  feeling  is 
one  extremity. " 

Personal  identity,  or  the  continued  essential  sameness  of 
the  ego,  is  more  than  a  string  of  experiences  bound  together 
by  indissoluble  association.  I  am  more  than  a  string  of 
experiences.  Memory  is  proof  of  personal  identity,  though 
it  does  not  constitute  it.  I  could  not  remember  a  past 
experience  as  mine,  unless  I  were  essentially  the  same  being 
then  as  I  am  now.  Does  the  word  7  mean  simply  a  string 
of  associated  sensations  and  ideas? 

The  chapter  on  Belief  is  the  most  important  one  in  Volume 
I.  Mill  considers  belief  under  three  heads:  Belief  in  events 
or  real  existences,  present,  past,  or  future;  belief  in  testimony, 
and  belief  in  the  truth  of  propositions.  He  says:  "In  my 
belief,  then,  of  the  existence  of  an  object,  there  is  included  the 
belief,  that,  in  such  and  such  circumstances,  I  should  hav 


ASSOCIATIONAL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  331 

such  and  such  sensations.  Is  there  anything  more?  It  will 
be  answered  immediately,  yes;  for  that  along  with  my  belief 
in  my  sensations  as  the  effect,  there  is  belief  of  something  as 
the  cause;  and  that  to  the  cause,  not  to  the  effect,  the  name 
object  is  appropriate.  .  .  The  word  cause  denotes  the 
antecedent  of  a  consequent,  where  the  connection  is  con- 
stant. .  .  From  this,  it  necessarily  follows,  that  between 
none  of  our  ideas  is  the  association  more  intimate  and  intense, 
than  between  antecedent  and  consequent  in  the  order  of 
events. " 

Again  Mill  says:  "That  a  cause  means,  and  can  mean 
nothing  to  the  human  mind,  but  constant  antecedent,  is  no 
longer  a  point  in  dispute."  On  this  assertion  J.  S.  Mill 
says:  "So  far  from  being  no  longer  a  point  in  dispute,  that  it 
is  denied  with  vehemence,  by  a  large  numerical  majority  of 
philosophers;  and  its  denial  is  perhaps  the  principal  badge 
of  one  of  the  two  schools  which,  at  this  time,  as  at  most 
other  times,  bisect  the  philosophical  world — the  intuitional 
school  and  the  experimental."  The  experimental  method 
may  do  for  science,  but  it  will  not  do  for  philosophy,  since 
philosophy  is  the  employment  of  reason  in  establishing 
fundamental  principles  that  shall  give  unity  and  harmony 
to  knowledge.  Is  a  constant  antecedent  the  sole  meaning 
of  cause?  It  is,  if  the  antecedent  is  not  efficient;  but  if  it  is 
not  efficient,  if  it  exerts  no  energy,  no  influence,  it  might  as 
well  be  absent,  in  which  case,  no  effect  would  follow;  it. 
therefore  is  efficient,  exerts  an  influence  or  is  dynamic.  Is 
it  not  strange  that  the  experimental  philosophers,  who  claim 
to  build  on  experience,  do  not  consider  that  they  exert  their 
energy  whenever  they  lift  a  weight?  Their  own  experience 
ought  to  teach  them  that  the  antecedent  is  dynamic,  that  is, 
more  than  a  mere  antecedent.  Philosophy  requires  a  rational 
basis.  If  the  antecedent  exerted  no  influence,  the  conse- 
quent would  not  follow.  Whatever  be  the  belief,  Mill  in- 
variably explains  it  by  the  principle  of  association.  He  says : 
"Our  first  assertion  was,  that  in  every  instance  of  belief, 
there  is  indissoluble  association  of  ideas.  .  .  Our  second 
assertion  was  that  cases  of  indissoluble  association  admitted 
by  all  men  to  be  this,  and  nothing  more,  are  acknowledged 
as  belief.  .  .  There  is  not  a  more  decisive  instance  of 
the  identity  of  belief  and  association  than  the  dread  of 


332  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

ghosts.  .  .  There  is  here,  indisputably  a  case  of  indis- 
soluble association."  Mill  has  been  successful  in  showing 
that  association  enters  into  belief;  but  in  many  cases,  belief 
depends  on  evidence,  at  least  on  probable  evidence,  taken 
as  the  reason  for  the  belief,  and  evidence  is  more  than  mere 
association.  When  the  evidence  is  conclusive,  the  belief  is 
transformed  into  knowledge. 

Mill  attempts  to  show  that  all  evidence,  including  that  of 
syllogistic  reasoning,  is  resolvable  into  association.  Why  is 
not,  All  P  is  M,  all  S  is  M,  /.  all  S  is  P,  just  as  valid  as,  all 
M  is  P,  all  S  is  M,  .'.  all  S  is  P?  The  conclusion  depends 
on  the  right  relation  of  P  and  S  to  M,  not  on  their  associa- 
tion with  M. 

In  Volume  II,  Mill  carries  forward  his  investigations  by 
his  ever  ready  law  of  association,  that  a  former  experience  is 
recalled  whenever  anything  recurs  which  was  known  along 
with  that  experience  in  time  or  place. 

He  resumes  the  discussion  of  language  and  considers 
especially  the  subject  of  names,  as  relative  terms,  and  abstract 
relative  terms.  This  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  and 
instructive  chapters  in  the  whole  work,  and  will  well  repay 
careful  study.  He  then  passes  on  to  numbers,  privative 
terms,  space  and  time. 

In  regard  to  quality,  Mill  says:  "The  names  of  all  qualities 
of  objects  are  names  of  sensations.  Are  they  anything  else? 
Yes;  they  are  the  names  of  our  sensations,  with  the  connota- 
tion of  a  supposed  unknown  cause  of  those  sensations.  As 
far,  however,  as  our  knowledge  goes,  they  are  names  of 
sensations,  and  nothing  else.  The  supposed  cause  is  never 
known;  the  effects  alone  are  known  to  us." 

This  quotation  brings  out  the  difference  between  the 
experimental  and  the  intuitional  philosophy.  We  experience 
the  effects,  the  sensations,  and  the  experimental  philosophy 
says  that  is  all  we  know,  and  virtually,  that  is  all  there  is; 
the  intuitional  philosophy  says,  we  know  that  there  is  a 
cause  for  the  sensations,  whether  we  know  the  specific  cause 
or  do  not  know.  There  is  a  cause  for  the  peculiar  taste  of 
salt,  and  a  different  cause  for  that  of  sugar,  though  we  may 
not  be  able  to  account  for  either,  or  to  explain  the  reason 
for  their  difference.  In  many  cases  the  difference  of  sensa- 
tions is  clearly  explicable.  Thus  an  iron  ball  three  inches 


ties  in 


ASSOCIATIONAL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  333 

diameter  exerts  a  greater  pressure  on  the  hand  than  a  ball  one 
inch  in  diameter,  because  it  contains  more  matter,  every 
particle  of  which  has  weight,  and  adds  to  the  sensation  of 
pressure. 

Again  Mill  says:  "When  the  smell  of  a  rose  is  perceived 
by  me,  or  the  idea  suggested  to  me,  immediately  all  the 
other  ideas  included  under  the  term  rose,  are  suggested  along 
with  it,  and  their  indissoluble  union,  presupposed.  But  this 
belief  of  the  previous  indissoluble  union  of  each  of  those 
sensations  with  all  the  other  sensations  is  all  which  I  really 
mean  when  I  refer  each  sensation  to  the  rose  as  its  cause." 
The  sensations  are  united  because  the  qualities  which  excite 
them  are  united  in  the  object  called  the  rose.  The  sensa- 
tions, or  their  ideas,  are  united  in  experience,  and  thus 
associated,  so  that  any  one  of  them  will  call  up  the  rest. 
When  a  person  takes  the  rose  you  are  admiring,  .and  gives  it 
to  another,  does  he  transfer  your  sensations  or  the  cause 
of  them? 

As  to  time,  Mill  says:  "Succession,  without  objects,  is 
precisely  the  meaning  of  the  word  time."  That  is,  from  a 
train  of  sensations  or  ideas,  of  whatever  nature,  abstract  the 
succession,  and  this  abstract,  this  succession  is  time.  To  my 
mind,  time  is  that  in  which  things  persist  and  succession 
takes  place.  At  first  thought,  this  would  seem  to  mean, 
that,  without  things  or  succession,  there  could  be  no  time; 
but  before  things  existed,  or  succession  took  place,  supposing 
them  not  to  be  eternal,  there  was  time — that  in  which  things 
could  persist  and  succession  take  place,  if  things  should  come 
to  be  or  succession  should  occur;  that  is,  time  is  the  condition, 
the  opportunity,  the  possibility  of  persistence  and  succession. 
If  there  should  be  no  succession,  no  change,  but  a  continuance 
of  all  things  as  they  are,  time  would  still  be  a  condition  of 
that  continuance;  hence,  succession,  or  change,  is  not  time, 
though  it  is  the  chronological  antecedent  of  our  idea  of  time. 
If  there  should  be  no  continuance  of  things,  but  an  unceasing 
succession  or  change,  time  would  still  be  a  condition  of  that 
succession  or  change;  hence  time  is  not  the  continuance  of 
things.  Time,  then,  is  that  which  renders  both  continuance 
and  succession  possible;  it  is  their  condition,  or  that  without 
which  they  could  not  be. 

In  regard  to  space,  Mill  says:  "The  word  space  is  an 
abstract,  differing  from  its  concrete,  like  other  abstracts, 


334  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

by  dropping  the  connotation  (denotation).  In  all  cases 
abstract  terms  can  be  explained  through  their  concretes, 
because  they  note  or  name  a  part  of  what  the  concrete 
names,  leaving  out  the  rest."  This  may  be  illustrated  by 
taking  a  cord,  a  wire,  or  a  rod,  and  leaving  out  the  matter, 
we  have  length.  Take  a  cubic  foot  of  wood,  or  of  iron,  or  of 
stone,  and  dropping  the  matter,  we  have  the  geometric  cube. 
This  may  aid  us  in  reaching  the  idea;  but  when  we  have  the 
idea,  a  cubic  foot,  as  a  geometric  object,  without  reference 
to  the  concrete  matter,  remains  as  a  limited  form  of  pure 
space.  Likewise  we  may  form  the  idea  of  a  sphere,  which 
we  may  enlarge  indefinitely,  and  if  we  drop  all  limitations, 
we  have  infinite  space.  If  there  were  no  matter,  would  space 
be  annihilated?  If  all  mind  should  go  with  the  matter, 
though  there  would  be  no  knowledge  of  the  reality,  would 
space  go  too? 

Mill  derives  the  idea  of  motion  from  tactual  and  muscular 
sensations,  as  in  moving  the  tips  of  the  fingers  of  the  right 
hand  along  the  bare  left  arm.  We  have  here  a  continuous 
sensation  in  the  tips  of  the  fingers,  local  change  of  sensations 
in  the  left  arm,  and  muscular  sensations  in  the  right  arm 
and  the  idea  of  force  or"  energy  involved  in  the  effort  to  move 
the  right  hand.  The  ideas  of  space,  time,  and  motion  are 
also  involved.  The  movement  may  be  followed  by  the  eye, 
and  thus  ocular  sensations  are  blended  with  tactual  and, 
muscular,  till  finally  motion  can  be  detected  by  the  eye  alone. 
Motion  implies  the  space  through  which  an  object  moves, 
also  the  time  required  for  the  passage  of  the  object  from  one 
point  of  its  path  to  another.  Any  change  in  the  motion  of  a 
body  requires  force,  that  is,  a  cause,  a  dynamic  antecedent. 

In  regard  to  personal  identity,  we  have  a  series  of  associ- 
ated sensations  and  ideas,  past  and  present,  including  the 
memory  of  the  past  and  a  consciousness  of  the  present. 
Does  this  series  constitute  the  ego?  Is  it  I?  Mill  says:  "I 
believe  that  a  train  of  antecedents  and  consequents  which 
forms  the  existence  of  other  men,  has  also  formed  my  exis- 
tence." 

J.  S.  Mill  adds  in  a  note:  "There  is  a  bond  of  some  sort 
among  the  parts  of  the  series  which  makes  me  say  they  were 
the  feelings  of  a  person  who  was  the  same  person  throughout, 
and  this  bond  to  me  constitutes  my  ego.'*  We  do  not  say, 


ASSOCIATION AL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  335 

I  was  the  past  series  of  sensations  and  ideas,  or  I  am  the 
memory  of  that  series,  neither  do  we  say  I  am  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  present  ideas  and  feelings,  but  I  remember  the 
past  and  am  conscious  of  the  present.  I  am  not  sensations, 
but  I  have  sensations;  I  have  ideas,  but  am  not  ideas,  nor  a 
train  of  ideas  and  feelings.  The  ego  holds  the  experiences  to- 
gether. 

Mill  begins  his  discussion  of  reflection  by  quoting  Locke: 
"That  notice  which  the  mind  takes  of  its  own  operations/' 
He  then  says:  "Reflection  is  nothing  but  consciousness;  and 
consciousness  is  the  having  sensations  and  ideas."  Reflection 
is,  however,  more  than  simple  consciousness,  or  being  aware 
of  what  is  passing  in  the  mind;  it  signifies  the  study  of  these 
phenomena,  their  examination,  discrimination  or  identifica- 
tion, and  classifications. 

A  careful  investigation  of  reflection  reveals  the  following 
processes:  Abstraction,  the  withdrawal  of  the  thoughts  from 
irrelevant  phenomena;  attention  to  the  phenomena  desired 
to  be  understood ;  analysis,  the  separation  of  these  phenomena 
into  their  elements;  synthesis,  or  putting  together  again  the 
elements  found  by  analysis;  comparison,  or  ascertaining  re- 
semblances and  differences;  discrimination,  the  distinguish- 
ing of  differences;  identification,  the  detection  of  sameness  or 
resemblance;  classification,  or  assigning  the  unlike  to  different 
classes,  and  the  like  to  the  same  class;  denomination,  the 
naming  of  classes  and  individuals,  and  definition,  the  descrip- 
tion of  things  by  genus  and  differentia  that  enables  us  to 
discriminate  or  to  identify. 

Pleasure  and  pain,  Mill  correctly  says  can  be  known  only 
by  experience.  The  idea  of  pleasure  he  identifies  with  desire, 
and  the  idea  of  pain  with  aversion,  each  with  a  reference  to 
the  future.  It  seems,  however,  that  desire  involves  the  wish 
to  enjoy  pleasure,  as  well  as  the  idea  of  it;  and  that  the 
aversion  to  pain  combines,  with  the  idea  of  pain,  the  wish  to 
avoid  it.  Hope  is  a  compound  of  the  emotional  element 
desire  with  the  intellectual  element  expectation  based  on 
the  probability  of  realization.  In  like  manner,  fear  is  a 
compound  of  aversion  and  expectation.  They  agree  in  the 
intellectual,  but  differ  in  the  emotional  element. 

Mill  has  noted  the  fact  that  it  is  not  always  the  immediate 
cause  of  pleasure,  as  food,  that  is  most  eagerly  sought  after, 


336  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

but  very  frequently  the  more  remote  cause  of  pleasure,  as 
money,  the  means  of  affording  many  pleasures,  and  of  grati- 
fying innumerable  desires.  Men  desire  wealth,  power, 
knowledge,  wisdom,  the  passports  to  dignity  and  to  fame, 
the  means  of  securing  the  friendship,  the  favor,  or  the  sub- 
serviency of  their  fellows;  and  they  have  strong  aversion  to 
their  opposites — poverty,  impotence,  ignorance,  folly,  con- 
temptibility.  It  is  regarded  praiseworthy  to  cultivate  the 
domestic  affections,  patriotism,  philanthropy,  and  benevo- 
lence. 

The  motives  to  action  spring  from  the  sensations,  the 
appetites,  the  instincts,  the  emotions,  the  affections,  as  love 
or  hatred,  and  the  desires  or  aversions.  These  are  not 
strictly  causes  of  volition,  but  are  reasons  in  view  of  which 
the  ego  makes  its  choice  and  decides  to  act. 

Virtue  involves  purity,  decision,  independence  and  heroism. 
The  specific  egoistic,  or  self-regarding  virtues  are  prudence, 
courage,  temperance,  chastity,  and  the  economic  virtues  of, 
industry,  frugality,  and  enterprise.  The  altruistic  virtues, 
embrace  sympathy,  justice  and  benevolence,  including  also, 
pity,  compassion,  mercy,  gratitude,  honesty  and  veracity. 
These  virtues  command  the  approbation  of  mankind,  and 
the  opposite  vices  their  detestation.  The  virtues  are  linked 
together  by  association,  so  likewise  the  vices. 

To  possess  the  virtues,  to  exhibit  them  in  conduct,  is  by 
common  consent,  considered  right,  and  is  approved  by  the 
individual  conscience,  and  fully  justified  by  the  good  conse- 
quences. The  vices  are  condemned  by  society,  by  the 
individual  conscience,  and  by  their  evil  consequences.  The 
obligation  to  do  right  and  to  avoid  wrong  finds,  in  the  good 
or  evil  consequences,  its  final  confirmation.  As  Mill  says: 
"With  the  idea  of  our  own  acts  of  virtue,  there  are  naturally 
associated  the  ideas  of  all  the  immense  advantages  we  derive 
from  the  virtuous  acts  of  our  fellow-creatures.  When  this 
association  is  formed  in  due  strength,  which  it  is  the  main 
business  of  a  good  education  to  effect,  the  motive  to  virtue 
becomes  paramount  in  the  human  breast." 

In  regard  to  Will,  Mill  says:  "The  object  of  the  inquiry 
is  to  find  out  what  that  peculiar  state  of  mind  or  consciousness 
is  by  which  action  is  preceded.  From  all  men  it  receives  the 
same  name.  It  is  called  Will  by  everybody;  and  by  every- 
body this  will  is  understood  to  be  a  state  of  mind  or  consck 


ASSOCIATIONAL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  337 

ness.  .  .  The  will  was  invariably  and  justly  assumed  as 
the  cause  of  the  action;  but  unhappily  there  was  always 
assumed,  as  a  part  of  the  idea  of  this  cause,  an  item  which 
is  found  to  be  altogether  imaginary.  In  the  sequence  of 
events  called  cause  and  effect,  men  were  not  contented  with 
cause  and  effect;  they  imagined  a  third  thing  called  force  or 
power,  which  was  not  the  cause,  but  something  emanating 
from  the  cause,  and  the  true  and  immediate  cause  of  the 
effect.'* 

The  fact  is,  the  cause  is  the  force  or  power  which  produces 
the  effect,  though  it  may  be  connected  with  other  elements 
in  an  antecedent  object.  An  antecedent,  without  force  or 
power,  might  as  well  be  absent,  but  if  the  cause  is  absent,  the 
effect  will  not  occur;  it  has,  therefore,  something  to  do  with  the 
effect,  or  is  efficient. 

Mill  says:  "In  all  this,  however,  there  is  nothing  but  the 
idea  of  an  antcedent  and  a  consequent,  and  a  fixed  order  of 
association.  .  .  The  actions  of  a  human  being  may  be  of 
two  sorts:  1.  Those  which  are  called  actions  of  the  body;  2. 
Those  which  are  called  actions  of  the  mind.  .  .  The 
actions  of  the  body  are  all  of  one  sort.  They  consist  essenti- 
ally of  that  action  of  certain  fibers  which  is  called  contraction. 

.  .  .  Muscular  or  fibrous  contractions  follow,  1st,  sen- 
sations; 2d,  ideas."  Muscular  contractions  may  follow  a 
stimulus  terminating  in  a  ganglion,  and  not  reach  the  brain. 
In  this  case  there  is  no  sensation  of  which  we  are  clearly  con- 
scious though  the  ganglion  responds  to  the  reported  irrita- 
tion; but  suppose  a  mosquito  lights  on  your  left  hand,  and 
commences  to  satisfy  his  appetite.  The  nervous  excitement 
which  follows  is  carried  to  the  brain.  A  sensation  follows, 
and  you  will  to  knock  off  the  intruder  by  a  movement  of 
the  right  hand.  Here  you  are  conscious  of  a  sensation  and  a 
volition,  and  a  movement  of  the  right  hand.  The  effort  to 
get  rid  of  the  intruder  reveals  the  nature  of  cause  as  antecedent 
energy.  The  pain  from  the  bite  was  a  reason  for  the  volition 
which  caused  the  movement  for  relief.  In  like  manner, 
volition  and  action  may  have  their  origin  in  an  idea  which 
awakens  desire  that  becomes  a  reason  for  volition,  the  cause 
of  action.  The  desire  awakened  by  the  idea  is,  however,  the 
reason,  not  the  cause  of  the  volition.  The  ego  itself  wills, 
that  is,  causes  the  volition,  and  through  the  volition,  the 
action. 


338  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Mill  gives  numerous  and  interesting  examples  of  muscular 
contraction  immediately  following  a  sensation  or  idea  without 
the  intervention  of  the  will,  a  result  of  habit  or  instinct;  and 
in  case  of  volition,  he  holds:  "that  our  power  of  willing  con- 
sists in  the  power  of  calling  into  existence  the  appropriate 
idea;  that  the  power  of  the  will  is  not  immediately  over  the 
muscle,  but  over  the  idea." 

Even  if  this  were  the  case,  the  will  has  an  indirect  power 
over  the  muscle  through  the  intervention  of  the  idea;  but  the 
idea,  of  itself,  is  not  of  the  nature  of  a  cause;  yet  the  idea  and 
the  muscular  action  have  been  so  often  associated,  that  the 
ego  could  scarcely  will  the  one  without  willing  the  other. 
When  I  reach  forth  my  hand  and  take  up  a  book,  conscious- 
ness informs  me  that  I  not  only  willed  the  idea,  but  the  act. 

I  have  been  quite  explicit  in  treating  of  James  Mill,  chiefly, 
because  he  was  a  leader  in  making  the  psychological  method 
prominent,  and  for  the  reason  that  he  was  a  distinguished 
representative  of  the  school  of  Associational  Philosophy. 

In  Ethics,  Mill  was  a  Utilitarian.  His  son,  John  Stuart 
Mill,  says  of  him:  "In  his  personal  qualities  the  Stoic  pre- 
dominated. His  standard  of  morals  was  Epicurean,  inas- 
much as  it  was  Utilitarian,  taking  as  the  exclusive  test  of 
right  and  wrong,  the  tendency  of  actions  to  produce  pleasure 
or  pain."  This  is  confirmed,  as  is  seen,  in  his  description  of 
The  Book  of  Ethics,  for  which  he  gives  the  alternative  title : 
"The  Book  of  Rules  for  regulating  the  actions  of  human 
beings,  so  as  to  deduce  from  them  the  greatest  amount  of 
good,  both  to  the  actor  himself  and  to  his  fellow-creatures 
at  large."  This  is  not  objectionable,  if  praiseworthiness 
is  regarded  a  greater  good  than  praise,  and  blameworthiness 
a  greater  evil  than  blame. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

Associational  and  Empirical  Philosophy — (Continued) 

5.  Mill  (1806-1873).  John  Stuart  Mill  was  born  in 
London,  and  was  instructed  by  his  father.  He  began  the 
study  of  Greek  when  three  years  of  age,  that  of  Arithmetic 
at  five,  and  the  study  of  Latin  and  Algebra  at  the  age  of 
eight.  He  read  a  great  amount  of  both  Greek  and  Latin, 
and  began  Logic  when  twelve  and  Economics  when  thirteen. 

In  regard  to  his  education  Mill  says:  "I  do  not  believe 
that  any  scientific  teaching  ever  was  more  thorough,  or 
better  fitted  for  training  the  faculties  than  the  mode  in  which 
Logic  and  Political  Economy  were  taught  me  by  my  father." 
He  read  Adam  Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations  and  Ricardo's 
Theory  of  Rent.  He  says:  "It  was  my  father's  main  object 
to  make  me  apply  to  Smith's  more  superficial  views  of  Polit- 
ical Economy,  the  superior  lights  of  Ricardo,  and  detect 
what  was  fallacious  in  Smith's  arguments  or  erroneous  in  his 
conclusions."  Thus  he  was  taught  to  think  for  himself. 

Mill  read  a  great  deal  of  history,  taking  notes  as  he  read, 
and  rehearsing  the  substance  to  his  father,  as  they  took  their 
walks  together  before  breakfast.  He  was  thus  under  the 
careful  tutorship  of  his  father  till  he  was  fourteen  years  of 
age.  He  then  left  England  for  France,  in  company  with  the 
family  of  Sir  Samuel  Bentham.  He  spent  a  year  in  France, 
but  kept  up  his  studious  habits,  and  recorded  in  a  diary  what 
he  found  interesting  in  his  experience. 

When  eighteen,  he  entered  the  India  House  as  clerk  in 
the  examiner's  office,  and  soon  became  assistant  examiner. 
The  duty  of  the  examiner  was  to  examine  the  letters  of  the 
agents  of  the  company,  and  write  instructions  in  reply. 
The  many  dispatches  which  Mill  wrote  gave  him  experience 
in  practical  affairs. 

In  concert  with  a  few  kindred  spirits,  Mill  organized  a  club 
which  he  called  The  Utilitarian  Society,  the  object  of  which 

339 


340  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

was  the  reformation  of  society  by  reaching  a  rational  solution 
of  social  problems,  according  to  the  principles  of  Hartley, 
Bentham,  and  James  Mill.  He  disseminated  his  views 
through  two  newspapers,  the  Traveller  and  the  Chronicle. 
The  Westminster  Review  and  the  Parliamentary  History  and 
Review,  new  magazines,  were  open  to  him.  He  wrote  many 
articles  for  both,  some  of  which  exhibited  great  ability.  At 
Bentham's  request,  he  edited  an  edition  of  Bentham' s  Ration- 
ale of  Judicial  Evidence,  and  found  the  work  congenial.  He 
took  an  active  part  in  a  reading  society  which  met  at  Grote's 
house,  and  engaged  in  the  debates  of  a  speculative  character. 

In  the  autumn  of  1826,  a  crisis  occurred  in  Mill's  mental 
life.  He  had  marked  out  for  himself  the  career  of  a  social 
reformer.  He  says:  "I  was  in  a  state  of  nerves,  such  as  every 
one  is  occasionally  liable  to.  .  .  In  this  frame  of  mind, 
it  occurred  to  me  to  put  the  question  directly  to  myself: 
Suppose  that  all  your  objects  in  life  were  realized;  that  all  the 
changes  in  institutions  and  opinions  which  you  are  looking 
forward  to  could  be  completely  effected  at  this  very  instant, 
would  this  be  a  great  joy  and  happiness  to  you?  And  an 
irrepressible  self -consciousness  distinctly  answered,  No!  At 
this  my  heart  sank  within  me;  the  whole  foundation  on  which 
life  was  constructed  fell  down.  All  my  happiness  was  to  have 
been  found  in  the  pursuit  of  this  good.  The  end  had  ceased 
to  charm,  and  how  could  there  ever  again  be  any  interest  in 
the  means.  I  seemed  to  have  nothing  left  to  live  for." 

The  cloud  did  not  soon  pass  away.  The  fact  was,  Mill 
had  overworked;  he  had  also  starved  his  affections  and  his 
aesthetic  nature.  He  ceased  for  a  time  to  write,  and  after  a 
prolonged  rest,  from  writing,  though  he  still  continued  to 
read,  slowly  recovered  his  health  and  tone  of  mind.  He 
says:  "The  cloud  gradually  drew  off,  and  I  again  enjoyed 
life;  though  I  had  several  relapses,  I  never  again  was  as 
miserable  as  I  had  been.  .  .  I  had  now  learnt  by  experi- 
ence that  the  passive  susceptibilities  needed  to  be  cultivated 
as  well  as  the  active  capacities,  and  required  to  be  nourished 
and  enriched  as  well  as  guided." 

He  found  satisfaction  in  reading  Wordsworth's  poems :  He 
says:  "These  poems  addressed  themselves  powerfully  to  one 
of  the  strongest  of  my  pleasurable  susceptibilities,  the  love 
of  rural  objects  and  natural  scenery." 


ASSOCIATIONAL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  341 

Mill  enjoyed  the  friendship  of  Mrs.  Taylor,  a  congenial 
spirit,  who  aftewards  became  his  wife,  and  assisted  and 
encouraged  him  in  his  literary  labors,  and  who,  if  his  estimate 
of  her  was  correct,  had  an  intellect  not  inferior  to  his  own. 

Mill  served  one  term  as  a  member  of  the  House  of  Commons 
and  though  he  was  not  an  eloquent  orator,  his  speeches  com- 
manded attention,  and  his  opinions  had  great  weight. 

In  addition  to  many  pamphlets  and  numerous  articles  for 
magazines,  Mill  was  the  author  of  numerous  important  books : 
Logic,  1843;  Political  Economy,  1848;  On  Liberty,  1859; 
Representative  Government,  1860;  Examination  of  Hamilton's 
Philosophy,  1865;  Subjection  of  Women,  1869;  Autobiography, 
1873;  Dissertations  on  Nature,  Religion,  and  Theism  (Posthu- 
mous), 1874. 

Of  Mill's  magazine  articles,  the  one  on  Utilitarianism, 
published  in  Frazier's  in  1861,  will  serve  as  a  type,  as  it  was 
a  carefully  reasoned  answer  to  the  objections  to  his  ethical 
theory.  In  this  article  he  explained  that  he  meant  by  utility, 
not  only  what  gave  sensational  pleasure,  but  whatever  con- 
tributed to  the  pleasures  of  the  imagination,  or  afforded 
satisfaction  to  the  reason. 

His  book  On  Liberty,  he  describes  as  a  joint  product  of 
himself  and  wife.  He  says:  "The  Liberty  is  likely  to  survive 
longer  than  anything  else  that  I  have  written  (with  the 
possible  exception  of  the  Logic),  because  the  conjunction 
of  her  mind  wTith  mine  has  rendered  it  a  kind  of  philosophic 
text-book  of  a  single  truth,  which  the  changes  progressively 
taking  place  in  modern  society  tend  to  bring  out  in  ever 
stronger  relief:  The  importance  to  man  and  society,  of  a 
large  variety  of  types  of  character,  and  of  giving  full  freedom 
to  human  nature  to  expand  itself  in  innumerable  and  con- 
flicting directions." 

Of  Mill's  other  books,  I  shall  notice  the  Logic  at  some 
length  and  shall  then  pass  on. 

For  many  years  Mill  had  contemplated  writing  a  work  on 
Logic.  With  Whately,  whose  book  on  Logic  he  had  reviewed, 
he  had  accepted  the  theory  that  all  reasoning  can  be  thrown 
into  the  syllogistic  form;  but  he  said:  "I  puzzled  myself,  like 
others  before  me,  with  the  great  paradox  of  the  discovery  of 
new  truths  by  general  reasoning.  As  to  the  fact,  there  could 
be  no  doubt.  As  little  could  it  be  doubted,  that  all  reasoning 


342  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

is  resolvable  into  syllogisms,  and  that  in  every  syllogism  the 
conclusion  is  actually  contained  and  implied  in  the  premises. 
How,  being  so  contained  and  implied,  it  could  be  now  truth, 
and  how  the  theorems  of  geometry,  so  different  in  appearance 
from  the  definitions  and  axioms,  could  be  all  contained  in 
these,  was  a  difficulty  which  no  one,  I  thought,  had  suffi- 
ciently felt,  and  which,  at  all  events,  no  one  had  succeeded  in 
clearing  up. 

The  fact  is,  neither  premise  alone  involves  the  conclusion, 
and  one  taking  the  premises  separately,  does  not  see  the 
conclusion,  but  taking  them  together  he  sees  the  conclusion, 
which  appears  to  him  a  new  truth,  new  to  him. 

Mill  maintained  the  untenable  position  that  the  syllogism 
involved  the  fallacy  of  begging  the  question.  He  says:  "It 
must  be  granted  that  in  every  syllogism,  considered  as  an 
argument  to  prove  the  conclusion,  there  is  a  petitio  principii. 
When  we  say,  All  men  are  mortal,  Socrates  is  a  man,  there- 
fore Socrates  is  mortal;  it  is  unanswerably  urged  by  the 
adversaries  of  the  syllogistic  theory,  that  the  proposition, 
Socrates  is  mortal,  is  pre-supposed  in  the  more  general 
assumption,  All  men  are  mortal;  that  we  cannot  be  assured 
of  the  mortality  of  all  men,  unless  we  are  already  certain  of 
the  mortality  of  every  individual  man;  that  if  it  be  still  doubt- 
ful whether  Socrates,  or  any  other  individual  we  may  choose 
to  name,  be  mortal  or  not,  the  same  degree  of  uncertainty 
must  hang  over  the  assertion,  All  men  are  mortal:  that  the 
general  principle,  instead  of  being  given  as  evidence  of  the 
particular  case,  can  not  itself  be  taken  for  true,  without 
exception,  until  every  shadow  of  doubt  which  could  affect  any 
case  comprised  within  it,  is  dispelled  by  evidence  aliunde 
and  then  what  remains  for  the  syllogism  to  prove?  That, 
in  short,  no  reasoning  from  generals  to  particulars  can,  as 
such,  prove  anything,  since  from  a  general  principle  we  can 
not  infer  any  particulars,  but  those  which  the  principle  itself 
assumes  as  known." 

Mill  here  chose  the  most  favorable  case  for  this  view, 
where  the  major  premise  is  proved  probable  by  ordin 
induction.  It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  establish  t 
major  premise,  that  all  men  are  mortal,  as  a  certainty,  as  is 
done  in  perfect  induction  where  the  instances  are  few, 
where  it  is  possible  to  examine  every  instance;  but  f 


ASSOCIATION  AL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  343 

general  experience,  it  can  be  accepted,  as  in  the  highest  de- 
gree probable  that  all  men  are  mortal.  Now  suppose  the  ques- 
tion is  raised,  Is  Gabriel  mortal?  it  not  being  known  whether 
Gabriel  is  a  man  or  an  angel.  Now  I  can  say,  All  men  are 
mortal;  Gabriel  is  a  man;  therefore  Gabriel  is  probably  mortal. 
Any  one  can  truthfully  say,  All  men  are  probably  mortal, 
without  knowing  the  existence  of  any  such  man  as  Gabriel; 
and  then  when  informed  that  Gabriel  is  a  man,  he  can  say 
that  Gabriel  is  probably  mortal. 

Sometimes  the  major  premise  is  established,  beyond  ques- 
tion, independently  of  the  knowledge  of  the  particular  in- 
stances involved.  To  repeat  an  illustration  before  given: 
Suppose  I  stand  on  the  summit  of  a  hill,  on  the  sea-shore 
and  see  a  ship  go  down  with  all  on  board.  I  do  not  have  to 
know  that  John  Brown  was  drowned  to  know  that  all  on 
board  were  drowned,  for  I  may  not  know  that  John  Brown 
was  aboard;  but  suppose  I  learn,  the  next  day,  that  John 
Brown  was  aboard  that  vessel  when  it  went  down.  Then  I 
can  say  that  all  on  board  a  certain  vessel,  at  a  certain  time 
were  drowned;  John  Brown  was  on  board  that  vessel  at  that 
time;  therefore  John  Brown  was  drowned.  Where  is  there 
the  shadow  of  the  petitio  here?  There  is  none,  hence  Mill's 
statement  that  every  syllogism  involves  the  petitio  is  not  true. 

Again,  I  can  find  the  last  term  of  an  arithmetical  progres- 
sion of  n  terms,  if  the  first  term  is  a,  the  common  difference^ 
d,  the  number  of  terms  n,  and  the  last  term  I,  thus: 


a,  a  +  d,  a  +  Zd,  a  +  3d,  a  +  4d,     .     .     .     a  +  (n  -  l)d. 

The  coefficient  of  d  being  one  less  than  the  number  of  the 
term,  /  or  the  n  term  is  evidently  expressed  by  the  formula: 

1=  a+  (n-  l)d. 

Now,  suppose  I  wish  to  know  the  last  term  of  a  series  whose 
first  term  is  5,  the  common  difference  3,  and  the  number  of 
terms  100.  I  write: 

/  =  a  +  (n  -  l)d. 
a  +  5,  n  =  100,  and  d  =  3, 
.  '  .  /  =  5  +  99  X  3  =  302. 

I  did  not  have  to  know  this  answer,  to  know  the  formula. 


344  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Again,  it  may  be  objected  that  a  deduction  from  a  perfect 
induction  is  useless,  since  the  conclusion  simply  asserts  what 
was  already  known,  when  the  major  premise  was  established. 
Thus,  Capt.  Smith  has  three  sons,  John,  Thomas  and  Henry, 
and  these  are  all  of  the  Captain's  sons.  John  has  visited 
England,  Thomas  has  visited  England,  and  Henry  has  visited 
England,  as  Capt.  Smith  well  knows,  and  can  state  as  a 
perfect  induction,  all  my  sons  have  visited  England.  Now 
it  may  not  be  worth  while  for  Capt.  Smith  to  prove  for  him- 
self that  John  has  visited  England,  by  saying,  All  my  sons 
have  visited  England;  but  John  is  one  of  my  sons;  therefore 
John  has  visited  England;  for  he  knew  that  before. 

Let  us  see,  however,  whether  a  legitimate  deduction,  which 
will  reveal  a  new  fact  to  some  one,  cannot  be  drawn  from 
this  perfect  induction.  Suppose  you,  from  another  part  of 
the  country,  should  visit  Capt.  Smith,  and  in  the  course  of 
conversation  he  should  inform  you  that  all  his  sons  had 
visited  England.  Suppose  the  next  day  you  fall  in  with  a 
young  man,  a  stranger,  you  would  know  neither  that  he  was 
one  of  Capt.  Smith's  sons,  nor  that  he  had  visited  England; 
but  entering  into  a  conversation  with  him,  he  informs  you 
that  he  is  the  son  of  that  Captain  Smith  with  whom  you 
conversed  yesterday.  Now  you  can  make  a  legitimate 
deduction  syllogism  thus:  All  of  Capt.  Smith's  sons  have 
visited  England;  this  young  man  is  the  son  of  Capt.  Smith, 
therefore,  this  young  man  has  visited  England.  You  have 
deduced  a  fact  new  to  you  and  have  not  been  guilty  of  begging 
the  question. 

Mill  refers  to  the  common  opinion  that  there  are  two  kinds 
of  reasoning — inductive,  from  particulars  to  generals,  and 
deductive,  from  generals  to  particulars,  and  then  says: 
"  There  is  a  third  species  of  reasoning  which  falls  under 
neither  of  these,  and  which  is  not  only  valid,  but  is  the 
foundation  of  both  the  others.  .  .  The  third  kind  of 
reasoning  is  from  particulars  to  particulars."  He  says: 
"The  proposition  that  the  duke  of  Wellington  is  mortal  is 
evidently  an  inference ;  it  is  got  at,  as  a  conclusion  from  some- 
thing else;  but  do  we  in  reality  conclude  it  from  the  proposi- 
tion, All  men  are  mortal?  I  answer,  no.  .  .  If  from  our 
experience  of  John,  Thomas,  etc.,  who  were  living,  but  are 
now  dead,  we  are  entitled  to  conclude  that  all  human  beings 


ASSOCIATIONAL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  345 

are  mortal,  we  might  surely,  without  any  logical  inconse- 
quence, have  concluded,  at  once,  from  those  instances,  that 
the  Duke  of  Wellington  is  mortal.  The  mortality  of  John, 
Thomas,  and  others  is,  after  all,  the  whole  evidence  we  have 
for  the  mortality  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington. "  This  has  the 
force  of  truth.  But  what  of  the  opinion  that  the  reasoning 
from  particulars  to  particulars  is  the  foundation  of  both  the 
others,  that  is  of  both  Induction  and  Deduction?  Take  the 
following  example :  A  president  of  a  college  made  the  follow- 
ing announcement,  one  morning,  at  the  chapel  exercises:  "I 
invite  all  the  Seniors  to  meet,  for  a  social  time,  at  my  house 
this  evening."  Any  one  of  the  seniors  would  reason:  All 
the  Seniors  are  invited;  I  am  a  Senior;  therefore  I  am  invited. 
Has  this,  for  a  foundation,  the  reasoning  from  particulars  to 
particulars? 

To  pass  on  to  Induction;  Mill  says:  "For  the  purposes  of 
the  present  inquiry,  Induction  may  be  defined,  the  operation 
of  discovering  and  proving  general  propositions.  .  .  The 
process  of  indirectly  ascertaining  individual  facts  is  as  truly 
inductive  as  that  by  which  we  establish  general  truths.  . 
Whenever  the  evidence  which  we  derive  from  observation  of 
known  cases  justifies  us  in  drawing  an  inference  respecting 
one  unknown  case,  we  should,  on  the  same  evidence,  be 
justified  in  drawing  a  similar  inference  with  respect  to  a 
whole  class  of  cases. "  The  inference,  however,  is  less  proba- 
ble for  the  whole  class  than  for  one  individual;  for  since  there 
is  a  chance  of  failure  in  any  one  individual  case  as  the  infer- 
ence is  only  probable  for  each  case,  then  when  the  whole  class 
of  cases  is  taken,  there  is  a  greater  probability  of  failure, 
somewhere,  than  for  any  one  case  taken  alone. 

As  to  the  ground  of  Induction,  Mill  says:  "Whatever  be 
the  most  proper  mode  of  expressing  it,  the  proposition  that 
the  course  of  nature  is  uniform  is  the  fundamental  principle 
or  general  axiom  of  Induction.  It  would  yet  be  a  great  error 
to  offer  this  large  generalization  as  any  explanation  of  the 
inductive  process.  On  the  contrary,  I  held  it  to  be  itself  an 
instance  of  induction,  an  induction  by  no  means  of  the  most 
obvious  kind.  Far  from  being  the  first  induction  we  make, 
it  is  one  of  the  last,  or  at  all  events,  one  of  those  which  are 
latest  in  attaining  strict  philosophical  accuracy.  .  .  The 
truth  is,  this  great  generalization  is  itself  founded  on  prior 


346  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

generalizations.  .  .  In  what  sense  then  can  a  principle 
which  is  so  far  from  being  our  earliest  induction,  be  regarded 
as  our  warrant  for  all  the  others?  In  the  only  sense  in  which 
(as  we  have  already  seen)  the  general  propositions  which  we 
place  at  the  head  of  our  reasonings  when  we  throw  them  into 
syllogisms,  ever  really  contributed  to  their  validity. " 

In  founding  the  great  generalization,  that  the  course  of 
nature  is  uniform,  on  prior  generalizations,  and  at  the  same 
time,  making  it  the  warrant  of  those  prior  generalizations, 
has  not  Mill  been  guilty  of  reasoning  in  a  circle?  The  objec- 
tion that  his  explanation  involves  the  fallacy  of  the  petitio 
principii  is  even  more  forcible  than  his  objection  to  the 
syllogism,  on  the  same  account;  for  the  major  premise  was 
not  used  in  finding  the  particular  cases,  from  which  it  was 
the  generalization,  while  according  to  Mill's  theory,  the 
uniformity  of  nature  is  the  warrant  for  those  prior  inductions 
of  which  it  is  the  generalization. 

Well,  what  is  the  warrant  for  the  principle  that  the  course 
of  nature  is  uniform,  in  the  realm  of  cause  and  effect?  All 
events  have  their  conditions  and  causes,  otherwise  they  would 
not  take  place,  since  non-entity  cannot  spring  into  entity. 
Like  conditions  and  causes  are  allowed  by  like  consequences. 
Like  signifies  essentially  alike,  not  identical.  If  the  effects 
are  not  alike,  it  is  because  the  conditions  or  causes  differ; 
for  whenever  two  causes  are  essentially  alike,  then  whatever 
determines  the  effect  in  the  one  case  is  present  to  determine 
it  in  the  other.  The  cases,  however,  must  be  essentially  alike, 
otherwise  there  is  no  warrant  for  the  inference. 

Why  did  not  Mill  accept,  at  once,  the  principle  of  the 
uniformity  of  nature,  as  a  rational  intuition?  Because,  as 
an  empirical  philosopher,  basing  all  knowledge  on  experience 
he  rejected  the  Intuitional  Philosophy  altogether.  He  says: 
"The  notion  that  truths  external  to  the  mind  may  be  known 
by  intuition  or  consciousness,  independently  of  observation 
and  experience,  is,  I  am  persuaded,  in  these  times,  the  great 
intellectual  support  of  false  doctrines  and  bad  institutions. 
By  the  aid  of  this  theory,  every  inveterate  belief  and  every 
intense  feeling,  of  which  the  origin  is  not  remembered,  is 
enabled  to  dispense  with  the  obligation  of  justifying  itself  by 
reason,  and  is  erected  into  its  own  all  sufficient  voucher  and 
justification.  There  never  was  such  an  instrument  devised 


ASSOCIATIONAL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  347 

for  consecrating  all  deep-seated  prejudices."  The  reception 
or  rejection  of  a  theory  should  turn  on  its  truth  or  falsity,  not 
on  the  fact  that  a  wrong  use  is  sometimes  made  of  it.  Noth- 
ing, perhaps,  is  more  frequently  used,  for  wrong  purposes, 
than  the  tongue;  shall  we,  therefore,  cut  it  out,  and  cast  it 
to  the  dogs?  In  fact,  Mill's  theory  reduces  rational  philos- 
ophy to  empirical  science. 

Mill  defines  cause,  thus:  "The  cause,  then,  philosophically 
speaking,  is  the  sum-total  of  the  conditions,  positive  and 
negative,  taken  together,  the  whole  of  the. contingencies  of 
every  description,  which  being  realized,  the  consequent 
invariably  follows."  It  will  be  seen  that  Mill  includes 
under  the  term  cause,  the  non-dynamic  condition  as  well  as 
the  dynamic.  The  absence  of  support,  then,  is  as  much  the 
cause  of  the  fall  of  a  body  as  gravity  itself.  It  would,  how- 
ever, accord  better  with  the  popular  view,  which  is  important, 
when  there  is  no  serious  objection,  to  call  the  combination 
of  the  dynamic  conditions  the  cause,  and  the  non-dynamic 
conditions,  simply  the  conditions;  but  Mill's  idea  of  cause  is 
not  that  of  efficiency,  but  that  of  immediate  and  invariable 
antecedence,  which  is  the  theory  of  Hume  and  of  James 
Mill;  but  there  is  more  in  cause,  as  we  have  before  shown,  than 
immediate  antecedence. 

Mill's  theory  of  the  four  methods  of  experimental  inquiry, 
which  he  calls,  the  Method  of  Agreement,  the  Method  of  Differ- 
ence, the  Method  of  Residues,  and  the  Method  of  Concomitant 
Variations,  exhibits  clear  and  profound  thought.  In  fact, 
his  extensive  treatise  on  Inductive  Logic  is  a  monument  of 
untiring  industry  and  deep  research,  unrivaled  in  this  field  of 
investigation,  and  merits  the  sincere  thanks  of  every  lover  of 
science.  The  subject,  however,  in  consideration  of  our 
limited  space,  is  too  extensive  to  follow  minutely  in  a  detailed 
examination.  We  must  be  content  with  one  brief  quotation, 
as  a  specimen  of  his  method:  "Let  A,  then,  be  an  agent  or 
cause,  and  let  the  object  of  our  inquiry  be  to  ascertain  what 
are  the  effects  of  this  cause.  If  we  can  either  find  or  produce 
the  agent  A  in  such  a  variety  of  circumstances  that  the 
different  cases  have  no  circumstances  in  common  except  A; 
then,  whatever  effect  we  find  produced  in  all  our  trials,  is 
indicated  as  the  effect  of  A,  Suppose,  for  example,  that  A 
is  tried  along  with  B  and  C,  and  that  the  effect  is  A  B  C;  and 
suppose  that  A  is  next  tried  with  D  and  E,  but  without  B 


348  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

and  C,  and  that  the  effect  is  A  D  E.  Then  we  may  reason 
thus:  B  and  C  are  not  effects  of  A,  for  they  were  not  pro- 
duced by  it  in  the  second  experiment;  nor  are  D  and  E,  for 
they  were  not  produced  in  the  first.  Whatever  is  really  the 
effect  of  A  must  have  been  produced  in  both  instances;  now 
this  condition  is  fulfilled  by  no  circumstance  except  A.  The 
phenomenon  A  can  not  have  been  the  effect  of  B  or  C,  since 
it  was  produced  where  they  were  not;  nor  of  D  or  E,  since  it 
was  produced  where  they  were  not.  Therefore  A  is  the 
effect  of  A." 

Mill  sharply  criticizes  Hamilton's  theory  of  the  relativity 
of  knowledge,  but  as  this  criticism,  though  severe  on  Hamil- 
ton throws  no  new  light  on  Mill's  doctrine  concerning  the 
relative  of  knowledge,  it  need  not  be  considered  in  this  con- 
nection. 

Mill's  theory  of  space,  however,  exhibits  the  inherent 
weakness  of  the  empirical  philosophy.  He  says:  "Space  is 
the  muscular  sensation  we  experience,  for  example,  in  moving 
the  hand  from  one  point  to  another.  Space  a  muscular  sensa- 
tion ! 

Mill  discusses  a  great  variety  of  phases  of  philosophy,  and 
in  all  of  these  discussions  displays  great  knowledge  and 
acute  critical  skill,  and  though  he  fails  in  doing  justice  to 
necessary  truths,  yet  he  commands  our  respect  for  his  candor 
and  ability,  and  may  be  justly  regarded  as  one  of  the  most 
eminent  thinkers  of  the  world,  and  well  worthy  of  the  high 
consideration  with  which  he  undoubtedly  will  always  be 
regarded,  by  all  who  honor  high  attainments  and  noble 
character. 

6.  Bain  (1818-1903) .  Alexander  Bain,  Professor  of  Logic, 
in  the  University  of  Aberdeen,  continued  the  investigations 
in  the  line  of  Empirical  and  Associational  Philosophy,  adding 
important  contributions  by  his  investigations  in  Physiological 
Psychology. 

His  principal  works  are  entitled  The  Senses  and  the  Intel- 
lect; the  Emotions  and  the  Will;  Mental  and  Moral  Science:; 
Psychology  and  Ethics;  Logic,  Deductive  and  Inductive. 

It  will  not  be  necessary  to  enter  upon  a  detailed  discussion 
of  these  works,  since  they  follow  essentially  the  course  taker 
by  the  two  Mills,  and  present  really  110  new  phase  of  Philoso- 
phy. I  shall,  therefore,  content  myself  with  a  notice  of  only 
a  few  points  of  Bain's  doctrines : 


ASSOCIATION AL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  349 

He  says:  "The  operations  and  appearances  that  constitute 
mind  are  indicated  by  such  terms  as  feeling,  thought,  memory, 
reason,  conscience,  imagination,  will,  passions,  affections, 
taste.  But  the  definition  of  mind  aspires  to  comprehend, 
in  few  words,  by  some  generalization,  the  whole  kindred  of 
mental  facts,  and  to  exclude  everything  of  a  foreign  charac- 
ter." 

In  speaking  of  "the  operations  and  appearances  that 
constitute  mind,"  Bain  identifies  mind  with  its  phenomena. 
If  "the  mind  is  the  sum  total  of  subject  experiences,"  as 
Bain  elsewhere  declares,  then  mind  is  not  that  which  thinks, 
feels  and  wills,  but  is  the  thinking,  feeling  and  willing,  apart 
from  any  thinker,  feeler  or  wilier;  but  the  recognition  of  a 
phenomenon  on  its  recurrence,  implies  a  spiritual  subject 
enduring  through  the  period  from  the  occurrence  of  the 
phenomenon  to  its  recurrence,  and  therefore  distinct  from 
the  fleeting  phenomena.  The  discrimination  of  one  psychical 
phenomenon  from  another  can  be  explained  only  by  refer- 
ring them  to  a  common  subject,  which,  being  differently 
affected  by  them,  discriminates  the  one  from  the  other. 
Memory  does  not  constitute  personal  identity,  neither  do 
the  ever  shifting  phenomena  of  which  we  are  conscious. 
Memory  is  the  proof  of  personal  identity,  and  the  shifting 
phenomena  find  their  explanation  in  the  ego,  and  so  far  as 
reason  can  see,  can  have  no  other  foundation. 

Again  Bain  says:  "We  are  incapable  of  discussing  the 
existence  of  an  independent  material  world,  the  very  act  is  a 
contradiction."  We  can,  of  course,  know  nothing  of  an 
external  world  that  is  not  in  any  way  related  to  our  minds; 
but  we  do  not  know,  and  are  not  warranted  in  affirming, 
that  nothing  exists  unknown  to  any  human  mind. 

As  to  the  Witt,  Bain  says :  "  The  word  'choice'  gives  us  one 
of  the  modes  of  designating  the  supposed  liberty  of  voluntary 
actions.  The  real  meaning  of  this  word,  that  is  to  say,  the 
only  real  fact  that  can  be  pointed  at  in  correspondence  with 
it,  is  the  acting  out  one  of  several  different  promptings. 
When  a  person  purchases  an  article  out  of  several  submitted 
to  view,  the  recommendations  of  that  one  are  said  to  be 
greater  than  of  the  rest,  and  nothing  more  needs  really  be 
said  in  describing  the  transaction.  It  may  happen  that  for 
a  moment  the  opposing  attractions  are  exactly  balanced,  and 


350  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

decision  is  suspended  thereby. "  But  suppose  he  must  make 
the  choice  then  and  there.  The  motives,  being  equal,  do  not 
compel  choice;  but  he  does  decide,  and  therefore  the  power  of 
decision  is  in  the  person  and  not  in  the  motive,  which  is  only 
an  inducement,  not  a  cause. 

Bain  goes  on  to  say  in  case  of  balanced  motives:  "The 
equipoise  may  even  continue  for  a  long  time;  but  when  the 
decision  is  actually  come  to,  the  fact  and  the  meaning  are 
that  some  consideration  has  risen  to  the  mind,  giving  a 
superior  energy  of  motive  to  the  side  that  has  preponderated. 
This  is  the  whole  substance  of  the  act  of  choosing. "  That 
is,  according  to  Bain,  the  motives  are  the  causes  of  volition, 
and  the  supposition  that  there  is  an  ego  that  makes  the 
decision,  in  view  of  motives  as  reasons,  is  a  fiction;  that  is, 
there  is  no  ego  that  deliberates  and  chooses,  but  there  is  only 
deliberation  and  choice  as  operations  without  an  operator, 
save  the  motives  which  produced  them. 

Again,  Bain  says:  "The  designation  'liberty  of  choice'  has 
no  real  meaning,  except  denying  extraneous  interference.  .  . 
But,  as  between  the  different  motives  of  my  own  mind,  there 
is  no  meaning  in  'liberty  of  choice.'  Various  motives — 
present  or  prospective  pleasures  and  pains — concur  in  urging 
me  to  act;  the  result  of  the  conflict  shows  that  one  group  is 
stronger  than  another,  and  that  is  the  whole  case."  Does 
Bain  mean  by  '  'me, "  when  he  says :  "  Various  motives  concur 
in  urging  me  to  act,"  the  sum-total  of  subject  experiences 
that  he  has  had  during  the  course  of  his  life?  How  can  such 
a  conglomerate  bundle  act?  The  ego  is  not  the  sum  of  the 
phenomena,  but  the  subject,  and  when  one  says :  "  I  will  do  it, " 
he  means  that  he  has  made  the  decision,  and  will  perform 
that  act  himself;  and  in  this,  he  counts  himself  not  passive 
but  active,  not  arbitrarily  but  rationally  active,  and  by  "I," 
he  means  himself,  a  personality,  not  a  bundle  of  operations. 

It  is,  however,  due  to  Bain  to  state  that  his  works  exhibit 
great  ability.  The  one  entitled  The  Senses  and  the  Intellect 
will  especially  well  repay  careful  reading;  for  it  introduces  the 
important  subject  of  physiological  psychology. 

To  Prof.  Bain  great  credit  is  due  for  enterprise  and 
liberality,  as  a  projector  and  generous  supporter,  both  in 
money  and  in  philosophic  contributions,  of  Mind,  an  Englis 
Psychological  Journal  of  a  high  order  of  merit. 


English 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

French  Enlightenment  Philosophy 

1.  Voltaire  (1694-1778).  The  importance  of  Voltaire  in 
Philosophy  is  not  that  of  an  originator,  but  that  of  a  pro- 
mulgator  of  the  doctrines  of  a  certain  school.  As  philosophy 
was  not  his  chief  field  of  work,  it  is  due  him,  to  set  forth, 
though  necessarily  in  the  briefest  possible  manner,  the  chief 
facts  of  his  life,  and  his  wonderful  literary  career. 

His  early  education  was  intrusted  to  the  Abbe  de  Chateau- 
neuf,  who  instructed  him  in  belles  lettres  and  Deism.  He 
soon  showed  facility  in  making  verses,  and  in  these  attempts, 
received  encouragement. 

At  the  age  of  ten,  he  was  sent  to  the  Jesuit  College,  Louis- 
le-Grand,  where  he  remained  seven  years.  This  college  not 
only  gave  a  wide  course  of  instruction,  but  encouraged 
dramatic  performances  which,  no  doubt,  gave  Voltaire  his 
taste  for  the  theater. 

Coming  home  from  college,  he  found  himself  in  conflict 
with  his  father  who  desired  him  to  prepare  for  some  profes- 
sion, regarding  literature,  the  choice  of  the  son,  as  no  pro- 
fession worthy  the  name.  The  young  man  formally  sub- 
mitted to  the  will  of  his  father  and  read  law,  in  pretense, 
while  actually  engaged  in  pursuits  more  suited  to  his  tastes. 

He  formed  some  romantic  attachments,  and  wrote  libelous 
poems  for  which,  to  avoid  the  danger  of  prosecution,  his 
father  sent  him  into  the  country,  with  his  friend,  the  Marquis 
de  St.  Ange,  where  he  was  supposed  to  study  law;  but  he 
spent  his  time  writing  essays  and  gathering  the  gossip  of 
history  which  he  afterwards  used  with  telling  effect. 

Returning  to  Paris,  and  entering  into  literary  society,  he 
read  his  tragedy  of  Oedipe  privately  to  his  friends,  and  was 
introduced  to  the  famous  "court  of  Sceaux,"  the  coterie  of 
the  ambitious  Duchesse  du  Maine.  For  his  supposed  aid 
in  lampooning  the  regent  Orleanes,  whom  the  Duchesse 
hated,  he  was  banished  from  Paris.  After  being  allowed  to 

25X 


352  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

return,  he  again  fell  under  the  suspicion  of  again  engaging  in 
libels,  and  by  the  spy  Beauregard,  was  inveigled  into  con- 
fession, and  was  arrested  and  sent  to  the  Bastile,  where  he 
recast  the  Oedipe  and  began  the  Henriade. 

An  interview  with  the  regent  induced  him  to  curb  his 
propensity  to  sarcasm  and  libel.  His  Oedipe  was  acted  at 
the  Theatre  Francais,  and  brought  him  both  reputation  and 
money.  The  next  year,  the  Lagrange-Chancel's  libels  called 
Philippiques,  again  brought  him  under  suspicion,  and  he 
was  informally  banished,  and  spending  some  time  with  Villars, 
he  added  to  his  stock  of  historic  gossip. 

Later  he  was  employed  by  the  government,  as  a  secret 
diplomatist;  but  falling  in  with  his  old  enemy  Beauregard, 
he  got  the  worst  of  an  encounter.  He  met  with  Rousseau 
with  whom  he  quarrelled.  He  went  to  the  Hague,  and 
continued  his  work  on  the  Henriade  which  was  first  printed 
at  Rouen  and  afterwards  revised. 

The  Mariamne,  a  tragedy,  appeared  first  with  great  suc- 
cess, but  at  length  fell  into  disrepute;  it  was  afterwards 
revised  and  regained  its  popularity. 

Insulted  by  the  Chevalier  de  Rohan,  he  replied  with  keen 
satire  for  which  he  was  beaten  by  the  servants  of  the  Cheva- 
lier. Voltaire  sent  a  challenge,  but  was  himself  sent  to  the 
Bastile,  and  shortly  after  to  England.  This  was  an  impor- 
tant visit  for  him,  as  it  gained  him  distinguished  friends,  as 
Young,  Pope,  Congreve,  Malborough,  and  exerted  a  great 
influence  on  his  subsequent  life. 

Returning  to  France,  he  published,  in  1731,  his  Charles 
XII,  and  in  1733  appeared  Lettres  Philosophiques  sur  les 
Anglais,  and  the  Temple  du  Gout.  The  latter  was  con- 
demned, searched  for,  and  burned.  Voltaire  took  himself 
out  of  harm's  way  by  going  to  the  independent  duchy  of 
Lorraine,  and  dwelt  at  the  chateau  Cirey,  where  he  did 
important  literary  work,  as  well  as  minor  work  of  more  fugitive 
writings.  Among  the  latter,  was  a  pamphlet  with  the 
sounding  title,  Treatise  on  Metaphysics.  Though  Voltaire 
knew  little  of  metaphysics,  this  pamphlet  served  his  purpose, 
as  a  vehicle  for  his  ridicule  of  religion,  though  softening  his 
attack  under  the  cloak  of  Deism. 

In  1739,  he  made  a  journey  to  Brussels,  thence  to  Paris, 
and  back  again  to  Brussels.  He  visited  Frederick, 


FRENCH   ENLIGHTENMENT   PHILOSOPHY  353 

King  of  Prussia,  and  this  visit  laid  the  foundation  for  his 
subsequent  residence  of  three  years  with  the  great  King. 
About  this  time,  he  published  his  plays  Merope  and  Mahomet, 
and  continued  his  miscellanies,  but  his  main  work,  at  this 
time,  was  Essais  sur  les  Moeurs,  and  the  Siecle  de  Louis  XIV. 

Through  the  influence  of  Richelieu,  he  was  employed  in 
the  fetes  of  the  Dauphine's  marriage,  and  rewarded  by  the 
appointment  of  histriographer-royal  with  a  salary  of  two 
thousand  livres.  He  received  medals  from  the  Pope  to 
whom  he  dedicated  his  Mahomet,  and  was  elected  a  member 
of  the  Academy;  but  his  rising  fame  provoked  envy,  and 
his  popularity  declined. 

On  urgent  invitation  from  Frederick  the  Great,  he  went 
to  Berlin  and  spent  three  years  with  the  King,  who  notwith- 
standing his  economical  habits,  treated  Voltaire  with  gener- 
osity. It  was,  however,  out  of  the  question  for  Frederick 
and  Voltaire  to  live  together  a  great  length  of  time  without 
quarreling.  Voltaire  also  quarrelled  with  Lessing,  the  most 
distinguished  author  in  Prussia. 

At  Potsdam,  the  Royal  residence,  he  finished  his  Siecle 
de  Louis  XIV,  and  began  his  Dictionnaire  Philosophique. 
A  quarrel  with  Maupertuis,  the  president  of  the  Berlin 
Academy,  led  to  such  a  misunderstanding  with  Frederick  as 
to  cause  his  expulsion  from  Prussia  and  as  he  was  not  per- 
mitted to  return  to  Paris,  he  found  a  refuge  at  Geneva,  and 
bought  and  fitted  up  a  country  house  just  outside  the  walls 
of  the  city,  which  he  called  Les  Delices;  it  was  a  beautiful 
home,  with  fine  views.  Here  he  fitted  up  a  theater,  and 
had  the  pleasure  of  acting  a  part  in  one  of  his  own  plays. 
This  brought  him  into  conflict  with  the  authorities  of  the 
city  who  had  forbidden  theatrical  performances. 

The  earthquake  at  Lisbon  gave  Voltaire  an  opportunity 
to  ridicule  the  orthodox  view  of  providence.  This  was  done 
first  in  verse  and  later  in  a  tale  called  Candide. 

His  troubles  at  Geneva  induced  him  to  buy  property  at 
Ferney  on  the  lake,  and  he  became  known  all  over  Europe 
as  the  Squire  of  Ferney.  Here  he  was  visited  by  distin- 
guished men  from  all  parts  of  Europe,  and  though  he  re- 
ceived them  with  commendable  hospitality,  yet  reserved 
considerable  time  for  his  literary  work.  Here  he  lived  and 
labored  for  many  years.  He  adopted,  as  a  daughter,  Reine 
Philiberte  de  Varicount,  a  young  girl  of  noble  family, 


354  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

though  poor,  and  gave  her  in  marriage  to  the  Marquis  de 
Valette.  In  gratitude  she  made  the  last  days  of  Voltaire  as 
happy  as  was  possible.  From  her  beauty  and  goodness 
she  received  the  pet  name  of  Belle  et  Bonne. 

In  1778,  the  last  year  of  his  life,  Voltaire  was  invited  to 
Paris  to  witness  the  tragedy  Irene  which  he  had  just  finished. 
He  left  his  home,  and  after  five  days,  arrived  in  Paris,  which 
he  had  not  seen  for  twenty-eight  years.  Though  not  well, 
he  witnessed  his  play,  and  was  crowned  with  laurels.  He 
also  met  and  warmly  embraced  Dr.  Franklin,  the  world 
renowned  American  philosopher. 

His  time  had  come,  he  became  seriously  ill,  and  shortly 
died,  whether  a  Deist  or  a  Christian  is  not  very  certain. 

The  literary  works  of  Voltaire  may  be  grouped  as,  Theatri- 
cal, Poems  proper,  Prose  Romances,  Historical  Works, 
Scientific  Works,  Philosophic  Writings,  Criticisms,  Miscel- 
laneous Writings,  Correspondence,  so  many  indeed  that  the 
"hundred  volumes"  of  Voltaire  has  become  a  current  say- 
ing. In  all  the  above  named  divisions,  Voltaire  did  great 
work,  and  for  literary  form,  he  stands,  as  an  artist,  unsur- 
passed, if  not  unrivaled;  and  will  ever  hold  his  place  among 
literary  men  as  one  of  the  marvels  of  the  world. 

Voltaire's  importance  in  philosophy  is  not  to  be  attributed 
to  original  power  as  a  thinker,  but  to  his  gift  as  a  popularizer 
and  disseminator  of  opinions.  His  principal  philosophic 
work,  Dictionnaire  Philosophique,  gave  him  the  opportunity 
to  exhibit  his  skill  in  paraphrasing,  which  he  employed  with 
great  effect.  He  thus  set  forth  his  philosophic  views,  and 
gave  currency  to  the  Physics  of  Newton  and  the  Empirical 
philosophy  of  Locke. 

Voltaire  commends  Locke  for  deriving  from  sensation 
everything  found  in  the  understanding,  thus  giving  the 
history  of  the  human  mind  instead  of  romance.  He  even 
regards  memory  and  thought  as  sensation  continued  and 
modified,  thus  carrying  sensation  far  enough  to  cover  the 
ground  assigned  by  Locke  to  reflection. 

If  it  be  true  that  mental  operations  are  simply  transformed 
sensations,  what  then  can  we  know  of  the  infinite  and  the 
eternal,  or  of  any  form  of  necessary  truth?  Voltaire's  reply 
is :  "  God  has  given  thee,  O  man,  understanding  for  thy  own 
good  conduct,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  penetrating 
the  essence  of  the  things  he  has  created. " 


~ 


FRENCH  ENLIGHTENMENT  PHILOSOPHY     355 

He  eagerly  accepted  Locke's  assertion  that  there  can  be 
no  valid  objection  to  the  opinion  that  matter  can  think, 
thus  rejecting  the  hypothesis  of  the  soul  as  a  spiritual  sub- 
stance, and  reducing  all  reality  to  God  and  matter,  regard- 
ing both  as  eternal.  For  he  says:  "No  axiom  has  ever  been 
more  generally  received  than  this,  that  nothing  comes  out  of 
nothing."  He  sarcastically  observes:  "We  of  the  present 
day  are  so  happy  as  to  know,  by  faith,  that  God  created 
matter  out  of  nothing."  Just  here,  if  Voltaire  were  still 
alive,  I  would  like  to  ask  him  whether  he  regarded  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  axiom,  Nothing  comes  out  of  nothing,  as  a  modified 
sensation. 

Voltaire  held  that  the  belief  in  immortality  was  essential 
to  the  preservation  of  morality,  and  encouraged  this  belief 
for  its  practical  value  to  society. 

Pleasure,  it  would  seem,  Voltaire  found  in  taking  dark 
views  of  things,  especially  of  human  life,  and  the  prospects 
of  humanity.  He  dwelt  on  disasters  such  as  the  burial  of 
Pompeii  by  the  eruption  of  Mt.  Vesuvius,  or  the  earthquake 
of  Lisbon,  asking  the  question,  as  if  directed  to  Leibniz, 
"If  this  is  the  best  possible  world,  what  must  the  others  be? " 
Hence  he  concludes  that  if  God  is  good,  he  is  not  omnipotent. 

Notwithstanding  his  cynicism,  Voltaire  proved  himself 
to  be  a  philanthropist  by  his  defense  of  the  oppressed  and 
his  compassion  for  the  friendless.  He  held  that  morality 
is  the  essence  of  religion,  and  had. little  or  no  respect  for 
dogma.  He  denounced  impostors,  and  advocated  tolera- 
tion, and  urged  upon  the  enlightened  and  ruling  classes  of 
society  their  duty  of  caring  for  the  masses.  Voltaire  was 
an  ethical  reformer  rather  than  a  metaphysical  Philosopher. 

2.  Montesquieu  (1689-1755).  Charles  de  Secondat, 
Baron  de  La  Brede  et  de  Montesquieu,  was  of  a  noble  and 
wealthy  family.  He  was  well  educated  at  the  Oratorian 
School  of  Juilly  and  at  Bordeaux,  and  was  destined  to  the 
profession  of  law.  His  uncle  left  him  his  fortune  and  an 
important  judicial  office,  the  presidency  of  a  district  of 
France. 

The  fame  of  Montesquieu  rests  chiefly  on  his  three  im- 
portant works:  The  Lettres  Persanes  were  in  the  guise  of 
letters  purporting  to  be  written  by  two  Persians  of  distinction 
traveling  in  Europe.  In  this  book,  Montesquieu  satirized 


356  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

the  social,  political,  and  ecclesiastical  follies  of  the  day,  and 
shocked  his  grave  readers  by  tales  of  scandal  from  social 
life.  The  book  made  sharp  hits,  was  eagerly  read,  and  went 
through  three  editions  the  first  year.  Its  questionable 
morality,  however,  prevented  Montesquieu's  election  to  the 
Academy,  but  for  a  time  only,  as  he  afterwards  canceled  the 
objectionable  features  of  his  book. 

Traveling  over  Europe,  he  met  Lord  Chesterfield  in  Italy, 
and  they  became  fast  friends.  Continuing  his  travels,  he 
arrived  in  England,  where  he  remained  nearly  two  years,  and 
acquired  a  high  admiration  of  the  English  government  and 
the  character  of  the  English  people. 

His  next  book  was  entitled  Considerations  sur  les  causes  de 
la  grandeur  des  Romains  et  leur  decadence.  This  was  a  more 
dignified  book  than  the  Persanes,  though  not  so  popular  in 
Paris.  The  salons  called  the  Persanes  the  grandeur,  and 
the  Considerations,  the  decadence  of  Montesquieu;  but  the 
Considerations  was  the  greater  book;  it  had  extraordinary 
merit.  In  it  Montesquieu  dropped  scandal,  and  discussed 
the  more  serious  questions  of  politics  and  sociology.  It  is  a 
noteworthy  incident  that  a  copy  of  the  Considerations,  anno- 
tated by  the  great  Frederick,  was  abstracted  from  the  Pots- 
dam library  by  the  great  Napoleon. 

Montesquieu's  third  and  greatest  book,  called  Esprit  des 
Lois,  contains  his  mature  views  on  political  and  social  ques- 
tions, forms  of  Government,  and  whatever  could  affect  the 
condition  and  happiness  of  the  people.  It  entitled  Montes- 
quieu to  be  regarded  the  pioneer  in  the  philosophy  of  history. 

His  important  views  can  be  thus  summed  up :  That  differ- 
ence of  character  is  determined  by  difference  of  circumstances, 
and  especially  by  the  peculiar  laws  of  the  state;  that  it  is 
better  to  worship  duty  rather  than  wealth  or  social  position; 
that  extremes  should  be  avoided  and  the  safe  middle  course 
pursued;  that  absolutism  was  a  great  wrong  to  the  people, 
whether  found  in  the  State  or  in  the  church;  that  the  pros- 
perity of  the  people  depends  not  so  much  upon  victory  in 
war,  as  on  public  sentiment,  love  of  liberty,  patriotism, 
industry  and  morality;  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  the  orderly 
movements  resulting  necessarily  from  the  constitution  of 
things;  that  civil  law  should  reflect  the  constitution  of  man; 
that  the  prevalence  of  religion  is  proof  that  there  is  in  it 
something  essential  to  the  happiness  of  man. 


FRENCH  ENLIGHTENMENT  PHILOSOPHY  357 

Montesquieu  considered  the  English  government  the 
ideal  of  perfection.  He  won  over  the  educated  class  to 
liberal  ideas,  and  made  the  political  doctrines  of  Locke  the 
common  property  of  Europe.  His  importance  is  that  of  a 
social  philosopher,  and  his  province  the  philosophy  of  history. 

3.  La  Mettrie  (1709-1751).  La  Mettrie  was  the  founder 
of  French  materialism.  He  lost  his  position  as  physician 
in  the  army  on  account  of  his  attack  on  the  prevailing  medical 
practice,  and  for  his  too  free  expression  of  his  opinions,  at 
that  time  unpopular.  He  was  persecuted,  but  took  refuge 
in  Holland,  but  this  refuge  was  at  length  denied  him  owing 
to  the  indignation  aroused  by  his  work,  L'homme  Machine, 
the  man  machine.  He  fled  to  Prussia  and  found  refuge 
with  Frederick  the  Great,  who  appointed  him  court  reader. 

La  Mettrie  attempted  to  prove  that  the  difference  between 
the  mind  of  man  and  that  of  the  brute  is  one  merely  of 
quantity,  not  quality.  He  extended  the  analogy  to  plants. 
Animals  have  something  in  common  with  plants;  but  they 
also  have  higher  wants,  and  more  enlarged  desires.  Man 
has  what  is  common  to  plants  and  animals,  plus  what  is 
peculiar  to  animals,  plus  what  is  characteristic  of  himself; 
but  the  higher  we  ascend  the  scale  of  being,  the  more  numer- 
ous the  wants,  and  the  greater  the  struggle  for  existence. 

According  to  La  Mettrie  we  see  nothing  but  matter  and 
its  changes,  yet  we  cannot  know  its  real  nature.  We  know 
its  extension,  motion,  change  of  form;  and  we  know  our 
sensations,  which  are  qualities  of  matter,  since  they  always 
accompany  certain  organic  changes.  As  thought  springs 
from  sensation,  it  also  is  a  mere  modification  of  matter. 
To  this  it  may  be  replied  that  La  Mettrie  has  not  shown 
that  the  sensation  of  which  we  are  conscious  is  nothing  but  a 
change  in  matter.  When  external  objects  act  on  some 
sense  organ,  the  afferent  nerves  carry  the  impression  to  the 
brain  from  which  a  response  is  sent  back  along  the  efferent 
nerves,  and  the  muscles  move  some  organ,  as  the  hand. 
Of  this  action  of  the  nerves  there  is  no  consciousness.  Sensa- 
tion is  not  a  part  of  the  process,  but  an  accompaniment. 
The  quivering  of  a  nerve  is  neither  sensation,  nor  thought, 
nor  consciousness.  The  nervous  agitation  belongs  to  the 
realm  of  matter,  the  sensation,  the  thought,  the  conscious- 
ness, belong  to  the  realm  of  mind.  The  one  is  physical,  the 


358  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

other  psychical.  The  states  of  consciousness  are  not  explica- 
ble by  the  laws  of  matter  and  motion.  Regarding  matter 
and  mind  as  the  two  species  of  the  genus  substance,  the 
support  of  attributes,  we  may  possibly  find  the  ground  of 
their  union  and  the  explanation  of  their  interaction,  in 
potency,  the  essence  of  the  genus  substance,  and  common  to 
its  two  species,  matter  and  mind. 

La  Mettrie  was  never  popular,  and  was  disowned  by  the 
materialists  themselves;  but  he  will  always  be  known  as  the 
inventor  of  L'homme  Machine. 

4.  Condillac  (1715-1780).  Etienne  Bonnot  de  Condillac 
received  holy  orders  when  a  young  man,  and  late  in  life,  was 
presented  with  the  Abbey  de  Mureaux  and  its  revenues.  He 
is  the  psychologist  of  the  French  Enlightenment  Philosophy. 

Like  Locke,  he  began  with  a  polemic  against  innate  ideas — 
a  mere  man  of  straw.  There  are,  of  course,  no  innate  ideas, 
but  there  are,  in  an  infant,  the  germs  of  powers  which, 
when  developed,  will,  under  proper  conditions,  evolve  ideas. 

Condillac  was  a  voluminous  writer,  the  author  of  more 
than  fifty  volumes.  He  wrote  one  of  the  greatest  treatises 
on  economics,  entitled,  Le  Commerce  et  le  Gouvernement, 
which  was  published  in  1776,  the  same  year  as  Smith's 
Wealth  of  Nations.  The  books  giving  his  philosophical 
opinions  are:  L'Origine  des  Connaissances  Humaines,  Traite 
des  Sensations,  Traite  des  Systemes,  Grammaire,  I? Art  de 
Ecrire,  UArt  de  Raisonner,  L'Art  de  Penser,  La  Logique,  La 
Langue  des  Calculs. 

Condillac  derived  all  mental  operations,  even  Locke's 
"reflection,"  from  the  one  origin,  sensation.  Memory, 
imagination,  judgment,  reasoning,  all  actual  or  conceivable 
mental  processes,  are  transformed  sensations.  It  is  pertinent 
to  enquire,  What  transforms  the  sensations?  As  passive 
effects,  they  can  not  transform  themselves.  There  is, 
therefore,  a  power  called  mind,  which  is  conscious  of  these 
sensations,  examines  them,  analyzes,  interprets,  and  classifies 
them.  The  memory,  the  imagination,  the  judgment,  the 
reason,  are  not  independent  powers,  but  are  capabilities  of 
the  same  continuous  ego,  which  is  the  very  core  of  personal 
identity,  the  very  same  which  each  person  calls  /. 

Condillac  criticized  abstract  systems,  and  contrasted  their 
obscurity  with  the  clearness  of  the  concrete  system  built  up 


FRENCH  ENLIGHTENMENT  PHILOSOPHY  359 

from  sensations.  He  divides  philosophic  systems  into  three 
classes:  Systems  resting  on  abstract  principles,  systems 
based  on  hypotheses,  systems,  like  Locke's,  built  up  from  the 
facts  of  sensation. 

Reasoning,  according  to  Condillac,  consists  in  evolving 
one  judgment  from  another  in  which  it  is  implicitly  involved; 
that  is,  the  force  of  reasoning  is  found  in  the  essential  identity 
of  two  judgments  which  differ  merely  in  form.  In  a  series 
of  continued  reasoning,  each  judgment  is  deduced  from  the 
judgment  next  preceding.  This,  however,  is  not  true  of  the 
syllogism  in  which  the  conclusion  is  derived  from  two  prop- 
ositions, through  the  intervention  of  a  middle  term.  Con- 
dillac, however,  rejects  the  middle  term  in  his  endeavor  to 
reduce  reasoning  to  the  arithmetical  form  of  calculation,  an 
operation  purely  mechanical;  but  Condillac  objects  to  the 
syllogism  because  it  deduces  particulars  from  generals, 
whereas  thought  sets  out  from  particulars,  and  passes  on  to 
generals.  He  therefore  accepts  inductive  reasoning  and 
rejects  deductive;  but  this  contention  will  not  stand  criticism, 
since  Science  employs  deduction  as  well  as  induction. 

Condillac  discards  the  Cartesian  test  of  truth,  clearness 
and  distinctness,  but  makes  identity  the  test,  not  identity  in 
form,  but  in  essential  meaning.  He  did  not  begin  with 
doubt,  as  Descartes  began  by  doubting  everything  it  was 
possible  for  him  to  doubt;  for  doubt  leaves  everything  un- 
determined, and  to  doubt  in  mathematics  is  impossible. 

Condillac  held  that  we  can  have  a  positive  beginning  in 
the  threefold  evidence  of  fact,  of  feeling,  and  of  reason. 
Series  of  facts  are  transformations  from  one  initial  fact  of 
sensation.  There  is,  therefore,  one  method  of  analysis 
common  to  all  the  science,  verifying  each  step  by  the  test 
of  identity,  taking  mathematics  as  a  model,  and  nature  as  a 
guide. 

The  development  of  the  faculties  of  a  human  being,  Con- 
dillac illustrated  by  a  statue  cut  out  by  a  sculptor  from  a 
block  of  marble. 

At  first  it  is  destitute  not  only  of  thought,  but  of  sensation. 
Suppose  that  the  sensation  of  odor  is  first  given  to  the  statue 
by  an  object,  as  a  flower;  attention  is  awakened,  then  memory, 
then  the  idea  of  succession,  then  comparison  by  a  variety  of 
sensations.  Let  the  other  senses  be  awakened,  in  succession, 


360  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

in  a  similar  manner,  then  finally  we  should  have  a  .sensitive 
thinking  being,  like  man;  but  it  is  evident  that  the  statue 
has  no  senses  to  begin  with,  and  could  not  be  given  a  sensa- 
tion, nor  be  converted  into  a  thinking  being.  But  if  sensa- 
tions could  be  thus  awakened,  being  passively  induced,  they 
would  have  no  power  of  interaction.  There  would  be  needed 
an  indwelling  mind  conscious  of  the  sensations,  analyzing 
them,  recombining,  comparing,  discriminating,  identifying, 
classifying,  defining.  A  sensation  is  itself  and  nothing  else; 
it  is  not  an  idea,  nor  a  thought,  nor  a  volition;  the  law  of 
identity  will  not  apply;  and  Condillac  has  certainly  failed  in 
his  attempt  to  deduce  mind  from  sensation. 

5.  Helvetius  (1715-1771).  Claude  Adrien  Helvetius  was 
descended  from  a  good  family,  mainly  physicians.  He  was 
handsome  in  person,  agreeable  in  manners,  and  ready  in 
conversation.  When  only  twenty -three  years  of  age,  he 
was  elected  a  member  of  the  Academy  of  Caen,  and  shortly 
after,  at  the  request  of  the  Queen,  was  appointed  farmer- 
general,  which  gave  him  a  very  great  income. 

Helvetius  had  a  versatile  mind,  and  was  capable  of  excel- 
ling in  any  one  of  several  various  pursuits;  but  finally  he 
entered  upon  the  investigation  of  philosophic  questions, 
especially  those  having  a  moral  and  social  bearing. 

His  first  philosophic  work  was  entitled  De  VEsprit,  taking 
sensation  for  its  point  of  departure.  Though  Helvetius 
fondly  imagined  that  this  book  would  make  him  famous,  it 
aroused  great  opposition.  It  was  condemned  by  the  Sor- 
bonne,  by  the  priests,  by  the  Archbishop  of  Paris,  and  by 
the  Pope  himself.  This  opposition,  though  led  by  the 
dauphine,  and  supported  by  the  church  and  the  influential 
classes,  served  as  an  advertisement  for  the  book.  It  was 
published  in  several  languages,  and  had  a  multitude  of 
readers.  The  book  did  not,  however,  long  maintain  its 
popularity,  and  in  a  few  years  was  quite  neglected. 

Alarmed  by  the  storm  which  his  book  excited,  Helvetius 
hurried  from  France,  and  took  refuge  with  that  friend  of 
persecuted  authors,  Frederick  the  Great,  who  highly  esteemed 
him  for  his  amiable  qualities. 

Why  did  De  1'Esprit  raise  such  a  storm?  On  account  of 
its  doctrines,  the  mere  statement  of  which  will  answer  the 
question:  All  man's  faculties,  memory,  imagination,  judg- 


FRENCH   ENLIGHTENMENT  PHILOSOPHY   361 

ment,  reason,  may  be  resolved  into  physical  sensations,  and 
he  differs  not  from  the  lower  animals,  save  in  his  superior 
physical  organization.  Man's  self-interests — his  desire  for 
pleasure  and  aversion  to  pain — are  his  only  springs  to  action, 
and  afford  the  final  explanation  of  his  conduct.  There  is 
no  liberty  of  choice  between  good  and  evil,  and  our  ideas  of 
right  and  wrong  vary  with  the  customs  of  the  people.  To 
promote  general  happiness,  it  is  needful  that  the  people  be 
led  to  see  that  the  happiness  of  each  is  involved  in  the  com- 
mon welfare,  and  that  the  true  method  of  reform  is  to  labor 
for  the  renovation  of  society,  and  the  reconstruction  of  the 
government,  rather  than  the  reformation  of  individuals, 
according  to  the  practice  of  the  church.  The  inequalities 
among  men  depend  upon  the  inequalities  of  their  educational 
advantages.  Helvetius  was  bitterly  opposed  to  priest-craft, 
and  a  strong  advocate  for  freedom  of  thought,  and  equality 
of  political  rights.  But  the  fact  is,  society  needs  the  services 
of  the  clergy,  to  lead  in  social  religion,  to  marry  the  young 
people,  to  bury  the  dead,  and  these  needs  not  only  call  for  a 
class  of  men,  but  will  insure  their  support.  The  abuses 
incident  to  the  profession  can  be  properly  guarded  against 
by  the  intelligence  of  the  people. 

Helvetius  prepared  another  book  called  De  Vhomme,  whose 
publication  was  posthumous.  In  this  book,  he  expresses 
some  noble  sentiments:  "No  one  has  ever  contributed  to  the 
public  good  to  his  own  hurt."  "A  good  man  obeys  a  noble 
interest."  Helvetius  taught  that  we  need  a  more  compre- 
hensive morality — one  that  will  harmonize  the  good  of  the 
individual  with  the  welfare  of  society.  He  was  a  tender- 
hearted man  and  a  philanthropist,  and  employed  his  large 
fortune  in  disseminating  what  he  believed  to  be  the  truth; 
and  though  the  popularity  of  his  works,  after  a  short  success, 
rapidly  waned,  yet  he  advocated  certain  opinions,  especially 
political,  which  will  yet  find  general  recognition. 

The  religious  point  view  of  Helvetius  was  Deistic,  not 
Atheistic,  and  he  enlarged  on  the  unknowableness  of  God. 
He  advocated  a  rational  morality  that  could  be  accepted  by 
all  the  people. 

6.  Diderot  (1713-1784).  Denis  Diderot  was  born  at 
Langres  and  educated  by  the  Jesuits.  He  did  not  follow 
his  father's  advice  and  choose  some  regular  profession,  as 
Law  or  Medicine,  but  entered  upon  a  literary  career. 


362  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

His  writings  are  so  numerous  that  it  is  out  of  the  question 
even  to  name  all  of  them.  They  extend  over  a  large  variety 
of  subjects,  and  exhibit  a  mind  of  great  versatility  and 
originality.  Suffice  it,  then,  to  mention  the  works  that  have 
a  philosophic  bearing. 

In  1745,  he  made  a  free  translation  of  Shaftesbury's 
Inquiry  concerning  Virtue  and  Merit ,  adding  original  notes. 
In  1746,  between  the  morning  of  Good  Friday  and  the 
evening  of  Easter  Monday,  he  wrote  Philosophic  Thought,  and 
shortly  after  supplemented  it  by  an  essay  On  the  Sufficiency 
of  Natural  Religion.  He  wrote  the  Sceptic  s  Walk  in  1747. 

His  letter  on  The  Blind,  published  in  1749,  made  him 
known  to  the  world  of  letters,  as  an  original  thinker.  It  was 
written  to  show  the  dependence  of  ideas  on  the  senses.  It 
was,  however  unacceptable  to  the  authorities,  and  he  was 
thrown  into  prison. 

A  bookseller  applied  to  him  for  a  translation  of  Chambers' 
Cyclopedia.  He  consented  to  undertake  the  work;  but,  on 
reflection,  concluded  that  it  would  be  better  to  produce  an 
original  work  which  should  contain  the  latest  thought  of  the 
time,  and  to  this  the  publisher  assented.  License  for  the 
work  was  secured,  the  contributors  engaged,  who  were 
afterwards  known  as  the  French  Encyclopaedists,  and  Diderot 
was  appointed  Editor-in-chief. 

After  reaching  the  seventh  volume,  the  work  fell  under  the 
displeasure  of  the  authorities,  and  its  continuance  forbidden. 
Diderot,  however,  carried  forward  the  work  under  vexatious 
difficulties,  in  a  clandestine  manner.  By  incessant  work  for 
twenty  years,  the  Encyclopaedia  was  finished  and  published, 
though  marred  through  the  timidity  of  the  publisher  in 
striking  out  certain  passages  he  feared  might  give  offense 
to  the  authorities.  The  Encyclopaedia,  however,  was  Diderot's 
monumental  work,  and  gave  him  lasting  fame. 

Two  dialogues  of  Diderot's  Conversations  between  D'Alem- 
bert  and  Diderot,  and  D'Alembert's  Dream,  are  classic  in 
Philosophy.  Diderot  held  that  sensibility  was  inherent  in 
the  atom  from  the  beginning;  for  it  is  absurd  to  suppose 
that  a  combination  of  several  dead  atoms  could  have  life 
and  sensation.  D'Alembert  raises  the  question:  If  we 
attribute  to  the  original  atom  sensation,  yet  how,  by  the 
conjunction  of  such  atoms,  can  a  consciousness  arise  which 


FRENCH   ENLIGHTENMENT   PHILOSOPHY   363 

has  its  seat  in  no  one  atom  but  in  their  aggregate?  Diderot 
replied:  All  finite  individuals,  by  their  inner  relation,  form 
one  aggregate  whole.  What  do  you  mean  by  individuals? 
There  are  no  individuals.  The  whole  is  the  one  great  single 
individual.  The  sensations  of  the  atoms  blend  into  one,  as 
the  music  of  the  many  instruments  of  the  orchestra. 

Diderot  was  noted  for  his  conversational  powers,  so  that 
it  has  been  said,  whoever  did  not  know  Diderot  as  a  con- 
verser  did  not  know  him  at  all.  At  his  friend  Baron  D 'Hoi- 
bach's  Salon,  he  charmed  a  circle  of  admiring  friends  by  his 
wonderful  gift  in  conversation. 

Diderot,  notwithstanding  his  extensive  literary  labors, 
never  amassed  a  fortune.  His  income  did  not  average  more 
than  $600  a  year.  Voltaire  indignantly  exclaimed :  Think  of 
Diderot  working  a  whole  year  for  £120,  while  an  army  con- 
tractor often  makes  £500  in  a  single  day ! 

When  Diderot  wished  to  provide  a  suitable  dower  for  his 
daughter,  he  found  himself  straitened  for  means,  and 
proposed  to  sell  his  library,  his  most  valued  possession.  The 
Empress  Catherine  of  Russia,  hearing  of  it,  directed  her 
agent  in  Paris  to  buy  the  library  at  a  price  of  £1,000,  and 
then  requested  the  philosopher  to  retain  the  books  till  she 
called  for  them,  in  the  meantime  appointed  him  her  librarian 
with  a  generous  salary. 

Diderot  was  the  life  and  soul  and  the  culmination  of  the 
French  Enlightenment  Philosophy,  but  he  contributed  little 
of  permanent  value  to  the  progress  of  philosophy,  though  his 
insight,  clear  and  brilliant  as  the  light,  and  his  penetrating 
originality,  gave  to  his  views,  expressed  in  his  written  works, 
and  especially  in  conversations,  the  fascination  of  Romance. 

Religious  faith  as  exhibited  in  the  church,  he  regarded  as 
an  evil;  for  as  he  believed  it  inevitably  degenerates  into 
dogmas  and  ritualistic  ceremonies,  first  deforming  then 
displacing  true  morality.  This  opinion  should  have  due 
consideration  and  the  evil  results  guarded  against  by  those 
who  regulate  religious  worship. 

7.  Holbach  (1723-1789).  Paul  Heinrich  Dietrich  Von 
Holbach,  a  wealthy  German  Baron,  born  at  Heidelsheim 
in  the  Palatinate,  came  to  Paris  when  a  young  man,  and 
made  it  his  home  for  life.  He  was  the  center  and  heart  of 
the  brilliant  circle  of  the  French  Enlightenment  Philosophers. 

Holbach   was   a   man   well-informed,   and   his   excellent 


364  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

memory  placed  ready  at  his  disposal  his  vast  store  of  knowl- 
edge. He  was  quiet  in  manner,  generous  to  his  friends,  and 
tenacious  of  his  opinions.  Impassive  and  inflexible,  he  was 
the  center  of  gravity  of  the  group  of  philosophers,  who 
statedly  assembled  at  his  salon  for  conversation. 

His  principal  work,  Systeme  de  la  Nature,  the  Bible  of 
Atheism,  appeared  pseudonymously  in  1770,  bearing  the 
name  of  Miraband,  who  had  died  ten  years  before.  No  one 
attributed  the  authorship  to  Miraband,  and  for  some  time, 
Holbach  was  not  even  suspected,  though  later  the  author- 
ship of  the  book  was  assuredly  known.  It  reflected  the 
opinions  of  the  brilliant  circle,  though  Holbach  reduced  the 
whole  to  the  order  of  a  compact  system. 

Holbach  combined  the  systems  of  materialism,  sensation- 
alism, fatalism,  and  atheism,  hitherto  somewhat  detached, 
into  one  — The  System  of  Nature.  He  thus  invokes  Nature: 
"O  Nature,  Sovereign  of  all  being,  and  Ye  her  Daughters, 
Virtue,  Reason,  and  Truth,  be  forever  our  only  Divinities!" 

He  taught  that  virtue  is  the  art  of  making  ourselves  happy 
through  the  happiness  of  others;  that  nature  chastises  im- 
morality; that  religion  applies  inefficient  remedies  by  re- 
quiring renunciation  contrary  to  human  nature;  that  true 
morality  cures  the  mind  through  the  body,  instead  of  mythi- 
cal beliefs;  and  that  the  one  sure  road  to  happiness  is  to 
labor  for  the  general  welfare. 

Theology  is  mythology,  and  class  government  oppression. 
Necessity  rules  in  the  moral  world  as  in  the  physical.  In 
fact,  the  moral  world  is  the  physical  with  superadded  con- 
sciousness. Since  nature  is  alive,  there  is  no  need  of  the 
hypothesis  of  a  spirit,  as  the  author  and  governor  of  nature, 
nor  of  the  Soul,  as  the  ruler  of  the  body.  The  physical 
organism  acted  on  by  external  causes  explains  the  phenom- 
ena of  mind. 

Voltaire  was  greatly  shocked  by  the  doctrine  of  the  Sys- 
tem of  Nature,  and  called  it  illogical  in  its  deductions,  absurd 
in  its  physics,  and  abominable  in  its  morals.  Voltaire's 
refutation  was  conducted  after  the  popular  method  of  com- 
mon sense,  rather  than  by  a  method  strictly  philosophical; 
but  Voltaire  was  a  Deist,  not  an  Atheist. 

Holbach  taught  that  mythical  hypotheses  will  be  aban 
doned  so  far  as  scientific  explanations  of  phenomena  arc; 
discovered. 


FRENCH  ENLIGHTENMENT  PHILOSOPHY  365 

8.  Rousseau  (1712-1778)  Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  was 
a  native  of  Geneva.  When  ten  years  of  age,  he  was  separated 
from  his  father  who  had  brought  him  up  in  a  very  irregular 
fashion. 

He  led  an  irregular  and  wandering  life,  finding  many 
patrons  and  friends  with  whom  he  usually  quarreled,  and 
passed  on  to  other  places,  finding  new  adventures,  and 
gaining  additional  experience.  From  Geneva  to  Paris  and 
back  again,  he  wandered  many  times,  and  to  other  places, 
even  to  England,  at  the  invitation  of  Hume.  He  saw  society, 
and  learned  human  nature,  and  this  knowledge  he  turned  to 
profit  in  his  writings. 

In  1749,  the  Academy  of  Dijon  offered  a  prize  for  the  best 
essay  on  the  subject :  The  Influence  of  the  Progress  of  Science 
and  Art  on  Morals.  Rousseau  won  the  prize,  and  at  once 
became  famous.  His  contention  was  that  civilization  is  too 
artificial,  and  that,  if  we  are  to  attain  happiness,  we  must 
go  back  to  nature. 

He  wrote  another  essay  for  a  prize  on  The  Origin  of  In- 
equality, which  though  not  securing  the  prize,  was  at  least 
equal  in  merit  to  the  other. 

The  books  which  brought  him  the  greatest  notoriety  were 
Emile,  a  work  on  education;  Confessions,  an  Autobiography; 
La  Npuvelle  Heloise,  a  novel;  and  Control  Social,  a  political 
treatise. 

The  relation  of  Rousseau  to  the  French  Illumination  was 
not  that  of  harmony,  but  of  opposition.  He  turns  from 
reasoning  to  feeling,  from  speculation  to  conscience,  from 
theological  dogmas  to  the  experience  of  the  heart.  Morality 
recedes  as  knowledge  advances.  This  may  be  true,  at 
certain  epochs,  but  the  experience  of  mankind,  that  the 
greatest  happiness  attends  the  highest  morality  will,  at 
length,  be  heeded  by  the  human  race,  but  that  morality 
will  be  based  on  knowledge. 

Social  order,  according  to  Rousseau,  rests  on  a  contract, 
not  beween  ruler  and  people,  but  between  the  people  them- 
selves, who  agree  to  certain  regulations  for  mutual  protec- 
tion, each  citizen  submitting  to  the  law  for  his  own  good, 
thus  securing  the  general  welfare.  The  government  is  the 
middle  term  between  the  citizens  as  sovereign  law-giver 


366  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

and  the  citizen  as  subject.  The  sovereign  is  the  consensus 
of  political  opinion  of  at  least  the  majority,  the  subject  is 
the  individual  citizen. 

Rousseau's  theory  of  education  is  founded  on  faith  in  un- 
corrupted  human  nature.  Let  the  child,  under  proper 
guidance,  largely  educate  himself.  His  views  on  education 
influenced  Basedow,  Pestalozzi  and  Froebel. 

Proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  are  profitable  as  checks  to 
Materialism  and  Atheism;  but  the  real  evidence  is  that  of 
feeling.  The  Soul,  the  world,  God,  freedom  and  immortality, 
all  have  the  inward  assurance  of  instinctive  feeling.  Like- 
wise morality  finds  its  authority  in  conscience,  and  its  justi- 
fication in  its  consequences. 

Rousseau  did  not  excel  in  speculative  Philosophy;  his 
views  were  too  erratic,  yet  in  educational,  social  arid  political 
matters,  he  has  exerted  a  wide  and  lasting  influence,  largely 
through  his  literary  gift  in  making  his  writings  interesting. 
His  political  theories  were  influential  in  bringing  about  the 
French  revolution. 

We  add,  at  the  close  of  this  chapter,  that  The  French  En- 
lightenment Philosophy  is  distinguished  more  for  the  brilliancy 
of  its  Literature  than  for  the  profundity  of  its  Philosophy. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

Reaction,  Eclecticism,  Positivism 

1.  Maistre  (1754-1821).  Joseph  de  Maistre  was  of  a 
noble  family.  His  father  was  president  of  the  Senate  of 
Savoy. 

Joseph  having  completed  his  studies  at  Turin,  received 
an  appointment  in  the  civil  service,  and  at  length  became  a 
member  of  the  Senate  of  Savoy.  When  Savoy  was  annexed 
to  France,  he  went  to  Lusanne  where  in  1796,  he  published 
a  work  entitled  Considerations  sur  la  France.  This  book 
was  directed  against  the  prevalent  skeptical  and  revolution- 
ary theories  of  the  time,  but  from  a  religious  point  of  view. 

His  most  celebrated  works,  Du  Pope  and  De  V  Eglise  Gal- 
licane,  were  polemics  against  the  philosophy  and  political 
views  of  the  philosophers  of  the  so-called  illumination.  He 
regarded  all  such  speculations  as  a  crime  against  order, 
against  religion,  and  against  the  well-being  of  mankind. 

De  Maistre's  opinions  can  be  thus  summed  up:  He  denied 
the  possibility  of  physical  causation,  and  affirmed  that  all 
material  movement  originates  from  spiritual  beings.  Let 
scientists  amuse  themselves,  if  they  will,  with  physical 
phenomena,  but  let  them  beware  of  intermeddling  with  social 
and  religious  questions.  The  guide  of  mankind  is  faith,  not 
reason.  God  imparts  his  guiding  truth  through  the  church 
and  the  state,  and  not  through  philosophers.  Human  reason 
is  a  blind  guide.  There  must  be  an  authoritative  guide. 
Free  thought  should  never  have  been  permitted.  The  mis- 
chief began  with  the  so-called  reformation,  and  was  con- 
tinued by  the  philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Vol- 
taire was  a  buffoon.  Montesquieu,  Condillac,  Helvetius, 
La  Mettrie,  Holbach,  were  disseminators  of  mischief.  The 
only  remedy  is  to  go  back  and  recognize  the  infallibility  of 
the  Pope,  and  submit  to  his  authority  as  a  heavenly  guide. 
He  commended  war,  the  hangman,  and  the  inquisition,  as 
purifying  agencies,  necessary  in  the  disordered  condition  of 
humanity.  Man  is  purely  passive,  he  receives  his  sensations 
from  without,  and  his  illumination  from  above. 

367 


368  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

As  the  philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century  was  a  wicked 
conspiracy  against  legitimate  authority,  it  ought  to  be 
crushed.  He  wrote  an  examination  of  the  philosophy  of 
Bacon,  and  made  an  acrimonious  attack  on  Locke;  but  he 
was  an  able  man,  and  struck  heavy  blows. 

2.  Cabanis    (1757-1808).     Pierre  Jean  Georges  Cabanis 
was  the  son  of  a  prominent  lawyer  who  was  also  chief  magis- 
trate of  a  district  in  lower  Limousin. 

His  early  education  was  intrusted  to  priests,  and  at  ten 
years  of  age,  to  the  college  of  Brives.  He  was  an  apt  scholar, 
but  independent  and  obstinate  in  his  opinions,  and  so  difficult 
of  management  that  he  was  dismissed  from  the  college,  and 
left  to  carry  on  his  studies  by  himself.  He  read  Locke  with 
delight,  and  attended  some  of  the  university  lectures. 

He  cultivated  poetry,  and  was  intimate  with  the  poet 
Roucher.  He  became  acquainted  with  Turgot,  Diderot, 
D'Alembert,  Condillac,  D'Holbach,  and  the  distinguished 
Americans,  Franklin  and  Jefferson.  He  was  intimate  with 
Mirabeau,  and  with  Condorcet. 

Cabanis  finally  chose  the  profession  of  medicine,  and 
studied  the  mysteries  of  physiology  with  the  deepest  interest. 
He  was  a  member  of  the  National  Institute,  and  was  appoint- 
ed professor  of  Clinics. 

In  the  winter  of  1797-8,  Cabanis  read  a  series  of  papers  on 
the  relation  between  the  body  and  the  soul,  which  were 
published  in  1802,  with  some  additions,  in  book  form. 
Though  he  entertained  a  great  respect  for  Condillac,  he  held 
against  him  that  our  sensations  were  not  wholly  excited  by 
external  causes;  for  physiological  conditions,  the  internal 
workings  of  the  various  organs  of  the  body,  were  the  causes 
of  sensations  of  which  we  are  distinctly  conscious. 

The  instincts  and  appetites,  in  close  relation  with  the  vital 
feelings,  the  emotions,  the  affections,  the  desires,  are  all 
a  constant  source  from  which  the  higher  operations  of  thought 
take  their  rise.  His  works  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  con- 
tributions to  materialistic  philosophy,  though  he  says  "the 
brain  excretes  thought  as  the  liver,  bile." 

Cabanis  maintained  that  there  is  a  universal  instinct,  and 
one  force  pervading  all  nature. 

3.  Maine  de  Biran  (1766-1824).     Maine  de    Biran  was 
the  son  of  a  physician  who  gave  him  a  good  education.     He 
was  one  of  the  life-guards  of  Louis  XVI. 


REACTION,   ECLECTICISM,   POSITIVISM     369 

At  the  breaking  out  of  the  revolution,  he  retired  to  his 
estate  near  Bergrae,  where  he  escaped  the  horrors  of  the 
reign  of  terror,  and  as  he  says  of  himself,  passed  per  saltum, 
from  frivolity  to  philosophy.  This  decided  his  life  pursuit, 
though  he  was  called  in  the  more  quiet  times  which  followed 
to  take  part  in  administrative  affairs;  but  he  retired  to  his 
retreat,  at  every  opportunity,  to  engage  in  his  favorite 
study.  Maine  de  Biran  had  especial  aptitude  for  psychology, 
and  though,  at  first,  he  took  Condillac  for  a  guide,  he  soon 
became  convinced  that  he  did  not  grasp  the  whole  truth  in 
regarding  man  only  passive,  receiving  impressions  and  all 
mental  material  through  sensations  excited  by  external 
causes;  for  the  body  itself,  by  its  internal  workings  furnishes 
material  for  thought,  and  in  connection  with  this,  the  will 
itself  consciously  directs  the  train  of  intellectual  processes. 
If  we  do  not  immediately  perceive  cause,  as  the  source  of 
energy,  we  are  conscious  of  effort,  we  feel  the  exertion  of 
energy.  Maine  de  Biran  makes  the  effort  ultimate;  but 
the  effort  would  be  impossible  without  a  power  which  exerts 
the  energy  or  makes  the  effort;  for  manifestly  nothing,  mere 
non-entity,  cannot  make  an  effort,  and  the  effort  is  not  self- 
supporting;  that  is,  the  effort  does  not  make  itself. 

Right  here  we  have  a  rational  intuition  of  the  ego,  or  soul, 
as  the  source  of  psychical  activity,  and  though  not  conscious 
of  the  ego  itself,  we  are  conscious  of  the  activities,  which 
require  the  ego  as  their  indispensable  condition.  We  know 
phenomena  by  consciousness,  but  the  ego  by  reason. 

Maine  de  Biran  did  not  question  the  truth  in  Condillac's 
theory  of  passivity;  but  he  discovered  that  it  was  but  half 
of  the  truth.  He  supplemented  the  passivity  by  activity, 
the  other  half. 

De  Biran  accepted  Kant's  distinction  between  phenomena 
and  noumena;  yet  he  differed  from  Kant  in  this:  Kant  ac- 
cepted the  rioumenon  by  faith,  Biran  grasped  the  phenom- 
ena by  feeling,  and  postulated  the  noumenon.  But  the 
noumenon  is  not  known  either  by  feeling  or  by  faith;  for 
feeling  gives  phenomena,  known  immediately  by  conscious 
experience,  but  consciousness  deals  directly  with  phenomena, 
which  appear,  yet  not  with  noumena  which  do  not  appear. 
Neither  does  faith  give  knowledge  of  noumena,  for  faith  is 
belief,  not  knowledge.  Rational  intuition,  however,  at  once 


370  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

apprehends  the  necessity  of  noumena  to  the  existence  of 
phenomena;  for  phenomena  are  not  self -supporting,  neither 
can  they  spring  from  non-entity  into  being. 

We  can  now  see  that  empirical  philosophy  can  not  deal 
with  noumena,  the  reality  of  which  it  will  either  ignore  or 
deny.  Empiricism  is,  therefore,  a  one-sided  philosophy,  a 
partial  system.  Philosophy  itself,  in  its  entirety,  is  both 
empirical  and  rational. 

Judged  by  its  history,  philosophy  includes  the  five  phases: 
Empiricism,  Idealism,  Skepticism,  Mysticism,  Rationalism. 

4.  Ampere  (1775-1836).  Andre  Marie  Ampere,  the  origi- 
nator of  the  science  of  Electro-dynamics,  was  a  physicist,  a 
mathematician,  and  a  philosopher,  and  eminent  in  all  these 
respects. 

He  was  the  associate  and  friend  of  Maine  de  Biran,  and 
for  the  most  part,  in  agreement  with  him,  as  in  making  the 
consciousness  of  the  energy  of  the  ego  the  starting-point  in 
philosophical  investigations.  His  psychological  method  was 
that  of  the  English  associational  philosophers. 

He  investigated  how  sensations  and  ideas  are  involuntarily 
associated,  and  how  scientific  knowledge  is  possible  through 
mental  activity.  He  is  not  content  with  mere  description, 
but  explains  the  appearance  of  complex  phenomena  by  the 
blending  or  association  of  simpler  elements.  Thus,  a  low 
voiced  reader  may  not  be  understood  when  reading  an 
unfamiliar  passage,  but  may  be  followed,  word  by  word, 
each  distinctly  heard,  when  he  reads  a  familiar  passage, 
with  no  increase  in  the  strength  of  the  voice,  the  words  being 
known  are  distinctly  heard. 

In  moving  an  arm,  Ampere  distinguished  between  the 
consciousness  of  effort,  and  that  of  the  muscular  sensation, 
since  when  another  moves  one's  arm,  there  is  a  consciousness 
of  muscular  sensation,  but  not  of  effort.  From  effort,  we 
learn  the  nature  of  cause,  as  more  than  antecedent,  even  as 
force,  or  energy,  the  effort  of  power. 

Though  Ampere  correctly  held  that  we  are  conscious  of 
phenomena  only,  yet  he  maintained  that  the  relations  be- 
tween the  phenomena,  involving  causality,  imply  noumenal 
validity.  Cause,  time,  and  space  have  noumenal  reality, 
though  we  reach  them  by  way  of  inference  under  the  form 
of  hypothesis.  We  apprehend  their  necessity  as  conditions  of 
phenomena. 


REACTION,  ECLECTICISM,  POSITIVISM    371 

The  hypothesis,  however,  is  necessary,  and  has  all  the 
force  of  a  rational  intuition,  which  apprehends  the  necessity 
of  the  conditions  of  phenomena,  not  the  absolute  necessity, 
but  the  conditional  necessity;  that  is,  phenomena  being 
given,  cause  must  be.  We  know  change  empirically,  for 
example,  change  in  the  movement  of  a  body;  but  this  change, 
known  by  experience,  is  impossible,  without  cause,  without 
space,  without  time.  Hence,  the  necessity  of  cause,  of 
space,  and  of  time,  is  infallibly  apprehended  by  rational 
intuition. 

In  Maine  de  Biran's  opinion,  the  passage  from  the  knowl- 
edge of  self  as  cause  to  that  of  external  causes  is  over  a  gulf 
we  cannot  bridge.  Here  we  encounter  one  of  the  profound- 
est  questions  of  metaphysics.  The  gulf,  however,  can  be 
bridged,  not  empirically,  but  rationally.  The  bridge  is  the 
principle  that  non-entity  can  not  spring  into  being.  Maine  de 
Biran  asks  the  question:  "What  experience  can  teach  us 
whether  the  forms  in  which  phenomena  are  co-ordinated  are 
absolute,  that  is,  in  things,  or  whether  they  are  only  in  the 
mind  which  apprehends  them?  Can  external  experience 
ever  shed  any  light  on  this  question  which  reflection  must 
raise?  Do  not  both  possibilities  fit  in  equally  well  with  the 
phenomena?"  The  answer  is,  experience  cannot  tell,  nor 
perhaps  Ampere's  theory  of  relations;  but  reason  can  tell. 
Events  are  continually  happening  without  our  knowledge, 
away  from  us,  on  the  other  side  of  the  globe,  or  elsewhere 
far  removed  from  us.  The  events  are  real,  the  causes  are 
real  and  necessary,  since  the  events  are  real;  but  this  necessi- 
ty is  not,  as  Kant  held,  merely  the  subjective  necessity  of 
apprehension,  but  the  objective  necessity  of  the  cause  appre- 
hended. If  the  events  are,  the  cause  must  be. 

The  question  is,  do  we  necessarily  apprehend  what  may 
not  be  an  objective  truth,  or  do  we  apprehend  what  is  a 
necessary  objective  truth?  Is  the  necessity  in  the  apprehen- 
sion, or  in  the  reality  apprehended?  Kant's  great  mistake 
was  in  placing  the  necessity  in  the  apprehension,  and  this 
mistake  has  thrown  philosophy  on  the  wrong  track  from 
his  day  to  ours. 

There  is  no  subjective  necessity  with  the  empirical  philos- 
ophers, while  consistently  adhering  to  their  theory;  for  a 
cause  with  them  is  not  efficiency,  but  antecedence,  and  is 


PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

reached  by  induction,  which  gives  only  probability,  not 
necessity  or  even  certainty.  This  comes  from  their  empiri- 
cism; but  when  they  lose  sight  of  their  one-sided  philosophy, 
they  say,  with  the  rest  of  mankind,  that  every  event  must 
have  a  cause,  placing  the  necessity,  the  event  being  given, 
in  the  objective  cause,  and  not  in  the  subjective  affirmation; 
and  in  this  cause  we  find  noumenal  reality,  not  only  in  our- 
selves but  in  the  objective  world,  which  strikes  a  fatal  blow 
to  subjective  idealism. 

In  the  course  of  nature,  in  the  development  of  science  and 
philosophy,  cause  is  the  dynamic  agency  which  explains  the 
tendency  of  everything  to  order,  to  a  comprehensive  and 
symmetrical  unity. 

5.  Cousin  (1792-1867).  Victor  Cousin  began  life  in 
troublous  times,  but  was  fortunate  in  receiving  a  good 
classical  education  in  the  Lycee  where  he  studied  eight  years. 
The  teaching  he  received  gave  him  a  taste  for  rhetoric  and 
oratory.  On  leaving  the  Lycee  he  was  crowned  in  the  hall 
of  the  Sorbonne  for  an  eloquent  Latin  oration,  and  thus 
entered  the  Normal  School  of  Paris  with  well-deserved  dis- 
tinction. x 

In  the  Normal  School,  he  listened  with  delight  to  Laro- 
miguiene's  lectures  on  philosophy,  which  made  a  deep  im- 
pression on  him,  as  he  was  highly  susceptible  to  the  influence 
of  powerful  minds.  He  afterwards  said:  "Those  lectures 
decided  the  course  of  my  life."  He  also  heard  the  lectures 
on  philosophy  by  Royer-Collard  of  whom  he  always  spoke 
in  terms  of  great  respect.  He  says:  "Royer-Collard  turned 
me,  by  the  severity  of  his  logic,  from  the  beaten  path  of 
Condillac,  into  that  of  the  Scottish  philosophy."  He  was 
also  influenced  by  Maine  de  Biran  and  Ampere. 

Cousin's  philosophy  early  shows  its  eclectic  character  by 
combining  Reid's  theory  of  immediate  perception  of  extern al 
objects  with  Maine  de  Biran's  doctrine  of  the  consciousness 
of  self-activity,  and  with  Ampere's  view  of  absolute  rela- 
tions. To  these,  at  a  later  date,  he  added  the  doctrine  of 
the  absolute  reason  taken  from  the  German  speculative 
philosophy  of  Schelling  and  Hegel.  He  taught  that  reasor 
is  impersonal,  since  it  is  alike  in  all;  but  this  is  because  it  is 
not  vitiated  by  the  senses.  Every  man's  reason  is  his  own, 
though  similar  to  that  in  others. 


REACTION,    ECLECTICISM,    POSITIVISM    373 

As  professor  of  philosophy  in  the  Normal  School  of  Paris, 
Cousin  gave  lectures  on  the  history  of  philosophy  to  en- 
thusiastic audiences,  who  were  charmed  with  his  eloquence. 
He  took  the  position  that  all  schools  of  philosophy  have 
elements  of  truth,  and  that  absolute  error  is  impossible  to 
the  human  mind,  and  therefore  that  the  true  procedure  is 
the  method  of  eclecticism,  to  take  what  is  true  from  all  the 
systems,  and  form  a  complete  whole.  He  insisted  on  method, 
and  said:  "As  is  the  method  of  a  philosopher,  so  is  his  system, 
and  the  adoption  of  a  method  decides  the  destiny  of  his 
philosophy." 

A  conglomerate  system,  however,  will  not  do;  it  will  lack 
consistency.  There  must  be  unity  in  the  central  principles, 
and  these  must  be  fundamental;  but  having  complied  with 
this  condition,  a  philosopher  may  rightfully  be  eclectic,  for 
this  will  secure,  or  at  least  tend  to  completeness. 

Cousin  gave  currency  to  the  division  of  the  faculties  into 
intellect,  sensibility  and  will.  His  lectures  on  the  history 
of  philosophy  are  well  worth  reading,  especially  his  searching 
review  of  Locke's  philosophy.  His  most  valuable  work  is, 
perhaps,  that  entitled,  Du  Vrai,  du  Beau,  du  Bien,  that  is, 
the  work  on  the  true,  the  beautiful  and  the  good. 

6.  Germain  (1776-1831).   Sophia  Germain,  a  lady  mathe- 
matician and  philosopher,  investigated  the  course  of  develop- 
ment of  the  sciences   and  philosophy,  and  sought  for  the 
criterion  of  truth. 

She  held  that  the  human  mind  realizes  the  need  of  order 
and  inter-relation  to  guide  in  scientific  and  philosophic 
researches,  and  found  the  sole  type  of  the  true  in  order  and 
proportion,  giving  unity  and  harmony  to  the  whole,  and 
including  the  principle  of  causality  as  a  special  form. 

Instead  of  asking  why  that  is,  seeking  for  the  final  cause 
or  purpose,  we  are  beginning  to  search  for  the  hmv,  and  the 
how  what;  that  is,  we  are  tending  towards  positive  philosophy; 
and  this  was,  at  that  time,  undoubtedly  the  drift  of  thought. 

7.  Jouffroy    (1796-1842).      Theodore    Jouffroy    empha- 
sized the  importance  of  the  psychological  method  of  con- 
sciousness or  introspection,  and  exaggerated  it  to  the  neglect 
of  both  physiology  and  metaphysics.     He  carried  forward 
the  eclecticism  of  Cousin  with  more  sobriety,  but  not  with 
such  lofty  flights  of  eloquence. 


374  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Eclecticism  was  also  strongly  advocated  by  Damiron,  a 
pupil  of  Cousin,  who  in  1828  published  a  work  on  French 
philosophy  in  the  nineteenth  century,  in  which  he  maintained 
that  eclecticism  was  a  true  mean  between  the  school  of 
Condillac,  on  the  one  hand  and  that  of  theological  philosophy 
on  the  other,  and  thus  reconciled  them  in  a  higher  unity. 

8.  Saint-Simon  (1768-1825).  Claude  Henri,  Comte  de 
Saint-Simon,  was  a  reformer;  and  if  he  is  entitled  to  the 
name  of  philosopher,  he  should  be  called  a  social  philosopher. 

He  served  as  a  French  soldier  in  aiding  the  American 
colonies  to  gain  their  independence  from  Great  Britain. 
He  advocated  the  project  of  connecting  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  Oceans  by  a  ship  canal  through  the  isthmus  of  Darien. 

He  took  no  part  in  the  French  revolution,  but  made  some 
money  by  dealing  in  real  estate,  as  he  said,  to  aid  him  in  his 
proposed  reforms.  He  lost  his  fortune,  but  continued  to 
work  in  poverty. 

Saint-Simon  was  not  a  systematic  thinker,  yet,  as  the 
founder  of  French  Socialism,  he  is  a  conspicuous  figure.  He 
had  the  attractive  power  to  draw  around  him  men  of  talent; 
and  both  Augustin  Thierry  and  Auguste  Comte  were  reck- 
oned among  his  disciples. 

He  did  not  advocate  the  abolition  of  private  property, 
but  held  that  capitalists  and  leaders  of  society  should 
devote  their  wealth  and  influence  to  the  relief  of  the  poor, 
and  the  elevation  of  society. 

Saint-Simon  in  his  greatest  work,  The  New  Christianity, 
affirms  his  belief  in  God,  and  proposes  to  reduce  Christianity 
to  its  essential  elements  by  clearing  away  its  dogmas  and 
excrescences.  He  said:  "The  new  Christian  organization 
will  deduce  the  temporal  institutions,  as  well  as  the  spiritual, 
from  the  principle,  that  all  men  should  act  towards  one 
another  as  brethren,"  an  important  truth. 

On  account  of  Saint-Simon's  religious  views,  Auguste  Comte 
parted  company  with  him,  though  Comte,  at  a  later  dat 
attempted  to  organize  a  religion  on  the  basis  of  his  positr 
philosophy,  the  religious  nature  forcing  its  recognition 
spite  of  an  atheistic  philosophy. 

After  the  death  of  Saint-Simon,  the  leadership  of  tl 
Socialistic  School  was  assumed  by  Bazard  and  Enfantii 
Bazard  was  thoughtful  and  logical  in  his  turn  of  mind;  bi 
Enfantin  was  flighty  and  impractical,  and  endeavored 


REACTION,    ECLECTICISM,    POSITIVISM    375 

found  a  Socialistic  church  with  fantastic  rituals,  and  allow- 
ing the  immoral  practice  of  free  love.  Bazard  and  his  fol- 
lowers could  not  endure  this,  and  withdrew  from  the  fellow- 
ship of  Enfantin  and  his  party,  which,  on  account  of  their 
doctrines  and  practices,  was  suppressed  by  the  civil  authori- 
ties. 

9.  Ccmte  (1798-1857)  Auguste  Comte,  the  founder  of 
the  Positive  Philosophy  received  his  elementary  education 
at  Montpellier,  his  native  town.  At  the  age  of  sixteen,  he 
was  admitted  to  the  Ecole  Polytechnique,  where  he  strenu- 
ously applied  himself  to  study.  After  two  years  at  this 
institution,  Comte,  taking  a  leading  part  in  a  students' 
rebellion,  was  sent  home,  but  he  shortly  returned  to  Paris, 
and  supported  himself  by  teaching. 

Comte  was  a  great  admirer  of  Franklin,  and  wrote  to  a 
friend :  "  I  seek  to  imitate  the  modern  Socrates,  not  in  talents, 
but  in  the  way  of  living.  At  five  and  twenty,  he  formed  a 
design  of  becoming  perfectly  wise  [moral],  and  fulfilled  his 
design.  I  have  dared  to  undertake  the  same,  though  I  am 
not  yet  twenty."  He  thought  of  going  to  America,  but  a 
friend  told  him  that  the  Americans  were  so  practical,  that 
not  even  Lagrange,  the  great  mathematician,  could  make  a 
living  there  only  by  land  surveying. 

By  the  aid  of  a  friend  he  attained  a  position  as  tutor  in  the 
family  of  Casimir  Perier,  at  a  good  salary,  but  finding  the 
work  irksome,  he  resigned  his  position  after  a  trial  of  three 
weeks. 

When  about  twenty  years  of  age,  he  became  acquainted 
with  Saint-Simon,  and  was  associated  with  him  for  about 
six  years.  After  beginning  his  own  independent  career,  he 
wrote  to  a  friend:  "I  certainly  am  under  great  obligations  to 
Saint-Simon;  that  is  to  say,  he  helped,  in  a  powerful  degree, 
to  launch  me  in  the  philosophic  direction  I  have  now  definitely 
worked  out  for  myself,  and  I  shall  follow  that,  without 
looking  back,  for  the  rest  of  my  life. "  But  after  six  years  of 
association,  Comte  and  Saint-Simon  parted  company,  as  the 
master's  pretensions  to  superiority  could  no  longer  be  en- 
dured by  his  ambitious  disciple,  who  placed  no  low  estimate 
on  his  own  intellectual  powers.  Later  in  life,  Comte  so  far 
forgot  his  indebtedness  to  Saint-Simon,  as  to  call  him  a 
"depraved  quack,"  and  to  say  that  his  influence  over  him 
was  merely  mischievous. 


376  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Comte's  marriage  was  not  happy  and  finally  ended  in 
separation  from  his  wife,  though  they  kept  up  a  friendly 
correspondence.  Later,  in  1848,  Comte  formed  the  ac- 
quaintance of  Madam  Clotilda  de  Vaux,  whose  husband  had 
been  condemned  for  life  to  the  galleys.  Comte  rated  her 
very  highly,  even  extravagantly.  She  supplied  the  cravings 
of  his  heart,  and  he  deeply  mourned  her  death,  which  occurred 
after  the  acquaintance  of  one  year. 

In  1833,  Comte  was  appointed  examiner  of  boys  who  were 
candidates  for  admission  to  the  Ecole  Polytechnique  at  Paris. 
The  salary  for  this  work  gave  him,  with  other  sources  of 
revenue,  a  respectable  income.  He  discharged  his  duties  as 
examiner  thoroughly.  An  incident  connected  with  this  work, 
shows  that  Comte  was  not  destitute  of  a  generous  heart.  He 
wrote  to  his  wife:  "I  hardly  know,  if  even  to  you,  I  dare 
disclose  the  sweet  and  softened  feeling  that  comes  over  me 
when  I  find  a  young  man  whose  examination  is  thoroughly 
satisfactory.  Yes,  though  you  may  smile,  the  emotion  would 
easily  stir  me  to  tears,  if  I  were  not  carefully  on  my  guard. " 

In  addition  to  all  his  other  work,  even  when  writing  his 
Positive  Philosophy,  he  gave,  for  seventeen  years,  a  free 
course  of  popular  lectures  on  Astronomy.  He  lost  his  posi- 
tion as  examiner,  and  with  it  half  his  income,  by  a  needless 
statement  in  the  preface  to  the  sixth  volume  of  his  philosophy, 
which  offended  the  men  who  had  given  him  the  appointment. 

He  applied  to  M.  Guizot,  Minister  of  State  to  the  King, 
Louis  Philippe,  to  establish,  in  the  University,  a  chair  of 
the  History  of  Science,  hoping  to  receive  the  appointment  to 
this  chair  as  professor.  He  gave,  in  substance,  the  following 
reasons  for  the  chair:  "If  there  are  four  chairs  devoted  to  the 
history  of  philosophy,  that  is,  to  the  study  of  dreams  and 
aberrations  of  thought  through  the  ages,  surely  there  should 
be  one  at  least  to  explain  the  progress  of  real  knowledge." 
The  chair  was  not  established.  Comte  says :  "  The  suggestion 
was  at  first  approved  by  Guizot's  philosophic  instinct,  and 
then  repelled  by  his  metaphysical  rancor. " 

Hearing  of  Comte's  financial  straits,  his  friend,  J.  S.  Mill, 
with  the  help  of  Grote,  Carrie  and  Molesworth,  advanced 
him  the  sum  of  £240.  The  same  was  repeated  for  another 
year,  when  Mill,  learning  that  Comte  made  no  effort  it] 
mend  his  own  fortune,  informed  him  that  he  must  take 


tort  to 
ie  car? 


REACTION,    ECLECTICISM,    POSITIVISM    377 

of  himself;  but  Comte  intimated  the  contribution  was  due 
the  distinguished  author  of  the  Positive  Philosophy  who  was 
working  for  the  good  of  humanity. 

In  the  later  years  of  his  life,  Comte  endeavored  to  establish 
a  religion  which  he  called  the  Religion  of  Humanity.  It  was 
to  have  a  ceremonial  worship,  with  a  ritual.  Thus  the  very 
thing  for  which  he  quarreled  with  Saint-Simon,  he  introduced 
for  his  own  followers,  though  he  did  not  call  it  New  Chris- 
tianity. 

Comte's  great  work,  that  on  which  his  fame  rests,  is  en- 
titled, Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive,  in  six  volumes.  Of  this 
work  a  good  abridged  English  translation  was  made  by 
Harriet  Martineau,  and  printed  in  one  volume.  This  trans- 
lation, approved  of  by  Comte  himself,  is  used  in  this  review. 

Comte  gives  the  law  of  human  progress  in  the  following 
terms:  "From  the  study  of  the  development  of  human  intelli- 
gence, in  all  directions,  and  through  all  times,  the  discovery 
arises  of  a  great  fundamental  law,  to  which  it  is  necessarily 
subject,  and  which  has  a  solid  foundation  of  proof,  both  in 
the  facts  of  our  organization,  and  in  our  historical  experience. 
The  law  is  this: — that  each  of  our  leading  conceptions — each 
branch  of  our  knowledge — passes  successively  through  three 
different  theoretical  conditions:  the  Theological,  or  fictitious; 
the  Metaphysical,  or  abstract,  and  the  Scientific,  or  positive. 

.  .  .  Hence  arise  three  philosophies,  .  .  each  of 
which  excludes  the  others.  The  first  is  the  necessary  point 
of  departure  of  the  human  understanding;  and  the  third  is 
its  fixed  and  definite  state.  The  second  is  merely  a  state  of 
transition. 

In  the  theological  state,  the  human  mind,  seeking  the 
essential  nature  of  beings,  the  first  and  final  causes  (the 
origin  and  purpose)  of  all  effects — in  short,  Absolute  Knowl- 
edge— supposes  all  phenomena  to  be  produced  by  the  immedi- 
ate action  of  supernatural  beings. 

In  the  metaphysical  state,  which  is  only  a  modification  of 
the  first,  the  mind  supposes,  instead  of  supernatural  beings, 
abstract  forces,  veritable  entities  (that  is,  personified  abstrac- 
tions) inherent  in  all  beings,  and  capable  of  producing  all 
phenomena.  What  is  called  the  explanation  of  phenomena 
is,  in  this  stage,  a  mere  reference  of  each  to  its  proper  entity. 

In  the  final,  the  positive  state,  the  mind  has  given  over  the 


378  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

vain  search  after  Absolute  notions,  the  origin  and  destination  of 
the  universe,  and  the  causes  of  phenomena,  and  applies  itself 
to  the  study  of  their  laws — that  is,  their  invariable  relations 
of  succession  and  resemblance." 

There  is,  without  doubt,  a  large  measure  of  truth  in  Comte's 
theory  of  the  three  stages  of  human  progress;  but  these 
stages  overlap  and  are  not  strictly  successive.  Many  minds, 
not  simply  the  ignorant,  but  those  highly  cultivated,  yet 
hold  to  the  validity  of  Theological  conceptions.  Metaphysics 
shows  vitality,  and  has  come  to  stay.  Science,  despairing  to 
find  the  ultimate  explanations  of  things,  and  though  legiti- 
mate in  its  method,  and  the  prevailing  stage  at  the  present 
time,  does  not  go  to  the  depth  of  things,  and  is,  by  its  own 
confession,  superficial.  Philosophy  is  deeper  than  Science. 

Not  knowing  the  natural  causes  of  phenomena,  the  human 
mind,  in  the  early  periods,  referred  them  to  supernatural 
agencies.  The  theological  stage,  is  as  Comte  admits,  the 
point  of  departure  for  the  human  mind;  yet  he  denies  to 
theological  conceptions  any  validity.  He  says:  "I  must 
remark  upon  one  very  striking  truth  which  becomes  apparent 
during  the  pursuit  of  astronomical  science — its  distinct  and 
ever  increasing  opposition,  as  it  attains  a  higher  perfection, 
to  the  theological  and  metaphysical  spirit.  Theological 
philosophy  supposes  everything  to  be  governed  by  will,  and 
that  phenomena  are,  therefore,  eminently  variable,  at  least 
virtually.  The  positive  philosophy,  on  the  contrary,  con- 
ceives them  subject  to  invariable  laws,  which  permit  us  to 
predict  with  absolute  precision. 

The  radical  incompatibility  of  these  two  views  is  nowhere 
more  marked  than  in  regard  to  the  phenomena  of  the  heavens, 
since  in  that  direction,  our  prevision  is  proved  to  be  perfect. 
The  punctual  arrival  of  comets,  and  eclipses,  with  all  their 
train  of  minute  incidents,  exactly  foretold,  long  before,  by  the 
aid  of  ascertained  laws,  must  lead  the  common  mind  to  feel 
that  such  events  must  be  free  from  the  control  of  any  will, 
which  could  not  be  will,  if  it  was  thus  subordinated  to  01 
astronomical  decisions." 

But  it  is  a  theological  conception  that  with  God  "is 
variableness,  neither  shadow  of  turning."  How  is  the 
uniformity  of  the  astronomical  laws  incompatible  with  the 
conception  of  God  who  is  "the  same  yesterday,  today,  and 
ever?" 


REACTION,    ECLECTICISM,    POSITIVISM    379 

The  stability  of  the  material  universe,  consequent  on  the 
uniformity  of  the  laws  of  nature,  is  essential  to  the  continued 
existence  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  world,  as  they  are  at 
present  constituted.  If  God  wills  the  existence  of  man  on 
earth,  he  also  wills  the  uniformity  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and 
this  uniformity,  which  is  the  indispensable  condition  of  the 
act  of  prevision,  is  not  subversive  of  theological  conceptions, 
nor  incompatible  with  the  idea  of  God. 

Again,  in  reference  to  Physics,  Comte  says:  "With  this 
science  begins  the  exhibition  of  human  power  in  modifying 
phenomena.  In  astronomy,  human  intervention  is  out  of 
the  question — in  physics,  it  begins;  and  we  shall  see  how  it 
becomes  more  powerful  as  we  descend  the  scale.  This  power 
counterbalances  that  of  exact  prevision  we  have  in  astronomy. 
The  one  power  or  the  other — the  power  of  foreseeing  or  of 
modifying — is  necessary  to  our  outgrowth  of  theological 
philosophy.  Our  prevision  disproves  the  notion  that  phenom- 
ena proceed  from  a  supernatural  will,  which  is  the  same 
thing  as  calling  them  variable;  and  our  ability  to  modify  them 
shows  that  the  powers  under  which  they  proceed  are  subordi- 
nate to  our  own. 

As  the  phenomena  of  any  science  become  more  complex, 
the  first  power  (that  of  prevision)  decreases,  and  the  other 
(that  of  modifying)  increases,  so  that  one  or  the  other  is 
always  present  to  show  unquestionably  that  the  events  of 
the  world  are  not  ruled  by  supernatural  will,  but  by  natural 
laws." 

But  it  is  a  theological  conception  that  it  is  God's  will  that 
man  should  "have  dominion  over  the  fish  of  the  sea,  and 
over  the  fowl  of  the  air,  and  over  the  cattle,  and  over  all  the 
earth,  and  over  every  creeping  thing  that  creepeth  upon  the 
earth."  This  certainly  gives  man  ample  license  to  modify 
the  circumstances  which  surround  him,  and  cause  them  to 
subserve  his  interests,  and  thus  to  promote  his  happiness, 
and  this  modification  is  not  subversive  of  theological  con- 
ceptions nor  incompatible  with  the  idea  of  God. 

Comte's  classification  of  the  sciences  begins  with  the  most 
simple  and  general,  and  passes  on  to  the  more  complex  and 
special.  Leaving  out  the  subdivisions,  we  have:  Mathe- 
matics, Astronomy,  Physics,  Chemistry,  Biology,  Sociology, 
This  classification  follows  the  historical  order  according  to 


380  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

which  each  has  passed  from  the  theological,  through  the 
metaphysical,  into  the  positive  stage.  The  deductive  method 
of  reasoning  prevails  in  the  more  simple  and  general  of  the 
sciences,  and  the  inductive  in  the  more  complex  and  special. 
The  six  groups  Comte  regards  as  irreducible.  The  passage 
from  a  lower  to  the  next  higher  is  accomplished  by  a  leap 
over  a  gap.  The  same  law  holds  as  to  the  subdivisions,  also 
as  to  the  organic  species.  This,  of  course,  does  not  accord 
with  Darwin's  theory  of  the  origin  of  species  Comte  does 
not  establish  the  discontinuity  by  the  positive  method  of 
observation  and  experiment,  but  metaphysically  and  dog- 
matically, thus  forsaking  his  own  methods;  but  discontinuity, 
when  it  is  a  fact,  does  not  disprove  the  existence  of  a  common 
law,  more  general,  as  generic,  than  the  narrower  laws  of  the 
species.  The  branches  of  the  hyperbola  are  discontinuous, 
yet  both  are  represented  by  the  one  and  same  equation. 

The  transmutation  of  energy  from  one  mode  of  manifesta- 
tion to  another  raises  the  question  whether  continuity  or 
even  identity  of  fundamental  cause  may  not  admit  of  discon- 
tinuity of  manifestations,  and  also  explain  those  cases  where 
apparent  discontinuity  of  manifestations  has  been  found,  by 
closer  inspection,  to  resolve  itself  into  continuity.  At  least 
later  investigations  have  proved  that,  in  many  cases,  the 
hiatus  of  discontinuity,  supposed  by  Comte,  has  been  resolved 
into  continuity;  but  the  fact  of  continuity  may  be  regarded 
a?  a  triumph  of  the  positive  method,  since  it  has  been  found  by 
that  method,  and  not  by  the  metaphysical,  and  hence  that 
Comte's  mistake  arose  from  his  forsaking  the  positive  method 
for  the  metaphysical ;  but  this  is  a  clear  proof  that  the  methods, 
metaphysical  and  positive,  by  their  overlapping,  are  not 
discontinuous  and  successive. 

Comte  objects  to  psychology,  because  it  is  founded  upon 
consciousness  or  observation  of  mental  phenomena.  He  says : 
"In  order  to  observe,  your  intellect  must  pause  from  activity; 
yet  it  is  this  very  activity  you  want  to  observe.  If  you 
cannot  effect  the  pause,  you  cannot  observe;  if  you  do  effect 
it,  there  is  nothing  to  observe.  The  results  of  such  a  method 
are  in  proportion  to  its  absurdity.  After  two  thousand 
years  of  psychological  pursuit,  no  one  proposition  is  established 
to  the  satisfaction  of  its  followers.  They  are  divided,  to 
this  day,  into  a  multitude  of  schools,  still  disputing  about  the 
very  elements  of  their  doctrine." 


REACTION,    ECLECTICISM,    POSITIVISM    381 

But  instead  of  its  being  impossible  to  be  conscious  of 
knowing,  it  is  impossible  to  know  without  being  conscious  of 
knowing.  Consciousness  is  involved  in  knowing  as  an  essen- 
tial element.  If  I  know,  I  know  that  I  know;  for  if  I  do  not 
know  that  I  know,  I  do  not  know.  In  like  manner,  it  may  be 
shown  that  feeling  and  volition  involve  consciousness.  We 
are  conscious  of  all  phenomena,  all  that  appear;  but  there 
are  subliminal  operations,  not  phenomena,  of  which  we  are 
not  conscious. 

The  psychological  method  has  not  been  so  fruitless  of 
good  results  as  Comte  supposes.  We  need  only  refer  to  the 
laws  of  association  and  memory,  as  exhibited  by  the  Associa- 
tionalist  philosophers,  of  whom  James  Mill  is  the  typical 
representative.  The  more  modern  work  of  the  Physiological 
Psychologists  has  been  fruitful  in  rich  results.  The  means 
of  psychological  investigation  may  be  divided  into  principal 
and  collateral ;  the  principle  employs  consciousness,  reflection 
and  rational  intuition;  the  collateral,  uses  the  works  of 
various  authors  who  have  written  on  the  subject;  it  studies 
comparative  psychology,  biology,  physiology,  anthropology, 
and  sociology;  it  observes  the  phenomena  of  society,  and 
acquaints  itself  with  literature,  as  found  in  history,  biography, 
poetry,  the  novel  and  the  drama.  Psychology  has  estab- 
lished something  worth  knowing;  for  writers  on  economics,  on 
sociology,  on  ethics,  appeal  to  psychology  for  fundamental 
principles. 

For  logic,  Comte  would  substitute  mathematics.  He  says: 
"Whatever  is  found  of  advantage  in  logic  in  directing  and 
strengthening  the  action  of  the  understanding  is  found,  in  a 
higher  degree,  in  mathematical  study,  with  the  immense 
added  advantage  of  a  determinate  subject,  distinctly  cir- 
cumscribed, admitting  of  the  utmost  precision,  and  free 
from  the  danger  which  is  inherent  in  all  abstract  logic — of 
leading  to  useless  and  puerile  rules,  or  to  vain  ontological 
speculations." 

But  certainly  logic  has  performed  a  valuable  service  in  dis- 
closing the  fundamental  laws  of  thought — the  law  of  identity, 
of  congruents,  of  conflictive  whether  contraries  or  contra- 
dictories, and  of  reason  and  consequent;  it  has  also  exhibited 
the  doctrine  of  concepts,  of  judgments  and  of  reasoning, 
whether  deductive  or  inductive,  and  laid  down  the  safe- 


382  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

guards  against  fallacy.  All  this  it  has  done,  and  which 
mathematics,  notwithstanding  its  great  achievements,  has 
not  done. 

Comte  held  strictly  to  the  immutability  of  natural  law; 
but  how  did  he  arrive  at  this  principle?  Not  by  the  intui- 
tion of  reason;  for  he  discarded  that  method  as  metaphysical. 
He  must,  therefore,  have  reached  it  by  real  induction;  but 
such  induction  gives  only  the  probable;  and  therefore  the 
necessary  immutability  of  the  laws  of  nature  may  not  be  a 
fact;  and  according  to  the  positive  method,  it  can  be  certain 
only  so  far  as  experience  confirms  it.  It  can  be  extended  in 
its  application  only  by  analogy.  This  accords  with  the 
tendency  of  the  mind  for  generalization;  but  if  it  seems  to 
satisfy  a  subjective  craving  for  certainty,  it  does  it  without 
due  warrant;  for  it  has  no  logical  objective  foundation,  and 
the  positive  philosophy  is  resolved  into  pure  empiricism,  and 
is  not  a  philosophy  at  all,  though  it  may  be  good  science. 

Comte  was  something  of  a  mystic;  he  assigned  to  feeling 
its  due  place  in  human  nature,  and  made  it  co-ordinate  with 
thought,  if  not  superior  to  it  in  importance.  His  religion  of 
humanity  does  no  discredit  to  his  heart,  whatever  may  be 
said  of  its  relation  to  his  head.  Every  religion  ought  to  be  a 
religion  of  humanity;  but  is  humanity  a  proper  object  of 
worship?  Worship  humanity ',  is  scarcely  acceptable  as  a 
guiding  precept.  A  better  precept  is,  Worship  God  and' 
strive  to  elevate  humanity.  True  religion  is  a  quality,  it  has 
for  its  first  part,  Love  to  God;  for  its  second  part,  Love  to  man, 
or  human  brotherhood. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

Later  German  Philosophy 

1 .  Mayer  (1814-1 878) .     Julius  Robert  Mayer,  after  study- 
ing medicine  at  Tubingen,  Munich  and  Paris,  was  chosen 
Surgeon  for  a  Dutch  ship  bound  for  Java.     After  returning, 
he  obtained  a  position  as  physician  in  Heilbronn,  his  native 
city. 

The  indestructibility  of  matter,  by  human  agency,  had 
already  been  proved  by  Lavoisier,  and  this  prepared  the  way 
for  the  kindred  truth — the  conservation  and  transformation 
of  energy.  Mayer  inferred  this  from  a  principle  of  reason— 
causa  aequat  effcctum,  rather  than  proved  it  by  experiment. 

The  cause,  as  Mayer  held,  passes  into  the  effect;  it  no 
more  passes  out  of  existence  than  do  oxygen  and  hydrogen 
when  they  unite  to  form  water.  Motion,  when  checked, 
passes  into  heat,  and  heat,  in  turn,  produces  motion.  There 
is  a  constant  relation  between  the  vanishing  cause  and  the 
effect  into  which  it  is  transformed,  and  this  constant  relation 
is  the  fact  of  prime  importance.  The  relation,  being  ex- 
pressed by  a  formula,  can  be  applied  to  mechanics  in  estimat- 
ing the  effective  work  of  given  forces  through  the  inter- 
vention of  machinery. 

Theory,  however,  needs  the  test  of  experiment,  and  it  is 
only  by  the  combination  of  the  theoretical  and  the  practical 
that  valuable  results  can  be  obtained.  Mayer's  merit  con- 
sists not  only  in  discovering  the  principle  of  the  conservation 
of  energy,  but  in  applying  it  to  a  variety  of  physical  phenom- 
ena. 

The  law  of  conservation  was  also  independently  discovered 
by  Colding,  a  Dane,  by  Helmholtz,  and  by  Joule,  an  English- 
man, and  this  illustrates,  what  is  often  found  to  be  true,  that 
several  minds,  without  intercommunication,  often  work  at  the 
same  thing,  and  reach  similar  results,  illustrated  by  Newton 
and  Leibniz  in  the  discovery  of  the  Calculus. 

2.  Vogt.    (1817-1895).     Karl    Vogt,    a    Naturalist    and 
Physiologist,  maintained  that  matter  is  the  only  substance; 


384  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

that  the  brain  is  the  organ  of  which  consciousness  is  the 
function;  that  thought  is  to  the  brain  as  gall  is  to  the  liver, 
thus  either  making  thought  material,  or  resolving  it  into  the 
motion  of  matter — the  vibrations  of  the  filiaments  of  the 
brain. 

3.  Moleschott   (1822-1893).     Jacob  Moleschott  took  for 
his  principle  the  conservation  of  matter,  which  he  held  to  be 
never  devoid  of  energy.     Force  is  the  constant  accompani- 
ment of  matter,  and  circulates  with  it  through  the  universe; 
and  with  force,  life;  with  life,  thought;  with  thought,  will; 
with  the  most  highly  organized  human  brain,  the  highest 
thought,  the  firmest  will. 

He  believed  that  his  standpoint  could  be  regarded  one- 
sidedly  materialistic  only  by  those  who  can  conceive  matter 
without  force,  or  force  without  any  supporting  substance;  it 
is,  therefore,  monistic,  dealing  with  two  attributes,  material 
and  spiritual,  in  one  substance,  which  is  the  conception  of 
Spinoza.  The  opposition  it  sets  up  is  not  that  between 
matter  and  spirit,  but  that  between  a  two  in  one,  or  a  two 
hopelessly  sundered.  Of  his  conception  he  says:  "Since 
matter  is  a  bearer  of  force,  endowed  with  force,  or  penetrated 
with  spirit,  it  would  be  just  as  correct  to  call  it  a  spiritual 
conception." 

Moleschott's  doctrine  may  be  thus  stated :  The  foundation 
of  all  reality  is  substance  with  two  attributes,  material  and 
spiritual,  and  that  these  are  never  found  apart,  but  are  not 
always  in  the  same  ratio  to  each  other,  and  so  vary  as  to 
approach  extension  and  inertia,  on  the  one  hand,  or  the 
highest  thought  and  firmest  will  on  the  other.  His  principal 
work  he  called  Kreislauf  des  Lebens. 

4.  Buchner  (1824-1899).     Louis  Biichner  held  that  mind 
and  matter,  or  to  speak  more  generally,  force  and  stuff,  are 
necessarily  and  inseparately  connected,  though  he  does  not 
attempt  to  explain  the  nature  of  the  relation,  more  than  to 
say  that  mind  is  a  property  of  matter,  or  force  a  property 
stuff;  but  even  this  is  a  matter  of  belief  rather  than  of  sciei 
tific  knowledge.     His  famous  work,  Kraft  und  Slqff  was  suj 
gested  by  Moleschott's  Kreislauf  des  Lebens. 

Buchner  holds  that  the  ultimate  basis  of  all  being  is  matter, 
and  that  the  conservation  of  matter  involves  the  conservation 
of  energy;  that  the  intricate  complexity  of  the  organism, 


LATER    GERMAN    PHILOSOPHY  385 

especially  that  of  the  brain,  produces  certain  effects  which, 
bound  together  into  unity,  constitute  the  ego  or  personal 
identity,  called  the  soul,  the  mind,  or  thought.  He  also 
held  that  force  and  matter  may  be  regarded  as  two  different 
aspects  or  modes  of  that  [substance]  which  underlies  all 
things. 

These  two  statements  are  in  conflict;  for  matter  cannot 
be  the  fundamental  reality,  if  it  is  only  an  aspect  or  mode  of 
something  else  which  underlies  all  things.  May  not  the 
whole  mystery  be  solved  by  calling  the  fundamental  reality 
cause,  which  manifest  material  attributes  on  the  one  hand 
and  spiritual  attributes  on  the  other,  and  that  these  two  are 
related  by  their  common  connection  with  cause?  Biichner's 
training  as  a  physician  influenced  his  thinking  as  a  philoso- 
pher. 

5.  Czolbe  (1819-1873).     Heinrich  Czolbe  was,  like  Btich- 
ner,  trained  as  a  physician.     He  held  that  the  same  motion 
which,  starting  in  the  outer  world,  was  carried,  without 
modification,  through  the  sense  organs  and  nerves,  to  the 
brain,  where  it  was  turned  back  into  a  circular  motion, 
giving  rise  to  sensation,  thought  and  consciousness,  which 
are   motions   in   space   and   wherever   such  motions  occur, 
whether  in  the  brain  or  out  of  it,  there  is  consciousness. 

Czolbe  admitted  the  difficulty  of  explaining  the  world 
from  a  single  principle,  whether  found,  as  by  Biichner  in 
matter,  or  by  Metaphysicians  in  mind,  or  by  Theologians  in 
God.  We  reach  a  reasonable  solution  by  taking  the  three 
elements — material  atoms,  organic  forces,  and  psychical 
elements  found  in  the  world  soul,  and  these  elements  co- 
operate in  their  action  and  unite  in  their  result,  manifesting 
both  physical  and  psychical  phenomena. 

Czolbe  was  a  clear  thinker,  and  strove  for  comprehensible 
results. 

6.  Haeckel   (1834 ).      Ernst    Haeckel,    Professor   of 

Zoology  at  the  University  of  Jena,  calls  himself,  not  a  mate- 
rialist, but  a  monist.     He  holds  to  an  underlying  ground  con- 
necting matter  and  spirit,  as  manifestations  of  one  common 
substance,  Spinoza's  theory. 

The  psychical  life,  one  of  the  original  elements  of  nature 
manifests  itself,  though  varying  greatly  in  degree,  from  the 
soul  of  the  atom  to  the  most  highly  developed  human  brain. 


386  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Psychical  phenomena  are  the  activities  of  the  complex  ner- 
vous tissues  of  the  living  organism.  The  law  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  matter  and  energy,  is  the  basis  of  the  stability  of  the 
universe.  The  law  of  substance,  according  to  Haeckel,  is  the 
true  and  only  cosmological  law. 

Haeckel  accepts  the  theory  of  evolution  as  expounded  by 
Darwin,  and  regards  Pantheism  as  the  only  true  system  of 
Theology.  His  views  are  forcibly  expressed  in  his  writings: 
The  History  of  Creation,  The  Evolution  of  Man,  and  The  Riddle 
of  the  Universe. 

In  The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  Haeckel  says  of  Spinoza: 
"We  adherefjfirmiy  to  the  pure,  unequivocal  monism  of 
Spinoza:  Matter,  or  infinitely  extended  substance  and  spirit 
(or  energy),  or  sensitive  and  thinking  substance,  are  the  two 
fundamental  attributes,  or  principal  properties  of  the  all- 
embracing  divine  essence  of  the  world,  the  universal  sub- 
stance. "  Again,  "All  the  changes  which  have  since  come 
over  the  idea  of  substance  are  reduced,  on  a  logical  analysis, 
to  this  supreme  thought  of  Spinoza's;  with  Goethe,  I  take 
it  to  be  the  loftiest,  profoundest,  and  truest  thought  of  all  the 
ages." 

8.  Lotze  (1817-1882).  Rudolph  Hermann  Lotze  was 
born  at  Bautzen,  the  district  of  Fichte  and  Lessing,  and  was 
educated  as  a  physician  at  Leipzig.  His  teachers  in  medicine 
and  physics  were  Weber,  Volkmann  and  Fechner.  Weisse 
was  his  guide  in  philosophy.  He  graduated  the  same  year, 
both  as  a  doctor  of  philosophy  and  a  doctor  of  medicine,  and 
at  once  became  a  decent  in  both.  He  was  afterwards  profes- 
sor of  philosophy  at  Gottingen,  and  was  elected  to  the  same 
chair  at  Berlin,  but  soon  after  died. 

Lotze's  ideal  was  that  of  the  romantic  philosophers,  to 
trace  the  development  and  interconnections  of  the  world  to 
one  eternal  idea.  In  him  were  combined  the  scientific  and 
speculative  tendencies,  thus  leading  him  to  attempt  the 
reconstruction  of  idealism  on  a  realistic  foundation.  To 
accomplish  this,  he  saw  that  he  must  avoid,  on  the  one  ham 
the  mistake  of  romanticism  of  overlooking  the  real  conditioi 
and  mechanical  connections  of  nature,  and  on  the  otht 
that  of  materialism  of  taking  matter,  which  is  only  a  frai 
work,  for  the  sum  total  of  reality. 


LATER  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY  387 

Lotze's  point  of  departure  is  the  mechanism  of  nature. 
He  endeavored  to  show,  by  an  analysis  of  the  concept,  that 
an  ideal  principle  is  involved,  which  is  the  eternal  source  of 
whatever  is  of  any  value.  Ideas  represent  things,  and 
thoughts  the  relations  of  ideas,  and  hence  also  of  things. 

In  his  medical  works,  Lotze  attributed  physical  phenomena, 
not  to  a  mystical  vital  force,  but  to  the  regular  operations  of 
universal  forces  in  living  organisms;  but  mechanism  con- 
stitutes only  a  part  of  nature,  the  spiritual  also  has  its  place; 
it  is  the  relation  of  the  material  and  spiritual  that  has  interest 
for  philosophy.  This  relation  he  traces  in  his  Microcosmus, 
a  work  which  supplements  Humboldt's  Cosmos  and  Herder's 
Ideen. 

The  Microcosmus  treats  of  psychology  in  relation  to 
physiology,  human  culture  as  shown  in  history,  cosmological 
theories,  and  the  philosophy  of  religion. 

Lotze  holds  th'at  spiritual  life,  at  its  highest  value,  is 
realized  only  in  combination  with  a  mechanical  system  of 
causes  and  losses.  It  is  the  business  of  philosophy,  rather 
than  of  science,  to  inquire  into  the  nature  and  relation  of 
cause  and  effect,  means  and  end,  substance  and  force,  freedom 
and  necessity,  matter  and  spirit,  which,  in  practical  life,  and 
in  the  special  sciences,  are  taken  for  granted.  Philosophy 
goes  deeper  than  science. 

Though  the  nature  of  cai^se,  the  source  of  all  change,  may 
be  learned  from  experience  in  the  consciousness  of  effort  we 
make  in  overcoming  resistance,  yet  its  necessity  is  presupposed 
by  reason  whenever  there  is  experience  of  change,  thus  im- 
plying the  interconnection  of  phenomena.  The  very  concep- 
tion of  nature  is  of  a  plurality  of  real  elements  in  reciprocal 
interaction;  but  this  mechanical  interaction  is  not  the  only 
feature  of  our  conception  of  nature,  which  is  even  impossible 
without  a  connecting  cause.  There  must  be  an  all  embracing 
cause  to  constitute  a  cosmos,  that  is,  a  universe  which  :s  all 
things  turned  into  one  system.  The  one  great  cause  is,  there- 
fore immanent,  not  transcendent.  Things  in  their  relation 
to  this  ground  cause  are  related  to  one  another.  There  is, 
then,  an  original  substance  the  all  embracing  principle,  the 
Deus  sive  Natura  of  Spinoza,  which  Lotze  called  the  ultimate 
fact  of  all  thought — the  ultimate  postulate;  it  is  presupposed 
in  the  simplest  case  of  reciprocal  action. 


388  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Materialism  and  Idealism  are  thus  reconciled  and  united. 
Neither  the  monads  of  Leibniz,  nor  the  reals  of  Herbart  afford 
thought  a  resting  place;  the  basis  must  be  monistic-Spirit,  as 
Lotze  held,  which  could  exert  itself  as  energy  at  all  points, 
and  cause  the  points  of  energy  to  interact.  The  points  can- 
not be  extended  solids,  however  small,  for  then  they  would 
have  parts  and  be  divisible;  neither  are  they  inextended  solids, 
for  then  they  would  be  nothing;  they  are,  therefore,  points  of 
energy,  locally  placed,  but  without  extension.  This  view 
renders  the  creation  of  so-called  matter  possible  and  con- 
ceivable. What  is  this  one  substance  or  primal  cause?  We 
can  understand  it  only  by  analogy  to  ourselves  as  causes; 
but  we  know  ourselves  as  subjects  of  activities  or  suscepti- 
bilities. As  finite  spirits,  we  can  do  and  suffer,  so  likewise 
can  the  infinite  Spirit. 

To  obviate  objections  to  freedom,  Lotze  says:  "The  soul 
evolves  from  itself  resolutions,  starting  points  for  future 
movements,  ...  if  experience  convinces  us  that  every 
event  of  external  nature  is  at  the  same  time  an  effect  having 
its  cause  in  preceding  facts,  it  still  remains  possible  that  the 
cycle  of  inner  mental  life  does  not  consist  throughout  of  a 
rigid  mechanism  working  necessarily,  but  that  along  with 
unlimited  freedom  of  will,  it  also  possesses  a  limited  power  of 
absolute  commencement. "  This  "  absolute  commencement," 
however,  is  not  a  commencement  from  nothing,  not  from 
antecedent  events,  but  from  mind,  human  or  Divine.  A 
volition,  as  an  event  is  caused,  and  therefore  not  free,  but 
caused  by  the  ego.  The  freedom  is  not  in  the  volition,  but 
in  the  ego,  the  subject  of  the  volition,  which  is  not  an  event, 
but  a  being,  free  to  cause  its  own  volitions.  Now,  because 
volitions  are  caused,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  cause  of  the 
volitions  is  caused  to  cause  them.  The  doctrine  of  freedom 
does  not  require  free  volitions,  but  a  being  free  to  cause  them. 
The  ego,  as  a  being,  is  free,  not  in  its  origin,  but  in  its  acts. 

A  perfectly  new  beginning,  not  connected  with  the  primal 
cause,  or  with  anything  else,  is  an  event  without  a  cause,  and 
is  therefore  impossible.  Yet  it  is  conceivable  and  possible 
that  the  primal  cause  can  act,  at  any  time,  and  originate  a 
new  line  of  events,  unless  its  energies  are  so  engaged  as  to 
leave  no  reserved  power,  thus  implying  that  it  had  exhausted 
itself  in  the  universe.  Even  if  the  primal  cause  originates  new 


LATER  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY  389 

events,  these  events  are  related  to  all  other  events,  by  their 
relation  to  the  primal  cause,  and  we  would  still  have  a  uni- 
verse. The  new  events  are  not  violations  of  any  laws  of 
nature,  though  miraculous,  not  caused  by  existing  events, 
but  by  the  primal  cause.  Miracles  should  never  be  con- 
ceived as  violations  of  the  laws  of  nature.  God  does  not 
violate  his  own  laws,  he  simply  does  that  which  would  not 
be  done  by  the  existing  forces  of  nature. 

The  supposition  of  an  absolute  commencement,  or  a  com- 
mencement from  nothing,  admits  the  possibility  of  a  time, 
far  back  in  the  past,  when  there  was  absolutely  nothing,  not 
even  the  first  cause;  if  so,  non-entity  sprang  into  entity,  and 
cause  is  not  the  necessary  condition  of  an  event,  or  the  doc- 
trine of  causality  is  a  delusion,  and  any  event  may  come  of 
itself,  or  there  is  no  causal  connection  between  events,  but 
this  would  destroy  foresight,  a  firmly  established  fact  of 
experience,  and  would  disintegrate  the  entire  universe,  or 
rather  there  would  never  have  been  any  universe.  Lotze's 
expression,  "absolute  commencement,"  is  unfortunate.  A 
new  series,  originated  by  a  mind,  has  not  an  absolute  com- 
mencement; it  is  related  to  the  mind  which  originates  it. 

Lotze  held  that  the  facts  of  the  universe  need  not  be  wholly 
similar  or  even  commensurable  to  be  reciprocally  related,  and 
that,  in  the  last  analysis,  it  is  not  a  logical,  but  an  aesthetic 
necessity,  that  leads  us  to  conceive  a  universe,  all  the  parts  of 
which  exhibit  infinite  variety  in  perfect  harmony. 

If  we  desire  to  understand  the  inner  nature  of  things,  we 
must  conceive  them  after  the  analogy  of  our  own  spiritual 
nature,  as  feeling  beings,  and  this  method  goes  deeper  than 
the  mechanical  conception.  Things  are  real  beings,  existing 
for  themselves,  and  are  not  merely  poetic  ideas  of  our  own 
creating.  It  may,  however,  be  true  that  they  are  God's 
ideas.  The  all-embracing  world  spirit  renders  the  universe 
comprehensible  in  the  interactions  of  its  parts,  and  in  its 
relation  to  ourselves. 

Lotze  held  that  we  can,  in  some  degree,  understand,  by 
analogy  from  our  own  spiritual  states,  that  the  absolute  world 
principle  is  a  personality,  since  in  that  case  only  could  it 
possess  independence  and  originality.  But  in  our  case, 
personality  encounters  obstacles  which  resist  our  efforts  and 
disturb  our  feelings;  but  in  the  all-embracing  cause,  feelings 


390  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

are  set  in  motion  by  its  own  activity.  It  may  be  conceived 
that  God  encounters  objects,  and  even  resistance  in  the  finite 
beings  he  has  created,  and  to  whom  he  has  granted  some 
degree  of  independence.  Free  beings,  within  certain  limits, 
manage  themselves,  and  may  even  run  counter  to  the  will  of 
God,  as  in  fact  man  often  does,  and  God  suffers  his  ill  manners 
and  is  thereby  grieved;  but  can  this  be,  if  as  Lotze  holds,  the 
form  of  time  is  not  applicable  to  the  Divine  Being?  Timeless 
action  and  timeless  suffering  are  inconceivable. 

Lotze  held  that  matter  and  spirit  are  contradictories;  but 
this  is  the  case  only  when  we  consider  them  species  under 
the  genus  substance.  In  this  case,  a  substance  cannot  be 
both  matter  and  spirit,  though  it  must  be  one  or  the  other. 
Passing  to  a  higher  genus  than  substance,  matter  and  spirit 
are  not  contradictories,  but  contraries.  We  may  conceive 
other  forms  of  existence  than  matter  and  spirit,  as  geometric 
forms  in  pure  space,  or  even  of  non-existence  as  opposed  to 
both  matter  and  spirit.  Not-matter  is  not  necessarily  spirit, 
for  it  may  be  a  form  of  space  or  !a  iportion  of  time,  or  even 
nothing. 

The  unity  of  the  universe  makes  the  reciprocal  action  of 
the  parts  possible;  and  this  action,  which  is  continual,  is  a  con- 
stant witness  of  a  common  interest  and  a  common  end — the 
highest  possible  good  for  the  whole.  The  ethical  principle  of 
reciprocity  is,  therefore  the  controlling  law  according  to  which 
the  universe  is  carried  forward  to  its  consummation.  Lotze's 
system  may,  therefore,  be  entitled  Ethical  Pantheism. 

Reciprocal  action  does  not  require  complete  homogeneity 
in  the  interacting  things,  or  even  proportionality,  as  the 
density  of  a  body  varies  inversely  as  its  extension ;  there  is  no 
inconsistency  in  supposing  that  interaction  pertains  between 
soul  and  body,  and  to  this  fact  experience  testifies.  The 
connection  finds  its  ground  in  substance,  of  which  both  soul 
and  body  are  species,  or  if  we  prefer  to  say,  both  matter  and 
mind  are  attributes. 

What  are  the  reasons  for  supposing  a  special  soul  substance? 
Two  alternatives  appear:  psychical  phenomena  must 
referred  to  a  soul  or  to  the  interactions  of  physical  forces; 
but  personal  identity  cannot  be  explained  by  varying  physical 
forces;  therefore,  the  soul,  the  only  alternative,  remains  the 
true  explanation. 


LATER  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY  3dl 

Stimuli  are  carried  from  the  nerves  to  the  brain,  and  the 
reaction  of  the  brain  is  accompanied  by  sensations,  which  are 
signals  the  soul  interprets,  and  thus  arise  ideas,  and  thoughts, 
and  all  other  mental  phenomena.  Idealism  is  true  so  far  as 
mental  pictures  are  concerned,  but  'false  when  it  denies  the 
external  causes  of  sensation.  Lotze,  however,  prefers  not  to 
call  material  objects,  so-called,  causes,  but  effects  of  mental 
states.  They  may  be  effects  of  God's  mental  states,  but  not 
of  ours.  The  senses  all  point  to  something  external.  Even 
Berkeley  says:  "Since  we  are  affected  from  without,  we  must 
allow  powers  to  be  without  in  a  being  distinct  from  ourselves. " 

The  dualistic  conception  of  the  relation  of  body  and  mind 
Lotze  regarded  as  a  provisional  assumption  which  will  give 
place  to  maturer  views;  for  he  held  that  extension  itself  is 
subjective;  that  matter  itself  is  nothing  but  the  phenomenal 
form  of  interaction  between  inextended  beings,  as  the  monads 
of  Leibniz,  or  the  reals  of  Herbart;  and  that  the  immortality 
of  the  soul  does  not  depend  upon  its  nature,  but  on  its  place 
in  the  ethical  order  of  the  world.  He  says:  "No  principle 
can  serve  us  here  except  the  general  idealistic  conviction  that 
every  created  thing,  whose  continued  existence  holds  a  part 
of  the  sense  of  the  world,  will  continue  to  exist,  and  that 
everything  will  pass  away  the  reality  of  which  can  find  a 
place  only  in  the  transitory  phase  of  the  world's  history." 
This  means,  if  it  means  anything,  that  a  person  will  be  im- 
mortal if  he  can  fill  worthily  a  place  in  the  moral  realm,  and 
if  he  does  so  fill  that  place,  but  otherwise,  he  will  pass  out  of 
existence. 

9.  Fechner  (1801-1887).  Gustav  Theodor  Fechner  was 
born  at  Lanwich.  His  chief  studies  were  medicine  and 
physics.  In  1835,  he  was  appointed  professor  of  physics, 
but  in  a  few  years,  he  was  forced  to  retire  from  his  post  on 
account  of  weakness  of  his  eyes. 

In  his  thinking,  he  was  influenced,  to  a  considerable  extent 
by  Weisse,  as  was  Lotze,  and  with  him  he  endeavored  to  con- 
struct an  idealistic  world  conception  on  a  realistic  basis. 

Fechner  formed  the  conception  that  there  is  a  definite 
quantitive  relation  between  connected  mental  and  material 
facts,  and  by  working  out  this  conception  he  became  the 
founder  of  the  experimental  science  of  psycho-physics,  or  as 
it  is  otherwise  called,  of  physiological  psychology.  To  ascer- 


392  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

tain  the  facts  pertaining  to  the  connection  of  the  nervous 
system  and  mental  manifestations,  and  to  determine  their 
laws  became  the  work  of  his  life. 

In  Fechner  were  found  two  strong  tendencies — to  employ 
the  experimental  method,  and  to  give  free  rein  to  his  imagina- 
tion. He  does  not  separate  mind  from  matter,  nor  God  from 
the  universe,  nor  does  he  derive  the  world  from  conscious 
thought,  or  the  poetic  pictures  of  the  imagination  from  the 
darkness  of  material  things.  The  infinite  embraces  the 
finite,  and  God  is  immanent  in  the  world  as  its  life  and 
support,  just  as  the  human  spirit,  by  pervading  the  body, 
is  its  life  and  support.  Each  person  is  conscious  of  his  own 
spiritual  activities,  and  by  analogy  extends  like  activities  to 
animals,  to  plants,  and,  if  he  pleases,  to  inorganic  objects. 

In  the  interaction  of  all  things,  Fechner  found  the  basis 
for  philosophy  and  religion,  and  thus  the  fact,  which  to  some 
minds  rendered  the  being  of  God  superfluous,  made  the 
belief  in  his  existence  necessary  both  to  Fechner  and  to 
Lotze.  The  concept  of  the  world  is  the  concept  of  God  whose 
life  is  the  life  of  the  world.  The  perfection  of  God  is  seen  in 
the  unfolding  and  progress  of  the  world  through  infinite  time. 
Herein  Fechner' s  view  is  superior  to  that  of  Lotze,  who  does 
not  regard  time  as  applicable  to  God. 

The  material  and  spiritual  worlds  are  the  outer  and  the 
inner  aspects  of  Deity,  the  one  substance  with  two  attributes, 
matter  and  mind,  which  is  the  doctrine  of  Spinoza.  We  may 
see  the  world  as  a  universe  of  matter  or  as  a  universe  of  mind, 
according  to  our  point  of  view,  just  as  an  observer  without  a 
hollow  sphere  would  see  only  its  convex  surface,  while  one 
within  would  see  its  concave;  but  one,  by  changing  his  point 
of  view,  would  see  the  surface  as  it  is,  convex  without  and 
concave  within. 

Fechner  advanced  beyond  Spinoza  in  attempting  to  dis- 
cover an  exact  mathematical  relation  between  matter  and 
mind,  the  two  sides  of  existence,  or  the  two  attributes  of  the 
one  substance.  He  found  that  the  changes  in  corresponding 
mental  and  physical  states  were  not  directly  proportional, 
but  that  the  change  in  the  mental  state  is  equal  to  the  ratio 
of  the  change  in  the  physical  state  to  that  state  multiplied  by 
a  constant.  Thus,  if  the  change  in  a  mental  state  m  is  dm, 
and  the  change  in  the  corresponding  physical  state  p  is  dp, 


LATER  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY  393 

then  c  denoting  the  constant,  we  shall  have  dm  =c  dp/c.  The 
constant  is  different  for  the  different  senses.  Fechner  evolved 
this  law  from  facts  discovered  by  Weber  from  experiment, 
and  called  it  Weber's  Law.  He  did  a  good  work  in  investi- 
gating the  laws  of  relation  connecting  physiological  phenom- 
ena with  physical. 

10.  Lange  (1828-1875).  Freidrich  Albert  Lange  was  the 
son  of  J.  P.  Lange,  the  celebrated  commentator  and  profes- 
sor of  theology  at  Zurich.  He  was  a  good  scholar  and  well 
versed  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  He  led  an  active  life  as 
teacher,  author,  editor,  and  political  agitator  as  a  reformer 
in  social  affairs.  The  philosophers  that  impressed  him  most 
deeply  were  Hegel,  Herbart,  and  Schleiermacher. 

Lange's  principal  work  is  The  History  of  Materialism,  in 
three  volumes.  It  is  a  work  of  great  merit,  clear  and  candid, 
and  to  most  readers,  convincing.  His  method  of  treatment 
is  to  push  materialism  forward  to  its  limit,  showing  that  it 
finally  breaks  down,  and  ends  in  failure  in  its  attempts  to 
deduce  thought  from  matter.  A  reader  of  his  book  would  be 
likely  to  think,  in  the  course  of  its  perusal,  till  he  reached  the 
climax,  that  Lange  was  an  advocate  of  materialism. 

The  afferent  nerves  carrying  stimulus  to  the  brain,  the 
efferent  carrying  the  response  to  the  muscles,  the  obedience 
of  the  muscles  to  the  command,  frequently  take  place  with- 
out any  conscious  mental  action;  but  in  emergencies,  sensa- 
tion is  excited,  thought  awakened,  and  decision  made,  con- 
stituting an  entirely  new  process,  all  in  another  realm,  that  of 
mind;  and  this  may  be  followed  by  an  outward  act,  again  in 
the  realm  of  matter. 

The  passage  from  the  physical  to  the  mental  realm,  or  the 
reverse,  is  the  great  mystery.  There  is  no  consciousness  till 
we  reach  sensation;  and  the  material  process  is  not  mental, 
though  it  may  be  its  condition.  The  mental  process,  the 
sensation,  the  thought,  the  whole  content  of  consciousness, 
find  no  explication  in  the  law  of  conservation  of  matter  and 
energy.  At  this  point,  in  Lange's  opinion,  materialism  fails. 

If  the  laws  of  matter  cannot  explain  the  phenomena  of 
mind,  can  the  laws  of  mind  explain  the  phenomena  of  matter? 
If  the  passage  in  one  direction  is  impossible,  can  the  passage 
in  the  opposite  direction  be  possible?  Lange  says:  "While  it 
always  remained  an  insurmountable  difficulty  for  Material- 


394  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

ism  to  explain  how  conscious  sensation  could  come  about 
from  material  motion,  yet  it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  by  no 
means  difficult  to  conceive  that  our  whole  representation  of 
matter  and  its  movements  is  the  result  of  an  organization  of 
purely  intellectual  dispositions  to  sensation." 

But  is  the  representation  of  matter  identical  with  matter 
itself?  One  can  imagine  a  chair.  Let  us  call  it  a  repre- 
sentation; but  what  is  the  consequence  when  one  attempts 
to  sit  in  it?  A  man  deeply  in  debt,  and  troubled  by  his 
creditors,  can  imagine  himself  rich;  but  will  his  imaginary 
money  pay  his  debts?  If  materialists  err  in  believing  that 
they  can  deduce  mind  from  matter,  do  not  idealists,  on  the 
other  hand,  err,  in  believing  that  they  can  deduce  matter 
from  mind?  Matter  and  mind,  however  may  be  species  of 
the  genus  substance,  which  is  the  ground  and  explanation 
of  their  connection,  and  the  true  unity  of  all  existence. 

11.  Duhring  (1833 ).  Eugen  Duhring  was  born  in 

Berlin,  and  was  brought  up  in  the  atmosphere  of  free  religious 
thought.  Mathematics  and  astronomy  were  his  favorite 
branches  of  knowledge.  He  studied  for  the  legal  profession, 
and  entered  on  its  practice,  but  was  forced  to  abandon  this 
vacation  on  account  of  disease  of  his  eyes  which  finally  made 
him  blind.  His  affliction  increased  his  natural  tendency  to 
suspicion,  and  to  regard  all  who  differed  from  him  as  enemies. 
His  wife  and  later  his  son  became  his  amanuensis. 

Cut  off  from  the  practice  of  law,  he  turned  his  thoughts 
to  the  investigation  of  philosophical  questions,  paying 
especial  attention  to  Epistemology,or  the  theory  of  knowledge. 
He  took  up  the  Kantian  problem  of  the  scope  and  limits  of 
knowledge,  and  discussed  it  in  the  spirit  of  positive  science. 

His  principal  work  he  called  Naturliche  Dialiktik.  This 
book,  excellent  in  form  and  matter,  is  valuable  on  account  of 
the  light  it  throws  on  the  relation  of  the  critical  to  the  positive 
philosophy.  He  distinguished  between  the  principle  of 
sufficient  reason,  a  law  of  thought,  from  the  wider  law  of 
reality;  and  this  principle  knocks  dogmatism  out.  He 
directed  attention  to  what  he  called  the  principle  of  insufficient 
reason,  which  requires  that  the  burden  of  proof  should  fall 
on  the  one  who  proposes  a  new  theory  in  conflict  with  that 
which  is  generally  accepted  as  true.  This  hits  the  idealists 
who  call  upon  realists  to  prove  that  things  exist,  as  is  gener- 


LATER  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY  395 

ally  believed,  apart  from  human  thought,  when  it  is  the 
business  of  the  idealists  to  prove  that  they  do  not  so  exist. 
Realists,  in  meeting  the  challenge  of  Idealists  should  throw 
back  the  burden  of  proof  where  it  belongs. 

Diihring  calls  his  philosophy,  the  philosophy  of  reality, 
the  fundamental  facts  of  which,  as  known  by  experience, 
must  afford  the  subject  matter  of  theoretical  investigation. 
To  throw  aside  the  facts,  and  to  speculate  on  concepts,  is  to 
leave  the  solid  ground  of  reality  to  explore  the  cloudy  region 
of  the  unreal  fictions  of  the  imagination. 

Diihring  admired  the  great  thinkers  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  such  as  Newton,  Galileo,  Hobbes  and  Spinoza,  and 
regarded  the  philosophers  of  the  nineteenth  as  reactionists; 
but  the  advance  of  science  in  the  nineteenth  is  its  glory;  the 
subjection  of  theory  to  the  test  of  experiment  is  a  matter  of 
great  practical  importance. 

In  his  theory  of  knowledge,  conducted  in  the  critical  spirit, 
Diihring  seeks  to  ascertain  the  relation  of  thought  to  reality. 
Thought  strives  to  advance  by  continuous  interconnection, 
and  like  a  line,  to  stretch  on  indefinitely;  but  a  real  thing  is 
definite,  and  continuation  can  take  place  only  by  the  addition 
of  particular  reals,  also  definite  in  magnitude  and  in  number. 
Pure  thought  is  not  restricted  to  real  things.  Thought, 
however,  may  restrict  itself,  as  it  does  in  science,  to  the 
realities  of  nature,  save  when  it  makes  hypotheses  which  are 
overthrown  by  the  test  of  facts;  but  confirmed  hypotheses, 
of  course,  correspond  to  facts. 

From  the  law  of  definite  number,  Diihring  deduced  the 
consequence  that  the  processes  of  nature  cannot  go  back  in 
an  infinite  regress,  and  hence  that  nature  had  a  beginning. 
From  this  we  can  deduce  the  further  consequence  that  there 
must  be  an  eternal  creator  of  the  universe,  since  non-entity 
cannot  turn  itself  into  entity.  There  may,  however,  be  no 
series  of  facts,  but  they  will  have  their  origin  either  in  the 
absolute  first  cause,  or  in  some  finite  but  free  causes,  as  human 
beings.  In  the  series  of  causes  and  effects,  there  is  no  abso- 
lute break  or  discontinuity,  but  the  chain  is  connected,  link 
by  link,  back  to  the  cause  at  its  head. 

We  often  discover  continuity  in  apparent  discontinuity, 
or  we  may  fail  to  find  continuity  by  experiment  where  it  was 
thought  to  exist.  Hence  science  forsakes  its  sphere  and 


396  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

dogmatizes,  when  it  says  an  event,  not  depending  on  any 
natural  causes,  is  impossible;  it  must,  however,  be  dependent 
on  some  cause;  it  is  not  an  absolute  commencement. 

For  the  most  part,  there  is  a  correspondence  between 
thought  and  reality,  or  the  relation  of  premise  and  con- 
clusion corresponds  to  that  of  cause  and  effect.  They  stand 
related  as  the  reason  of  knowing  and  the  reason  being;  but 
the  deep  principle,  underlying  all  reality,  that  causes  nature 
to  work,  induces  mind  to  think,  and  between  the  two,  there 
should  be  harmony. 

It  does  not,  therefore,  destroy  the  validity  of  knowledge, 
because  it  is  the  product  of  two  factors — the  objective  nature 
of  things,  and  the  subjective  nature  of  thought.  In  specula- 
tive thought,  there  may  be  disagreement  between  the  concep- 
tion and  the  reality,  but  in  real  knowledge,  there  is  harmony. 

Diihring  held  that  to  give  a  complete  picture  of  real  exis- 
tence is  the  task  of  philosophy.  He  recognized  one  reality— 
nature  and  all  it  embraces;  but  in  nature  he  included,  not 
only  phenomena,  but  all  reality,  including  the  first  cause— 
the  one  substance,  the  Deus  sive  Natura  of  Spinoza.  He 
assigns  ends  to  nature,  the  results  or  final  outcome,  whether 
intended  or  not.  The  lower  forms  exist  for  the  higher;  the 
mechanical  finds  its  end  in  the  rational. 

The  resistances  conscious  beings  encounter  are  the  foils, 
which  lend  a  charm  to  existence,  lead  to  effort,  promote 
happiness,  and  make  life  worth  living. 

Diihring  finds  the  basis  of  ethics  in  sympathy.  The  in- 
dividual realizes  his  highest  good  in  society,  and  the  con- 
summation of  human  progress  will  be  universal  brotherhood. 

12.     Wundt  (1832- •).     Wilhelm   Wundt,    Professor   of 

Philosophy  in  the  university  of  Leipzig,  bases  his  psychology 
on  physiology,  and  thus  is  a  physiological  psychologist.  He 
makes  physiology,  however,  an  introduction  to  psychology, 
which  he  holds  to  be  the  science  of  immediate  consciousness 
of  phenomena. 

In  regard  to  Fechner's  work,  Wundt  said:  "The  Psycho- 
physics  which  he  founded  was  only  the  first  conquest  on  a 
field  in  gaining  full  possession  of  which  there  can  be  no  more 
insurmountable  obstacles,  now  that  such  a  beginning  has 
made." 

Wundt 's  work  which  he  called  Physiologische  Psycholot 


LATER  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY  397 

first  published  in  1874,  aims  to  accomplish  the  co-operation 
of  science  and  philosophy,  thus  giving  philosophy  a  positive 
basis. 

Wundt  wrote  three  volumes  on  Ethics :  I.  The  Facts  of  the 
Moral  Life;  II.  Ethical  Systems;  III.  The  Principles  of 
Morals  and  the  Sphere  of  Their  Validity.  He  classifies  Ethical 
Systems,  as  to  motives,  and  as  to  ends.  Under  ethics  of 
motives,  he  classes  Ethical  Intuitionism  and  Ethical  Em- 
piricism, placing  ethics  of  feeling  under  intuitionism,  and 
ethics  of  understanding  under  empiricism;  but  ethics  of 
reason,  he  relates  to  both. 

Under  ethics  of  ends,  he  places  the  heteronomous  systems, 
political  and  religious;  and  under  autonomous  systems  he 
places  eudemonism,  individual  and  universal;  also  evolution- 
ism, individual  and  universal. 

Science  and  philosophy  are  not  identical  either  in  aim  or 
method,  as  science  deals  with  facts,  their  classification,  and 
laws,  while  philosophy  deals  with  causes  and  fundamental 
principles  which  account  for  the  facts;  but  the  labors  of 
Wundt  tend  to  the  harmony  of  science  and  philosophy,  and 
to  their  co-operation  in  the  advancement  of  knowledge. 

Wundt  holds  that  the  laws  of  our  apprehension  of  objects, 
are  the  laws  of  the  objects  themselves,  thus  postulating  the 
harmony  between  man  and  nature,  manifest  in  their  inter- 
action. 

Other  important  works  by  Wundt  are  Logic,  System  of 
Philosophy,  Human  and  Animal  Psychology,  Folk  Psychology. 

13.  Paulsen  (1846-1908).  Friedrich  Paulsen,  Professor 
of  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Berlin,  has  written  a  work 
called  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  also  one  entitled  A  System 
of  Ethics,  both  of  which  have  been  translated  by  Professor 
Thilly. 

Paulsen's  special  merit  is  his  success  in  making  philosophy 
intelligible  to  the  people.  He  has  aimed  to  do  this  especially 
in  his  treatise  on  ethics.  His  historical  sketch  of  ethics  from 
Socrates  down  to  the  present  is  remarkably  interesting  and 
instructive.  He  has  presented  practical  ethics  in  such  a  way 
as  to  impress  its  importance  on  the  mind  of  his  readers,  and  to 
inspire  them  with  a  noble  ambition  to  live  a  higher  moral  life. 
His  system  may  be  called  Teleologic  Energism,  since  it  teaches 
the  duty  of  striving  for  the  highest  end. 


398  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

In  his  second  edition,  Paulsen  did  not  call  his  system 
utilitarianism,  as  he  did  in  the  first,  and  though  admitting  that 
morality  is  older  than  moral  philosophy,  yet  he  holds  that 
experience  decides  what  is  advantageous  or  disadvantageous. 
The  consequences  of  conduct  stand,  therefore,  in  his  opinion, 
as  its  final  justification  or  condemnation. 

14.  Stirner  (1808-1856).  Max  Stirner  is  best  known  as 
the  author  of  a  work  entitled  Der  Einzige  und  Sein  Eigentum, 
which  may  be  translated,  The  Unique  One  and  his  Property, 
or  more  smoothly,  though  less  accurately,  The  Ego  and  His 
Own.  His  system  is  Anarchism. 

This  remarkable  book,  published  in  1845,  at  first  attracted 
considerable  attention,  but  being  in  advance  of  the  current 
thought,  it  sank  out  of  sight  for  a  generation.  In  the  last 
ten  years,  the  interest  in  it  has  revived,  and  it  has  been 
translated  into  several  of  the  languages  of  Europe.  An 
excellent  translation  into  English,  made  by  Steven  Byington, 
was  published  by  Benjamin  R.  Tucker,  in  1907,  at  New  York., 

Lange,  in  his  History  of  Materialism,  calls  Stirner,  "The 
man  who  in  German  Literature  has  most  preached  Egoism 
recklessly  and  logically,"  and  says,  "Stirner  went  so  far  in 
his  notorious  work,  as  to  reject  all  word  ideas.  Everything 
that,  in  any  way,  whether  it  be  external  force,  belief,  or  mere 
idea,  places  itself  above  the  individual  and  his  caprice,  Stirner 
rejects  as  a  hateful  limitation  of  himself.'* 

By  Ego,  Stirner  did  not  mean  the  part  of  human  nature 
common  to  all  egos,  but  the  unique  personality  peculiar  to 
any  individual  ego.  Each  ego  is  for  himself  sui  generis,  the 
sole  ego,  all  other  egos  being  his  own  ideas.  I  then  am  the 
important  reality,  and  as  far  as  myself  am  concerned,  the 
supreme  fact,  rightfully  free  from  all  law,  civil,  ecclesiastical, 
social,  or  moral,  save  my  own  will. 

Egoism,  therefore,  obliterates  justice,  or  reduces  it  to  the 
will  of  the  strongest,  and  logically  resolves  itself  into  anarch- 
ism,  not   necessarily   anarchism   as   popularly   understood, 
signifying  disorder,  robbery,  bloodshed  and  murder,  but  tl 
abolition  of  all  law  above  the  will  of  the  ego.     This  remim 
us  of  Hobbes  who  held  to  the  egoistic  view  of  human  nati 
He   believed,   however,    that   mankind   would   extermiriat 
themselves  unless   held  in  check  by  civil    law  enforced 
penalties. 


LATER  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY  399 

J.  L.  Walker,  who  wrote  a  very  able  introduction  to  Bying- 
ton's  translation  of  Stirner's  work,  says:  "He  [Stirner]  would 
lay  aside  government,  but  would  establish  any  regulation 
deemed  convenient,  and  for  this  only  our  convenience  is 
consulted."  But  would  not  the  strong  oppress  the  weak? 
Stirner  believes  that  the  strong  would  refrain  from  such  con- 
duct, not  for  the  sake  of  the  weak,  but  for  their  own  sake, 
knowing  that  it  would  bring  the  best  results  to  themselves. 

The  doctrine  of  exclusive  egoism,  with  its  consequent 
anarchism,  is  based  on  the  assumption  of  the  total  selfishness 
of  the  ego,  which  it  is  assumed  always  acts  in  view  of  its  own 
interests.  Benevolence  is,  therefore,  rejected  as  constituting 
no  original  element  of  human  nature.  Let  us  see.  Suppose 
an  ultra  egoist  to  have  his  choice  between  the  two  courses  of 
action.  He  can  get,  say  $1,000  worth  of  good  for  himself  by 
a  certain  action,  and  at  the  same  time  benefit  his  neighbor  A 
$1,000  worth,  or  he  can  get  $1,000  of  good  for  himself,  by 
damaging  his  neighbor  B  $1,000,  no  other  person  being 
affected  by  his  act,  which  course  of  conduct  would  he  choose? 
If  he  had  no  regard  for  A  or  B,  the  choice,  so  far  as  they  are 
concerned,  would  be  a  matter  of  indifference;  but  the  egoist 
would  answer,  and  this  is  Stirner's  belief,  I  would  take  the 
course  that  would  benefit  A,  because  I  should  get  more  good 
out  of  that  course.  I  would  enjoy  helping  A,  and  regret 
damaging  B.  To  this  answer  it  may  be  replied,  if  you  were 
not  benevolent,  you  would  neither  enjoy  helping  A  nor  regret 
damaging  B.  To  help  A  would  not  please  you,  nor  to  damage 
B  displease.  Benevolence  therefore,  as  well  as  selfishness,  is 
an  ultimate  element  of  human  nature;  that  is,  the  doctrine 
that  the  ego  is  exclusively  selfish  is  false.  Granting  that  a 
man's  motive  always  contains  a  selfish  element,  that  does  not 
invariably  exclude  benevolence.  A  motive  is  usually  com- 
plex, containing  more  than  one  element.  The  will  of  the  ego 
would  answer  for  law  only  when  the  ego  is  enlightened  and 
benevolent. 

Other  considerations,  it  must  be  admitted,  more  exclusively 
egoistic,  may  enter  into  the  foregoing  case.  The  egoist  might 
say:  If  I  help  A,  he  will  probably  in  turn,  help  me,  or  if  I 
damage  B,  he  would  likely  damage  me,  and  on  these  con- 
siderations I  act.  Suppose,  however,  these  considerations 


400  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

were,  by  some  possibility,  entirely  removed,  still  the  egoist 
would  prefer  to  help  A,  rather  than  to  damage  B,  which 
would  be  a  choice  purely  benevolent. 

How  would  Stirner  secure  the  weak  against  the  encroach- 
ments of  the  strong?  He  says,  page  386 :  "I  love  men  too, — 
not  merely  individuals,  but  every  one.  But  I  love  them  with 
the  consciousness  of  egoism;  I  love  them  because  love  makes 
me  happy.  I  love  because  loving  is  natural  to  me,  because  it 
pleases  me.  .  .  I  have  a  fellow  feeling  with  every  feeling 
being,  and  their  torment  torments,  their  refreshment  refreshes 
me  too."  But  why?  If  Stirner  was  utterly  selfish,  the  tor- 
ment of  others,  or  their  refreshment,  would  be  a  matter  of 
indifference.  He  would  be  neither  tormented  nor  refreshed 
by  their  torment  or  refreshment;  but  since  he  is  tormented 
or  refreshed  with  the  others,  he  has  a  benevolent  heart. 
Egoism  can  be  the  final  philosophy  only  if  benevolence  as 
well  as  selfishness,  is  an  ultimate  element  of  the  ego,  but  that 
would  be  a  combination  of  egoism  and  altruism. 

Let  us  reconsider,  at  this  point,  the  two  kinds  of  quantity 
involved  in  knowledge — content  corresponding  to  the  Pla- 
tonic idea  or  the  modern  concept,  and  extent,  the  class  em- 
bracing objects  having  common  content,  with  its  subdivisions 
down  to  individuals.  From  Plato  to  Hegel,  philosophers 
have  generally  attached  more  importance  to  content  than 
to  extent;  but  why?  because  content  is  practically  invariable, 
except  from  the  slow  growth  of  advancing  knowledge,  while 
the  extent  is  subject  to  continual  change,  and  philosophers 
attach  more  importance  to  the  permanent  than  to  the 
transitory.  The  concept  corresponding  to  the  content, 
though  it  may  be  an  object  of  thought,  and  gradually  become 
more  complete  and  perfect,  cannot,  by  itself,  be  pictured  by 
the  imagination.  It  contains  nothing  subject  to  either  pain 
or  pleasure,  while  the  extent  embracing  classes  and  individuals 
which  may  be  improved  or  damaged,  or  suffer  pain  or  pleasure, 
has  value  in  itself,  equal  if  not  superior  to  that  of  the  concept. 

Take  an  individual,  for  example  Aristotle.  His  uniqueness, 
that  in  which  he  differed  from  other  men,  gave  him  value. 
Disturb  that,  or  destroy  it,  and  Aristotle  had  lost  his  individ- 
uality and  his  value.  Aristotle  as  capable  of  thought  of  will, 
as  susceptible  of  happiness  or  misery,  of  pleasure  or  pain,  had 


LATER  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY  401 

more  value  than  all  the  ideas  Plato  ever  had,  plus  all  the 
concepts  of  modern  philosophers. 

Let  philosophers  study,  not  only  content  and  concepts 
but  extent,  classes  and  individuals,  and  seek  their  welfare, 
and  they  will  find  that  people  will  not  only  listen  to  them 
with  pleasure,  but  will  profit  by  their  instructions. 

In  forming  alliances,  as  in  marriage  or  otherwise,  the  fatal 
mistakes  are  made,  not  because  of  a  want  of  knowledge  of  the 
common  attributes  of  human  nature,  but  because  of  ignorance 
of  the  unique  characteristics  of  individuals.  To  know  the 
idiosyncrasies  of  our  friends  gives  power  to  secure  our  mutual 
welfare.  It  was  to  the  uniqueness  of  each  individual  Ego 
that  Stiriier  assigned  such  importance  as  to  place  him  above 
all  law,  save  his  own  capricious  will.  This  can  be  done  with- 
out danger  only  when  all  men  are  so  enlightened  and  con- 
scientious, that  they  not  only  know  what  is  best  to  be  done, 
but  will  not  fail  to  do  it. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

Philosophy  of  Evolution 

1.  Darwin  (1809-1882).  Charles  Darwin  was  born  at 
Shrewsbury,  England.  He  studied  medicine  in  Edinburgh, 
and  theology  at  Cambridge,  but  engaged  in  neither  of  these 
professions,  as  he  felt  a  strong  attraction  towards  science. 
He  joined  the  Beagle  in  its  voyage  round  the  world,  from 
1831  to  1836.  This  voyage  settled  Darwin's  destiny  as  a 
Naturalist. 

The  following  are  the  most  important  of  Darwin's  works: 
Origin  of  Species,  published  1859 ;  Variation  of  Animals  and 
Plants  under  Domestication,  1868;  Descent  of  Man,  1871; 
Expression  of  the  Emotions  in  Man  and  Animals,  1872;  We 
are  especially  concerned  with  The  Origin  of  Species  and  The 
Descent  of  Man.  - 

The  importance  of  Darwin's  teaching  does  not  rest  on  the 
origination  of  the  theory  of  evolution — that  the  different 
organic  species  have  been  produced  by  natural  causes,  for 
this  opinion  had  been  held  by  others  before  him,  but  on  his 
method  of  supporting  this  theory,  by  collecting  facts  in  the 
organic  kingdom,  indicating  the  action  of  natural  causes  in 
the  production  of  variations  leading  to  new  species. 

Darwin  did  not  attempt  to  explain  the  origin  of  life  by 
natural  causes,  but  the  origin  of  species  by  natural  selection, 
or  the  survival  of  the  fittest;  for  the  origin  of  life  he,  at  first, 
referred  to  the  Creator,  but  later  called  it  an  inexplicable 
mystery. 

Darwin  was  led  to  his  investigations  by  reading  the  theory 
of  Malthus,  that  the  population  tends  to  increase  more  rapid- 
ly than  the  means  of  support,  and  seeing  that  the  law  applied 
to  the  entire  animal  kingdom.  Hence  would  arise  a  struggle 
for  existence  in  which  the  fittest  would  stand  the  best  chance 
of  surviving,  while  the  unfit  would  be  likely  to  perish.  The 
struggle  for  life  is  a  means  of  evolution,  and  the  qualities 
developed  would  be  transmitted  by  heredity.  The  process, 

402 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  EVOLUTION  403 

continued  for  generations,  would,  by  gradual  accumulations, 
form  new  varieties,  which,  becoming  permanent,  are  called 
species. 

While  the  struggle  for  existence  develops  certain  qualities, 
or  powers,  in  the  organisms,  adapting  them  to  their  environ- 
ment, natural  selection,  the  environment  itself,  favors  those 
varieties  which  have  developed  these  powers.  The  outcome 
of  the  struggle,  in  some  instances  at  least,  is  progress,  which 
in  case  of  man,  means  especially  intellectual,  moral,  and  social 
advancement. 

Darwin's  writings  afford  an  illustration  of  the  thorough 
application  of  the  inductive  method  of  investigation,  and  are 
otherwise  interesting  and  instructive.  But  does  the  fact  that 
two  species  have  many  features  in  common  prove  that  the 
more  advanced  is  the  development  of  the  other?  Cannot 
the  common  features  be  explained  from  the  fact  of  a  common 
creator?  A  carpenter  builds  a  barn,  then  a  house.  Many  of 
the  features  of  the  barn  he  carries  forward  to  the  house;  but 
does  that  prove  that  a  house  is  a  developed  barn?  The 
common  builder  will  explain  the  common  features.  There  is 
no  proof  that  the  primordial  forms  of  life  were  few.  God  was 
not  restricted  in  this  respect.  The  human  line,  for  all  that 
we  know,  may  have  been  human  from  the  beginning;  but 
many  features  of  man's  organism  may  be  found  in  lower 
organisms,  without  proving  that  the  lower  evolved  into  the 
higher,  or  that  man  had  a  simian  origin.  Examples  are 
wanting  which,  by  the  test  of  fact,  would  make  the  theory 
conclusive. 

The  origin  of  life  has  never  been  proved  to  be  inorganic 
matter;  but  the  method  of  nature  is,  as  Tyndall  declared: 
"Life  is  the  issue  of  antecedent  life."  How  then  did  life 
originate?  The  rational  answer  seems  to  be:  From  the  living 
Creator.  It  may  be  asked,  "How  did  the  living  Creator 
originate?"  The  answer  is,  the  living  Creator  is  eternal, 
and  did  not  originate  from  anything.  Events,  new  beginnings, 
have  causes,  but  eternal  realities  have  no  causes,  for  if  so, 
they  would  not  be  eternal. 

Darwin  discussed  the  effect  of  the  disuse  of  certain  organs, 
causing  them  to  be  atrophied,  and  finally  to  disappear,  save 
a  slight  trace;  and  thus  sometimes  an  organism  reverts  to 
a  former  type  or  simpler  form. 


404  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

The  origin  of  the  variations  is  not  to  be  confounded  with 
natural  selection.  The  origin  of  variation,  produced  by 
whatever  cause  in  the  environment,  change  in  the  climate, 
abundance  or  scarcity  of  food,  the  presence  or  absence  of 
enemies,  confirmed  habits,  or  growing  intelligence,  fits  or 
unfits  the  animal  for  its  habitat.  Then,  by  natural  selection, 
those  fittest  for  their  environment  survive  and  transmit  the 
fortunate  variation,  while  those  unfit  finally  perish.  The 
natural  selection  follows  the  variation  as  a  necessary  conse- 
quence. The  selection  implies  improvement  as  to  the  con- 
ditions of  life. 

Darwin  traces  the  effects  of  natural  selection  between  the 
variations,  however  caused.  Calling  the  variations  accidental 
simply  means  that  the  causes  are  unknown.  The  theory  of 
evolution,  in  its  broadest  sense,  includes  the  investigation 
both  of  the  causes  and  the  effects  of  variation. 

Variations  may  be  continuous  and  progressive  up  to  the 
point  where  the  organism,  instincts,  habits,  intelligence,  are 
best  fitted  for  the  environment,  and  then  cease,  and  the 
animal  and  its  descendants,  remain  the  same  as  long  as  the 
environment  remains  essentially  the  same;  but  a  change  in 
the  environment,  after  a  lapse  of  time,  would  call  for  new 
variations,  though  it  would  meet  with  more  resistance,  on 
account  of  established  organization  and  confirmed  habits, 
than  it  would  meet,  if  the  change  in  the  environment  had 
been  more  continuous. 

The  survival  of  the  fittest,  so  far  as  man  is  concerned,  does 
not,  in  certain  cases,  at  least,  always  mean  the  survival  of 
those  intellectually  and  morally  the  best;  for  the  savage 
tribes  of  Africa,  compared  with  Europeans,  are  fitter  to 
survive  in  the  malarious  regions  of  that  continent;  but  it 
holds  true,  take  the  world  over,  and  for  a  long  period,  that 
the  survival  of  the  fittest  means  the  survival  of  the  best ;  and 
this  gives,  as  may  be  inferred  from  the  history  of  the  past,  a 
hopeful  outlook  for  the  future  of  the  human  race.  Intelli- 
gence, morality,  manhood  and  brotherhood,  finally  will  pre- 
vail, and  become  established.  This  is  the  natural  conse- 
quence of  evolution,  and  so  optimism  is  more  reasonable  than 
pessimism. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  materialists  and  atheists  have 
eagerly  accepted  evolution  as  favoring  their  opinions ;  but  the 
truth  in  evolution  favors  neither  materialism  nor  atheism. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  EVOLUTION  405 

The  Creator,  regarded  as  iminent  in  nature,  works  the 
whole  process  of  evolution,  and  the  working  of  natural  forces 
is  his  working,  and  the  mode  of  his  working  is  natural  law. 
God  does  not  violate  any  natural  law  in  producing  any  result 
he  may  will;  for  his  working,  always  consistent,  is  natural 
law;  but  he  does  certain  things  which  otherwise  would  not  be 
done,  but  in  doing  so,  neither  sets  aside,  nor  violates  any  law; 
he  is  not  a  law  breaker,  but  a  law  maker. 

The  divine  working,  therefore,  is  not  to  be  restricted  to  the 
beginning  of  life,  but  is  continued  in  the  progress  of  evolution 
through  the  entire  realm  of  nature.  The  processes  of  nature, 
occurring  according  to  general  laws  will  inevitably  be  at- 
tended by  certain  evils,  but  certainly  by  less  evil  than  that 
attending  continual  intervention,  and  interruption  of  law, 
thus  throwing  every  thing  into  confusion,  and  rendering  it 
impossible  to  foresee,  to  anticipate,  and  to  prepare  for,  the 
irregular  and  lawless  changes. 

The  evils  which  are  undoubtedly  in  the  world  give  ample 
scope  for  the  exertion  of  our  powers  in  mitigating  them,  and 
for  relieving  the  unfortunate,  and  for  laboring  for  the  intel- 
lectual and  moral  elevation  of  the  human  race.  Though  we 
may  not  be  able  to  solve  the  problem  of  evil,  yet  we  can,  as 
Darwin  has  nobly  said,  "do  our  duty."  To  mitigate  evil,  to 
do  our  duty,  is  the  best  means  of  moral  development. 

2.  Spencer  (1820-1903).  Herbert  Spencer  was  born  at 
Derby.  He  was  encouraged  by  his  father  to  think  for  him- 
self, and  this  he  was  not  slow  to  do.  At  an  early  age,  he 
showed  a  taste  for  history  and  for  natural  science  and  mathe- 
matics. He  worked  several  years  as  a  civil  engineer;  but  his 
calling  was  to  authorship  in  the  line  of  philosophy. 

In  accepting  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge, 
he  followed  Hamilton  and  Mansel,  but  carried  the  doctrine 
boldly  forward  to  its  consequences.  He  was,  however,  more 
in  agreement  with  Mill,  Lewes,  Darwin  and  Huxley,  than 
with  the  Scotch  philosophy. 

His  study  of  Lyell's  Geology  led  him  to  accept  the  theory 
of  natural  development,  and  to  extend  it  as  universal  evolu- 
tion; to  the  exposition  of  this  he  devoted  his  life. 

Spencer's  Philosophy  of  Evolution,  which  he  called  Synthetic 
Philosophy,  is  found  in  his  collected  works  of  which  the  fol- 
lowing are  the  titles:  First  Principles,  Principles  of 


406  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Principles  of  Psychology,  Principles  of  Sociology,  Principles  of 
Ethics,  Essays,  Social  Statics,  Study  of  Sociology,  Education, 
Facts  and  Comments,  Various  Fragments,  Inadequacy  of 
Natural  Selection,  Descriptive  Sociology,  and  Autobiography. 

Spencer's  originality  consists  in  his  extension  of  the  theory 
of  evolution  to  all  specialized  investigations,  rather  than  in 
his  elaboration  of  a  new  theory  of  knowledge.  He  has  not, 
however,  reconciled  conflicting  views,  by  extending  the  doc- 
trines of  empiricism  and  positivism,  to  all  objects  of  knowl- 
edge, through  the  fact  of  evolution.  Empirical  knowledge 
does  not  embrace  all  that  may  be  known.  We  have  rational 
knowledge,  as  well  as  empirical. 

The  relativity  of  knowledge  may  mean  that  the  objects  of 
knowledge  are  related  to  our  faculties  of  knowing,  in  which 
case,  it  is  self-evident,  or  it  may  mean  that  our  knowledge  is 
of  the  relative  as  distinguished  from  the  absolute.  What  do 
we  mean  by  the  absolute?  If  we  mean  the  unrelated,that 
is,  that  which  is  not  related  to  anything,  even  to  our  thought, 
it  is,  of  course,  unknown  and  unknowable;  but  if  we  simply 
mean,  by  the  absolute,  the  not-dependent,  it  may  possibly  be 
an  object  of  knowledge. 

Spencer's  teaching  in  regard  to  the  absolute,  which  he 
calls  the  ultimate  reality,  is  certainly  contradictory.  For 
he  says:  "The  ultimate  reality  is  of  all  things  the  most  cer- 
tain." He  also  says:  "The  ultimate  reality  is  unknown  and 
unknowable  '  These  two  statements,  irreconcilable  as  they 
appear,  may  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  knowledge  is 
of  two  kinds :  rational,  and  empirical  or  positive. 

That  the  ultimate  reality  is  of  all  things  the  most  certain 
is  rational  knowledge;  it  is  known  by  reason;  for  if  there  were 
no  ultimate  reality,  there  never  would  have  been  anything. 
But  the  ultimate  reality  is  unknown  by  sensation  and  per- 
ception; that  is,  it  is  unknown  empirically,  or  as  positive 
knowledge.  How  easily  might  Spencer  have  reconciled  the 
conflicts  in  philosophy,  between  the  empirical  and  rational 
schools,  had  he  admitted  the  authority  of  rational  intuition 
in  consistency  with  his  own  teaching  that  what  is  intuitive  to 
the  individual  was  empirical  to  the  race,  the  faculty  of  rational 
intuition  being  gradually  evolved  by  the  long  experience  of 
mankind;  yet  it  could  not  have  been  evolved  had  there  been 
no  faculty  to  be  developed;  but  however,  formed,  the  individ- 
ual has  now  the  faculty  of  rational  intuition. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  EVOLUTION  407 

If  the  absolute,  as  the  first  cause,  the  ultimate  reality,  is 
of  all  things  the  most  certain,  as  Spencer  declares,  it  certainly 
is  not  unknown  and  unknowable.  Spencer  probably  meant 
that  it  is  unknown  and  unknowable,  as  to  its  essence  and  the 
mode  of  its  existence,  and  not  as  to  the  reality  of  its  being. 
We  know  that  the  first  cause  is;  we  know  that  it  is  eternal; 
we  know  that  it  is  the  ultimate  power  in  the  universe;  our 
knowledge  of  it  is  positive,  not  negative;  and  Spencer  him- 
self calls  it  "an  object  of  religious  sentiment."  Well  did 
John  Stuart  Mill  say :  "Spencer  has  a  prodigious  amount  of 
knowledge  of  the  unknown  and  unknowable. " 

Spencer  attempted  to  find  a  philosophic  basis  for  the 
reconciliation  of  science  and  religion.  Assuming  that  there 
is  truth  in  each  case,  there  must  be  fundamental  agreement. 
The  basis  for  reconciliation,  he  declares,  is  the  tacit  convic- 
tion that  the  ultimate  truth  for  both  is  an  insoluble  mystery, 
utterly  inconceivable,  and  therefore  unknowable.  Incon- 
ceivable it  is  to  the  imagination,  but  not  unknowable  to  the 
reason.  Spencer's  doctrine  amounts  to  this:  The  power 
which  the  universe  manifests,  and  which  we,  therefore,  know 
to  exist,  is  wholly  inconceivable,  and  therefore  unknown  and 
unknowable.  The  apparent  contradiction,  that  the  ultimate 
reality  is  both  known  and  unknown,  may  possibly  be  recon- 
ciled by  a  restatement:  The  power,  or  ultimate  reality,  is 
known  by  reason  to  exist  as  a  reality,  but  is  wholly  unknown 
empirically  as  to  its  essence. 

The  essential  realities  corresponding  to  religious  and 
scientific  ideas  are  expressed  by  the  words — God,  creation, 
soul,  matter,  time,  space,  force.  If  the  realities  expressed 
by  these  terms  are  wholly  unknown,  then  we  cannot  distin- 
guish between  them;  but  we  do  distinguish.  These  terms, 
therefore,  have  not  the  same  meaning.  Space  is  not  time, 
and  neither  space  nor  time  is  force.  We  know  by  experience, 
as  when  we  lift  a  weight,  what  force  is,  though  we  may  not 
know  the  essence  of  the  substance  which  exerts  force. 

Spencer's  criterion  of  knowledge  is  conceivability ;  that  is, 
what  is  inconceivable  is  unknowable,  thus  making  the  imag- 
ination, which  is  the  picture  forming  faculty,  the  test  of 
knowledge;  but  it  is  not  the  business  of  the  imagination  to 
test  truth,  but  to  make  mental  pictures,  and  as  a  poetic 
power,  to  give  us  aesthetic  satisfaction. 


408  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Let  us  apply  Spencer's  test  of  conceivability  to  the  idea 
of  space:  We  cannot  conceive  space  as  necessarily  finite;  for 
we  can  imagine  space  beyond  any  supposed  limit.  We  can- 
not conceive  space  as  infinite;  for  to  imagine  an  infinite 
picture  is  impossible;  therefore  space,  whether  finite  or 
infinite,  is  inconceivable,  and  therefore,  according  to  Spen- 
cer's doctrine,  unknowable.  So  much  for  making  the  imag- 
ination the  test  of  knowledge. 

Now,  let  us  apply  to  our  idea  of  space  the  test  of  reason. 
We  have  clear  ideas  of  body  and  motion;  but  neither  body 
nor  motion  is  possible  without  space,  the  room  for  body  and 
motion.  We  then  have  the  idea  of  space  as  that  which  con- 
tains body,  a  part  of  which  the  body  occupies,  and  through 
which  it  moves.  Space,  then,  is  a  reality,  though  not  a 
substance;  it  is  extension  in  three  dimensions,  whether  empty 
or  filled ;  yet  the  filling  is  not  the  space,  but  the  filled  is  a  part 
of  space. 

We  know  by  the  law  of  contradictories,  that  space  is  either 
finite  or  infinite.  Let  us  see  what  reason  declares  with 
respect  to  its  finitude  or  infinitude.  If  we  suppose  space 
finite  or  limited,  the  limit,  if  infinitesimal  in  thickness,  would 
inclose  a  finite  portion  of  space,  leaving  an  unlimited  portion 
without;  if  the  boundary  has  finite  thickness,  it  occupies  space, 
still  leaving  unlimited  space  without;  if  the  enclosing  bound- 
ary has  unlimited  thickness  it  occupies  unlimited  space; 
hence  in  any  case,  the  whole  of  space  cannot  be  limited  or 
finite,  and  is,  therefore,  infinite,  and  this  is  known  to  be  true 
though  not  picturable  by  the  imagination.  Reason  therefore 
apprehends  space  to  be  infinite.  We  know  first,  by  the  law  of 
contradictories,  that  space  is  either  finite  or  infinite;  we 
know  next  that  it  is  not  finite;  therefore,  we  know  that  it  is 
infinite.  Conceivability  is  not,  therefore,  the  test  of  truth ; 
for  we  cannot,  by  the  imagination,  conceive  space  to  be 
finite,  neither  can  we  conceive  it  to  be  infinite;  but  it  must  be 
either  finite  or  infinite. 

We  repeat:  If  by  the  absolute,  we  mean  the  unrelated  to 
anything  else,  even  to  thought,  it  is,  of  course,  not  known  to 
exist,  and  the  assumption  of  its  existence  is  utterly  groundless; 
but  if,  by  the  absolute,  we  mean  the  non-dependent,  it  is  not 
necessarily  unrelated  to  thought,  and  may  be  rationally 
known.  The  dependent  must  be  dependent  on  something, 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  EVOLUTION  409 

otherwise  it  is  not  the  dependent;  but  that  on  which  the 
dependent  depends  is  either  independent  or  dependent;  if  in- 
dependent, we  have  found  the  absolute;  if  dependent,  we  go 
back  further,  either  in  an  infinite  series,  which  has  no  ultimate 
support,  or  as  a  whole,  is  dependent  and  dependent  on  noth- 
ing, which  is  impossible,  or  back,  till  we  reach  an  independent 
basis,  and  hence  the  absolute.  To  know  the  dependent,  or 
the  conditioned,  is,  therefore,  to  know  the  existence  of  the 
independent  or  the  non-conditioned,  that  is,  the  absolute. 
It  is,  however,  to  be  remembered  that  we  may  know  the 
conditioned  empirically,  while  we  must  know  the  uncon- 
ditioned rationally;  we  may  know  the  relative,  as  an  event, 
empirically,  and  if  its  immediate  cause  is  relative,  we  may 
know  that  empirically ;  but  the  ultimate  cause,  we  must  know 
rationally.  Sound  epistemology  requires  both  empirical  and 
rational  knowledge. 

Spencer  gives  the  rationale  of  explanation  thus :  To  explain 
a  given  fact  is  to  reduce  it  to  a  more  general  fact,  and  that  to 
a  still  more  general  fact,  and  so  on,  till  we  reach  an  ultimate 
fact,  which  cannot  be  further  reduced,  and  is,  therefore,  inex- 
plicable, and  hence  unknowable.  We  must,  therefore,  con- 
clude that  all  so-called  knowledge  rests  on  the  unknowable; 
hence  no  knowledge  is  possible,  if  the  ultimate  is  unknowable. 

Spencer,  however,  would  say  we  know  the  relation  of  the 
fact  to  the  more  general  fact,  which  proves  that  all  knowledge 
is  relative;  but  the  more  general  fact  depends  on  a  fact  still 
more  general,  and  so  on  till  we  reach  the  ultimate  fact,  which, 
as  inexplicable,  is  unknowable,  and  then  nothing  is  truly 
known.  Thus  we  are  led  to  the  nescience  of  Hamilton  and 
Mansel,  who,  for  the  lack  of  knowledge,  fell  back  on  faith; 
but  faith  though  going  further  than  knowledge,  requires  a 
basis  of  knowledge.  We  cannot  have  faith  in  an  object,  about 
which  we  know  nothing.  Absolute  ignorance  affords  no 
basis  for  faith. 

The  demonstration  of  a  necessary  truth,  as  in  Geometry, 
requires,  for  its  ultimate  basis,  a  self-evident  necessary  truth. 
As  the  basis  is  ultimate,  it  is  not  proved,  and  must,  therefore, 
be  self-evident,  or  not  known  at  all,  but  if  not  known  at  all, 
the  entire  demonstration  fails;  the  ultimate  basis  must, 
therefore,  be  self-evident.  The  ultimate  basis  must  be  a 
necessary  truth,  and  not  a  contingent  fact;  for  if  contingent, 


410  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

it  might  possibly  not  be  at  all,  and  again  the  demonstration 
would  fail;  the  basis  must,  therefore,  be  a  necessary  truth, 
if  the  demonstration  be  possible;  and  the  ultimate  basis  must 
be,  at  once,  apprehended  as  self-evident  by  the  insight  of 
rational  intuition. 

Let  us  try,  in  another  way,  to  reach  the  ultimate  of  thought, 
though  declared  by  Spencer  to  be  inexplicable  and  unknow- 
able. We  may  begin  with  any  object,  either  mineral,  vege- 
table or  animal,  say,  for  example,  the  class  quadruped.  What 
is  implied  in  thinking  quadruped  as  existing?  We  answer 
the  thinking  subject  and  the  class  quadruped,  at  least  as  an 
object  of  thought.  We  call  the  subject  /,  or  the  ego.  The 
object  thought  of  is  a  class  or  collection  of  individual  objects, 
and  may  be  defined  thus :  Quadrupeds  are  vertebrates  having 
four  feet.  We  now  have  the  wider  class  vertebrates,  which 
includes  quadrupeds  and  all  other  animals  having  a  skeleton. 
Quadrupeds  are  not  dropped,  but  only  their  determination, 
their  characteristic  attribute;  their  existence  is  retained 
without  specification,  along  with  the  existence  of  all  other 
vertebrates.  The  extent  has  been  increased,  while  the  con- 
tent has  been  diminished.  The  ego,  conscious  of  its  thinking, 
remains.  Suppose  we  say  vertebrates  are  animals;  we  in- 
crease the  extent,  diminish  the  content,  and  retain  the  exis- 
tence of  the  class,  making  it  wider,  and  the  existence  of  the 
ego.  Let  us  now  say  animals  are  organized  beings;  we  in- 
crease the  extent,  by  taking  in  vegetables,  without  dropping 
animals,  and  decrease  the  content,  retaining  still  both  the 
object  and  the  ego.  Let  us  say  organized  beings  are  beings; 
retaining  the  ego,  we  have  dropped  from  the  content  every 
attribute  but  existence,  and  have  taken  in  every  object  in 
the  universe.  Does  being  equal  nothing,  as  Hegel  asserts? 
No;  it  has  for  its  content  one  attribute,  existence,  and  for  its 
extent  every  object  of  the  universe  including  the  ego,  who 
thinks  being.  Being  equals  everything  existing. 

Is  being  unknown?  No;  although  it  is  inexplicable,  in  the 
sense  that  it  can  not  be  referred  to  a  wider  class,  it  is  known 
immediately  in  itself  and  along  with  the  ego  which  knows 
its  existence.  Were  it  possible  to  drop  existence,  everything 
would  vanish,  including  the  ego,  leaving  nothing  to  know 
and  nothing  to  be  known — a  perfect  blank.  We  could  not 
even  assert  the  blank;  for  to  assert  would  call  back  the 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  EVOLUTION  411 

even  supposing  it  annihilated;  but  it  is  not  annihilated;  for 
to  deny  existence  is  to  assume  the  ego  that  denies.  To  deny 
reality  is,  therefore,  contradictory,  since  it  assumes  reality. 

Even  if  we  could  deny  objective  ex  stence,  we  could  not 
deny,  without  self-stultification,  the  ego,  or  subjective  exist- 
ence. If  we  could  drop  being,  we  would  annihilate  ourselves, 
and  could  neither  affirm  nor  deny  anything.  To  deny  exist- 
ence, is  to  assume  existence,  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  since 
thinking,  even  in  the  form  denying,  implies  self.  Thinking 
existence  away,  is  thinking  self  away,  which  is  impossible. 
Existence,  therefore,  cannot  be  thought  away.  But  can  not 
all  objective  existence  be  thought  away,  leaving  subjective 
existence?  That  would  require  the  ego  to  be  self -existent, 
self-dependent,  or  absolute;  but  the  finite  ego  knows  itself  as 
consciously  dependent;  it  is,  therefore,  not  the  absolute. 
The  dependent,  however,  must  depend  on  something  else,  and 
that,  if  dependent,  must  depend  on  something  else,  and  so  on, 
either  till  we  reach  the  independent,  or  on,  in  an  infinite 
series  of  dependent  things,  but  dependent  without  an  inde- 
pendent support,  which  is  impossible,  and  if  so,  we  must 
finally  reach  the  independent,  the  absolute,  not  absolute  hi 
the  sense  of  the  unrelated,  but  absolute  in  the  sense  of  not- 
dependent.  The  absolute  is,  therefore,  not  unknown  and 
unknowable;  for  knowledge  of  the  dependent  implies  the 
knowledge  of  the  independent  or  the  absolute.  The-knowl- 
edge  of  the  absolute  opens  the  way  for  valid  knowledge  of 
other  reality,  subjective  or  objective,  and  we  are  not  driven 
to  the  monstrous  absurdity  that  all  knowledge  depends  on 
the  unknown,  and  hence  is  not  knowledge  at  all.  Though 
the  essence  of  the  ultimate  reality  is  unknown,  and  perhaps 
unknowable,  its  existence  is  certainly  known,  and  this  is 
probably  what  Spencer  meant,  when  he  declared  it  to  be  of 
all  things  most  certain,  though  inconsistently  calling  it  un- 
known and  unknowable.  There  is  therefore  a  known  positive 
basis  both  for  science  and  religion,  which  are  reconciled  by 
the  known  ultimate,  not  the  unknown. 

Spencer  defines  life  thus:  "Life  is  a  continual  adjustment 
of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations. "  A  more  complete 
definition  is  the  following: 

Life  is  the  active  cause  which  adjusts  the  inner  relations 
to  the  outer,  and  the  outer  to  the  inner,  and  each  relation, 
whether  outer  or  inner,  to  any  or  to  all  the  others. 


412  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Spencer's  definition  of  evolution  runs  thus:  "Evolution  is 
an  integration  of  matter  and  concomitant  dissipation  of 
motion;  during  which  the  matter  passes  from  an  indefinite, 
incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  definite  coherent  heterogeneity; 
and  during  which  the  retained  motion  undergoes  a  parallel 
transformation. " 

What  are  matter,  motion,  and  force?  Spencer  says:  "The 
interpretation  of  all  phenomena  in  terms  of  matter,  motion 
and  force  is  nothing  more  than  the  reduction  of  our  complex 
symbols  of  thought  to  the  simplest  symbols;  and  when  the 
equation  has  been  brought  to  its  lowest  terms,  the  symbols 
remain  symbols  still."  Again,  Spencer  says  of  Spirit  and 
matter,  in  the  last  sentence  of  his  First  Principles:  "the  one 
is  no  less  than  the  other  to  be  regarded  as  a  sign  of  the  Un- 
known Reality,  which  underlies  both."  This  reminds  us  of 
Spinoza's  One  Substance  of  which  mind  and  matter  are  attri- 
butes. If  "matter,  motion,  and  force  are  but  symbols  of 
the  Unknown  Reality, "  does  not  this  reality  reveal  itself 
to  us  through  these  symbols,  and,  to  some  extent  at  least, 
become  known?  From  the  order  of  the  universe,  it  may  be 
inferred  that  the  ultimate  reality  is  intelligent  power  mani- 
fested in  matter,  mind,  force,  and  motion. 

Again,  Spencer  says:  "A  power  of  which  the  nature  re- 
mains forever  inconceivable,  and  to  which  no  limits  in  Time 
or  Space  can  be  imagined,  works  in  us  certain  effects.  These 
effects  have  likeness  of  kind,  the  most  general  of  which  we 
class  together  under  the  names  of  matter,  motion  and  force. " 
This  reduction  of  matter,  motion,  and  force  to  subjective 
effects  wrought  in  us,  looks  like  what  Spencer  calls  "the 
insanity  of  idealism. "  If  effects  wrought  in  us  can  be 
logically  referred  to  any  cause,  that  cause,  so  far  forth,  is  not 
wholly  unknown,  though  Spencer  may  see  fit  to  call  it  un- 
known, and  yet  it  may  not  be  wholly  known.  We  may 
know  that  it  is,  though  we  do  not  know  how  it  can  be. 

Spencer's  attitude  towards  religion  he  thus  expressed: 
"However  untenable  may  be  any  or  all  of  the  existing  relij 
ious  creeds,  however  gross  the  absurdities  associated  wi1 
them,  however  irrational  the  arguments  set  forth  in  then 
defense,  we  must  not  ignore  the  verity  which,  in  all  likeli- 
hood, lies  hidden  within  them.  The  general  probabilil 
that  widely  spread  beliefs  are  not  absolutely  baseless  is,  ii 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  EVOLUTION  413 

this  case,  enforced  by  a  further  probability  due  to  the  omni- 
presence of  the  beliefs.  .  .  We  may  be  sure,  therefore*, 
religions,  though  even  none  of  them  be  actually  true,  are  yet 
all  adumbrations  of  the  truth. " 

The  greatest  service  Spencer  has  rendered  mankind  is  in 
the  line  of  Sociology  and  Ethics.  He  was  a  great  generalize^ 
and  possessed  the  power  of  clear  statement,  so  that  his  books 
are  readable,  as  well  as  instructive.  The  drift  of  his  mind  is 
seen  in  his  attempt  to  bring  all  science  under  the  law  of 
evolution. 

Spencer  held  that  the  power  of  rational  intuition  has  been 
developed  in  man  by  evolution  through  the  long  ages  of 
human  experience.  The  acts  of  intuition  have,  no  doubt, 
by  reflex  action,  modified  the  nervous  system,  and  built  up  an 
organic  basis  in  the  brain  for  further  and  clearer  apprehen- 
sion, so  that  fundamental  truth,  as  the  necessity  of  an  ulti- 
mate reality,  is  now  intuitive  to  the  individual,  though  the 
ability  to  apprehend  it  has  been  gradually  acquired  by  the 
experience  of  the  race.  The  individual  has,  therefore,  now 
the  power  of  rational  intuition,  so  that  he  can  apprehend,  as 
axiomatic,  the  principles:  Space  is  infinite;  time  is  infinite; 
every  event  must  have  a  cause;  there  must  be  an  ultimate 
reality. 

NOTE:  Philosophy  has  many  votaries  in  America,  where 
it  has  been  assiduously  cultivated  by  a  good  number  of 
original  thinkers;  but,  at  least  for  the  present,  it  is  thought 
best  to  defer  entering  into  this  field,  however  inviting  it  may 
appear. 


INDEX 


Abelard,  124 

Absolute,  269,  407 

Academic  School,  82 

Aenesidemus,  83,  96 

Aeons,.  105 

Aetiology,  84,  93 

Agnosticism,  106 

Agnostic,  84 

Agrippa,  84 

Albertus  Magnus,  130 

Alexander,  the  Great,  63 

Alfarabi,  127 

Algazel,  128 

Alison,  298 

Alkendi,  127 

Ambrose,  113 

Ammonius,  99 

Ampere,  370 

Amyntas,  63 

Anaxagoras,  25 

Anaxarchus,  30 

Anaximander,  10 

Anaximines,  11 

Andronicus,  64 

Anselm,  122 

Antinomies  of  Pure  Reason,  242 

Antiochus,  97 

Antisthenes,  50 

Apellicon,  64 

Apologists,  109 

Arabic  Philosophy,  127 

Arcesilaus,  82,  94 

Arete,  50 

Aristippus,  49 


Aristophanes,  42 
Aristocles,  53 
Ariston,  53 
Aristotle,  63 
Arius,  111 
Arnauld,  169 
Association,  321 
Athanasius,  112 
Atheism,  261 
Atomists,  27 
Augustine,  113 
Averroes,  128 
Avicenna,  127 

Bacon,  Fr.,  144 
Bacon,  R.,  127 
Bain,  348 
Basilides,  105 
Bayle,  184 
Bentham,  323 
Berkeley,  208,  254 
Bernard,  139 
Boehme,  141 
Boethius,  74 
Bonaventura,  139 
Brown,  300 
Bruno,  142 
Biichner,  384 
Butler,  331 

Cabanis,  368 
Campanella,  143 
Cardanus,  142 
Carneades,  95 


415 


416 


INDEX 


Categories  of  the  Understanding,  239 

Cato,  95 

Cause,  16,  26,  219,  239 

Celsus,  111 

Christianity,  104,  107 

Chrysippus,  76 

Cicero,  98 

Clarke,  203 

Cleanthes,  75 

Clement,  105,  110 

Common  Sense,  294 

Compte,  375 

Conceptualism,  120,  125 

Condillac,  358 

Condorcet,  368 

Consciousness,  302 

Cooke,  145 

Cousin,  372 

Crantor,  94 

Crates,  73,  75 

Cudworth,  188 

Cumberland,  190 

Cynic  School,  50 

Cyrenaic  School,  49 

Czolbe,  385 

D'Alembert,  368 

Darwin,  402 

Deduction,  67 

Definition  of  Philosophy,  5,  10,  26 

Democritus,  28 

Descartes,  158,  176,  253 

Diderot,  361 

Diodorus,  48 

Diogenes  of  Apollonia,  11 

Diogenes,  the  Cynic,  51 

Diogenes,  Laertius,  84 

Dionysius  of  Syracuse,  53 

Dionysius,  the  Areopagite,  118 

Dogmatists,  86 

Dii  bring,  394 

Duns  Scotus,  132 


Eckhart,  140 
Eclecticism,  97 
Ego,  199 

Eleatic  Philosophy,  13 
Empedocles,  23 
Empiricism,  321 
Epictetus,  74 
Epicurus,  71 
Epistemology,  409 
Erigena,  118,  138 
Eubulides,  48 
Euclid  of  Megara,  47 
Euclid  of  Alexandria,  47 
Eusebius,  112 
Evolution,  402 
Existence  of  God,  243 

Fatalism,  261 
Fechner,  391 
Ferrier,  310 
Fichte,  250,  255 
Freedom  of  the  Will,  155 
Fox,  141 

Gassendi,  169 

Genus  and  Species,  124 

Germain,  273 

Geulincx,  166,  176,  253 

Gilbert,  124 

Glanvill,  167 

Gnostics,  104 

God,  Proofs  of  Existence,  243 

Gorgias,  38 

Grote,  32 

Guy  on,  141 

Haeckel,  385 
Hamilton,  304,  409 
Hartley,  321 
Hartmann,  287 
Hegel,  267 
Helvetius,  360 
Heraclitus,  18,  57 


INDEX 


417 


Herbart,  280 

Hilarius,  113 

Hippias,  41 

Hobbes,  151 

Holbach,  363 

Horace,  317 

Hugo  of  St.  Victor,  125,  139 

Hume,  93,  215,  254 

Idealism,  59,  240 
Induction,  67.  345 
Innate  Ideas,  60,  194,  313 
Irenaeus,  105,  110 
Isocrates,  40 

Jacobi,  260 
Jamblichus,  102 
Jerome,  113 
John,  the  Apostle,  110 
John  of  Salisbury,  125 
Jouffroy,  373 
Justin  Martyr,  109 
Justinian,  104 

Kant,  227,  254 

LaMettrie,  357 
Lange,  393 
Law,  141,  279,  309 
Leibniz,  180,  254 
Lessing,  261 
Leucippus,  27 
Locke,  192, -atZ,  254 
Logic,  307 
Logos,  99,  109 
Lotze,  386 
Lucretius,  30,  73 

Macaulay,  149 
Malebranche,  166,  176,  253 
Malthus,  402 


Maimonides,  172 
Maine  de  Biran,  368 
Maistre,  366 
Mansel,  409 
Marcion,  105 
Marcus  Aurelius,  74 
Meyer,  383 
McCosh,  318 
Megaric  Philosophy,  47 
Menander,  105 
Metrodorus,  30 
Mill,  James,  324 
Mill,  J.  S.,  339 
Mnesarchus,  20 
Moleschott,  384 
Monads,  181 
More,  141,  189 
Musonius  Rufus,  74 
Mysticism,  136 

Neleus,  64 
Neo-Platonism,  98 
Nichomachus,  63 
Nicene  Creed,  112 
Nicole,  169 
Nominalism,  120 

Optimism,  185 
Origen,  105,  110 

Paley,  323 
Panaetius,  74 
Pantheism,  136 
Parmenides,  14,  57 
Pascal,  168 

Patristic  Philosophy,  107 
Paulsen,  397 
Pelagius,  113 
Perception,  77 
Peripatetic  School,  70 
Personal  Identity,  218 


418 


INDEX 


Philip  of  Macedon,  63 

Philo,  106 

Philolaus,  20 

Plato,  53,  56,  57 

Plotinus,  100 

Polemo,  73 

Polus,  41 

Polycarp,  110 

Polytheism,  102 

Porphyry,  101 

Port  Royal  Logic,  169 

Posidonius,  74 

Positivism,  367,  377 

Pre-established  Harmony,  182 

Principle  of  Contradiction,  183,  196 

Principle  of  Identity,  187,  265. 

Principle  of  Sufficient  Reason,  183, 

187 

Proems,  103 
Prodicus,  37 
Protagoras,  33 
Pyrrho,  82 
Pythagoras,  20,  58 

Quadrivium,  117 

Realism,  59,  120,  124 
Reid,  293 

Relativity  of  Knowledge,  406 
Richard  of  St.  Victor,  139 
Roscellinus,  120 
Rousseau,  365 
Ruysbroeck,  141 

Saint-Simon,  374 
Scepticism,  82 
Schelling,  264 
Scholasticism,  117,  127 
Schopenhauer,  284 
Scotism,  v.  Duns  Scotus,  132 
Scottish  School,  293 


Scotus  Erigena,  118,  138 

Self,  199 

Seneca,  81 

Sensational  Philosophy,  37 

Sextus  Empiricus,  84 

Socrates,  42,  62 

Socratic  Schools,  47 

Sophists,  32 

Space,  233,  310 

Spencer,  405 

Spinoza,  172,  254 

Stewart,  297 

St.  Martin,  141 

Stilpo,  73 

Stirner,  498 

Stoics,  74 

Substance,  199 

Syllogism,  66,  342 

Telesius,  142 
Tertullian,  110 
Thalis,  9 

Theodicy,  81,  183 
Theology,  104,  107,  117 
Theophrastus,  64 
Thomas  Aquinas,  131 
Thomas  a'  Kempis,  141 
Thrasymachus,  41 
Time,  235 
Timon,  83 
Toland,  117 
Trivium,  117 
Tropis,  84 
Tyrannion,  64 

Unconscious,  287 
Universals,  120,  130 
Utilitarianism,  341 

Valentinus,  105 
Victorines,  139 


INDEX  419 


Voet,  161  Wundt.  396 
Vogt,  383 

Voltaire,  351  Xenocrates,  73 

Xenophanes,  13 

Whewell,  67  Xenophon,  42 
Will,  Freedom  of,  155 

William  of  Champeaux,  122  Zeller,  57 

William  of  Occam,  134  Zeno  of  Elea,  16 

Wolff,  187  Zeno,  the  Stoic,  73 


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